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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE # 71 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 21st day of October, 2003, are as follows: BY TRAYLOR, J.: 2002-K -3021 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHANCE CEASER (Parish of St. Landry) (Battery of a Police Officer - Two Counts) Accordingly, we reinstate the jury's verdict against defendant, as well as the sentence imposed by the trial court. KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 02-K-3021 STATE OF LOUISIANA versus CHANCE CEASER ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. LANDRY

TRAYLOR, J. Defendan t , Ch an ce Ceaser,1 was charged by Bill of Information with two counts of battery of a police o fficer in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:34.2(B). The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts, but found that the second count produced no injury requiring medical attention. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years at hard labor on the first co u n t an d g av e him a concurrent sentence of six months on the second. The Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed the

convictio n an d o rd ered the acquittal of the defendant upon a finding that the police had no probable cause t o arres t the defendant for resisting an officer and, therefore, the defendant had the right to resist the unlawful arrest. 2002-374 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 828 So. 2d 680. Upon t h e s t ate's application, we granted certiorari to

review the correctnes s o f t h at decision. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the court of appeal and reinstate defendant's conviction and sentence. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 9, 2001, at ap p ro ximat ely 2:30 p.m., the Eunice City Police received a telephone call from the home of Ms. Millie Ceaser, rep o rting a domestic disturbance involving the homeowner's adult son, Chance. Officer Kevin Noel and Sergeant Baxton Troy Stagg of the Eunice Cit y Po lice responded to the report and heard defendant arguing with his mother an d b ro ther, Shaun, as they approached. Upon arriving at M s . Ceaser's home, Officer Noel and Sgt. Stagg observed defendant arguing with his mother and brother in the kitchen. Ms. Ceaser insisted that the
Defendant signed his name "Chanse Ceaser" on several documents in this record. His surname is also alternatively spelled "Ceasar" in the record.
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police remove defendant from her home. The officers were familiar wit h d efendant due to a h is t ory of disturbances which had caused his mother to request his removal from her home in the past. The officers en t ered the home and asked defendant to leave peacefully so that he could cool off and avoid an escalation of events. On this occasion, h o wev er, defendant refused to leave voluntarily, loudly saying he was not "f---ing leaving." In an at t empt to defuse the situation, Sgt. Stagg took hold of defendant's arm to escort him o u t o f the home. In response, the defendant jerked his arm away from the officer. At this point, the o fficers informed defendant that he was under arrest and both officers attempted to grab hold of defendant to secure and handcuff h im. Defendant began grab b in g at various items on Sgt. Stagg's duty belt: pepper spray, handcuffs, radio, and gun. As the struggle progressed, d efendant scratched Sgt. Stagg's face with his fingernails, bit him, and grabbed and tore Sgt. Stagg's flashlight from his duty belt and struck Sgt. Stagg on his head, behind the left ear. Sergeant St agg withdrew and expanded his collapsible baton and struck defendant s ev eral times. Sgt. Stagg later testified that the blows, which are inten ded to temporarily paralyze the thigh muscle of assailants, "didn't have any effect u p o n h im."

Meanwhile, Officer Noel attempted to restrain d efen d an t in what he termed "a violent struggle," only to receive a blow to his own head with the flashlight defendant wielded. Officer Noel sustained a two-inch laceration to the top of his head which req u ired five or six stitches. Defendant retreated to his bedroom and was

apprehended outside the home. Thereafter, defen d an t was charged with two counts of battery of a police officer in violation of La. Rev. Stat. 14:34.2(B). At trial, Sgt. Stagg testified regarding the proced ure the police follow when they receive a complaint of a disturbance at a residence. He stated that t wo o fficers will respond to the call to "find out what's going on, just investigate to the best of our ability with the attitudes of the people when we get there. Normally, separate them to try to defuse the situation. It depends on how bad the arguing is or if any batteries may have been committed." Regarding t h e instant call, Sgt. Stagg testified that the

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defendant was placed under arrest when he refused to be escorted out of t h e h o u se. Sgt. Stagg stated t h at after defendant refused to leave the home voluntarily, they attempted to escort him out "by the arm" which is a common procedure. Officer Noel t es t ified that after Ms. Ceaser asked that defendant be removed from her house, the officers "wen t to escort him out by his arms and he started struggling" and hit Sgt. Stagg on the left side of his head with a flashlight. Defendant then struck Officer Noel over his head with the flashlight, causing the laceration. Officer Noel stated that the defendant was placed under arrest for resisting the officers and "very violently" refus in g to leave the home. Officer Noel testified that the defendant had not struck anyone before he was arrested. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, but d et ermined that only the battery of Officer Noel required medical attention and merited an in creased sentence. The trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to two y ears at hard labor on the first count and gave h im a co n current sentence of six months on the second.

The Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, rev ers ed t he conviction and acquitted the defendant upon a finding that the police had no probable cause to arrest the defendant for resisting an officer and, therefore, the defendant had t h e right to resist the unlawful arrest. 02-374 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 828 So. 2d 680. DISCUSSION In order for the State to obtain a conviction for battery of a police o fficer, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Battery o f a police officer has three elements: the intentional use of force upon a police o fficer, without the consent of the officer, when the offender knows or should reas o n ably know that the victim is a police officer acting within the performance of his duty. LSA-R.S. 14:34.2. The sufficiency of evidence of the crime is viewed the evidence in the lig h t most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King , 436 So. 2d 559 (La.1983). The t es t imony adduced at trial indicates that the uniformed officers responded to a call to remove defendant from the home and that they instructed t h e d efen d ant

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to leave the home in accordance with him mother's wishes.

The officers had

previously removed the defendant from the home for similar disturbances. The jury also heard testimony that defendant was instru ct ed t h at he was under arrest. Given the circumstances of this case, we find that the jury could have pro p erly found, after viewing the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that defendant intentionally used force upon the p o lice officers, without the consent of the officers, when the he knew or should reasonably have known that the victim is a p olice officer acting within the performance of his duty. Once t h e elements of La. Rev. Stat. 14:34.2 are satisfied, a defendant can defeat his conviction only by showing that the battery was justified and in defense of an unlawful arrest. Thus, the issue is whether the police had lawful grounds, or probable cause, to arrest the defendant. An individual in Louis ian a h as a timehonored right to resist an illegal arrest. City of Monroe v. Goldston , 95-0315 (La. 9/ 29/ 96), 661 So. 2d 428; White v. Morris, 345 So. 2d 461, 465 (La. 1977). However, that right is only available where the arrest is illegal and is tempered by the requirement that in preventing such illegal restraint of his libert y , h e may use only "such force as may be necessary." City of Monroe v. Ducas, 14 So. 2d 781, 784 (1943). Here, the appellate court incorrectly reasoned that the police h ad n o valid grounds to arres t d efen d ant, which resulted in the further erroneous conclusion that defendant was justified in resisting an unlawful arrest. Nevertheless, the court of appeal considered if "probable cause for arresting him might have been supportable on some other ground." The court of appeal then examined La. Code Crim. Proc. art 213 and concluded that the officers had "n o reas on to believe that the defendant h ad co mmit ted an offense, nor did he commit an offense in their presence after th ey arrived at the house." The Third Circuit purportedly canvassed the Criminal Code to determine whether the police had probable cause to arres t d efen d ant for any offense,2 but
While we do not find error in the court of appeal's summary rejection of the applicability of La. Rev. Stat. 14:103, relative to disturbing the peace, to the instant intra-family argument, we do not necessarily agree with remainder of the court's determinations but pretermit discussion of the applicability of the Protection from Family Violence Act, La. Rev. Stat.
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neglected to properly consider a valid rehearing argument made by the stat e in it s rehearing application: that the police had probable cause for the arrest under La. Rev. Stat. 14:63.3(A),3 which provides the owner of any immo v able property with the authority to order anyone from the premises. address this applicable and determinative statute. As this court has noted on several occasions, La. Rev. Stat. 14:63.3 prohibits entering or remaining in places or on land after being forb idden to do so, either orally or in writing. S t a t e i n the interest of J.A.V., 558 So. 2d 214 (La. 1990); State v. The statute "requires a reasonably The court of appeal neglected to

Johnson , 381 So. 2d 498 (La. 1980).

contemporaneous or written request to leave as an indispensable element of the offense." Id . In the instant case, both of these elements are unquestionably satisfied. Further, the reco rd clearly establishes that both Ms. Ceaser and the police officers made con t emporaneous requests, and in fact made several such requests, for the defendant to leave t h e p remis es . When the defendant refused to do so, the officers had probable cause to arrest him on the b as is o f h is violation of La. Rev. St at . 14:63.3(A) and did so by verbally informing him that he was under arrest and attempting to secure him with handcuffs. We furth er n o t e that what the officers subjectively believed or testified that they believed when they placed the defendant under arrest is not necessarily relevant to the outcome o f t h is cas e, as the lone dissenter would have this court find. Both State and Federal Constitutions require that "seizure" of person by law enforcement o fficial be founded upon objective justification; when seizure takes the form of an arrest, the police officer must have probable cause to believe the person arrested h as committed an offense. La. Const. Art. 1,

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