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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE # 34 FROM CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 14th day of April, 2004, are as follows: BY WEIMER, J.: 2003-CC-1424 DAVY JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN v. THE ESTATE OF ELIUD TONY SANTIAGO, ET AL. (Parish of Vernon) For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and enter summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. REVERSED AND RENDERED. JOHNSON, J., concurs.

4/14/04 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 03-CC-1424 DAVY JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN versus THE ESTATE OF ELIUD TONY SANTIAGO, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF VERNON

WEIMER, Justice This matter is before the court following the denial of a motion for summary judgment in the trial court and denial of a writ of certiorari in the court of appeal. We granted certiorari in order to determine the propriety of those actions. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 03-1424 (La. 10/10/03), 855 So.2d 346. For reasons that follow, we reverse the lower court judgments and enter summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm). FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case involves determining whether the shooting death of a wife and mother was intentional or accidental. Davy Jones and his wife, Annissa, had been estranged for a period of several months. During that time she moved into the home of Eliud Santiago. Two days before the tragic shooting, Annissa and Davy reconciled and she agreed to move back to the Jones household. At some point, that decision was conveyed to Eliud

Santiago. Annissa, accompanied by her then eight year old daughter, Kaitly1, went to the Santiago home to retrieve some clothing and personal belongings. While the two were at the Santiago residence a series of events unfolded. In the end, Kaitly was the only survivor. Eliud Santiago took his own life with a single gunshot to the head. Prior to shooting himself, Santiago shot Annissa Jones as well as his two young daughters. All of the victims died of gunshot wounds to the head. Davy Jones filed suit to recover damages sustained on behalf of himself and his minor children as a result of the death of Annissa Jones, his wife and the mother of his children. The petition alleges that on or about June 20, 1999, Eliud Santiago, for unknown reasons, shot and killed Annissa Jones before shooting himself. The petition further alleges the death of Annissa Jones was caused by the negligence of Eliud Tony Santiago in (a) firing a firearm and striking Annissa Jones causing her death, (b) an intentional battery which resulted in the death of the minor children's mother, and (c) discharging a firearm in a negligent or reckless manner. Named as defendants were the Estate of Eliud Tony Santiago and State Farm Insurance Company,2 the insurer providing homeowner's insurance coverage to Eliud Santiago. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have plaintiffs' claim dismissed on the basis that the killing of Annissa Jones was not a covered occurrence under the insurance policy issued to Eliud Santiago and was specifically excluded by the intentional act exclusion. In support of its motion,

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The child's name is spelled a number of different ways (Kaitlan, Kaitlyn, Katilyn) in various documents in the record. We use the spelling which appears in the petition for damages.
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In its answer to the petition, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company acknowledged it had been incorrectly named as State Farm Insurance Company. 2

State Farm submitted a number of exhibits including selected pages of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, Davy Jones, as well as selected pages of the depositions of two officers employed by the Vernon Parish Sheriff's office who conducted an investigation at the scene of the shooting. State Farm also submitted a certified copy of the policy of insurance issued to Eliud Santiago arguing that the exclusion contained therein applies to the facts of this case.3 In a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, State Farm submitted selected passages from the deposition of Dr. Terry Welke, the Calcasieu Parish Coroner who conducted the autopsy on three of the decedents. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted the entirety of the deposition of Dr. Terry Welke and the deposition of Kaitly Jones, the daughter who accompanied Annissa to Mr. Santiago's residence on the afternoon of the shooting. The court heard argument on the motion for summary judgment on October 22, 2002. Defendant argued Annissa's death was the result of an intentional shooting by the insured and the policy exclusion applied to deny coverage for the intentional act. Plaintiff argued the shooting was accidental rather than intentional and thus coverage under the homeowner's policy was not prohibited by the exclusion for intentional acts. The court took the matter under advisement to

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company Homeowners policy # 18-B9-9302-0, with an effective date of August 29,1998, and an expiration date of August 29,1999, contained an exclusion which provided in part: 1. Coverage L [personal liability] and Coverage M [medical payments to others] do not apply to: a. bodily injury or property damage: (1) which is either expected or intended by an insured; or (2) to any person or property which is the result of willful and malicious acts of an insured; 3

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review the exhibits which had been offered in support of and in contravention to the motion. On January 31, 2003, the court signed a judgment denying the motion for summary judgment based on the deposition testimony of Kaitly Jones. The court indicated that "if this witness is found to be credible it would tend to support plaintiff's version of the pertinent events." State Farm applied for writ of certiorari to the court of appeal. The court of appeal denied the writ with the following notation: "We find no error in the trial court's ruling." State Farm then applied to this court for writ of certiorari. DISCUSSION A motion for summary judgment will be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B); Gootee Construction, Inc. v. Amwest Surety Insurance Company, 03-0144, p. 3 (La. 10/10/03), 856 So.2d 1203, 1205; Independent Fire Insurance Company v. Sunbeam Corporation, 99-2181, 99-2257, p.7 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 230231. Summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2);4 Gootee
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This court has stated: Article 966 was amended in 1996 to provide that summary judgment procedure is favored. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). Since a 1997 amendment to Article 966, Louisiana's standard for summary judgment has been closely aligned with the federal standard under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). When sufficient time has been allowed for discovery, the courts will assess the proof submitted by the parties equally, without the former presumption in favor of trial on the merits, in order to dismiss meritless litigation. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821, pp. 4-5 (La. 9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606, 609-610, quoting Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/96), 685 So.2d 691, writ denied, 97-0281 (La. 3/14/97), 690 So.2d 41.

Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 03-1533 (La. 2/20/04), ___ So.2d ___ 4

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