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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #015 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 17th day of March, 2009, are as follows:

BY TRAYLOR, J.:

2008-C -1667

PEGGIE HUNTER v. MORTON'S SEAFOOD RESTAURANT & CATERING AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY (Parish of St. Tammany) Based on the foregoing, we hold that the meaning of the word "forward" in La. R.S. 13:850, means to "send" the document. Because the trial court has made no factual finding of when Ms. Hunter "forwarded" her original document and required fees, this matter is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinions expressed herein. REMANDED. WEIMER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.

03/17/09

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2008-C-1667 PEGGIE HUNTER VERSUS MORTON'S SEAFOOD RESTAURANT & CATERING AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY

TRAYLOR, Justice We granted certiorari in this matter to consider the meaning of the term "forward" as contained in the facsimile filing statute, La. R.S. 13:850.1 For the following reasons, we find that "forward" means "to send." Consequently, we remand this matter to the trial court to allow plaintiff to present proof that she "forwarded" the original signed pleading, together with the filing and transmission fee, within five legal days from the date of the facsimile transmission of the document, as required by the statute. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Acts 1991, No. 463, Section 1; Acts 1995, No. 1119, Section 1. The provisions of the statute are set out in the body of the opinion, infra. 1

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Peggie Hunter ("Ms. Hunter") alleges that she was injured when she fell on March 10, 2006 as she was leaving Morton's Seafood Restaurant in Madisonville, Louisiana. On Thursday, March 8, 2007, Ms. Hunter filed a petition for damages by facsimile transmission against Morton's Seafood Restaurant & Catering and XYZ Insurance Company ("defendants"). Ms. Hunter's facsimile transmission was

directed to the office of the Clerk of Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany ("Clerk's Office"). On Friday, March 9, 2007, the Clerk's Office transmitted a receipt of transmission that Ms. Hunter's suit had been received on March 8, 2007. Thereafter, on Friday, March 16, 2007, the United States Postal Service delivered Ms. Hunter's original petition, together with filing and facsimile transmission fees, to the Clerk's Office. The Clerk's Office stamped Ms. Hunter's original petition for damages as "filed" with the Clerk's Office on March 16, 2007. Ms. Hunt's original petition for damages also was stamped as "fax filed" on March 8, 2007. On May 3, 2007, defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription, asserting that Ms. Hunter's cause of action had prescribed because suit was not filed until March 16, 2007, more than one year after the date of the accident. On October 12, 2007, following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants' exception of prescription and dismissed Ms. Hunter's suit with prejudice. Ms. Hunter appealed the trial court's judgment to the First Circuit Court of Appeal. On appeal, Ms. Hunter argued that the trial court erred in finding that her cause

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of action had prescribed. Ms. Hunter asserted that, pursuant to La. R.S. 13:850, she had timely forwarded the original petition to the Clerk's Office within five legal days of instituting her suit by facsimile transmission. However, defendants maintained that because the original petition was not received by the Clerk's Office until March 16, 2007, the sixth legal day following the facsimile filing, the petition was filed outside of the five-day requirement of La. R.S. 13:850. The court of appeal, in an en banc decision, reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining defendants' peremptory exception of prescription and remanded this matter to the lower court for further proceedings.2 The court of appeal stated, in pertinent part, that: [h]aving determined that the original petition was forwarded within five days of the receipt of the fax transmission by the clerk of court, and there being no issue of nonpayment of fees, the trial court erred in failing to give said fax filing force and effect. Therefore, because Ms. Hunter's petition was filed as of March 8, 2007, it was timely filed pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3492 and La. R.S. 13:850. The trial court erred in granting [defendants'] peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, and the October 12, 2007 judgment is hereby reversed. All First Circuit Court of Appeal jurisprudence not consistent with the ruling in this case is overruled.3 Defendants now seek this court's supervisory review of the First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision. LAW AND DISCUSSION

Hunter v. Morton's Seafood Restaurant & Catering, 2007-2396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/3/08); 992 So.2d 1078.
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Id., 2007-2396, p. 10; 992 So.2d at 1084. 3

La. R.S. 13:850 provides the following:

Download 2008-C-1667 PEGGIE HUNTER v. MORTON'S SEAFOOD RESTAURANT & CATERING AND XYZ

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