Preview:

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #004 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinion handed down on the 20th day of January, 2010, is as follows:

BY CLARK, J.: 2009-CC-1193 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. 2003 INFINITI G35 VIN #JNKCV51E93MO24167 AND KRISTOFOR REBSTOCK (Parish of Lafourche) Retired Judge Moon Landrieu, sitting ad hoc for Weimer, J., recused. Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court's ruling and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

01/20/10 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2009-CC-1193 STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS 2003 INFINITI G35 VIN# JNKCV51E93MO24167 AND KRISTOFOR REBSTOCK ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF LAFOURCHE

CLARK, Justice* We granted a writ in this forfeiture proceeding to determine whether the courts below erred in their interpretation of La. R.S. 40:2610, a section of the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989. This legislation established the requirements for an owner of, or interest holder in, seized property to file a claim with the appropriate seizing agency and district attorney to protect his alleged interest. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's ruling and remand the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with the opinion below. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 16, 2008, the Lafourche Parish Drug Task Force ("Task Force") seized the 2003 Infiniti G35 VIN# JNKCV51E93MO ("Infiniti") at issue here from Kristofor Rebstock ("Rebstock").1 Judge John E. LeBlanc of the Louisiana District Court for the Seventeenth Judicial District signed a warrant of seizure, finding probable cause that the Infiniti was subject to forfeiture based on the averred facts in a Task Force agent's supporting affidavit.

*

Retired Judge Moon Landrieu, sitting ad hoc for Weimer, J., recused. Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

1

The Task Force also seized $1402.00 from Rebstock, but he did not contest the forfeiture of this currency.

1

According to the affiant, agents of the Task Force conducted surveillance of Rebstock's residence for several months prior to the seizure date, due to suspicions of Rebstock's upper-level involvement in a methamphetamine distribution ring operating within the parish. The agents conducted undercover purchases of

methamphetamine from Rebstock, during which agents observed Rebstock leaving his residence in the Infiniti, driving to a shed located on a different street from his residence, remaining at the shed for a brief period of time, and then returning to his residence in the Infiniti shortly before the undercover transactions occurred. Based on the information provided by a cooperating defendant and a confidential informant, the Task Force agents believed that Rebstock used the shed as a storage unit for methamphetamine. When the agents executed a search warrant of Rebstock's

residence, Rebstock himself confirmed this information by admitting to an agent that he used the Infiniti to transport methamphetamine from the shed to his residence. Furthermore, the agents received information from a documented confidential informant with the Louisiana State Police Department both that Rebstock had used the cash proceeds from the illegal sale of methamphetamine to purchase the Infiniti and that the Infiniti contained secret compartments that Rebstock used to hide the methamphetamines, the latter of which was confirmed by the agents during an inspection of the vehicle. On the same day as the seizure, May 16, 2008, and in order to commence the forfeiture proceeding, the State served Rebstock with a Notice of Pending Forfeiture. The Notice of Pending Forfeiture advised Rebstock of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture of the Infiniti, which included, inter alia : (1) an explanation of not only how the Task Force observed Rebstock using the Infiniti to transport methamphetamine for eventual distribution, but also how the Infiniti was confirmed to have been equipped with aftermarket, hidden compartments to conceal this activity; (2) an account of Rebstock's confession confirming his use of the Infiniti in transporting

2

methamphetamines for distribution; and (3) a description of why the State believed that the Infiniti was purchased with cash proceeds from the sale of

methamphetamines. The State additionally informed Rebstock of the procedure to preserve any right that he may have in the Infiniti, and of the resulting consequences if such steps were not taken. In response, Rebstock mailed what he captioned a "Notice of Claim" to both the Task Force and the district attorney. Within this document, Rebstock averred that he was the owner of the Infiniti and objected to any forfeiture proceeding for the following reasons: 1) my property has been unconstitutionally seized and specifically avers that La. R.S. 40:2601-2622 is unconstitutional under the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws and Constitution of the State of Louisiana; and alternatively, that the State of Louisiana has failed to comply with the provisions of La. R.S. 40:26012622; 2) that the seizure of the vehicle in question was without legal consent and in violation of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Louisiana; and 3) that the assets in question were not "used or intended to be used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture" pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2604; 4) claimant contends said assets are exempt from forfeiture under the provisions of La. R. S. 40:2605; and alternatively, 5) the provisions of La. R. S. 40:2605 are ambiguous and irreconcilable thereby rendering the entire forfeiture provisions of La. R.S. 40:2601-2622 unconstitutional.2 Rebstock further averred that "the automobile in question was acquired by claimant on or about 2007 act of exchange [sic] with a third party whereby claimant traded his Cheveronet [sic] Camaro for this vehicle with no additional cash being exchanged" and that "the vehicle was not used in any manner to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture, contrary to the allegations made by law enforcement." 3 On June 20, 2008, the State filed a motion to strike Rebstock's Notice of Claim. The State also filed a rule to show cause why the State's motion to strike claim should not be granted and why a judgment of forfeiture in favor of the State should not be granted. In support, the State submitted the warrant of seizure, the affidavit from the
2

R., p. 21. Id.

3

3

Task Force agent in support of the seizure warrant application, the Notice of Pending Forfeiture, and Rebstock's Notice of Claim. A hearing was held on the State's rule to show cause before Judge Walter Lanier, III, a different judge than the one who signed the warrant of seizure. At the hearing, the State argued that Rebstock's Notice of Claim was invalid for failing to aver the specific factual basis supporting each assertion required by La. R.S. 40:2610. Rebstock contended that his Notice of Claim was valid because it contained general factual assertions and a general denial of the State's allegations of conduct giving rise to forfeiture, sufficient to put the State on notice that Rebstock intended to contest the forfeiture of the Infiniti. Judge Lanier agreed with Rebstock, holding that the

inclusion of a general denial and general factual assertions were sufficient to qualify as a valid claim. Judge Lanier, therefore, denied the State's motion to strike the claim and the rule to show cause. The State then applied for a supervisory writ to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit. A five-judge panel considered the writ application, and a threejudge majority denied it, stating that the matter was not appropriate for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. The two dissenting judges, however, would have granted the writ application and reversed the district court's ruling on the ground that Rebstock's Notice of Claim failed to provide the specific factual and legal averments required by statute. Following the denial, the State petitioned this Court for a supervisory writ, which was subsequently granted.4 In this Court, Rebstock neither appeared for oral argument nor submitted a written brief on the issue presented. LAW AND ANALYSIS The precise issue that this Court must resolve is whether the district court erred in holding that the claimant satisfied the requirements delineated in La. R.S. 40:2610

4

State v. 2003 Infiniti G35 VIN #JNKCV51E93MO24167, 2009-1193 (La. 9/25/09); 18 So. 3d 98.

4

for the filing of a claim by merely making general assertions that track the statutory language, without providing specific factual and legal contentions in support. In resolving this issue, we first note the general rules for statutory construction. La. R.S. 1:3 provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]ords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language." In addition, the statute directs that "the word `shall' is mandatory and the word `may' is permissive." La. R.S. 1:4 directs that, "[w]hen the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursing its spirit." We are likewise cognizant of the principles for statutory interpretation found in the jurisprudence, particularly that "[t]he fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent." Moss v. State, 2005-1963, p. 15 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196. This legislative intent is to be determined "by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law." Id . In addition, "[a] statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed purpose and intent of the legislature." Id . Through the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 ("Act"), La. R.S. 40:2601-2622, the Louisiana Legislature established a civil system of expressly delineated procedures, which allow the State to seize and have forfeited property that is related to, is a proceed from, facilitates, or is itself a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, La. R.S. 40:961-995 . As is apparent from its structure, language, and general tenor, the Act provides not only a process by which the State is able to have forfeited such property in a speedy, fair, and efficient manner, without the accumulation of litigation, storage, and maintenance costs, but also provides a means through which an innocent owner or

5

interest holder can regain his property in a speedy and relatively inexpensive process. However, in order for the Act to function as intended, courts must ensure that both the State and the owner or interest holder strictly follow each of the Act's detailed requirements for the various stages in the process. Initially, the Act establishes the proper jurisdiction and venue for all proceedings brought under the Act.5 The Act then details the specific conduct giving rise to forfeiture and the categories of property that are subject to seizure and forfeiture.6 In addition, the Act provides guidance to an innocent owner or interest

5

La. R.S. 40:2602 provides:

Download 2009-CC-1193 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. 2003 INFINITI G35 VIN #JNKCV51E93MO24167 AND

Louisiana Law