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Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA NEWS RELEASE #016

The Opinions handed down on the 15th day of March, 2011, are as follows:

BY CLARK, J.: 2010-C -0070 CITY OF DEQUINCY v. RANDY JAMES HENRY Retired Judge Philip C. Ciaccio, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Chief Justice Catherine D. Kimball. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the rulings of the courts below and render judgment. REVERSED AND RENDERED.

3/15/11

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA NO. 2010-C-0070 CITY OF DEQUINCY VERSUS RANDY JAMES HENRY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 3
CLARK, Justice* We granted this application to determine whether the courts below erred in deciding that an employer had approved in writing a compromise between an employee and a third-party, and that the employer was not entitled to a credit toward the employee's future medical costs, all as described in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1102. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the issue of whether or not the City had given written approval of the settlement need not be resolved, but that the courts below did, in fact, err in ruling that the employer was not entitled to a credit toward future medical costs, and we, therefore, reverse. FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY In November of 2000, while investigating an automobile accident, Officer Randy James Henry came into contact with a live electricity line owned by CLECO Utility Group, Inc. ("CLECO") and suffered severe disabling injuries. Mr. Henry was employed as a police officer by the City of DeQuincy ("the City") at the time of the accident.

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Retired Judge Philip C. Ciaccio, assigned as Justice ad hoc , sitting for Chief Justice Catherine D. Kimball.

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Following the accident, the City, through the Louisiana Municipal Risk Management Agency ("RMI"), began paying Mr. Henry workers' compensation benefits. Mr. Henry subsequently filed a tort suit against CLECO, in which the City intervened in order to recover the benefits paid to and on behalf of Mr. Henry. After years of litigation, Mr. Henry and CLECO agreed to mediate the matter. The City and RMI were informed of the impending mediation but declined to attend. Instead, the City, by email, agreed to waive one-third of its lien as attorney's fees and verified to the mediator the exact amount of the lien at the time of the mediation. On October 23, 2008, Mr. Henry and CLECO mediated the third-party suit and agreed to settle the claim for the sum of $4,350,000.00. On that day, Mr. Henry, his wife, their attorney, and the attorney for CLECO all signed a written document containing the terms of the settlement agreement. Following the completion of the settlement, the City filed a motion to terminate Mr. Henry's workers' compensation benefits due to Mr. Henry's failure to obtain the prior written approval of the City and its insurer as required by Section 23:1102(B). Mr. Henry, in return, moved to declare that the City had tacitly approved the settlement and that any future credit to the City from Mr. Henry's settlement proceeds applied only to Mr. Henry's future disability benefits, and not to the cost of his future medical treatment. The hearing of the matter, held on December 1, 2008, consisted of the arguments of the attorneys and the introduction of exhibits. No witnesses testified. Separate from the proceeding, the attorneys for the City and CLECO agreed that CLECO would pay the City $321,045.25, representing the amount of

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the City's lien less one-third for attorney's fees, in return for the City's dismissal of its intervention against CLECO and the City's promise to not pursue against CLECO its reimbursement rights afforded by Section 23:1102(C)(1). On March 9, 2009, the workers' compensation judge ruled that the City had given prior written approval for the settlement; that the City and/or RMI was paid in full for the full amount of the lien less one-third for attorney's fees, reinstating Mr. Henry's rights to future compensation; that the City was entitled to a credit for the balance of the settlement funds; but that the credit only applied to Mr. Henry's future disability benefits and not to the cost of his future medical treatment. On December 9, 2009, the court of appeal affirmed the ruling of the workers' compensation judge. City of Dequincy v. Randy James Henry, 09-636 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 237. This Court granted the City's writ on April 30, 2010. City of Dequincy v. Randy James Henry, 2010-0070 (La. 4/30/10), 34 So.3d 296. DISCUSSION Initially, we note that this issue is one of statutory interpretation. The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 2000-1695, p. 11 (La.6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294, 302; Succession of Boyter, 99-0761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 5 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766. The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering

the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law. SWAT 24 Shreveport

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Bossier, 2000-1695 at 11, 808 So.2d at 302; Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 at 9, 756 So.2d at 1129. A statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed purpose and intent of the legislature. Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 at 9, 756 So.2d at 1129. Further, it is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Sultana Corporation v. Jewelers Mutual Insurance Company, 03-0360, p. 9 (La.12/3/03), 860 So.2d 1112, 1119. As a result, courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to, and preserving, all words can legitimately be found. St. Martin Parish Police Jury v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 212 La. 886, 33 So.2d 671, 676 (La. 1947); State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630, 634 (La. 1904). Finally, it is presumed that the legislature acts with full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory construction. Sultana Corporation, 03-0360 at 9, 860 So.2d at 1119. In addition to the above judicial principles which are guides to determine the intent of the legislature, the legislature has enacted rules for the construction of statutes in the provisions of the revised statutes. Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:3 provides: Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. With these rules in mind, we note that both courts below and both parties

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agree that Section 23:11021 is the controlling statute, although Mr. Henry asserts that Section 23:1102 should be read in para materia with a related statute, Section 23:1103.2 As Mr. Henry admits in brief, by their very terms, Section 23:1102

Section 23:1102 reads: A. (1) If either the employee or his dependent or the employer or insurer brings suit against a third person as provided in R.S. 23:1101, he shall forthwith notify the other in writing of such fact and of the name of the court in which the suit is filed, and such other may intervene as party plaintiff in the suit. (2) Any dispute between the employer and the employee regarding the calculation of the employer's credit may be filed with the office of workers' compensation and tried before a workers' compensation judge. However, any determination of the employer's credit shall not affect any rights granted to the employer or the employee pursuant to R.S. 23:1103

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