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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 98-KA-0064

STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS

CEDRIC D'WAYNE HOWARD
******************************************************************** ON APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE PARISH OF RAPIDES, HONORABLE DONALD T. JOHNSON, JUDGE *********************************************************************

Traylor, J.* On February 2, 1995, a Rapides Parish grand jury indicted the defendant, Cedric D'Wayne Howard, for the first degree murder of Rita Rabalais in violation of LSA-RS 14:30. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the same jury charged with determining the defendant's guilt unanimously returned a verdict of death. The jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the offender had been previously convicted of an unrelated armed robbery; and (2) it was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. This matter comes before us on direct appeal under Article V, Section 5(D) of the Louisiana State Constitution. Defendant raises 25 assignments of error, none of which have merit. Therefore, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.1 FACTS On October 24, 1994, Alexandria police officers, responding to a call from the victim's niece, discovered the severely battered body of 82-year-old Rita Rabalais hidden in her bedroom closet. After the Alexandria police department homicide division secured the scene, detectives took photographs, dusted for fingerprints, and recovered from the kitchen garbage can a knife, a knife sharpening rod, a blue hand towel, and a rubber glove bearing a latent palm print. The officers also recovered a piece of metal tubing, part of a Weedeater, from a wicker basket in the

*

KNOLL, J. not on panel. See Rule IV, Part 2, Section 3.

Several assignments of error were not discussed in this opinion because they do not represent reversible error and are governed by clearly established principles of law. They will be reviewed in an appendix which will not be published but will comprise part of the record in this case.

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dining room. An autopsy revealed that Rita had been stabbed multiple times and badly beaten. Her face and head were severely bruised and lacerated and repeated blows to the head had caused massive bleeding to the brain. In addition, Ms. Rabalais had suffered three other potentially fatal knife wounds: One on each side of the neck, severing both the carotid artery and a primary vein, and a stab wound to the left side which had penetrated six inches and lacerated the heart and one lung. The state's forensic pathologist found evidence of multiple blunt trauma, as well as of defensive wounds to the victim's arms. He verified that the victim's wounds were consistent with the type of injuries which would have been inflicted by the instrumentalities recovered at the scene. During the investigation, the police questioned Ricky Swafford, a 14-year-old boy who lived near the victim. He testified at trial that a couple of nights before the murder he had been outside Lonnie Simmons' house with the defendant and several others as they were planning the crime. He also testified that, although the defendant did not say much in the conversation, he believed that the defendant was willing to assist in the robbery/murder. Ricky further recalled that he did not go to school on the morning of the murder and that as he was walking to his aunt's house, he saw Freddie Gradley in the back alley two houses down from the victim's. He described Gradley as wearing jeans and a white t-shirt which had a big red stain on it. Swafford did not see anyone else in the vicinity. Later, the police came to Ricky's house and interviewed him there, as well as at the detective division. On December 8, 1994, Ricky Swafford gave a statement to police about the conversation he had overheard. Also on December 8, 1994, Detectives Don Weatherford, Jr. and Gary Billingsley interviewed the defendant, who was in Renaissance Detention Center at the time. The following morning, the same detectives took a taped statement from the defendant as part of the investigation. Defendant did not inculpate himself and was not arrested after his statement. However, on December 9, 1994, the detectives took Fredrick Gradley's statement, who confessed his own involvement, and implicated the defendant and four others. Gradley was arrested and warrants issued for the arrest of Jerry Joseph, Joseph General, Joseph Green, and defendant. These five defendants were indicted for first degree murder on February 2, 1995. On June 22, 1995, Jerry Joseph entered a plea agreement with the state. The state agreed to reduce the charge against him to manslaughter, in exchange for his truthful testimony against his co-perpetrators. Following Joseph's cooperation with police, four additional perpetrators were implicated and arrest warrants issued for Lonnie Simmons, Joseph Michael Elie, Frederick Demond Bush, and Daveon Deshan McCullough. These four defendants were indicted on the same first degree murder charge on July 20, 1995. Joseph testified at defendant's trial that he had been present at the Eat A Bite Club when defendant and Fredrick Gradley were planning a breakin at a woman's house on Kelly Street. Joseph disclosed that Ms. Rabalais had been targeted because she was supposed to have a lot of money. He further testified that later that night he met 2

Gradley, Joe General, Ced Howard and Joe Green (Joseph's cousin) on the corner of Chester Street. Also present were Mike Elie, Lonnie Simmons, Daveon McCullough, Fred Bush, and an individual who remains unidentified. While the others entered Ms. Rabalais' house, Joseph testified that he remained on the porch of a house across the street, drinking a 40-ounce beer. Shortly afterward Joseph went inside and saw the victim surrounded by the others. They were beating, kicking and stabbing the victim. At one point, as Ms. Rabalais held onto Gradley, defendant hit her over the head with a pipe. Joseph testified that he left the scene before the others stuffed her in the closet, but that he did observe General and some of the others wiping the walls and cleaning anywhere they had touched. Joseph further admitted that money was taken from the house and that he got $50.00. Defendant did not testify at trial. However, before the jury entered the courtroom to hear opening statements in the guilt phase, defendant addressed the court, claiming that he disagreed with his lawyers' strategy geared to ending trial with a life sentence for a crime he did not commit, and that he would prefer death to a life sentence. He then asked the judge to find him guilty. PRETRIAL ISSUES Assignment of Error No. 9 Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it found him competent to stand trial. On June 8, 1995, while detained in pretrial status, defendant suffered a cerebral aneurysm which required surgery. On September 8, 1995, defense counsel filed a motion for appointment of a sanity commission to determine if defendant was competent to assist in his own defense. The trial court appointed Dr. James W. Quillin and Dr. John MacMahon to examine defendant.2 The doctors performed separate examinations on October 9, 1995 and on October 12, 1995. Generally, a person who suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him incapable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, of consulting with counsel, and of assisting in preparing and conducting his defense may not be subjected to trial. La.C.Cr.P. arts. 641-649.1; State v. Rogers, 419 So.2d 840, 843 (La. 1982), citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), and State v. Bennett, 345 So.2d 1129 (La. 1977).3 A defendant

At the sanity hearing, the parties stipulated that Dr. Quillin is an expert in the field of clinical psychology and that Dr. MacMahon is an expert in the field of clinical psychiatry. In Bennett, 345 So.2d at 1138, this Court noted that the facts to consider in determining an accused's ability to assist in his defense include: whether he is able to recall and relate facts pertaining to his actions and whereabouts at certain times; whether he is able to assist counsel in locating and examining relevant witnesses; whether he is able to maintain a consistent defense; whether he is able to listen to the testimony of witnesses and inform his lawyer of any distortions or misstatements; whether he has the ability to make simple decisions in response to well-explained alternatives; whether, if necessary to defense strategy, he is capable of testifying in his own defense; and to what extent, if any, his mental condition is apt to 3
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has the burden to establish his incapacity to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (states may require the accused to prove his incompetency to stand trial only by a preponderance of the evidence; a higher standard of "clear and convincing evidence" violates the Due Process Clause); State v. Frank, 96-1136 (La. 10/4/96), 679 So.2d 1365 (Cooper invalidates 1990 La. Acts No. 755, amending La.C.Cr.P. art. 648 to require a finding of incompetency by "clear and convincing evidence." While the district court may receive expert medical testimony on point, the ultimate decision of competency is for the court alone. La.C.Cr.P. art. 647; Rogers, 419 So.2d at 843; State v. Edwards, 406 So.2d 1331, 1342. "Moreover, the judge's determination of a defendant's present mental capacity is entitled to great weight and his ruling will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous." Bennett, 345 So.2d at 1132. The determinations of the trial judge as to competency of defendant to stand trial are entitled to great weight on review and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158, 167 (La. 1983); State v. Rochon, 393 So.2d 1224, 1228 (La. 1981). Dr. Quillin reported his findings to the court at a hearing held on March 14, 1997. He noted that defendant, as a result of the cerebral aneurysm, had some impairment of his left hemisphere and evidenced some memory dysfunction.4 Defendant also suffered from right hemparesis, or difficulty with motor function on the right side. The doctor found defendant's verbal functions showed some mild paraphasic error in his running conversation, which means that defendant would occasionally insert the incorrect word for the meaning he was trying to express. Additionally, defendant's semantic fluency, which tests a person's ability to name contents of a category, was below normal. The doctor found defendant alert and responsive, with no psychotic illness, abnormality of thought, depression, or suicidal thoughts. An intellectual function test placed defendant in the low normal range overall, with no mental retardation. Dr. Quillin assessed defendant's I.Q. at 82, which is in the low normal range. The doctor did report that defendant may have difficulty listening to the testimony of others and informing his counsel of any misstatements in their testimony. However, the doctor found that defendant clearly understood the charges against him and the role of the judge, of the

deteriorate under the stress of trial.
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At the sanity hearing, the parties stipulated that Dr. Quillin is an expert in the field of

clinical psychology and that Dr. MacMahon is an expert in the field of clinical psychiatry. The clinical findings of memory impairment related to short term, or immediate, memory. The doctor found defendant's remote memory to be reasonably intact. The doctor did caution, however, that defendant's memory lapses could be relevant should defendant decide to testify in his own defense, and under cross-examination, not remember the response he gave 30 minutes earlier. However, for practical purposes, the decision of whether to testify most likely rested on the fact that defendant had a prior felony conviction. In any event, this Court has never held that amnesia alone per se renders a defendant incompetent to stand trial. See State v. Dixon, 96-0332 (La. 5/17/96), 673 So.2d 608 (Memorandum Decision). 4

prosecutor, and of counsel. He also noted that defendant could recall and relate facts about his actions during the commission of the offense and had the ability to give a defense for his actions. Under the totality of the circumstances, Dr. Quillin opined that defendant was capable of standing trial. Dr. John MacMahon reiterated that defendant understood his legal rights and the nature of the proceedings against him. Based on his evaluation of defendant, Dr. MacMahon found defendant mentally fit to stand trial, as well as competent at the time of the offense. Given this consensus of medical opinion, the trial court found defendant competent to proceed. Here, both doctors testified that defendant was capable of proceeding to trial. On the showing made, the trial judge does not appear to have committed manifest error in determining the instant defendant mentally competent to stand trial. This assignment lacks merit. VOIR DIRE ISSUES Assignment of Error No. 12 Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the state's challenges for cause regarding three potential jurors, Doris Ross, Mabeline White, and Emma Rachal, based upon their opposition to the death penalty. Defendant claims that the jurors had expressed a willingness to consider voting for the death penalty and had stated that they would follow the trial court's instructions as to the law. A prospective juror is properly excluded for cause because of his/her views on capital punishment when the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177, 182 (La. 1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). The basis of exclusion under La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b), which incorporates the standard of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), as clarified by Witt, is that the juror's views "would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Witherspoon further dictates that a capital defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impartial jury prohibits the exclusion of prospective jurors "simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." Witherspoon, 391 U.S.at 1776-78. Moreover, notwithstanding La.C.Cr.P. art. 800(B), which states that a defendant cannot complain of an erroneous grant of a challenge to the state "unless the effect of such a ruling is the exercise by the state of more peremptory challenges than it is entitled to by law," both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that it is reversible error, not subject to harmless-error analysis, when a trial court erroneously excludes a potential juror who is Witherspoon-eligible, despite the fact that the state could have used a peremptory challenge to strike the potential juror. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 664 (1987); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); State v. Craig, 95-2499 (La. 5/20/97); 699 So.2d 865 (unpub. app. at 7). 5

Doris Ross A review of the record demonstrates that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the state's challenges for cause as to each of the prospective jurors in dispute. Prospective juror Doris Ross was questioned in the first panel. Before the venirepersons came up to the jury box, each had completed a questionnaire provided by the district court. Ms. Ross's responses revealed that she does not like the idea of judging others. To many questions, including whether she had any personal or philosophical beliefs that would prevent her from rendering a fair verdict in the case, she answered, "Not sure." During examination, Ms. Ross was equally noncommittal: A: That's what I'm not sure about. I mean, possibly I could, like what he said, you know, once I had heard all the proof. But I'm not absolutely sure that I could do that. I mean death. Ooh, that's just a -- so final....And at this point, I think maybe I could. But -- but what if I got there, and I said, `I can't do this,' you know. I'm just not sure enough about something that final, making a decision on it. At one point, she seemed to indicate that if the victim were an elderly person such as her father, she would probably be "gung ho" and could make this decision. However, she again equivocated. She further indicated that she had strong religious beliefs and that it would be hard for her to make a decision.. In granting the state's challenge for cause, the trial judge noted in Ms. Ross "an interminable vacillation that was inconclusive" given its depth and severity. Mabeline White Next, defendant complains about the trial court granting the state's cause challenge as to Mabeline White, also in the first panel of prospective jurors. On her juror questionnaire, Ms. White indicated that the only book she reads is the Bible and that she feels that "God is the only one to judge." She also answered affirmatively when asked if she had any personal or philosophical feelings that would impair her ability to render a fair verdict. During voir dire, she elaborated: A: I, myself, don't want to judge. I'm afraid to judge. I don't know. It's -- I can't put it in words, but -- Lord, have mercy Jesus. Judging, I think I'm going to have a problem with that. Q: Okay. A: Because my God says, "Judge ye not and ye shall not be judged." Q: Okay, ma'am. A: And that's my belief. I have a -- I'm just -- can't do it. Even after defense attempts to rehabilitate Ms. White, she stood firm in her conviction that she did not want to judge. In granting the state's challenge for cause, the court noted that it found the woman so distraught that she was beyond rehabilitation. Emma Rachal Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in granting the state's challenge for cause as to prospective juror Emma Rachal. On her juror questionnaire, she wrote that she is Catholic and has a Pro-Life bumper sticker on her car. She also advised the court that she would feel guilty about imposing the death penalty. She went on to state: A: I don't think that I have the right to condemn somebody else to death, and that 6

would be what I would be doing in one sense. Q: You're crediting that to a moral belief? A: Well, moral or religious. Q: Okay. A: I don't believe it's in my hand to do this. I mean, the other things I would feel sort of okay about doing. But this is one thing that I don't know if I would feel comfortable doing this. Ms. Rachal also indicated that if the defense did not put on a case, she would have problems with defendant's Fifth Amendment presumption of innocence. In each of these instances, the prospective jurors expressed views that would prevent or substantially impair them from making impartial decisions as jurors, and thus the trial court's decision to grant the state's challenges for cause as to each is supported by the record. This assignment is meritless. Assignment of error no. 13 Defendant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defense's cause challenge of two potential jurors, D'Juana Hinkley and Charles Fussell, who both admitted to being predisposed to the death penalty, thus compelling him to squander two peremptory challenges and denying his constitutional right to his full twelve peremptory challenges. Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is denied erroneously by a trial court and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. State v. Robertson, 92-2660 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d 1278, 1280; State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La. 1993). An erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error. State v. Cross, 93-1189 (La. 6/30/95); 658 So.2d 683, 686; State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 225 (La. 1993). A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause and these rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. Cross, 658 So.2d at 686-687; Robertson, 630 So.2d at 1281. A trial judge's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of his discretion, notwithstanding that the juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, when subsequently, on further inquiry or instruction, the juror "has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence." State v. Claiborne, 397 So.2d 486, 489 (La. 1981). In the instant case the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges. Consequently, prejudice must be presumed from any error by the court in ruling on the defense cause challenges, and this Court must review the denials of the defendant's cause challenges on the merits. As discussed above, the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Witt, 469 U.S. at 424; Sullivan, 596 So.2d at 186. In a "reverseWitherspoon" context, the basis of the exclusion is that the juror "will not consider a life sentence and ... will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him ..." Robertson, 630 So.2d at 1284. If a prospective juror's inclination toward the 7

death penalty would substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties, a challenge for cause is warranted. Ross, 623 So.2d at 644. D'Juana Hinkley Defense counsel challenged Ms. Hinkley for cause based on her alleged predisposition toward imposing the death penalty once a finding of guilt was made. However, this position is not supported by the record. For example, on direct, Ms. Hinkley responded as follows: Q: Okay. Tell me about how you feel about the death penalty. Can you just give us a rough idea? A: I believe in the capital punishment. I'd -- not given lightly, mind you. Not just say, oh well, let's do this. No. Q: Do you think every murder justifies capital punishment? A: No. Q: Could you -- if we got to that stage, and we're assuming a lot now. State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury unanimously returned a verdict of first degree murder. Could you, at that point, weigh either punishment, either life or death penalty? Give equal consideration to both of them? A: Yes. On cross, Ms. Hinkley responded as follows: Q: And if you make the decision that he's guilty of first degree murder, would you be more inclined, at that point, to give the death penalty than to consider the alternative, which would be life imprisonment? A: Most likely. Yes. Q: You think you would be more inclined toward the prosecution once you had made the decision as far -- on the guilt or innocence stage, is that right? A: Yes. Q: Okay. Would you require the defendant to show -- show why he should not be put to death? A: No. Q: But you still feel that you would be more inclined toward the death penalty once you had made that decision that he was guilty of first degree murder? A: Yes. Q: Could you tell us why? And I know I'm putting you on the spot, and I hate to put you on the spot, but. A: Well, if he's done something, or if you've murdered somebody and, you know, with all intentions of that's what you were going to do, yeah, you have to pay for it. Q: Okay. And when you indicate you have to pay for it, are you indicating that when you have to pay for it, that in most of the cases the appropriate penalty is death? A: Most. Not all. Q: Most. But not all. A: Right. The parties recalled Ms. Hinkley for a separate voir dire and clarification of her responses. She again indicated that she could consider both life imprisonment and death, and that she would follow the judge's instructions. The court then denied the defense challenge for cause because the prospective juror "left the door open" for a fair and impartial evaluation of the evidence during the penalty phase. Afterward, counsel excused Ms. Hinkley peremptorily. Next, defendant complains that the trial court forced the defense to exercise a peremptory challenge as to venireperson, Charles Fussell, based on an alleged predisposition to voting for the death penalty upon conviction of first degree murder. However, Mr. Fussell's voir dire responses do not merit a challenge for cause. First, the court posed general voir dire questions to the panel and Mr. Fussell indicated that while he believed in the death penalty, he would want to be sure before imposing it "where I could sleep at night." The prosecutor further examined Mr. Fussell: 8

Q: ... Now assuming we're able to prove an aggravating circumstance to you beyond a reasonable doubt, are you telling me then you could consider returning a verdict of death? A: Yes, I could. Q: Now could you also consider the other option, life imprisonment? A: Is that going to be an option? I mean, I.... Q: Those are your options, death and life. What I'm trying to find out, would you equally consider the two? A: Yes, I would equally consider the two. Although I believe that when you take -- I mean if it's proven that you've taken a life, I -- I mean, I would really feel like that you should give a life for a life. Q: Okay. Well, let me ask you this. In -- in all first degree murder cases, do you think that death is the appropriate sentence all the time? A: No. Q: Okay. So there are situations where you would envision life imprisonment? A: Yes. On cross, when asked if he would feel predisposed to give death, Mr. Fussell responded: A: No, I would not. I mean I would give it equal -- it would have to be depend -my feelings, me personally, it would have to be the case. I mean if it was a driveby shooting, if it was a, you know, or vengeance kind of murder -- I mean, it all depends on what the case was about. But I don't really think I would have a leniency one way or the other, although I do believe in capital punishment. Q: In short, it wouldn't be an automatic decision for you. A: No, it would not. In refusing to grant the defense challenge for cause, the court found that Mr. Fussell would not rule out consideration of life. The defense then used its last peremptory challenge on Mr. Fussell. In situations similar to those presented by the instant case, this Court has reversed convictions on three occasions. In State v. Maxie, 93-2158 (La. 4/10/95); 653 So.2d 526, 53438, the Court vacated a first degree murder conviction and death sentence because the trial judge erroneously denied a defense challenge for cause of a venireman who, though he said he "could listen" to mitigation evidence, felt death the only appropriate punishment "[o]nce the crime guilt is established." In Robertson, 630 So.2d at 1281-84, the Court vacated a first degree murder conviction and death sentence because the trial judge erroneously denied a defense challenge for cause of a venireman who, though he stated he could perform his duties according to the judge's instructions, nonetheless stated he had his "opinion" on the appropriateness of the death sentence for double murder. In Ross, 623 So.2d at 645, the Court vacated a first degree murder conviction and life sentence because the trial judge erroneously denied a defense challenge for cause of a juror who said he could "consider" both the death penalty and life imprisonment but "personally" had his "vote" for capital punishment as "the only penalty" in a murder trial. The instant case is distinguishable from Maxie, Robertson, and Ross in that Ms. Hinkley and Mr. Fussell did not indicate that their minds were set on death. The record reflects that neither Ms. Hinkley nor Mr. Fussell should have been excluded under Witherspoon/Witt, and thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the defense challenges for cause as to both prospective jurors. This assignment lacks merit. Assignment of error no. 14 In this assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred by not providing the jury with complete voir dire instructions and by allowing the parties to present the law. In defendant's 9

view, the trial court had a responsibility to explain all terms of art at all stages of the trial, which it abdicated. Instead, defendant claims that the parties were left to provide the jury panels with partisan interpretations of the law, without the court enlightening the panels as to the "official" version of the law they were to follow. Thus, any answers relative to their ability to follow the "law" could not be considered reliable. Finally, defendant complains that at the time of the trial court's closing instructions to the jury, it did not cure any misinformation by instructing that all other instructions given by the parties were to be disregarded. In support of these contentions, defendant points to four prospective jurors whom he believes did not understand the law: Linda Paul, Elvis Laborde, Crawford Brown, and D'Juana Hinkley. However, the record reveals that the trial court did in fact instruct the jury at critical stages of the capital trial.5 Furthermore, defendant fails to point specifically to any misstatements of the law made by the state. In any event, this Court has consistently held that misstatements of the law by the district attorney during voir dire do not give rise to reversible error when the trial court properly instructs the jury. State v. Cavazos, 610 So.2d 127, 128-29 (La. 1992); Brogdon, 457 So.2d at 630; State v. Edwards, 420 So.2d 663, 681 (La. 1982); State v. Belgard, 410 So.2d 710, 725 (La. 1982); State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722, 727 (La. 1980). Generally, La.C.Cr.P. art. 786 provides that the court, the state, and the defendant shall have the right to examine prospective jurors and the scope of the examination shall be within the discretion of the court. See, e.g., State v. James, 459 So.2d 1299, 1305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (no error for prosecutor to read statute defining charge during voir dire or to explain the concept of general and specific criminal intent to the panel), writ denied, 463 So.2d 600 (La. 1985). A review of the voir dire record on the four prospective jurors defendant names in this assignment shows no abuse of discretion or even any confusion on the part of the venirepersons. Linda Paul Prospective juror, Linda Paul, was questioned in the first panel. Before the attorneys questioned the panel, the judge propounded questions, en masse, as to general concepts, including presumption of innocence. On cross, Ms. Paul indicated that she would want to hear both sides of the story before she made up her mind. Another prospective juror then queried, "I believe he instructed us a while ago that the burden of proof was on the prosecution. Is that correct?" Counsel responded, "That's most likely correct." At which point the trial judge interjected, "That is correct. Don't be misled. That is the law. The State has the burden of proof."

During voir dire, the trial judge scrupulously instructed each panel, before the attorneys questioned the potential jurors, using the format suggested in the Louisiana Judges' Criminal Bench Book,

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