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JERRY BEARD                                              *                    NO. 2006-CA-1244
VERSUS                                                   *                    COURT OF APPEAL
SEACOAST ELECTRONICS,                                    *                    FOURTH CIRCUIT
INC.
*                                                        STATE OF LOUISIANA
*
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2005-6476, DIVISION “E-7”
HONORABLE MADELEINE LANDRIEU, JUDGE
JUDGE MAX N. TOBIAS, JR.
(COURT COMPOSED OF JUDGE MICHAEL E. KIRBY, JUDGE TERRI
F. LOVE, AND JUDGE MAX N. TOBIAS JR.)
ALEXANDRA E. MORA
LAW OFFICE OF ALEXANDRA MORA
322 LAFAYETTE STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA   70130
COUNSEL FOR JERRY BEARD
S. MARK KLYZA
RACHEL E. LINZY
THE KULLMAN FIRM, A.P.L.C.
1100 POYDRAS STREET
1600 ENERGY CENTRE
NEW ORLEANS, LA   70163
COUNSEL FOR SEACOAST ELECTRONICS, INC.




AFFIRMED.
The plaintiff/appellant, Jerry Beard (“Beard”), appeals from the
summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant/appellee, Seacoast
Electronics, Inc. (“Seacoast”), partially dismissing Beard’s suit.  After
reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment.
Seacoast services and inspects marine electronic equipment.  Beard
was hired by Seacoast in December 2004 as a field engineer/technician.  One
of Beard’s duties was to inspect marine electronic equipment on ocean-going
vessels.  Beard was originally stationed at Seacoast’s Jacksonville, Florida
office, but was transferred to the New Orleans office on 7 March 2005.
On or about 22 March 2005, Beard drafted a letter to Seacoast’s
president, Art Thomas (“Thomas”), expressing his dissatisfaction and
frustration with his co-workers and the New Orleans office.  Beard did not
send the letter at that time.
On 28 March 2005, Beard was assigned to inspect a vessel.  During
the inspection, he concluded that a piece of the ship’s equipment, an EPIRB
(one of the vessel’s ways to emit a distress signal) was broken, and that he




could not issue a valid certification based on his understanding of the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) rules.  Seacoast
representatives disagreed with Beard and issued the certificate to the vessel.
On 30 March 2005, Beard drafted a second letter to Thomas
expressing his concern that the issuance of the certification did not comply
with FCC rules.  Beard e-mailed his 22 March and 30 March 2005 letters to
Thomas on 30 March.
By e-mail communication dated 31 March 2005, Thomas informed
Beard that he viewed the 22 March letter as a resignation, which Thomas
accepted.  Beard contends that he was terminated because he complained
about Seacoast’s issuance of the above-referenced certification which he
contends violated FCC rules.
On 12 May 2005, May Beard filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that his
termination violated the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. R. S. 23:967.
It is uncontested that Beard relies only on federal law as the only legal
authority allegedly violated by Seacoast.
Seacoast filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the
Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. R.S. 23:967, does not protect private




persons unless they allege a violation of state law.  The trial court granted
summary judgment in Seacoast’s favor on 14 July 2006, and designated the
ruling as a final judgment after an express determination that no just reason
for delay existed.  This devolutive appeal followed.
As an appellate court, we are bound to review the trial court's
summary
judgment de novo.  Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 94-1767, p. 5 (La.
3/30/95), 653 So. 2d 1152, 1155.    Summary judgment is properly granted if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,
and/or affidavits show that no genuine issue of material fact exists.  La.
C.C.P. art. 966 B. Summary judgment is favored and is designed to secure
"the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of litigation.  La. C.C.P.
art. 966 A(2).  If a plaintiff fails to put forth evidence that he can carry his
burden at trial on any crucial element of the cause of action asserted,
summary judgment is appropriate.  La. C.C.P. art. 966 C(2).
The Louisiana Whistleblower Statute provides protection to an
employee against reprisal from the employer for reporting or refusing to
participate in illegal work practices.    Seacoast argues that it is clear from the




wording of the statute and prior jurisprudence that Beard must allege a
violation of state law in order to prevail on the merits of the case.  Beard
contends, however, that because La. R. S. 23:967(A)(3), reads “violation of
law,” his cause of action is not limited to state law violations, but
encompasses violations of federal law as well.
In Hale v. Touro Infirmary, 04-0003 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/3/04), 886
So. 2d 1210, writ denied, 05-0103 (La. 3/24/05), 896 So. 2d 1036, the same
issue was presented to the court as a matter of first impression.  In that case,
we stated:
We further agree that the violation of law in
question must be that of a state statute.  The first
subsection detailing under what circumstances an
employer may not take "reprisals" clearly states
that the employee must be aware of a violation of
state law.  The two subsequent subsections prohibit
reprisals against employees who not only know of
the violation and report it to their employers, but
who also testify before public bodies or simply
refuse to participate in the illegal activity.
Although the language of the statute is
inconsistent, the interpretation that is supported by
the structure and that fits best into the framework
of the statute is one that holds the statute to its
most specific terms, i.e., violations of state law
only.
Id. at pp. 9-10, 886 So. 2d at 1216.   (Footnotes omitted.)




Beard relies on federal law rendered before Hale to support his
position that La. R.S. 23:967(A)(3) permits him to sue for violations of
federal law.  However, while decisions of federal appellate courts are
considered persuasive, they are not binding on the courts of this state.   State
v. White, 321 So. 2d 491, 494 (La. 1975).    In addition, Beard argues that we
need not follow any precedent as a civilian court.  We, however, find that
our decision in Hale is directly on point and, therefore, is binding precedent
on this court.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.

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