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JOHN JOHNSON,                                                                            *   NO. 2010-CA-1388
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE                                                                    *   COURT OF APPEAL
CLASS OF THOSE
SIMILARLY SITUATED                                                                       *   FOURTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS                                                                                   *   STATE OF LOUISIANA
ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL                                                                    *
BOARD, XYZ INSURANCE
COMPANY, CITY OF NEW                                                                     *
ORLEANS, AND ABC                                                                         *
INSURANCE COMPANY
MCKAY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH
REASONS
I concur with the majority opinion in so far as it concerns National Union
and Republic.  However, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against U.S. Fire.
The majority is correct that the U.S. Fire policy unambiguously provided
personal injury liability (PIL) coverage without limitation.  The policy at issue in
this case is a form contract drafted by U.S. Fire and it lacks an explicit aggregate
cap for PIL coverage.  Insurers are free to limit their coverage but their limitations
must be clear and explicit.
It has become well-settled law in the field of insurance that words and
phrases employed in a contract of insurance are to be construed, interpreted and
defined in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than in a technical,
philosophical or limited sense; that such words and phrases are to be construed
liberally in favor of the policyholder and that all ambiguities are likewise to be
resolved in favor of the policyholder.  Carney v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 371
So.2d 815, 818 (La. 1979).   “[P]olicy language extending coverage is broadly
interpreted, while policy language excluding coverage is restrictively interpreted.”
Pinell v. Patterson Services, Inc., 481 So.2d 595, 596 (La. 1986).  If “the words of




a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further
interpretation” is necessary.  See La. C.C. art. 2047.  As the majority has stated,
U.S. Fire’s policy unambiguously provided PIL coverage without limitation.
Reformation should not be applied in this case.  The whole concept of
reformation is actually somewhat alien to our civilian tradition.  Courts are
prohibited from taking parol evidence to explain or contradict the insurance
contract’s clear meaning.  Peterson v. Schimek , 98-171 (La. 3/2/99), 729 So.2d
1024.
In Louisiana, summary judgment is favored and should be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.  La. C.C.P.
art. 966 (A)(2).  A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  La. C.C.P. art. 966 (B).
When a contract is not ambiguous or does not lead to absurd consequences, its
interpretation is a question of law for a court to decide.  Am. Deposit Ins. Co. v.
Myles, 2000-2457 (La. 4/25/01), 783 So.2d 1282, 1286.  Furthermore, the
interpretation of an insurance contract is usually a legal question which can be
properly resolved in the framework of a motion for summary judgment.  Robinson
v. Heard, 2001-1697 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 943, 945.  In the instant case, the
U.S. Fire policy unambiguously provides PIL coverage without limitation.
Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate as to U.S. Fire.

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