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01/15/02 "See News Release 004 for any concurrences and/or dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA NUMBER 2000-K-1158 STATE OF LOUISIANA versus ALLEN MAISE (Sentenced as "Alan Maise") KNOLL, Justice, concurring Although I agree with the majority opinion, I concur to offer additional reasons in support of the conclusions reached therein. In State v. Malone, 403 So. 2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1981), Chief Justice Calogero, then Justice, writing for the majority, recognized that "[a]n individual on probation does not have the same freedom from governmental intrusion into his affairs as does the ordinary citizen." In addition, the majority in Malone stated that "[a] probationer has essentially the same status as a parolee; in our view both must necessarily have a reduced expectation of privacy." Id. at 1238. Although Malone did not reach the question of whether admissions to a probation officer required prior Miranda warnings, in State v. Lassai, this Court stated: Defendant's admissions made to his probation officer were properly admitted by the trial judge in spite of the absence of Miranda warnings; the Miranda rule has not been extended to probation hearings.

State v. Lassai, 366 So. 2d 1389, 1390 (La. 1978), citing United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 9832 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972). See also State v. Edwards, 440 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983) (holding that a probationer's admissions to a probation officer are admissible at a revocation hearing in spite of the absence of Miranda warnings). Even though Lassai did not involve the use of the defendant's admissions at a separate criminal proceeding to adjudicate his guilt of the

newly committed crime, it seems logical to conclude that these admissions would be equally admissible in such an instance.1 See United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Par., 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972) (finding that "[t]o hold that evidence obtained by a parole officer in the course of carrying out this duty cannot be utilized in a subsequent prosecution would unduly immunize parolees from conviction."). Moreover, as Malone recognized, a person on probation has severely truncated constitutional rights because of his status as a probationer. Malone, 403 So. 2d 123839. In State v. Patrick, 381 So. 2d 501 (La. 1980), we found that a parole officer's warrantless search of a parolee's person and residence was reasonable, even though less than probable cause was shown. Likewise, because the status of probationer is equated to a parolee, I find it important that as a condition for parole, a parolee "[p]romptly and truthfully [shall] answer all inquiries directed to him by the probation and parole officer." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

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