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LEO POLLARD, JR., ET AL.                                                        *   NO. 2010-C-0788
VERSUS                                                                          *   CONSOLIDATED WITH
ALPHA TECHNICAL, ET AL.                                                         *   NO. 2010-C-0805
CONSOLIDATED WITH                                                               *   COURT OF APPEAL
IN RE:  HARVEY TERM                                                             *   FOURTH CIRCUIT
LITIGATION I                                                                        STATE OF LOUISIANA
RE:  PAMELA MITCHELL, ET                                                        *
AL.                                                                             *
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NOS. 2001-8708 C/W 2001-20645, DIVISION ―D‖
Honorable Lloyd J. Medley, Judge
Judge Charles R. Jones
(Court composed of Judge Charles R. Jones, Judge James F. McKay, III, Judge
Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr., Judge Roland L. Belsome, and Judge Daniel L. Dysart)
(ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA)
BELSOME, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
Robert G. Harvey, Sr.
Justin A. Zitler
LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT G. HARVEY, SR., APLC
600 North Carrollton Avenue
New Orleans, LA   70119
--AND—
Darleen M. Jacobs
JACOBS SARRAT & LOVELACE
823 St. Louis Street
New Orleans, LA   70112
COUNSEL FOR EARL ADAMS, ET AL.
Henry T. Dart
Grady J. Flattmann
HENRY DART, ATTORNEY AT LAW, APLC
510 North Jefferson Avenue
Covington, LA   70433
COUNSEL FOR LEO POLLARD, ET AL.




George F. Riess
LAW OFFICE OF GEORGE F. RIESS & ASSOCIATES, LLC
228 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 1224
New Orleans, LA   70130
COUNSEL FOR DOTTIE ADAMS, ET AL.
Mary S. Johnson
Jill T. Losch
Ingrid M. Kemp
JOHNSON GRAY McNAMARA, LLC
21357 Marion Lane, Suite 300
Mandeville, LA   70471
--AND—
Thomas M. McNamara
JOHNSON GRAY McNAMARA, LLC
P. O. Box 51165
Lafayette, LA   70505
--AND—
Chad J. Mollere
JOHNSON GRAY McNAMARA, LLC
650 Poydras Street, Suite 1201
New Orleans, LA   70130
COUNSEL FOR KERR-McGEE OIL & GAS CORPORATION,
SHELL OIL COMPANY, SHELL OFFSHORE INC., AND SWEPI LP
Ronald A. Johnson
Bettye A. Barrios
JOHNSON JOHNSON BARRIOS & YACOUBIAN
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4700
New Orleans, LA   70139-7708
COUNSEL FOR BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY F/K/A
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY AND ATLANTIC RICHFIELD
COMPANY
Michael R. Phillips
Louis M. Grossman
KEAN MILLER HAWTHORNE D‟ARMOND McCOWAN & JARMAN
909 Poydras Street, Suite 1400
New Orleans, LA   70112
COUNSEL FOR CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., TEXACO INC., AND
UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA




Deborah D. Kuchler
Janika D. Polk
Michele Hale DeShazo
KUCHLER POLK SCHELL WEINER & RICHESON, LLC
1615 Poydras Street, Suite 1300
New Orleans, LA   70112
COUNSEL FOR CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY
Richard S. Pabst
Julie Parelman Silbert
KEAN MILLER HAWTHORNE D‟ARMOND McCOWAN
& JARMAN, L.L.P.
909 Poydras Street, Suite 1400
New Orleans, LA   70112
COUNSEL FOR MARATHON OIL COMPANY AND TRANSCO
EXPLORATION COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO EXCHANGE OIL
AND GAS CORPORATION
Christoffer C. Friend
Rene A. Curry, Jr.
Brett F. Willie
CURRY & FRIEND, PLC
228 St. Charles Avenue
Whitney Bank Building, Suite 1200
New Orleans, LA   70130
COUNSEL FOR OXY USA INC. AND PLACID OIL COMPANY
R. A. OSBORN, JR.
OSBORN & OSBORN, APLC
2439 Manhattan Boulevard, Suite 500
Harvey, LA   70058
COUNSEL FOR OFS, INC.
REVERSED AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS




This matter is before the Court pursuant to an order of remand by the
Supreme  Court  dated  November                                                                                            5,   2010.    The  order  directs  this  Court  to
reconsider the merits of these1 writ applications in view of the district court‘s May
26, 2010 order granting approval of a settlement class.  After a review of the issues
herein, we reverse and remand with instructions.
The facts underlying this matter are discussed at length in appeal No. 2008-
CA-1486.2      The scope of our review in the appeal concerned the judgment of the
district court denying class certification in this toxic tort case.    The denial of class
certification by the district court was based on the recommendations made by the
Special Master, who was appointed by the district court.   Ultimately, this Court
affirmed the judgment of the district court denying class certification on January
28, 2010.
1 The original writ applications 2010-C-788 and 2010-C-805 were consolidated.   The relators in writ 2010-C-805,
the Mitchell plaintiffs, subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the emergency writ application on November 15,
2010.   The order granting the dismissal was issued on March 15, 2011.
2 La. C.C.P. art. 592(A)(3)(b) has been amended to give any party the right to obtain the trial court's findings of fact
and reasons for judgment on a class certification decision, and to codify Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., 2003-0276, 2009-
1223, 849 So.2d 497 (La. 6/6/03) that class action certification judgments are appealable as of right.
1




On February 19, 2010, an emergency writ application, No. 2010-C-0250,
also entitled Leo Pollard, et al v. Alpha Technical, et al., was filed by the Earl
Adams, et al., plaintiffs (the Adams plaintiffs) in reference to the same toxic tort
litigation.     The Adams plaintiffs alleged therein that the district court, on January
11,  2010, rendered judgment granting the motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class  Settlement  urged  by  the  Plaintiffs‘  Management  Committee                      (the
respondents) which purported to include certain litigants.   Particularly, in the writ
application, we were presented with a disputed preliminary class settlement, but
there was no ―class,‖ as determined by the district court and affirmed by this Court
on appeal.    However, as reflected in the January 11, 2010 ex parte order attached
to the writ application, the district court had in fact approved a class settlement that
had been requested by the Plaintiffs‘ Management Committee.    We also noted that
while the district court purportedly approved the motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Settlement on January  11,  2010, the district court had been  clearly
divested of jurisdiction.                                                                  In our disposition, this Court:  (1) granted a stay of
proceedings  related  to  the  rendering  of  judgment  granting  the  motion  for
Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement pending the finality of the appeal, and
(2) vacated the district court‘s rulings on the motion for new trial and remanded the
matter for the district court‘s reconsideration.
Subsequently, in the instant consolidated writ applications,  2010-C-0788,
and 2010-C-0805, the Adams plaintiffs (and the Mitchell plaintiffs, respectively)
alleged that while the motion  for new trial  was before the district court  for
reconsideration, counsel for the Plaintiffs‘ Management Committee re-urged the
identical motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement and, that same was
2




once again approved by the district court via written judgment and reasons dated
May 26, 2010, followed by the detailed order dated May 28, 2010.
In its May 26, 2010, judgment and written reasons, the district court wrote in
pertinent part:
JUDGMENT AND REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This matter came for hearing on May 26, 2010 on
the Motion for New Trial filed on behalf of Defendant
Intracoastal Tubular Service, on Motion for New Trial
with Motion to Set Aside, Vacate and Annul Preliminary
Order filed on behalf of Earl Adams, et al. Plaintiffs, and
on Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial filed
on  behalf  of  Pamela  Mitchell,  Melvin  Lewis,  Rose
Benjamin, Rev. Johnny McKinnis, Rev. Calton Lewis
and Rev. Jerry Davis, Sr.   Additionally, the Court heard
argument on the Plaintiff Management Committee and
Settling  Defendants  Joint  Motion  to  Re-Urge  Joint
Motion  for  Preliminary  Approval  of  Settlement  and
Certification of Settlement Class and to Amend January
11,                                                                                2010  Order  to  Re-Set  Deadlines,  Objections  to
Preliminary Approval of the Settlement and Certification
of  the  Settlement,  and  Supplemental  Objections  to
Motion to Re-Urge Preliminary Approval of Settlement
Class and to Amend Deadlines for Opting Out.
*                                                                                  *                                                     *   *
The Court after considering the law, evidence and
argument of counsel, renders judgment as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Intracostal Tubular Service's Motion for New Trial is
DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that  Plaintiffs  Pamela  Mitchell,  Melvin  Lewis,  Rose
Benjamin, Rev. Johnny McKinnis, Rev. Calton Lewis,
and Rev. Jerry Davis, Sr.‘s Motion For New Trial is
DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Earl Adams, et al. Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial
with Motion to Set Aside, Vacate and Annul Preliminary
Order on the Grounds of ill Practice, Denial of Due
Process and Fraud Upon the Court is DENIED.
3




IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that  Earl  Adams,  et  al  Plaintiffs'  Objections  to
Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Certification of
Settlement Class are DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Earl Adams, et al Plaintiffs' Supplemental Objections
to the Motion To Re-Urge Preliminary Approval of the
Settlement Class and to Amend Deadlines for Opting out
is DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that  Plaintiff  Management  Committee  and  Settling
Defendants' Joint Motion to Re-Urge Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Certification of
Settlement Class and to Amend January 11, 2010 Order
to Re-Set Deadlines is GRANTED.
The two-step approach for approval of a settlement
class is laid out in Gates v. Rohm & Haus Co..  248
F.R.D. 434, 438-439 (E.D. Pa. 2008), Armstrong v. B. Q
of  School  Dirs.,                                               616  F.2d            305,314                    (7  Cir.                               1980),
overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134
F.3d                                                             873                  (7  Cir.                   1998);  In  re  Mid-Atlantic  Toyota
Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. l 379, 1384 (D. Md. 1983);
Horton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
855 F. Supp. 825,827 (E.D.N.C. 1994). First, the Court
issues a preliminary approval of the settlement, where the
court  reviews  the  proposed  settlement  for  obvious
deficiencies, schedules   a fairness hearing, and provides
the  class  with  notice  of  the  proposed  settlement  and
hearing. Second, the court considers the final approval of
the  proposed  settlement  at  a  formal  fairness  hearing
during which arguments and evidence are presented in
support of and in opposition to the proposed settlement.
On a motion for preliminary approval the Court
need only ascertain whether there is ―probable cause‖ to
notify  the  class  members  of  the  proposed  settlement
and.to  proceed  with  a  fairness  hearing.  Mid-Atlantic
Toyota,                                                          564  F.  Supp.  at   1384.  When  making  the
preliminary determination of fairness of the settlement,
the standard is not whether the settlement was the best of
all possible deals, but rather, "whether it is fair, adequate,
and free from collusion." Hunlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150
F.3d                                                             1011,                1027                       (9  Cir.                               1988).  When  a  proposed
settlement appears to fall within the range of possible
approval, it is appropriate to issue preliminary approval
4




and direct notice to members of the settlement class.
Horton, 855 F. Supp. 825 at 827.   Thus, for these reasons
the Court preliminarily approves the proposed settlement
class.
Additionally, Movers requested a new trial on the
basis that they had not received notice and were not
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Under La.
C.C.P. Art. 594(B), a formal hearing is not required until
after preliminary approval and notice of the compromise
has been provided to the class. Further, Rule 9.8 (c)(2) of
the Rules for Louisiana District Courts exempts parties
from filing contradictory motions in instances where all
affected parties have been joined in the filing of the
motion. Here, the settling parties were the only parties in
this case affected by the joint motion for preliminary
approval of the settlement. The Defendant objectors were
not 'affected" parties and the objecting Plaintiffs were not
parties  at  all.  Thus,  the  settling  parties  were  neither
required to obtain their consent to the joint motion nor to
set   the   joint   motion   for   contradictory   hearing.
Nonetheless, the Court set this matter for hearing on May
26, 2010, and all objections to the preliminary approval
of the settlement class have been heard. Thus, for these
reasons the Court finds that notice to the objectors was
sufficient and the requirements for preliminary approval
of the settlement class were fully satisfied.
New Orleans, Louisiana, May 26, 2010. [Emphasis in original]
In its Order Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement and Certifying
Class Action For Settlement Purposes, dated May  28,  2010, the district court
specified:
1.                                                                               Settlement Class:   The Court has considered the
submissions of the Settling Parties with regard to class
certification  for  settlement  purposes  only  and  has
analyzed  the  proposed  Settlement  Class  pursuant  to
Articles                                                                         591(A),                                                       (B)(l)(b),   (B)(3),  and                      (B)(4)  of  the
                                                                                 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. The Court finds
                                                                                 that  all  elements  necessary  for  certification  of  the
                                                                                 proposed  Settlement  Class  under  Articles                                                                                   591(A),
(B)(1)(b),                                                                       (B)(3)  and                                                                (B)(4)  have  been  satisfied….
[Emphasis added]
5




The district further indicated that the requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequate representation, class definition, and predominance were met by
the settling parties, and the district court went on to certify the following class of
plaintiffs as a settlement class:
…all  persons  or  entities  who  or  which  owned  real
property  and/or  lived  and/or  operated  a  place(s)  of
business and/or regularly worked, attended school, and/or
attended church from 1946 to June 30, 2008 within the
geographic boundaries of the properties in and between
the  point  beginning  at  the  intersection  of                                         8th  and
Manhattan Boulevard, then running south along the west
side of Manhattan Boulevard to Lapalco Boulevard, then
running west along the north side of Lapalco Boulevard
to the  1st Avenue Canal, then running north to Patriot
Street, then running west to MacArthur Avenue, then
running north along the east side of MacArthur Avenue
to 7th Street, and then running east to 8th Street to the
point  of  beginning  in  Harvey,  Louisiana,  Parish  of
Jefferson, and who or which claim to have sustained
damages as a result of the release or dispersion of toxic
and/or  hazardous  substances,  including  lead,  TERM,
NORM, radioactive substances and/or materials, and/or
associated dust generated, stored or released as a result of
oil  field  pipe  cleaning  operations  conducted  on  the
Property [as defined in the PSA] ... by or on behalf of one
or  more  of  the  Settling  Defendants  and/or  Released
Parties                                                                                  [as defined in the Settling Parties' Preliminary
Settlement Agreement].
Lastly, the district court further defined the geographic boundary as:
…beginning  at  the  intersection  of  Peters  Road  and
Breaux Avenue, thence Northerly along Peters Road to
the  northern  boundary  of  Square  J  Lot                                              11,  thence
Easterly  along  the  Northern  boundary  of  Lot                                        11  of
Square J to the western boundary of Square I, thence
Northerly along the western boundary of Square I to the
northern boundary of Square I Lot 35 of the Rathborne
Subdivision, thence Easterly along the northern boundary
of  Square  I  Lot  35  of  the  Rathborne  Subdivision  to
Grefer Avenue, thence Southerly along Grefer Avenue to
16th  Street,  thence  Easterly  along                                                   16th  Street  to  the
eastern boundary of the property owned now or formerly
by  the  Grefers,  thence  Southerly  along  the  Eastern
boundary  of  the  Grefer  Property  to  Breaux  Avenue,
6




thence Westerly along Breaux Avenue to the point of
beginning in Harvey, Louisiana.
After reviewing the writ application, this Court, on June 15, 2010, issued a
disposition finding that the district court‘s reliance on the case law therein was
clearly in error because there had not been a class certified.    We reiterated that the
district court had refused to certify a class, and that the respondents herein had
sought relief of the district court‘s failure to certify a class in appeal No. 2008-CA-
1486.                                                                                      We saw nothing in the previously filed appeal or the emergency writ
applications  either  certifying  or  defining  a  class.                                  We  further  noted  that
procedurally,  the  district  court  could  not  establish  a  new  methodology  for
approving a class settlement without first granting a new trial and then certifying a
class.
Nevertheless,  the  Adams  plaintiffs  sought  writs  of  certiorari  from  the
Supreme Court, and after its review, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to
this Court on November 5, 2010.  In its per curiam, the Supreme Court wrote:
[w]e  find  no  indication  that  the  court  of  appeal
considered the district court‘s subsequent May 28, 2010,
―Order Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement
and Certifying Class Action for Settlement Purposes,‖
although relators represent that a copy of the May 28,
2010  order  was  submitted  to  the  court  of  appeal.
Because the district court‘s May 28, 2010 order provides
detailed factual findings regarding the certification of a
settlement class for purposes of La. Code art 591(B), we
find that the court of appeal should have considered this
order before it vacated the district court‘s order granting
preliminary approval to the settlement and certifying a
class settlement.
On November 15, 2010, Mr. Geroge F. Riess filed a Motion to Withdraw
Emergency Writ Application to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Filed June 4,
2010.   (No. 2010-C-805), which this Court granted.
7




Subsequently, on December 2, 2010, this Court issued an order scheduling
briefing deadlines and directed the district court to provide a per curiam.     In its
per curiam, dated December 6, 2010, the district court wrote in pertinent part:
Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals‘ order
issued on December 2, 2010, the District Court reissues
its reasons for judgment as it's per curium as per the
order of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The  two-step  approach  for  approval  of  a
settlement class is laid out in Gates v Rohm &
Haas  Co.,                                                                               248  F.R.D.                             434,              438-439   (E.D.  Pa.
2008); Armstrong v. B. Of School Dirs., 616 F.2d
305,314 (7 Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds
by Felzen v Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th  Cir. 1998);
In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F.
Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Md. 1983); Horton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
825,827 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
First,   the   Court   issues   a   preliminary
approval of the settlement, where the court reviews
the proposed settlement for obvious deficiencies,
schedules a fairness hearing, and provides the class
with notice of the proposed settlement and hearing.
Second, the court considers the final approval of
the  proposed  settlement  at  a  formal  fairness
hearing during which arguments and evidence are
presented in support of and in opposition to the
proposed settlement.
On a motion for preliminary approval the
Court  need  only  ascertain  whether  there  is
"probable cause" to notify the class members of
the  proposed  settlement  and  to  proceed  with  a
fairness  hearing.  Mid-Atlantic  Toyota,                                                564  F.
Supp.  at                                                                                1384.  When  making  the  preliminary
determination  of  fairness  of  the  settlement,  the
standard is not whether the settlement was the best
of all possible deals, but rather, ―whether it is fair,
adequate,  and  free  from  collusion.‖  Hanlon  v.
Chrysler  Corp.,                                                                         150  F.3d  1011,                        1027  (96  Cir,
1988). When a proposed settlement appears to fall
within  the  range  of  possible  approval,  it  is
appropriate  to  issue  preliminary  approval  and
direct notice to members of the settlement class.
Horton, 855 F. Supp. 825 at 827. Thus, for these
8




reasons  the  Court  preliminarily  approves  the
proposed settlement class.
Additionally, Movers requested a new trial
on the basis that they had not received notice and
were not given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.  Under  La.  C.C.P.  Art.                                                                                             594(B),  a  formal
hearing  is  not  required  until  after  preliminary
approval and notice of the compromise has been
provided to the class. Further, Rule 9.8 (c)(2) of
the Rules for Louisiana District Courts exempts
parties  from  filing  contradictory  motions  in
instances  where  all  affected  parties  have  been
joined in the filing of the motion. Here, the settling
parties were the only parties in this case affected
by the joint motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement.  The  Defendant  objectors  were  not
"affected" parties and the objecting Plaintiffs were
not parties at all. Thus, the settling parties were
neither required to obtain their consent to the joint
motion nor to set the joint motion for contradictory
hearing. Nonetheless, the Court set this matter for
hearing on May 26, 2010, and all objections to the
preliminary approval of the settlement class have
been heard.    Thus, for these reasons the Court
finds that notice to the objectors was sufficient and
the requirements for preliminary approval of the
settlement class were fully satisfied.                                                                                       [Emphasis in
original]
In the remanded consolidated writ applications, 2010-C-0788, and 2010-C-
0805, the Adams plaintiffs once again argue that while the motion for new trial
was  before  the  district  court  for  reconsideration,  the  Plaintiffs‘  Management
Committee3  re-urged  the  identical  Motion  for  Preliminary  Approval  of  Class
Settlement and, that same was once again approved by the district court via written
judgment dated May 26, 2010, followed by a detailed order dated May 28, 2010.
The Adams plaintiffs also raised the following assignments of error:
3 We note that the Plaintiffs‘ Management Committee and the Settling Defendants make up what is composed of the
―settling parties.‖   The district court refers to the settling parties in its May 26, 2010 judgment, and its May 28, 2010
Order.
9




(1)    The  district  court  abused  its  discretion  in  recommending                    ―Zero
Recovery‖ for plaintiffs listed in Section 1 of the Notice Plan;
(2)  The district court abused its discretion by ―ignoring‖ Orill v. AIG, Inc.,
2009-0888 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/21/10), 38 So.3d 457; and,
(3)  The district court erred in failing to notice a ―Lack of Candor to the
Tribunal‖ by the settling defendants in the proposed Notice Plan.
DISCUSSION
This Court has held that ―the trial court can alter, amend or recall its initial
ruling  on  certification  and  may  enlarge,  restrict,  or  otherwise  redefine  the
constituency of the class or the issues to be maintained in the class action at any
time prior to a trial on the merits.‖   Marshall ex rel. minor children v. Air Liquide-
Big Three, Inc., 2008-0668 p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/08), 2 So. 3d 541, 550 (La.
Ct. App. 2008) writ denied sub nom. 2009-0105 La. 3/13/09, 5 So. 3d 125, La.
Code Civ. Proc. art. 592 A(3)(c); also see Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 98-0452
(La.App. 4 Cir. 11/4/98), 725 So. 2d 10.    Furthermore,
―[f]our  fundamentals  guide  our  review  of  class
certification cases[:]                                                                    (1) the standard of our review is
abuse of discretion; (2) we are to be guided by the state
and federal jurisprudence interpreting Federal Rule  23
and our own law; (3) for purposes of certification, a court
is not permitted to review the claims in a case on their
substantive merits; and (4) the burden is on the plaintiffs
to  establish  that  the  statutory  criteria  for  a  class
certification are met.‖                                                                   Duhe v. Texaco, 08-665, p. 3
(La. App. 3d Cir. 12/10/08), 998 So.2d 1220, 1222-23,
citing  Duhe v. Texaco, 779 So.2d 1070.
Thus, ―[a] trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class; it
also has the same discretion to amend or reverse its decision at any time.‖ Mathews
v. Hixson Brothers, Inc., 03-1065, p. 4 (La.App. 3rd Cir.2/4/04), 865 So. 2d 1024,
1028,  writ  denied,                                                                      04-0554                             (La.   4/30/04),   872  So.   2d  491.   Furthermore,
10




―Louisiana's class action statute is largely derived from Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.   Therefore, reference to cases that interpret the federal class action
statute  is  appropriate  where  there  is  a  lack  of  Louisiana  jurisprudence  on  a
particular issue. See, Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131, 133 (La. 1977) (stating
Louisiana class action statute was adapted largely from Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23).‖ Banks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 98-0551 pp. 6-7 (La. 12/7/98),
722 So. 2d 990, 994 on reh'g, 98-0551 (La. 7/2/99), 737 So. 2d 1275.
Preliminary Concerns
In Ford v. Murphy Oil Company U.S.A., Inc., 96-2913, pp. 4-5 (La. 9/9/97),
703 So. 2d 542, 544-45 on reh'g in part sub nom, 96-2913 La. 10/10/97, 710 So.
2d 235, the Supreme Court discussed the history of class actions as follows:
The  class  action  is  a  nontraditional  litigation
procedure permitting a representative with typical claims
to sue or defend on behalf of, and stand in judgment for,
a class of similarly situated persons when the question is
one  of  common  or  general  interest  to  persons  so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court. See Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte,
1 Newberg on Class Actions,  §  1.01, p.  1-2,  1-3  (3d
ed.1992).  The  purpose  and  intent  of  class  action
procedure is to adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect
on  all  common  issues  applicable  not  only  to  the
representatives who bring the action, but to all others
who are  ―similarly situated,‖ provided they are given
adequate notice of the pending class action and do not
timely exercise the option of exclusion from the class
action.
The class action originated in eighteenth century
English equity courts, as an exception to the rule that
joinder of all interested parties was necessary to obtain
complete justice. In the United States, the class action
procedure was available only in equity until 1938 when
the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  were  enacted.
Original  Rule                                                                             23  recognized  the   ―true‖  class  action,
which concluded the rights of all class members, whether
named in the suit or not; the  ―hybrid‖ class action, in
which  class members  made separate claims  against a
11




common  fund  or  property;  and  the                          ―spurious‖  class
action, in which the members of the class made separate
claims involving common questions of law or fact. The
―true‖ class action was described by original Rule 23(a)
as an action in which ―the right to enforcement for ... the
class was ... joint, or common, or secondary in the sense
that the owner of primary right refuses to enforce it and
class member thus becomes entitled to enforce it.‖ As
opposed to judgments in ―true‖ class actions, judgments
in                                                             ―spurious‖  and                                    ―hybrid‖  class  actions  did  not
determine the rights of absent class members.
In 1961, Louisiana enacted Articles 591-597 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, modeled after original Federal
Rule  23. However, the redactors of the Code of Civil
Procedure rejected the hybrid and spurious class action
models, authorizing only ―true‖ class actions. La. C.C.P.
art.                                                           591, Comment (c).   In 1966, Federal Rule 23 was
amended,  eliminating  the  three  categories  of  class
actions.  Accordingly, the statutes governing class actions
in  Louisiana  originated  from  the  federal  class  action
statute as it existed between 1938 and 1966, before the
explosion  of                                                  ―mass  tort‖  class  actions,  and  with  the
express legislative intent to recognize only ―true‖ class
actions under the original federal rule because of the
availability of Louisiana's liberal joinder and intervention
rules.
Because a ―mass tort‖ class action would typically
fall under the definition of a ―spurious‖ class action, now
superseded by Rule 23(b)(3), see Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, ----, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2245, 138
L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), it is problematic to apply Articles
591-597 in mass tort cases.
The Supreme Court has also held that:
La.  Code  Civ.  P.  arts.                                     591-597  were  modeled  after
Federal Rule 23 as originally enacted. After amendment
of Rule 23 in 1966, our courts have used the factors set
forth in Rule 23(b) as guidelines to determine whether to
allow  a class  action.  Stevens,                              309  So.2d  at  150-151.
Recently in Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 96-2913
(La.9/9/97); 703 So.2d 542, this court directed Louisiana
courts to be guided by the standards for class certification
set forth in Rule 23(b).   Rule 23(b)(3) provides that the
court must find that the questions of law or fact common
to  the  members  of  the  class  predominate  over  any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a
12




class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair  and  efficient  adjudication  of  the  controversy.  To
determine whether common issues predominate, a crucial
question is whether the case would be manageable as a
class action. The trial judge is given wide discretion in
determining  whether  to  allow  class  actions  using  the
factors listed in Rule                                                                23(b) and the  ―fairness‖ factors
enunciated in Stevens. See Ford, 703 So.2d at 547-548.
Banks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 98-0551, pp. 7-8                                     (La. 7/2/99), 737 So. 2d 1275,
1280.
Considering that the Louisiana statutes closely mirror Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, a close examination of the respective Rule and Articles is warranted.
In particular, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) Rule 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1)  the  class  is  so  numerous  that  joinder  of  all  members  is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if
Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1)  prosecuting  separate  actions  by  or  against  individual  class
members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent  or  varying  adjudications  with  respect  to
individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that,
as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests;
(2)  the party opposing the class has  acted or refused to  act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole; or
13




(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members,  and  that  a  class  action  is  superior  to  other  available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The
matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A)  the class members‘ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B)  the  extent  and  nature  of  any  litigation  concerning  the
controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C)  the  desirability  or  undesirability  of  concentrating  the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
(c) Certification Order; Notice to Class Members; Judgment;
Issues Classes; Subclasses.
(1) Certification Order.
(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable time after a person
sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must
determine by order whether to certify the action as a
class action.
(B)  Defining the Class; Appointing Class Counsel. An order
that certifies a class action must define the class and the
class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class
counsel under Rule 23(g).
(C)  Altering or Amending the Order. An order that grants or
denies class certification may be altered or amended
before final judgment.
(2) Notice.
(A)  For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class certified under
Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may direct appropriate
notice to the class.
(B)  For  (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule
23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best
notice  that  is  practicable  under  the  circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be
identified  through  reasonable  effort.  The  notice  must
clearly and  concisely state in plain, easily understood
language:
(i)                                                                         the nature of the action;
(ii)                                                                        the definition of the class certified;
14




(iii)                                                                   the class claims, issues, or defenses;
(iv)   that  a  class  member  may  enter  an  appearance
through an attorney if the member so desires;
(v)                                                                     that the court will exclude from the class any
member who requests exclusion;
(vi)   the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and
(vii)  the binding effect of a class judgment on members
under Rule 23(c)(3).
(3) Judgment. Whether or not favorable to the class, the judgment
in a class action must:
(A) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), include
and  describe  those  whom  the  court  finds  to  be  class
members; and
(B) for any class certified under Rule  23(b)(3), include and
specify or describe those to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice
was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be class members.   [Emphasis supplied]
(d) Conducting the Action.
(1) In General. In conducting an action under this rule, the court
may issue orders that:
(A)  determine  the  course  of  proceedings  or  prescribe
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication
in presenting evidence or argument;
(B)  require--to protect class members and fairly conduct
the action--giving appropriate notice to some or all
class members of:
(i)                                                                     any step in the action;
(ii)                                                                    the proposed extent of the judgment; or
(iii)                                                                   the members' opportunity to signify whether
they  consider  the  representation  fair  and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or to otherwise come into the action;
(C)  impose conditions on the representative parties or on
intervenors;
(D)  require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
allegations  about  representation  of  absent  persons
and that the action proceed accordingly; or
(E)  deal with similar procedural matters.
(2) Combining  and  Amending  Orders.  An  order  under  Rule
23(d)(1) may be altered or amended from time to time and
may be combined with an order under Rule 16.
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise. The claims,
issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily
dismissed,  or  compromised  only  with  the  court's  approval.  The
15




following  procedures  apply  to  a  proposed  settlement,  voluntary
dismissal, or compromise:
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all
class members who would be bound by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying
any agreement made in connection with the proposal.
(4) If  the  class  action  was  previously  certified  under  Rule
23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it
affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual
class  members  who  had  an  earlier  opportunity  to  request
exclusion but did not do so.
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires
court approval under this subdivision (e); the objection may be
withdrawn only with the court's approval.
In Louisiana, the procedure for class actions is found in La. Code Civ. P. art.
591, et seq.4    and provides:
A.   One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all, only if:
(1)                                                                                                                        The  class  is  so  numerous  that  joinder  of  all
                                                                                                                           members is impracticable.
(2)                                                                                                                        There are questions of law and fact common to
the class.
(3)                                                                                                                        The  claims  or  defenses  of  the  representative
                                                                                                                           parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.
(4)                                                                                                                        The   representative   parties   will   fairly   and
adequately protect the interest of the class.
(5)                                                                                                                        The class is or may be defined objectively in
terms of ascertainable criteria, such that the court
may determine the constituency of the class for
purposes of conclusiveness of any judgment that
may be rendered in the case.5
4 La. C.C.P. art. 591 was last updated via Acts 1997, No. 839, § 1, eff. July 1, 1997.   This version is current through
the 2010 Legislative Session.
5  These  collective  prerequisites  are  generally  known  as  numerosity,  commonality,  typicality,  adequacy,  and
identifiability (class definition). Louisiana procedural law requires that a class action be certified only if all five
requirements are present.
16




A.                                                                                       An action may be maintained as a class action only if all
of the prerequisites of Paragraph A of this Article are
satisfied, and in addition:
(1)                                                                                      The  prosecution  of  separate  actions  by  or
against  individual  members  of  the  class
would create a risk of:
(a)                                                                                      Inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual members of
the   class   which   would   establish
incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(b)                                                                                      Adjudications    with    respect    to
individual members of the class which
would  as   a  practical   matter   be
dispositive of the interests of the other
members    not    parties    to    the
adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2)                                                                                      The party opposing the class has acted or
refused   to   act   on   grounds   generally
applicable  to  the  class,  thereby  making
appropriate   final   injunctive   relief   or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole; or….
The Civil Law Treatise notes that under La. C.C.P. art. 591, if all of the
basic requirements are met, then four types of class action are potentially available,
each with separate additional requirements. The 591B(1) action is a class action
where the prosecution of separate actions by or against members of the class would
create a risk of ―inconsistent or varying adjudications … which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,‖ or a risk of
judgments which would dispose of or substantially impair the rights of other
members of the class who are not parties to the adjudication. The 591B(2) action is
one in which injunctive or declaratory relief would be appropriate to the class as a
17




whole because of the conduct of the party opposing the class. These two are the
traditional ―non-opt out classes,‖ and are the least common.‖6   (footnotes omitted.)
La. C.C.P. art.591(B)(3) provides:
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the  members  of  the  class  predominate  over  any  questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to these
findings include:
(a) The  interest  of  the  members  of  the  class  in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions;
(b) The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy  already  commenced  by  or  against
members of the class;
(c) The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation in the particular forum;
(d) The  difficulties  likely  to  be  encountered  in  the
management of a class action;
(e) The practical ability of individual class members to
pursue their claims without class certification;
(f)  The extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on
behalf  of  or  against  the  class,  including  the
vindication of such public policies or legal rights as
may be implicated, justifies the costs and burdens of
class litigation; or…
Regarding this aforementioned paragraph, The Civil Law Treatise provides:
The                                                                                            591B(3) class action may be maintained if the questions of law or fact
common to the class ―predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members,‖ and the class action ―is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.‖ The matters pertinent to findings of
―predomination‖ and ―superiority‖ include:
1.  the  interest  of  class  members  in  individually  controlling  the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
6 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 4:12 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
18




2.  the extent and nature of litigation already commenced by or against
class members;
3.  the desirability of concentrating  the litigation in the particular
forum;
4.  the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the
class action;
5.  the practical ability of individual class members to pursue their
claims without class certification; and
6.  the ―extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on behalf of or
against the class, including the vindication of such public policies
or legal rights as may be implicated, justifies the costs and burdens
of class litigation.‖7
Finally, La. C.C.P. art. 591(B)(4) provides ―(4) [t]he parties to a settlement
request certification under Subparagraph B(3) for purposes of settlement, even
though the requirements of Subparagraph B(3) might not otherwise be met.‖8    The
Civil Law Treatise Provides that ―[t]he 591B(4) provides for a ―settlement class
action,‖  which  permits  a  district  court  to  certify  a                                                             591B(3)  class  action  for
settlement purposes even though the specific requirements for the maintenance of
that type of class action are otherwise not met.‖    In addition, the Treatise indicates
that ―[t]he 591B(1) and (2) class actions apparently bind all members of the class.
The 591B(3) class action will bind members of the class who receive notice and do
not ―opt out.‖ The 1997 legislation does not provide for the binding effect of a
591B(4) settlement class action.‖
As mentioned above, the Civil Law Treatise § 4:12 identifies a ―third type of
class action… which has prompted the greatest use of the [class action] device.
7 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 4:12 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).   The Treatise notes that
―the third type of class action is the one which has prompted the greatest use of the device. This type originally was
the ―spurious‖ or F.R.C.P. Rule 23(b)(3) class action, which was not included in the original Louisiana Code, but
was subsequently crafted by the Louisiana courts. The 591B(3) action added to the Code in 1997 is a ―spurious -
type‖ class action, with some additional limitations upon its use.
8 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 4:12 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
19




This type originally was the  ‗spurious‘ or F.R.C.P. Rule  23(b)(3) class action,
which was not included in the original Louisiana Code, but was subsequently
crafted by Louisiana courts.   The 591B(3) action added to the Code in 1997 is a
‗spurious-type‘ class action, with some additional limitations upon its use.‖
Based on this review of the federal rule and the state statutes, it follows that
under Louisiana law, satisfaction of all elements of La. C.C.P. art. 591(A) is a
prerequisite for an action to be maintained as a settlement class under La. C.C.P.
art. 591(B)(4), even though the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 591(B)(3) need not
be met.
In their first assignment of error, the Adams plaintiffs argue that the district
court abused its discretion in recommending ―Zero Recovery‖ for plaintiffs listed
in Section  1 of the Notice Plan.   The Adams plaintiffs argue that they sought
review of the Notice Plan for the ―obviously deficien[cy]‖ on its face, and for the
plan ―substituting collusively inadequate representation‖9 to replace counsel for the
Adams plaintiffs.
In Davis v. Am. Home Products Corp., 2002-0942, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir.
3/26/03), 844 So. 2d 242, 249 writ denied, 2003-1180 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d
1279, this Court wrote:
The purpose and intent of a class action procedure
is  to  adjudicate  and  obtain  res  judicata  effect  on  all
common  issues  applicable  not  only  to  the  class
representatives who bring the action, but to all other
others who are similarly situated, provided they are given
adequate notice of the pending class action and do not
timely exercise their option of exclusion. Doerr v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 2001-0775, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/27/02), 811
So.2d 1135, 1141, writ denied, 2002-0920 (La.5/31/02),
817 So.2d 105, and writ denied, 2002-0938 (La.5/31/02),
817 So.2d 106.
9 This particular issue related to the adequacy of representation will be discussed in the second assignment of error.
20




Louisiana trial courts are afforded broad discretion
in determining the class certification issues, and have
wide latitude in considerations involving policy matters,
and those requiring a preliminary analysis of the facts.
Ellis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 550 So.2d 1310 (La.App.
1 Cir.1989), writ denied 559 So.2d 121 (La.1990).
Furthermore, in Guillory v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2004-1545 p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir.
11/2/05), 915 So. 2d 1034, 1036 writ denied, 2005-2430 (La. 3/24/06), 925 So. 2d
1233, the Third Circuit wrote:
La.Code Civ.P. art. 592(A)(3)(c) allows a trial court, at
any time before a decision on the merits, to enlarge,
restrict, or otherwise redefine the constituency of the
class or the issues to be maintained in the class action.   If
evidence  is  later  produced  establishing  that  the  class
boundary should indeed be made smaller than it presently
is, the trial court may reduce its size at that time.
As to the Federal rules regarding class notice, F.R.C.P. Rule 23(c)(2)(B)
provides:
For any class certified under Rule  23(b)(3), the
court must direct to class members the best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and concisely
state in plain, easily understood language:
(i)   the nature of the action;
(ii)  the definition of the class certified;
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses;
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance
through an attorney if the member so desires;
(v)  that the court will exclude from the class any
member who requests exclusion;
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion;
and,
21




(vii) the  binding  effect  of  a  class  judgment  on
members under Rule 23(c)(3).
In addition, F.R.C.P. Rule 23(e) requires that all members of the class be
notified  of  the  terms  of  any  proposed  settlement.    The  F.R.C.P.  Rule          23(e)
requirement is ―designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement and ‗to
apprise  class  members  of  the  right  and  opportunity  to  inspect  the  complete
settlement  documents,  papers,  and  pleadings  filed  in  the  litigation.‘‖  In  re
Prudential, 148 F.3d 283 at 326-27 (3rd Cir. 1998)(quoting 2 Newberg on Class
Actions § 8.32, at 8-109).  Furthermore,
Federal  Rule of Civil  Procedure  23(e) provides
that                                                                                     ―[a]  class  action  shall  not  be  dismissed  or
compromised  without  the  approval  of  the  court,  and
notice . . . to all members of the class in such manner as
the  court  directs.‖  Thus,                                                             ―class  actions‖  cannot  be
compromised without first obtaining court approval and
affording proper notice (and an opportunity to be heard)
to absent class members.
Clearly, Rule 23(e) paints with a broad brush. It
leaves to the courts the task of working out the practical
details.  Building  on  Rule                                                             23(e),  the  Federal  Judicial
Center's  current  Manual  for  Complex  Litigation—a
commonly-cited  resource  for  federal  courts  handling
class action suits—suggests a two-stage process. First,
the proposed settlement should be submitted to the court
for preliminary approval. Second, an order is entered
providing  for  notice  of  a  formal                                                    ―fairness  hearing,‖
during which the court will make a final determination as
to  whether  the  settlement  is  fair,  reasonable,  and
adequate.
Kent A. Lambert, Class Action Settlements in Louisiana, 61 La. L. Rev. 89, 91-92
(2000).
In Louisiana, while La. C.C.P. art. 592(B) provides that the district court
―shall direct to the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances…‖,
this  only  applies  to  actual  class  actions  maintained  under  La.  C.C.P.  art.
22




591(B)(3).10   The statute is silent as related to La. C.C.P. art. 591(B)(4) class.
However, we can extrapolate that F.R.C.P. Rule 23 applies with regard to allowing
actual and potential class members proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, La. C.C.P. art. 594, entitled Dismissal or Compromise governs the
settlement and notice procedure for certain class actions and provides:
A. (1) An action previously certified as a class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court exercising jurisdiction over the
action.
10 Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 592(B)(1), ―notice‖ for any action maintained as a class action under La.C.C.P. art .
591(B)(3), provides:
In any class maintained under Article 591(B)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class
the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. This notice, however given, shall be given as soon as practicable after
certification, but in any event early enough that a delay provided for the class members to exercise an
option to be excluded from the class will have expired before commencement of the trial on the merits of
the common issues.
La. C.C.P. art. 592(B)(2) provides:
The notice required by Subparagraph B(1) shall include:
(a)                                                                                                                    A general description of the action, including the relief sought, and the names and addresses of the
representative parties or, where appropriate, the identity and location of the source from which the
names and addresses of the representative parties can be obtained.
(b)                                                                                                                    A statement of the right of the person to be excluded from the action by submitting an election
form, including the manner and time for exercising the election.
(c)                                                                                                                    A statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion.
(d)                                                                                                                    A statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an
                                                                                                                       appearance through counsel at that member's expense.
(e)                                                                                                                    A statement advising the class member that the member may be required to take further action as
                                                                                                                       the court deems necessary, such as submitting a proof of claim in order to participate in any
recovery had by the class.
(f)                                                                                                                    A general description of any counterclaim brought against the class.
(g)                                                                                                                    The address of counsel to whom inquiries may be directed.
(h)                                                                                                                    Any other information that the court deems appropriate.
The Court notes that the Commentary of La. C.C.P. art 592 provides:
The notice provisions established by La Code Civ. Proc Ann art 592(B) expressly apply only to
class actions certified under the provisions of La Code Civ. Proc Ann art 591(B)(3), which sets out
one of the alternative additional requirements for maintaining a class action, requiring a finding
that the common questions of fact or law predominate over questions affecting only individual
members, and a finding that a class action is the superior procedural method for deciding the
controversy. When a class is certified because the trial court has made those findings, the court is
required by La Code Civ Proc Ann art 592(B) to direct that the members of the class be given "the
best notice practicable under the circumstances." Specifically, individual notice must be given to
all members of the class who can, through reasonable effort, be identified.
23




(2)  Notice of the proposed dismissal of an action
previously  certified  as  a  class  action  shall  be
provided to all members of the class, together with the
terms of any proposed compromise that the named
parties have entered into. Notice shall be given in
such manner as the court directs.
B. After notice of the proposed compromise has been
provided to the members of the class, the court shall
order a hearing to determine whether the proposed
compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the
class.  At  such  hearing,  all  parties  to  the  action,
including members of the class, shall be permitted an
opportunity to be heard.
C. The court shall  retain the authority to review and
approve any amount paid as attorney fees pursuant to
the compromise of a class action, notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary.
D. Any agreement entered by the parties to a class action
that  provides  for  the  payment  of  attorney  fees  is
subject to judicial approval.
E. If the terms of the proposed compromise provide for
the  adjudged  creation  of  a  settlement  fund  to  be
disbursed  to  and  among  members  of  the  class  in
accordance with the terms thereof, the court having
jurisdiction  over the class  action  is  empowered  to
approve the compromise settlement of the class action
as a whole and issue a final judgment accordingly,
following  a  finding  that  the  compromise  is  fair,
reasonable, and adequate for the class, and to order
the distribution of the settlement fund accordingly,
without  the  necessity  of  prior  qualification  of
representatives of minors, interdicts, successions, or
other incompetents or absentees, or prior approval of
the terms of the settlement or the distribution thereof
by another court; provided, that in such cases the
court having jurisdiction over the class action shall
include in the orders of settlement and distribution of
the settlement fund appropriate provisions to ensure
that all funds adjudicated to or for the benefit of such
incompetents, successions, or absentees are placed in
appropriate  safekeeping  pending  the  completion  of
appointment,    qualification,    and    administrative
procedures otherwise applicable in this Code to the
interests and property of incompetents, successions,
and absentees.   [Emphasis added]
24




In the instant matter, the Adams plaintiffs have raised objections to the
proposed Legal Notice and the Notice Plan.    The disputed Legal Notice provides,
in selected sections:
1.                                                                                  Why has this notice been issued?
The Court sent you this notice because you have a right
to know about a proposed settlement of a class action
lawsuit, and about all of your legal rights and options,
before  the  Court  decides  whether  to  approve  the
proposed settlement. If the Court approves the proposed
settlement, and after objections and appeals are resolved,
an administrator appointed by the Court will make the
payments that the proposed settlement allows. You will
be informed of the progress of the proposed settlement.
This  package  explains  the  lawsuit,  the  proposed
settlement, your legal rights, what benefits are available,
who is eligible for them, and how to get them.
The Court in charge of the lawsuit is the Civil District
Court, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, Division "D-16," and
the case is known as In re: Harvey TERM Litigation,
Case  No.                                                                           01-8708  and  all  consolidated  cases:  Leo
Pollard, Jr., et al. v. Alpha Technical Services, Inc., et
al., No. 01-8707 Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, Div. D, Sec. 16; Glenda Bailey, et al. v. Exxon
Mob// Corporation, et al., No.  01-8926, Civil District
Court for the Parish of Orleans, Div. A, Sec. 5; James A.
Williams, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al., No.
01-8959, Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
Div, C; Odile Gordon, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation,
et al., No, 01- 14101, Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans, Div. N, Sec. 8; Jo Ann B. Grigsby, et al. v.
Joseph Grefer, et al., No. 01-16364, Civil District Court
for  the  Parish  of  Orleans,  Div.  B.  Sec.                                      15;  Willie
Williams, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al., No.
01-18230, Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
Div. F, Sec. 10; Ida Rose Wilson, et al. v. Exxon Mobil
Corporation, et al., No. 01-19533, Civil District Court
for the  Parish of  Orleans, Div.  D,  Sec.                                         13;  John  H.
Cotton, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al., No. 01-
19938, Civil District Court for the Parish of    District
Court for the Parish of Orleans, Div. K, Sec. 14; and Phil
Burras, et al. v. Exxon Mobil corporation, et al., No. 02-
644, Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Div.
G, Sec. 11.
25




There are several other lawsuits that have been filed that
involve the same legal issues as those involved in this
lawsuit,  and  the  proposed  settlement  could  extend  to
many  of  the  individuals  who  have  sued  the  Settling
Defendants in those other lawsuits. Those other lawsuits
include the following: Willie Williarns, Jr., et al. v. Alpha
Technical  Services,  Inc.,  et  al.,  No.                      09-1795,  Civil
District  Court  for  the  Parish  of  Orleans,  State  of
Louisiana, Div. D, Sec.  16; Bernice Adams, et al. v.
Alpha Technical Services, Inc., et al., No. 669987, 24th
JDC, Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana; Mary Green, et
al. v. Alpha Technical Services, Inc., et al., No. 669995,
24th JDC, Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana; Brittany
Roache, et al. v. Alpha Technical Services, Inc., et al.,
No.                                                             669999,                                                 24"  JDC,  Jefferson  Parish,  State  of
Louisiana; Mary Louise Roussel v. Grefer, et al, Civil
District  Court,  Parish  of  Orleans,  State  of  Louisiana,
Docket No.  2005-06591; Earl A. Adams, Jr. et al v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc, et al, No. 02-19308, Civil District
Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Div. D, Sec.
16; Warren Lester, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et
al., No. 2002-19657, Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans,  State  of  Louisiana,  Div.  N,  Sec.                 8;  Warren
Lester, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation et al., No. 630-
402,                                                            24th  JDC

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