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STATE OF LOUISIANA                                                             *   NO. 2012-KA-1176
VERSUS                                                                         *
                                                                                   COURT OF APPEAL
AARON T. JOSEPH                                                                *
                                                                                   FOURTH CIRCUIT
                                                                               *
                                                                                   STATE OF LOUISIANA
                                                                               *
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 471-573, SECTION “J”
Honorable Darryl A. Derbigny, Judge
Judge Edwin A. Lombard
(Court composed of Judge Edwin A. Lombard, Judge Paul A. Bonin, Judge Daniel
L. Dysart)
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr.
District Attorney
Kyle Daly
Assistant District Attorney
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA
Christopher A. Aberle
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 8583
Mandeville, LA 70470-8583
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED




The State appeals the trial court judgment granting the defendant’s motion to
quash the indictment.  After review of the record in light of the applicable law and
arguments of the parties, we affirm the trial court judgment.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
On July 7, 2007, the defendant, Aaron T. Joseph, was charged by bill of
information with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in violation of La. Rev. Stat.
14:68.4.  On July 25, 2007, he pleaded not guilty at his arraignment.  After the
defendant failed to appear for a hearing on September 14, 2007, his bond was
forfeited and an arrest warrant issued.  He appeared for trial on September 30,
2009, and on October 28, 2009, but each time his trial was continued.  On October
19, 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft of goods valued over
five hundred dollars in Jefferson Parish and on October 30, 2009, he was sentenced
to serve five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.  On December
2, 2009, the defendant failed to appear for his trial in Orleans Parish, resulting in
the issuance of alias capias.  The matter was continued without date.
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On January 26, 2012, the defendant appeared in court in Orleans Parish for a
“filed arrest on capias notification” hearing.  Counsel for the defendant filed a
motion to quash the indictment, asserting that the State failed to commence trial
within the pertinent prescriptive period.  The State filed no written opposition to
the motion and, at the hearing on April 3, 2012, the State presented no evidence,
made no argument, and submitted no written pleading to the court in opposition to
the defendant’s motion to quash.  Accordingly, the trial court granted the
defendant’s motion to quash.  At that point the State took its only action with
regard to the defendant’s motion, noticing its intent to appeal.
Standard of Review
The trial court's ruling on a motion to quash should not be reversed in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Sorden, 2009-1416, p. 3 (La. App. 4
Cir. 8/14/10), 45 So. 3d 181, 183 (citations omitted).
Applicable Law
Louisiana's relevant statute provides that no felony trial, other than for a
capital offense, may be commenced after two years from the date of institution of
the prosecution.  See La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 578(A)(2).  This period shall be
interrupted if “[t]he defendant fails to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual
notice, proof of which appears in the record.  La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 579(A)(3)
(emphasis added); see also La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 579(B) (the periods of
limitation begin to run anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer
exists).  Upon expiration of the time period, the court shall, upon motion of the
defendant prior to trial, dismiss the indictment.  La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 581.
The purpose of the statute's mandating dismissal upon expiration of the
legislative time limits is to enforce the accused's right to a speedy trial and to
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prevent the oppression caused by suspending criminal prosecutions over citizens
for indefinite periods of time. State v. Romar, 2007-2140, p. 3 (La. 7/1/08), 985
So.2d 722, 725 (citing State v. Rome, 93-1221, p. 3 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1284,
1286) (citations omitted).  In addition, the “statutory scheme limiting the state's
time in which to commence trial after initiating prosecution prevents delays in the
administration of justice by imposing on judicial tribunals an obligation of
proceeding with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.”  Rome,
supra (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Because statutes of
limitation are the primary guarantee against inordinate delays and represent the
legislative balancing of the interests of the state against the interests of the
defendant, “these limitations should be given effect unless the state carries its
burden of showing valid grounds to support an interruption or sufficient suspension
of these time periods.”  Rome, supra.
When, as in this case, a defendant brings an apparent meritorious motion to
quash based on prescription, the State bears a heavy burden of demonstrating either
an interruption or a suspension of the time limitation such that prescription will not
have tolled.”  Rome, supra.
Discussion
In its appellate brief, the State asserts that on October 28, 2009, the
defendant “was notified in open court to appear on December 2, 2009.”  Therefore,
according to the State, the defendant’s case had not prescribed “because
prescription was interrupted after he failed to appear pursuant to actual notice;
there is nothing contained in the record to indicate that the State was aware of his
incarceration in another parish.”
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Notably, however, the docket entry which the State cites as evidence of
actual notice to the defendant states only “send notices” and “notify defense
counsel.”  The minute entry for that date (which the State does not cite) does note
that “the defendant was notified in court” but does not indicate the substance of
this notification.  Thus, the evidence that the defendant received actual notice of
the December 2, 2009, trial date is equivocal at best.  Moreover, under our
standard of review, we look to see if the State met its heavy burden in
demonstrating that the time limitation was interrupted or suspended and if the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash.  Under the
circumstances of this case, where the State failed to present to the trial court any
evidence (or even argument) that the time limitation had been suspended, we
clearly cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion
to quash.
Conclusion
We do not find that the  State met its heavy burden in demonstrating an
interruption to the time limitation or that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the motion to quash in the total absence of effort on the part of the State to
oppose the motion.  The trial court judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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