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STATE OF LOUISIANA                                                       *   NO. 2005-KA-1221
VERSUS                                                                   *   COURT OF APPEAL
RICHARD LLOYD                                                            *   FOURTH CIRCUIT
                                                                         *   STATE OF LOUISIANA
*
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 446-176, SECTION “J”
Honorable Darryl A. Derbigny, Judge
Charles R. Jones
Judge
(Court composed of Judge Charles R. Jones, Judge David S. Gorbaty, and
Judge Edwin A. Lombard)
Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney
David S. Pipes, Assistant District Attorney
1340 Poydras Street, Suite 700
New Orleans, LA   70112-1221
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
R. Judson Mitchell, Jr.
7214 St. Charles Avenue
Box 902
New Orleans, LA   70118
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT




AFFIRMED
Richard Lloyd appeals his conviction of fraudulently receiving
workers’ compensation payments in excess of $10,000.  We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lloyd was a fireman for the City of New Orleans who injured his knee
and shoulder while moving a fire hose on October 27, 1999.  On March 5,
2004, Lloyd was charged with one count of misrepresentations concerning
workers’ compensation benefit payments in excess of $10,000.00 from
September 1, 2000 through October 31, 2002, in violation of La. R.S.
23:1208C(1).  At his arraignment on April 13, 2004, he pled not guilty.
Subsequently, Lloyd’s trial commenced on May 25, 2004, at the Criminal
District Court for the Parish of Orleans.
Cain and Cochran Management Services, Inc. handled workers’
compensation claims for the City of New Orleans.  At trial, Kevin Pierre, a
claims supervisor for the company, testified that on the date of Lloyd’s
injury, Lloyd filed the required form indicating he had been injured.  Mr.
Pierre identified a Form 1025, the Employee Certificate of Compliance
form, which Lloyd signed on April 26, 2000.  Mr. Pierre testified that the




form advised Lloyd that he must comply with workers’ compensation
statutes, including reporting any earnings he received while getting
workers’ compensation benefits.  Mr. Pierre testified that from September
2000 through November, 2002, Lloyd received supplemental earnings
benefits (SEBs) from the City of New Orleans in connection with his
injuries totaling $26,108.91.  Mr. Pierre explained that SEBs are awarded to
injured workers who are unable to earn ninety per cent or more of their pre-
injury wages.
Mr. Pierre also identified State’s Exhibits 12-44, which were several
Form 1020 reports submitted by Lloyd.  Mr. Pierre explained that these
reports, Employee Monthly Reports of Earnings, are to be filed by all
injured workers receiving benefits.  Mr. Pierre testified Lloyd was required
to list on the 1020 forms if he was employed by anyone, was self-employed,
or owned a business while receiving his benefits, as he was previously
advised on the 1025 form he signed in April, 2000.  However, on none of the
1020 forms that Lloyd submitted did he indicate any earnings other than a
disability pension.
Mr. Pierre also identified State’s Exhibits 2-11, which were copies of
the SEB checks issued to and cashed by Lloyd.  He also identified State’s
Exhibit 45, which was a transaction table of monies Lloyd received from




September 2000, through November 2002, specifying the check numbers,
the date each check was printed, the dollar amount of each check, and the
classification or type of payment for each check.
Leon Naquin testified he was a senior file case manager for Intracorp,
a private rehabilitation company used by the City of New Orleans in
connection with workers’ compensation claimants.  He testified that he was
asked to conduct a vocational assessment of Lloyd’s wage earning capacity
and to provide job placement assistance to Lloyd.  He testified he met with
Lloyd on May 3, 2002 and took Lloyd’s medical history.  Mr. Naquin stated
that Lloyd had undergone surgery and participated in rehabilitation, and his
doctor released him for work in December 2000.  Mr. Naquin testified that
Lloyd told him he had been in the Army, had been a firefighter for twenty-
seven years, and before becoming a firefighter had been a bus driver and a
shipping clerk.  Lloyd also told him that he had been placed on disability
retirement from the New Orleans Fire Department.  Mr. Naquin testified that
his goal was to find part-time employment for Lloyd to supplement his
income, which Lloyd listed as $2100 a month from his disability pension
and $980 a month through workers’ compensation.  Mr. Naquin testified that
he prepared a transferable skills analysis.  He then took Lloyd to the Job
Service Office to help him register and investigate available jobs, and he




gave Lloyd job interview tips.  Mr. Naquin stated that he identified
approximately twelve potential jobs for Lloyd.  He testified that he worked
with Lloyd from May through August of 2002, and sometime around July he
had trouble getting in touch with Lloyd.   He testified he finally obtained
another contact number, and when he called that number, the background
noise sounded like a restaurant.  He testified that the person who answered
the call told him he would give the message to Lloyd.
Bea Matsukey identified herself as a compliance officer in the fraud
section of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Office.  She testified that
her job was to conduct investigations of possible workers’ compensation
fraud.  She testified that in early 2003, Management Services USA
(MSUSA), which she identified as a third party administrator for the City of
New Orleans, sent correspondence to her office concerning possible
workers’ compensation fraud by Lloyd.  Ms. Matsukey testified that she
received a complete copy of MSUSA’s file on the case, which included the
1025 and 1020 forms completed and signed by Lloyd.  The file also
contained medical and vocational rehabilitation reports, as well as reports
and a video from Paper Chasers, a private investigation firm.  After
reviewing the entire file, Ms. Matsukey concluded that Lloyd had violated
La. R.S. 23:1208 in that he was the owner of the Sportsman Bar and Lounge,




he worked there as well, and he did not include any earnings from the bar on
his 1020 forms.  She then submitted the file to the Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s Office.
Romy Samuels, the Alcohol and Beverage Manager for the City of
New Orleans through the Department of Finance, testified that her office
issues all liquor licenses for businesses in New Orleans that sell alcohol.
She testified that a party seeking a liquor license must come into the Alcohol
Beverage Outlet unit, submit an application for a license, and pay applicable
fees.  She testified that the Sportsman Lounge at 3120 Diana Street has been
in operation and had a liquor license since 1989.  She identified State’s
Exhibits 73-88, which were applications and copies of liquor licenses issued
to the Sportsman Lounge, and Lloyd was the applicant for the licenses.  She
testified that the applications listed Lloyd as the sole proprietor of the bar.
She identified State’s Exhibits 89-90, which were an amended application
and schedule showing Lloyd had purchased the property.  She also identified
exhibits 46-77, which were sales tax revenue forms generated by the City of
New Orleans showing sales tax remitted by the Sportsman’s Lounge, and
these exhibits indicated Lloyd made these sales tax payments.  Ms. Samuels
testified that Lloyd made quarterly sales tax payments, and she characterized
the payments as not reflecting substantial sales amounts.




Karen Thurman testified she was a branch manager for Cain and
Cochran, and she stated that she signs all checks issued for workers’
compensation payments.  She identified State’s Exhibits 2-11, the cancelled
checks she issued to Lloyd, which he cashed.  She testified that on the back
of all checks since March, 2001 is the warning:   “By endorsing or depositing
. . . payee certifies . . . circumstances affecting this entitlement have not
changed and no false statements or representations have been made.”  She
testified that the back of the checks also threatened civil or criminal penalties
for violation of this warning.
The State introduced exhibits S-1 through S-90, and the jury viewed
the exhibits.  The State then rested, and the defense rested without
presenting any evidence.
On December 1, 2004, a six-person jury found Lloyd guilty as
charged.  The court sentenced him on June 21, 2005, to five years at hard
labor, suspended, and placed him on five years active probation with special
conditions.  The court did not order restitution, noting that civil proceedings
would cover that issue. The court also granted Lloyd’s appeal on that date.
DISCUSSION
A.  Errors Patent
A review of the record reveals no patent errors.




B.  Assignment of Error
By his sole assignment of error, Lloyd contends that his right to a
meaningful review of his conviction has been denied because the district
court lost several exhibits used to convict him.  He argues that he intended to
attack the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, and that his
conviction was based upon these missing exhibits.  He maintains that
without these exhibits, this Court cannot review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction.
As per La. Const. art. I, § 19:
No person shall be subjected to
imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property
without the right of review based upon a complete
record of all evidence upon which the judgment is
based.  This right may be intelligently waived.
The cost of transcribing the record shall be paid as
provided by law.
Generally, cases raising the issue of the right to a meaningful review involve
missing transcripts.  See State v. Scott, 2004-1142 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/27/05),
913 So. 2d 843; State v. Sublet, 2005-0123 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/05), 904
So. 2d 778.  In Scott, this Court reiterated the three-part test for determining
whether omissions from an appeal record require reversal of the defendant’s
conviction, as set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Frank,
99-0553 (La. 1/17/01), 803 So. 2d 1:
In State v. Frank, 99-0553, p.21 (La.




1/14/01), 803 So.2d 1, 19-20, the Louisiana
Supreme Court enunciated a three-part standard for
reviewing incomplete record claims.  First, "[m]
aterial omissions from the transcript of the
proceedings at trial bearing on the merits of an
appeal will require reversal." 99-0553 at pp. 20-21,
803 So.2d at 19-20, citing State v. Robinson, 387
So.2d 1143 (La. 1980). . . Second,
"inconsequential omissions or slight inaccuracies
do not require reversal."  Frank, supra, citing State
v. Goodbier, 367 So.2d 356, 357 (La. 1979)
(declining to reverse when record did not include
transcript of voir dire examination and the court
reporter's affidavit indicated that no objections
were made by the attorneys during voir dire); see
also State v. Lyons, 597 So.2d 593 (La. App. 4
Cir.1992)(declining to reverse when record did not
include some of the jury charges, transcript of voir
dire, impaneling of jury or opening statement).
Third, and "[f]inally, a defendant is not entitled to
relief because of an incomplete record absent a
showing of prejudice based on the missing
portions of the transcripts."   Frank, supra, citing
State v. Castleberry, 98-1388, p. 29 (La. 4/13/99),
758 So.2d 749, 773.  However, this court has held
that under some circumstances a complete
appellate review of a conviction and sentence can
be accomplished, even when there are missing
portions of the trial record.  See, e.g., State v.
Cooley, 98-0576, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/99),
747 So.2d 1182, 1187.  An incomplete record may
be adequate for appellate review.  State v.
Hawkins, 96-0766, p. 8 (La. 1/14/97), 688 So.2d
473, 480.    Finally, a defendant is not entitled to
relief absent a showing of prejudice based on the
missing portions of the transcripts.   State v.
Castleberry, 98-1388, p. 29 (La. 4/13/99), 758
So.2d 749, 773.
State v. Scott, at pp. 8-9, 913 So. 2d at 849.




Here, Lloyd does not argue that the transcript of trial is incomplete.
Rather, he points out that most of the exhibits used by the State to obtain his
conviction have been lost in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  In support
of his assertion that his right to a meaningful appellate review has been
violated, he cites State v. Walker, 2002-1350 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/03), 844
So. 2d 1060.  In Walker, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first
degree robbery and one count of attempted first degree robbery.  Two of his
convictions were based in part on videotapes of the crimes and photographic
lineups.  None of the witnesses, however, identified the defendant at trial as
the perpetrator of those crimes.  On appeal, the videotapes and photo lineups
were missing, and the defendant argued his right to appellate review was
denied.  This Court agreed, distinguishing an earlier case by this Court
where a photographic lineup introduced at the suppression hearing was
missing at the time of appeal.  This Court stated:
This Court has reviewed its decision in State
v. Tucker, 95-0030 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/18/96), 682
So.2d 261, in which this Court stated that “where
the missing portions of the trial record are not
evidentiary, their absence does not compromise the
defendant’s constitutional right to a judicial review
of all evidence.” Id. at p.4 and at 263.  In Tucker,
this Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction
even though the photographs used in a photo line-
up were missing and not included in the record that
was available for this Court to review. In Tucker,
unlike in the instant case, the photo line-up was not
introduced into evidence at the trial. Therefore, the




evidentiary portion of the trial was made part of
the appellate record, and reversal was not
mandated in Tucker. In the instant case, however,
this Court does not have before it all of the
evidentiary portion of the record.
State v. Walker, at p. 11, 844 So. 2d at 1066.
This Court also noted the Supreme Court’s holding in State v Deruise,
98-0541 (La. 4/3/01), 802 So. 2d 1224, that a defendant is not entitled to a
new trial due to missing evidentiary portions of the record without showing
prejudice based on the missing evidence.  Nonetheless, this Court found that
the defendant’s right to a meaningful appellate review had been violated.
This Court stated:
Applying the guidelines set forth in the
Deruise case to the instant case, this Court finds
that the defendant is clearly prejudiced by not
having the missing evidentiary exhibits that were
introduced at trial. These exhibits were the critical
evidence considered by the jury in finding the
defendant guilty of first degree robbery of the
Orleans Avenue E-Z Serv and attempted first
degree robbery of the Owl Food Mart. The
videotapes and the photographs relating to the Owl
Food Mart incident constituted the physical
evidence that resulted in the defendant being
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Not only does this Court not have available for
review on appeal the critical evidence in the instant
case, appellate counsel is also denied the
opportunity to review the evidence that resulted in
his client, the defendant, receiving a life sentence.
In the instant case, appellate counsel is not the
same as trial counsel, so appellate counsel has




never had the opportunity to review the physical
evidence upon which his client was convicted.
This is clearly prejudicial to the defendant.
Additionally, this case is one in which the
defendant was convicted solely because he was
identified from three types of evidence: videotapes
of the crimes, photo line-ups, and testimony
describing the perpetrator and his clothing. There
was, however, no in court identification of the
defendant by any of the witnesses. Any weapon the
perpetrator may have had was never recovered, the
perpetrator’s clothing was never recovered, the
proceeds of the robbery were not recovered, and no
fingerprints were recovered. The defendant was
not arrested until more than two months after the
crimes, and he was arrested in another state. The
jury convicted the defendant based on his identity
as the perpetrator determined from the missing
videotapes, the missing photo line-ups, and the
testimony at trial. The only portion of this
evidence that is available for review on appeal is
the testimony describing the perpetrator and his
clothing. The perpetrator was described as a black
man between five feet six and five feet eight inches
tall weighing between one hundred forty and one
hundred fifty pounds. The  testimony identifying
the clothing worn by the perpetrator described
similar, but not identical, items of clothing,
clothing that was never recovered and, therefore,
not introduced at trial. Because this Court believes
that the missing videotapes and the missing photo
line-ups were very significant items of evidence,
and we must assume that they were heavily relied
upon by the jury to convict the defendant, it would
be both grossly unfair and unconstitutional under
Article 1, §19 of the Louisiana Constitution for
this Court to review the record in this case without
all of the critical evidence.
Although this Court assumes that the jury




was correct in its determination of the defendant’s
guilt in the crimes that occurred at the two stores
that had security cameras that videotaped the
crimes, the Louisiana Constitution does not permit
this Court to rely on the jury’s verdict without a
review of the entire record of the trial. There were
critical items of physical evidence introduced at
the defendant’s trial, and it is this Court’s
constitutional duty to review that evidence, as well
as the rest of the record of the trial proceedings, to
determine whether the defendant has received a
fair trial that comports with the requirements of
law, including the Louisiana Constitution and the
United States Constitution. In this case, this Court
cannot do this, because the critical evidence is
missing. We are, therefore, bound to reverse the
defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree
robbery of the Owl Food Mart and for first degree
robbery of the Orleans Avenue E-Z Serv. Because
this Court is reversing the conviction of the crime
for which the defendant was charged and convicted
as a multiple offender, his adjudication as a
multiple offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1
must be  reversed, also.
State v. Walker, at pp. 12-14, 844 So. 2d at 1066-1068.  Noting that these
exhibits were missing, that no witness identified the defendant at trial as the
perpetrator of these robberies, and that appellate counsel was not counsel at
trial, this Court held that the defendant’s right to a meaningful review of his
appeal were denied.
By contrast, this Court found no violation of the defendant’s right to a
meaningful review of his conviction where the jury verdict sheets were
missing from the appeal record.  In State v. Johnson, 2004-0178 (La. App. 4




Cir. 12/8/04), 892 So. 2d 28, this Court rejected the defendant’s claim,
noting that the trial transcript indicated that after the jury had returned into
open court, the court reviewed the jury sheets and found the verdicts to be
responsive to the bill of information and correct in form.  The district court
then read the verdicts into the record, noting that the verdict sheets were
dated and signed by the jury’s foreman.  In addition there was no objection
by the defense to the verdicts or any request for polling the jurors.
Here, the State introduced exhibit S-1 (Form 1025, Employee
Certificate of Compliance), S-2-11 (checks issued to and cashed by Lloyd),
S-12-44 (1020 forms, Employee Monthly Reports of Earnings), S-45 (the
transaction table showing the list of checks issued to Lloyd, with reasons for
the checks’ issuance), S-46-72 (sales tax revenue forms filed by Lloyd in
connection with his bar), S-73-88 (ABO applications by Lloyd and the
licenses issued to Lloyd’s bar), and S-89-90 (ownership papers concerning
the bar).  When the record was lodged, it contained no exhibits.  Just prior to
the storm, defense counsel moved to supplement the record with the exhibits
introduced at trial.  This Court’s request for these exhibits from the property
room of the criminal district court was mailed a few days before the storm.
The district court complied, but it produced only Exhibits S-1, S-2, S-11, S-
12, S-44, S-45, S-46, and S-72.  Defense counsel sought the rest of the




exhibits and was given time to find them and file them, but he could not find
them and he filed his brief without them.  Most likely, the rest of these
exhibits are lost.
Lloyd now contends that because these exhibits are missing, he is not
able to mount a defense of his conviction, citing Walker.  However, Walker
is distinguishable from the matter sub judice.  Unlike in Walker, here the
various witnesses fully described each exhibit, either individually or by type.
The exhibits here were not introduced to show identity; rather, they were
introduced to prove the elements of the crime, but again, they were fully
described so that the reviewing court knows what was in the exhibits.
Moreover, unlike in Walker where appellate counsel was not present at trial
and could not know exactly what was introduced or the quality of the
evidence introduced, appellate counsel here was also counsel at trial.  Thus,
he is familiar with what evidence was introduced at trial.
The appellant argues that he cannot raise a viable sufficiency claim
because the evidence introduced by the State to prove its case is lost.
However, from the existing exhibits and the trial testimony, it appears this
Court can review the record for sufficiency of evidence.  In State v. Brown,
2003-0897 (La. 4/12/05), p. 22, 907 So. 2d 1, 18, the Court set forth the
standard for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence:
When reviewing the sufficiency of the




evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana
appellate courts are controlled by the standard
enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under this
standard, the appellate court “must determine that
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a
rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the
crime had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Neal, 00-0674, (La.6/29/01) 796
So.2d 649, 657 (citing State v. Captville, 448
So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984)).
See also State v. Sykes, 2004-1199 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/9/05), 900 So. 2d 156.
Lloyd was charged with and convicted of a workers’ compensation
fraud valued at $10,000 or more, a violation of La. R.S. 23:1208, which
provides in pertinent part:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person, for
the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit
or payment under the provisions of this Chapter,
either for himself or for any other person, to
willfully make a false statement or representation.
*                                                                               *   *
C. (1) Whoever violates any provision of
this Section, when the benefits claimed or
payments obtained have a value of ten thousand
dollars or more, shall be imprisoned, with or
without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or
fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.
(emphasis added)
Thus, in order to prove the charge against Lloyd, the State had to prove that
Lloyd made false statements in order to receive workers’ compensation




benefits in the amount of at least $10,000.
In support of this charge, the State introduced various authenticated
forms, signed by Lloyd, wherein he failed to note that he was the proprietor
of the bar during the times alleged in the bill of information.  The bill of
information charged Lloyd with workers’ compensation fraud from
September 1, 2000 through October 31, 2002.  The State introduced S-1, the
1025 form Lloyd signed which contained the warning that in order to get his
SEB benefits, he must notify the agency of “the earnings of any wages, [or]
changes in employment or medical status.”  The State also introduced S-12-
24, the 1020 forms Lloyd was required to file each month in order to receive
his SEB benefits.  The 1020 forms provided to this Court (Exhibits S-12 and
S-14) covered December 1-30, 2002 and November 1-30, 1999, neither of
which is included in the period alleged in the bill of information.
Nonetheless, they show that the 1020 forms included the following
questions:   “2.  For the period covered in this report, did you receive a
salary, wage, sales commission, or payment, including cash, of any kind?   3.
For the period covered in this report, were you self-employed or involved in
any business enterprise?  These include but are not limited to farming,
sales work, operating a business (even if the business lost money), child
care, yard work, mechanical work, or any type of family business.”




(emphasis added)  At trial, Mr. Pierre testified that with respect to the 1020
forms submitted by Lloyd, Lloyd did not indicate on any of the forms that he
was self-employed or in any business enterprise.
Moreover, the State introduced certified documents showing that Cain
and Cochran Management Services, Inc. issued various checks to Lloyd on
behalf of the City for SEB benefits from a time period which included
September 2000 through October 2002.   Mr. Pierre testified that the
payments to Lloyd for SEB benefits during the time listed in the bill of
information totaled $26,108.91.  To prove that Lloyd operated the bar during
this time, the State introduced various ABO application and licenses issued
to the bar listing Lloyd as the sole proprietor during the time period covered
by the bill of information, as well as sales tax revenue statements filed by
Lloyd on behalf of the bar during the pertinent time period.  Romy Samuels
identified these exhibits and testified as to their contents.  Karen Thurman,
who issued the checks for Cain and Cochran on the City’s behalf, testified
that she personally signed the checks issued to Lloyd and that the checks
were cashed.  She also identified the checks.
Lloyd argues that he cannot raise his sufficiency arguments to this
Court because most of these exhibits are missing.  He appears to concede
that he answered “no” on the pertinent 1020 forms when asked if he was




involved in a self-business because he maintains that he did not list the bar
because it lost money during that time.  Unfortunately, however, the 1020
forms stated that he was required to list any self-business “even if the
business lost money.”  Thus, the forms explicitly informed Lloyd that he
was to list his business, even if it lost money, and he failed to do so.  In
addition, Mr. Pierre testified that Lloyd did not list the bar on any of the
1020 forms he submitted.  Therefore, the remaining forms and Mr. Pierre’s
testimony adequately proved Lloyd falsely answered question 3 on the
pertinent forms, proving the false statement element of the crime.
Lloyd also argues that the evidence does not show that the amount he
received was in excess of $10,000 because almost all of the checks are
missing.  However, the record contains S-45, the transaction table
authenticated by Mr. Pierre, which shows every check issued in connection
with Lloyd’s workers’ compensation claim, giving the date the check was
issued, the amount of the check, the person or entity to whom the check was
issued, and the reason for the check’s issuance.  The total payments listed on
S-45 issued to Lloyd under the classification “IND SEB” far exceeds
$10,000 for the pertinent period.  In addition, Mr. Pierre testified that the
total amount of SEB payments Lloyd received during the period alleged in
the bill of information totaled over $26,000.  The evidence in this record




supports the jury’s verdict.  Thus, Lloyd cannot claim prejudice from the
missing exhibits because testimony concerning the missing exhibits shows
that they would only have reinforced the jury’s verdict, not cast doubt on it.
As noted above, the issue in Walker was the robber’s identity, and the
missing exhibits, which were not available to appellate counsel, were
introduced to establish identity.  There was no trial testimony describing
content of the videotapes and the photo lineups which would have aided
appellate counsel, who was not trial counsel, in his sufficiency arguments or
this Court in its review of the defendant’s convictions.  By contrast, although
most of the actual exhibits are missing in this case, testimony at trial fully
described these exhibits’ contents, and this testimony is sufficient to prove
the State’s case.  Thus, it does not appear that the loss of these exhibits
unduly prejudiced Lloyd’s right to a meaningful review of his claim on
appeal of the insufficiency of evidence to support his conviction.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Richard Lloyd’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED

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