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STATE OF LOUISIANA                                                             *   NO. 2011-KA-1666
VERSUS                                                                         *
                                                                                   COURT OF APPEAL
SHERRY S. BRIDGES                                                              *
                                                                                   FOURTH CIRCUIT
                                                                               *
                                                                                   STATE OF LOUISIANA
                                                                               *
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 478-384, SECTION “J”
Honorable Darryl A. Derbigny, Judge
Judge Madeleine M. Landrieu
(Court composed of Judge Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr., Judge Paul A. Bonin, Judge
Madeleine M. Landrieu)
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr.
District Attorney
Scott G. Vincent
Assistant District Attorney
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/ APPELLEE
Katherine M. Franks
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 1677
Abita Springs, LA 70420--1677
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED IN PART;
REMANDED




Sherry Bridges entered a Crosby plea1 to one count of possession of a
controlled  dangerous  substance  in  violation  of  Louisiana  Revised  Statute
40:967(C)(2), maintaining her right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion
to suppress.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On May 28, 2008, Sherry Bridges was charged by bill of information with
one count of possession of crack cocaine in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute
40:967(C)(2).   Ms. Bridges pled not guilty.   The trial court held a preliminary
hearing on May 16, 2011 and found sufficient probable cause to substantiate the
charge.
Ms. Bridges filed a motion to suppress and produce evidence.   On July 21,
2011, the trial court adopted the May 16, 2011 preliminary hearing transcript and
denied Ms. Bridges’ motion to suppress.   At that time, Ms. Bridges withdrew her
prior plea and entered a plea of guilty under State v. Crosby, reserving her right to
seek appellate review of the trial court’s ruling on her motion to suppress.     The
trial court accepted the plea under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
1 State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).
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893 and immediately sentenced Ms. Bridges to one year at the Department of
Corrections.   The trial court suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Bridges on
active probation for one year.    As a condition of probation, Ms. Bridges was
ordered to pay $250.00 to the Judicial Expense Fund and $190.00 in court costs.2
Ms. Bridges timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACT
At the preliminary hearing, the only witness called was Officer Miguel
Aubert of the New Orleans Police Department.   Officer Aubert testified that on
May 5, 2008, he was assigned to the First District Task Force and that he and his
partner, Officer Laron Stewart, were conducting proactive patrol in the area around
Tulane Avenue.   They observed a blue Oldsmobile with a broken taillight and an
inoperable license plate light.    The officers pulled the Oldsmobile over at the
intersection of Tulane Avenue and South Tonti Street.     Both officers exited the
police car and approached the vehicle from the rear.  As Officer Aubert approached
from the  passenger side,  he  observed  Ms.  Bridges  lean  forward  towards  the
floorboard of the car as if she were attempting to conceal illegal narcotics or a
weapon.  For safety, the officers ordered the occupants, the driver and Ms. Bridges,
out of the vehicle.   The occupants complied and were escorted to the rear of their
vehicle.     Officer Aubert returned to the passenger side of the vehicle to see what
Ms. Bridges placed on the floorboard, and his partner remained with the occupants.
Officer  Aubert  testified  that  when  he  returned  to  the  Oldsmobile,  the
passenger door was open, and he observed a pack of Kools cigarettes on the car
2 There is a discrepancy in the record.   The minute entry provides that the trial court ordered Ms. Bridges to pay
$250.00 to the Judicial Expense Fund and $198.50 in court costs.   The transcript from the July 21, 2011 sentencing
hearing provides that Ms. Bridges pay $ 250.00 to the Judicial Expense Fund and $190.00 in court costs. When there
is a discrepancy between the minute entry and the transcript, the transcript prevails.   State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732,
734 (La.1983).
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floorboard with two crack pipes sticking out of the top of the pack.    He stated that
he  was  standing  within  the  doorway  of  the  vehicle  when  he  made  these
observations.   Officer Aubert also noted that the cigarette pack was located right
on the floorboard “at the tip” of the passenger seat: “it wasn’t shoved all the way
up under the seat.”
When Officer Aubert retrieved the cigarette pack, he found in the pack two
partially smoked marijuana cigarettes and a single piece of crack rock wrapped in a
napkin.   Officer Aubert admitted on cross examination that a person could legally
purchase glass pipes, like the ones found in the Kools’ cigarette pack, in a gas
station or convenience store.   Officer Aubert explained, however, that through his
experience as a police officer, he has seen these pipes being used to smoke crack
cocaine.   Based on the officers’ observations, Ms. Bridges was Mirandized and
arrested.  The driver of the Oldsmobile was issued a citation for the broken taillight
and license plate light.  The field test results confirmed that substances found in the
Kools cigarette pack were cocaine and marijuana.
ERRORS PATENT
Upon review of the record, this court has identified an error patent with
regard to the payments ordered by the trial court as a condition of Ms. Bridges’
probation.   At sentencing, the trial court ordered Ms. Bridges to pay the sum of
$250 to the Judicial Expense Fund as a “condition of her probation.”    The minute
entry of the sentence states in pertinent part,                                           “[T]he Defendant must pay the
following fines and fees.                                                                 $250.00 to the Judicial Expense Fund; $198.50 in court
cost (sic) . . .”
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 895.1(B) provides that when a
court suspends the imposition or the execution of a sentence and places a defendant
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on probation, it may order the defendant to make payment, as a condition of
probation, to a certain exclusive list of authorized recipients.  The Judicial Expense
Fund is not included in this exclusive list.   See, La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B).   Thus,
ordering the defendant to pay this fine to the Judicial Expense Fund is an error
apparent from an inspection of the record.
In the present case the sentencing transcript establishes that the trial court
ordered the defendant to pay $250.00 as a special condition of probation. As such,
the case must be remanded to trial court to modify  the special condition of
probation either by identifying an authorized purpose and recipient in accordance
with Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 895.1(B) or by deleting the
special condition of this $250 payment.3
DISCUSSION
Ms. Bridges’ sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in denying
the motion to suppress.   Specifically, Ms. Bridges claims that the “intrusion in the
car in which [Ms. Bridges] was a passenger constitutes an unjustified search” and
violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5
of the Louisiana Constitution.
The trial court is vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to
suppress and, consequently, the ruling of a trial judge on such a motion will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Oliver, 99-1585, p. 4 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 9/22/99), 752 So.2d 911, 914.   The district court's findings of fact on a
motion  to  suppress  are  reviewed  under a  clearly erroneous  standard,  and  its
ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is reviewed de novo.
3 See, Louisiana Revised Stature 15:571.11 and Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1381.4(A)(2)
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State v. Pham, 2001-2199, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/22/03), 839 So.2d 214, 218; U.S.
v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102 (5 Cir. 1993).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5
of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution protect a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy even while that person is within his automobile.  Both the federal and state
constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, and a warrantless search
and seizure is presumed to be unreasonable.   State v. Thucos, 390 So.2d 1281,
1286 (La. 1980).   In order to justify a warrantless search, the State must show that
the search  falls within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant
requirement.  State v. Barrett, 408 So.2d 903, 904 (La. 1981).
In this case, the State cites the plain view exception and inevitable discovery
doctrine in support of the search of car and the seizure of the evidence found
therein.4    In order for the plain view exception to apply, there must be prior
justification for police intrusion into a protected area and it must be immediately
apparent, without close inspection, that the item is contraband. State v. Norals,
2010-0293, p. 5, (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/30/10), 44 So.3d 907, 910 citing Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).
Here, the element of prior justification is satisfied because the officers
involved had probable cause to stop the Oldsmobile.    As a general rule, the
decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.   State v. Waters, 2000-0356, p. 4
(La. 3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056, citing, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).   The standard is an objective
4 Technically, the “plain view” exception to the requirement of having a search warrant is not really an exception
since it is premised on the idea that no “search” even occurred.   State v. Dowling, 387 So.2d 1165, 1169 (La.1980).
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one that does not take into account the subjective beliefs or expectations of the
police officer.  Waters, 2000-0356, p. 4, 780 So.2d at 1056, citing Whren, 517 U.S.
at                                                                                        813,  116 S.Ct. at  1774.      Although they may serve, and may often appear
intended  to  serve,  as  the  prelude  to  the  investigation  of  much  more  serious
offenses, even relatively minor traffic violations provide an objective basis for
lawfully detaining the vehicle and its occupants.  Id.
In the instant case, the record indicates that the taillight and the license plate
light of the Oldsmobile were not operating.   Accordingly, there was reason to
believe that that a traffic safety law had been violated and thus the officer’s
decision to stop the vehicle was justified.   It is well settled that once a vehicle is
lawfully stopped, the police have the right to order occupants out of a vehicle in
making a traffic stop.   Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137
L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); State v. Benoit, 2001-2712, p. 6 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So.2d 11,
15.
Ms. Bridges does not contest the reasonableness of the initial stop and
detention. The question presented here is whether Officer Aubert was justified in
searching under the passenger seat.   In State v. Davis, 612 So.2d 256, 258 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 1992), the defendant was speeding, and as the police officers pulled
next to him to wave him over to stop, they saw the defendant reach down and place
something under the seat.   The officers stopped the car, ordered the defendant out
of the car, and searched under the seat, finding contraband.   Id.   Prior to reaching
its decision in Davis, the Fourth Circuit reviewed State v. Archie, 477 So.2d 864,
865-866 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1985), in which this Court ruled that an exaggerated
motion as if to place something under the seat could easily lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that his safety or the safety of others was in danger and
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justified the search.   Id. at 259.   Based upon this Court’s holding in Archie, the
Davis Court found that the police were justified in looking under the seat after the
driver  and  passenger  exited  and  thus  upheld  the  search  and  seizure  of  the
contraband.  Id.
In the present case, Officer Aubert testified that after pulling the vehicle
over, he observed Ms. Bridges motion as if she were putting something under the
seat.   Thus, like the police officers in Archie, 477 So.2d at 866, and Davis, 612
So.2d at 259, Officer Aubert and his partner could reasonably believe that Ms.
Bridges was trying to hide or retrieve something, possibly a weapon.  Accordingly,
Officer Aubert was justified in ordering the occupants out of the car and searching
under the passenger seat.
Officer Aubert testified that it was immediately apparent to him that the item
on the vehicle’s floorboard was contraband.   Officer Aubert specifically stated that
when  he  saw  the  open  cigarette  pack  on  the  floorboard,  he                                                      “immediately
recognized two glass tubes which was (sic) used to smoke crack cocaine, one of
them which contained wire mesh.”5     See, State v. Aicklen, 2000-1181, p. 2 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 6/14/00), 767 So.2d 116, 118 (permitting the seizure of crack pipe
under the plain view doctrine when the officers observed “a little PVC pipe with
mesh wire” containing a residue).   Although Officer Aubert acknowledged that
glass tubes can be purchased legally from a convenience store, he testified that he
was an officer of the First District Task Force, a division which concentrates on
drugs and guns within the district.   Officer Aubert further stated that he suspected
that the glass tubes were crack pipes based on his experience as a police officer.
5 Officer Aubert also testified that the car door was already open and he was standing in the doorway when he made
these observations.   This further indicates that he was lawfully in a position from which he could view the cigarette
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Officer Aubert’s testimony demonstrates that he suspected that the cigarette pack
contained crack pipes without further inspection.
Louisiana  jurisprudence  provides  that  the  plain  view  doctrine  does  not
require a police officer to be certain that the object in plain view is contraband; it
simply requires that the officer have probable cause to believe the item in question
is either evidence or contraband.    Norals,  2010-0293, p.  5,  44 So.3d at  910.
“Immediately apparent” under the plain view exception means only that the officer
must have probable cause to believe an item is contraband.   State v. Dorsey, 2000-
2331, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/24/01), 779 So.2d 1008, 1013.
Here, through his experience in narcotics, Officer Aubert became aware that
glass  tubes  sold  at  convenience  stores  were  frequently  used  to  smoke  crack
cocaine.   As such, Officer Aubert had probable cause to believe that the cigarette
pack contained contraband.  See, State v. Hall, 555 So.2d 495, 499 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1989) (recognizing that through past experience, the officer’s observation in the
automobile’s glove box of plastic vials, loose white powder, and an open bag of
party balloons constituted probable cause to believe that the balloon dropped by
the driver of the automobile contained an illicit substance).
CONCLUSION
The record reflects that the Oldsmobile’s broken taillight and inoperable
license plate light provided the police with reasonable suspicion to make the traffic
stop  at  issue  here.    Once  the  vehicle  was  stopped,  Officer  Aubert’s  police
experience and the attempt by Ms. Bridges to hide something under the passenger
seat justified Officer Aubert’s search of the vehicle resulting in the discovery of the
pack and crack pipes as required to seize an item without a warrant under the plain view doctrine. See, State v.
Smith, 96-2161, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/98), 715 So.2d 547, 549.
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contraband.   Ms. Bridges behavior coupled with the plain view doctrine and the
fact that it became immediately apparent to  Officer Aubert that the partially
opened cigarette pack contained contraband justified Officer Aubert’s search of the
vehicle and seizure of the evidence.   We find no error in the trial court’s denial of
the motion to suppress.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm Ms. Bridges’ conviction; vacate her
sentence only insofar as it directs payment of $250.00 to the Judicial Expense
Fund; and remand the case with instructions to correct the sentence by modifying
the special condition of probation either by identifying an authorized purpose and
recipient  in  accordance  with  Louisiana  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  article
895.1(B) or by deleting the special condition of this $250 payment.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED IN PART;
REMANDED
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