Beaulieu et al. v. The Aube Corp.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2002 ME 79
Docket: Cum-01-61
Argued: April 4, 2002
Decided: May 15, 2002
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
BRIAN BEAULIEU et al.
v.
THE AUBE CORPORATION[1]
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Natalie Farrin and Brian Beaulieu appeal from two summary judgments entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Delahanty, J. and Humphrey, J.), determining that (1) Farrin's untimely notice of claim to defendant Aube Corporation doing business as The Cascade Inn (Cascade Inn) was without good cause pursuant to the Maine Liquor Liability Act, 28-A M.R.S.A. § 2513 (1988), and (2) Beaulieu failed to establish a prima facie case that the Cascade Inn negligently served Roy Crabtree liquor in violation of the Maine Liquor Liability Act, 28-A M.R.S.A. § 2506 (1988). Farrin and Beaulieu argue that the Superior Court erred in (1) determining that Farrin did not have good cause for her untimely filing, and (2) excluding Beaulieu's expert's opinion and granting judgment to the Cascade Inn. We affirm the judgments.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶2] The following case history is taken from the statements of material fact and supporting documents filed by the parties. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h). Where ambiguities exist, they are resolved in favor of the non-prevailing party on summary judgment. Green v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 673 A.2d 216, 218 (Me. 1996).
[¶3] On July 21, 1997, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Roy Crabtree left his home to go to the Cascade Inn in Saco for dinner. He was seated for his meal at 8:10 p.m., staying for around one hour and leaving the restaurant at approximately 9:00 p.m. That evening, Natalie Farrin was the passenger on a motorcycle operated by Brian Beaulieu. The two were travelling south on Route 1 when a vehicle operated by Crabtree struck the motorcycle as the vehicle was driven from the Cascade Inn driveway.
[¶4] A witness, Andrew Sparda, heard a "quick screech and then a bang," looked toward the accident, and saw Farrin and Beaulieu "go up in the air rather high" and then land. Sparda ran to the scene and found both persons on the ground. Farrin was unresponsive. Beaulieu was conscious and speaking.
[¶5] Sparda observed Crabtree get out of his vehicle and mumble something. Crabtree later claimed that he was speaking to the victims. The area was well lit by street lights and, at this point, Crabtree was approximately five feet from Sparda. According to Sparda, Crabtree exhibited signs of intoxication, including bleary, bloodshot eyes, a disheveled appearance, and slurred words. Sparda stated that Crabtree "just wasn't moving with any grace."
[¶6] After Sparda and Crabtree stared at each other for about five seconds, Crabtree got back in his vehicle and placed it in reverse, nearly running over Natalie Farrin's head, located just behind the rear wheel of Crabtree's vehicle. When Sparda looked up again, the vehicle was present but Crabtree was gone.
[¶7] Roy Crabtree did not return home, but instead walked around all night. The following morning, July 22, Crabtree reported to the Saco Police Department to turn himself in. A month later he admitted to a private investigator hired by Brian Beaulieu that he was served and drank a glass of wine while at the Cascade Inn.
[¶8] Farrin retained an attorney in early August 1997 to represent her in her claim regarding the injuries she sustained as a result of the collision with Crabtree's vehicle. That attorney's investigation of the collision consisted of obtaining police reports and statements of witnesses who were at the scene of the collision, none of which indicated that Crabtree drank alcohol at the Cascade Inn prior to the accident.[2] Farrin and her attorney decided to rely upon the work of the investigator hired by Beaulieu's attorney rather than incur investigation costs. At some point, this decision was communicated to Beaulieu's attorney, who agreed to share any information uncovered by his investigator.[3]
[¶9] Farrin's attorney did not learn that Crabtree had consumed alcohol at the Cascade Inn until she spoke with Beaulieu's attorney in early July 1999. At that time, she also learned that Andrew Sparda had given a statement that Crabtree appeared intoxicated at the scene of the collision. Farrin's attorney then prepared a notice of claim pursuant to the Maine Liquor Liability Act, which the Cascade Inn received on July 19, 1999. The Cascade Inn had received Beaulieu's notice of claim on November 10, 1997. Beaulieu's notice of claim included the allegation that the Cascade Inn had negligently served Crabtree alcohol on July 21, 1997, when he was "visibly impaired" and that such impairment contributed to the collision. See 28-A M.R.S.A. § 2506(2).
[¶10] Beaulieu and Farrin filed separate complaints against the Aube Corporation doing business as The Cascade Inn Restaurant in July 1999. The complaints alleged that the Cascade Inn negligently served Roy Crabtree liquor in violation of the Maine Liquor Liability Act (MLLA), 28-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2520 (1988 & Supp. 2001). The two complaints, including Beaulieu's negligence claim against Crabtree, were consolidated on October 19, 2000.
[¶11] On January 3, 2001, the Superior Court (Delahanty, J.) granted the Cascade Inn's motion for summary judgment with respect to Farrin.[4] The court determined that Farrin failed to establish good cause for filing a late notice of claim and that the notice was not made timely "merely because prejudice to the defendant [was] lessened when notice of the accident and personal injury claims was provided earlier by Beaulieu."
[¶12] On September 25, 2001, the Superior Court (Humphrey, J.) granted the Cascade Inn's motion for summary judgment with respect to Brian Beaulieu, finding that Beaulieu failed to establish a prima facie case for negligent service of liquor under the MLLA. Specifically, the court determined that Beaulieu's expert, Dr. Harvey Cohen, did not have a sufficient basis for expressing his opinion regarding Roy Crabtree's blood alcohol level or state of intoxication while at the Cascade Inn. The court concluded that Beaulieu failed to set forth a prima facie case establishing liability under the MLLA because "there is no [other] evidence of Crabtree's state of intoxication at the time he was served at the Cascade Inn."
[¶13] Beaulieu and Farrin's notice of appeal was filed on October 16, 2001. At that time, Beaulieu's negligence claim against Crabtree was still pending. In January 2002, upon Beaulieu and Farrin's motion, the Superior Court directed the entry of partial final judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶14] The entry of a summary judgment is reviewed for errors of law. Coulombe v. Salvation Army, 2002 ME 25, ¶ 8, 790 A.2d 593, 595. On review, we consider only the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set forth in the parties' M.R. Civ. P. 56(h) statements. Stewart v. Aldrich, 2002 ME 16, ¶ 8, 788 A.2d 603, 606. A trial court properly grants summary judgment for the movant if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stanton v. University of Maine Sys., 2001 ME 96, ¶ 6, 773 A.2d 1045, 1048. To avoid judgment as a matter of law in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action. Id. ¶ 6, 773 A.2d at 1049. Any findings for the plaintiff may not be based upon conjecture or speculation. Id.
A. Farrin's Notice of Claim
[¶15] The Maine Liquor Liability Act governs actions when a plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently served alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated individual, and that person's consumption of liquor proximately caused the subsequent injury for which the plaintiff seeks damages.[5] 28-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2504, 2506. As a precursor to pursuing a claim under this Act, a plaintiff "must give written notice to all defendants within 180 days of the date of the server's conduct creating liability." 28-A M.R.S.A. § 2513.[6] A plaintiff may avoid dismissal for failure to file a timely notice of claim if she "shows good cause why notice could not have reasonably been filed within the 180-day limit." Id.
[¶16] It is undisputed that Natalie Farrin failed to provide the Cascade Inn the requisite notice within the 180-day limit. She contends, however, that she had good cause for the eighteen