Blanchard v. Sawyer
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	2001 ME 18
Docket:	Pen-00-302
Argued:	November 7, 2000
Decided:	January 25, 2001

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.
Majority:	CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
Dissent:	WATHEN, C.J.

PATRICIA BLANCHARD et al.

v.

MARIA ROSE SAWYER et al.

DANA, J.

	[¶1]  Patricia Blanchard and Hazen Gray Blanchard appeal from a
judgment entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Marsano, J.)
affirming a judgment entered in the District Court (Newport, Gunther, J.)
that the 1994 judgment divorcing Patricia Blanchard and Malcolm Sawyer
(Newport, Hjelm, J.) unambiguously allowed Malcolm to change beneficiaries
on his life insurance policies, and allowed his estate to demand a release
deed for certain real estate from the Blanchards.  We affirm the judgment.
	[¶2]  In 1994, Patricia Blanchard (at the time, Patricia Sawyer) and
Malcolm Sawyer obtained a divorce judgment incorporating an agreement of
the parties.  The judgment required Malcolm to maintain his life insurance
policies{1} "presently in existence and which insure[] his life for the benefit of
Plaintiff and/or the daughter of the parties."  In addition, the judgment
required Patricia to deliver a release deed to certain real estate held in joint
tenancy with Malcolm, after Malcolm paid her $15,000 on a specified
schedule and paid off certain marital debts or the creditors released Patricia
from her obligations on those debts.  Before he died, Malcolm changed the
beneficiary on his life insurance policies from Patricia to their daughter,
Deanna Sawyer.  Patricia, as the surviving joint tenant, deeded the real
estate to herself and her new husband.
	[¶3]  Malcolm's estate moved for contempt, enforcement or
amendment of the divorce judgment and sought a judgment directing the
Blanchards to execute a release deed.  The Blanchards then commenced a
declaratory judgment action against the estate and Deanna to obtain a
determination of the meaning of the life insurance and real estate provisions
of the divorce judgment.  In its consolidated order, the court entered a
judgment in favor of Deanna with respect to the life insurance benefits, and
in favor of the estate concerning its right to demand a release deed.  The
Superior Court affirmed and this appeal followed.
	[¶4]  "When a settlement agreement is incorporated into a divorce
judgment, the settlement agreement 'becomes part of the judgment of the
divorce court.'" Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2000 ME 37, ¶ 9, 746 A.2d 358,
360 (quoting Murphy v. Murphy, 1997 ME 103, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 932, 934). 
"In resolving any ambiguity in a divorce judgment, it is the intent of the
divorce court, as revealed in the language of the judgment, that controls." 
Greenwood, 2000 ME 37, ¶ 9, 746 A.2d at 361 (citing Wardwell v.
Wardwell, 458 A.2d 750, 752 (Me. 1983)).  The language of a judgment is
ambiguous where it is "reasonably susceptible of different interpretations." 
Hughes v. Morin, 2000 ME 135, ¶ 9, 755 A.2d 513, 516 (quoting Portland
Valve, Inc. v. Rockwood Systems Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983)).
	[¶5]  "A court's construction of a divorce decree, like any judgment,
must be consistent with the language read as a whole and objectively
supported by the record."  Glew v. Glew, 1999 ME 114, ¶ 5, 734 A.2d 676,
679 (quoting Murphy, 1997 ME 103, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d at 934).  "When the
meaning of ambiguous language used in a judgment is determined by a
consideration of the language in context of the judgment, that meaning . . .
becomes a question of law for the court."  Hughes, 2000 ME 135, ¶ 10, 755
A.2d at 516 (quoting Bliss v. Bliss, 583 A.2d 208, 210 (Me. 1990)).  We
"review questions of law de novo."  Royal Ins. Co. v. Pinette, 2000 ME 155,
¶ 4, 756 A.2d 520, 523.  When the meaning may only be gleaned by
examining extrinsic evidence, however, the finder of fact determines the
meaning based on the evidence presented.  See Glew, 1999 ME 114, ¶ 7,
734 A.2d 679.
	[¶6]  The divorce judgment provides:  "Defendant is Ordered to
maintain the Prudential Life Insurance polic[ies] presently in existence and
which insure[] his life for the benefit of Plaintiff and/or the daughter of the
parties."  We conclude that the life insurance provision in the divorce
judgment is ambiguous because there are two reasonable interpretations of
the language.  One interpretation would provide that each policy "presently
in existence" as of the date of judgment must be maintained, as is, insuring
the benefit of Patricia Blanchard, Deanna Sawyer, or both, as each policy
provided at the time of judgment.  The other interpretation would require
only that Malcolm Sawyer maintain each life insurance policy and list (at his
option) Patricia Blanchard, Deanna Sawyer, or both as beneficiary.
	[¶7]  Because the life insurance clause stands alone, the judgment
itself does not reveal the court's intent.  The resolution of the matter is,
therefore, a question of fact for the trier of fact.  An appellate court may
review factual findings of a lower court only for clear error.  See Keybank
Nat'l Ass'n v. Sargent, 2000 ME 153, ¶ 35, 758 A.2d 528, 537; Westleigh v.
Conger, 2000 ME 134, ¶ 7, 755 A.2d 518, 519-20.  The District Court
found that, even if it had concluded that the judgment was ambiguous and
had taken into account the witnesses' testimony, it still would have decided
in Deanna's favor.  That finding by the court does not constitute clear error
because the record reasonably supports the court's finding.{2}  We conclude,
therefore, that although it was error for the court to conclude that the
judgment was unambiguous, the court's factual finding supports its order
that the divorce judgment gave Malcolm the power to change the beneficiary
from Patricia to Deanna.
	[¶8]  As to the real estate in question, the divorce judgment provides:

The Court orders that said real estate shall continue to be
held as joint tenants by the parties, provided, however,
that the Defendant, MALCOLM G. SAWYER, shall pay to the
Plaintiff, PATRICIA A. SAWYER [now Patricia Blanchard],
the total sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($15,000.00) within thirty-six (36) months of the date of
this judgment. . . . Upon payment of all sums due, and
evidence that all marital debts accruing prior to this
judgment in which Plaintiff is an obligor are paid (or
Plaintiff's liability thereunder is released by said creditor),
Plaintiff shall execute a release deed to Defendant of her
right, title and interest in said premises.

The court was correct in its determination that, because the death of a joint
tenant does not alter the survivor's obligation pursuant to the divorce
judgment, Malcolm's death did not alter Patricia's obligation to provide a
release deed.  See Fitzgerald v. Trueworthy, 476 A.2d 183, 185-86 (Me.
1984) (holding, where judgment was silent as to rights of survivorship, that
ex-husband's death did not alter in personam obligation of wife to sell house
and divide proceeds pursuant to divorce judgment).  The language of the
judgment itself reveals an intent to use the continuing joint tenancy to
secure Patricia against creditors and against any nonpayment of the $15,000
that Malcolm owed.  Because the estate has satisfied Malcolm's obligations to
pay Patricia $15,000 and to satisfy the marital debts, the Blanchards must
deliver a release deed.
	The entry is:
			Judgment affirmed.


WATHEN, C.J., dissenting.

	[¶9]  I respectfully dissent with respect to the life insurance benefits. 
In my judgment, the divorce decree unambiguously required Malcolm
Sawyer to maintain the life insurance policies as they were presently in
existence at the time of the divorce.  The judgment provides that Malcolm
must "maintain the Prudential Life Insurance polic[ies] presently in
existence and which insure[] his life for the benefit of Plaintiff and/or the
daughter of the parties."  The court concludes that this language is
reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that Malcolm had the discretion
to designate Patricia Blanchard, Deanna Sawyer, or both as beneficiary.  This
interpretation, however, is not supported by the language of the judgment.
	[¶10]  The single sentence in question has as its direct object the life
insurance policies that were "presently in existence."  The remainder of the
sentence describes the policies as those "which insure[ Malcolm's] life for
the benefit of Plaintiff and/or the daughter of the parties."  The use of the
present tense of the verb "insure" confirms unambiguously that the policies
that Malcolm must maintain are those which presently insure his life for the
benefit of Patricia, Deanna, or both.  The phrase "for the benefit of Plaintiff
and/or the daughter of the parties" is not a grant of discretion to Malcolm to
select a beneficiary but is, rather, a description of the life insurance policies
that were then in existence.  Accordingly, I would vacate that portion of the
Superior Court's judgment dealing with the life insurance proceeds.

Attorney for plaintiffs:

Philip R. Foster, Esq., (orally)
Foster Law Offices
P O Box 919
Ellsworth, ME 04605-0919

Attorney for defendant:

J. Hilary Billings, Esq., (orally)
Billings & Silverstein
P O Box 1445
Bangor, ME 04402-1445

FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . Although the original divorce judgment refers to a single policy, the parties do not dispute that the court and the parties intended that the clause apply to three policies. The judgment of the District Court (Gunther, J.) listed all three policies. {2} . The parties stipulated that at the time of the divorce Patricia Blanchard was the sole beneficiary under all three policies. The divorce judgment made no provision for alimony or any unsecured continuing benefit. Malcolm's attorney testified that it was his understanding that both Patricia and Malcolm wanted to take care of Deanna and that the language of the policy allowed Malcolm to designate Deanna a beneficiary.