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STATE OF MAINE  SUPERIOR COURT  
CUMBERLAND, ss.  . - CIVIL ACTION  
- - iz  DOCKET NO: RE-06-11 /' (ff,,t!/lLl.!'.A-! "f'  
BONNIE GIORDANO  
Plaintiff  
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S  
MOTION FOR SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT  

KATHLEEN HIGGINS Defendant
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Bonnie Giordano ("Giordano"), filed a complaint against Defendant, Kathleen Higgns ("Higgins"), in January 2006, seeking to foreclose on property in Harrison, Cumberland County, Maine, occupied by Higgins. On April 30,2001, Nggins had entered into a land installment contract with Ottavo Mazzuchelli ("Mazzuchelli"), Giordano's predecessor in interest. Tlus agreement provided that Higgins would occupy the property, make a down payment of $15,000, pay a monthly rent of $500, and pay taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses. In return, after fifty months, Mazzuchelli would convey title to Higgns; any default, however, would terminate the agreement. According to the complaint, an affidavit memorializing the aforementioned terms was filed with the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds at Book 22413, Page 55.
After an unsuccessful Forcible Entry and Detainer action in Bridgton District Court, Giordano filed the instant foreclosure action. She now seeks
summary judgment on the basis that Higgins defaulted on her contractual
obligations. Giordano contends that the most recent payment under the contract was made in 2003, no real estate taxes on the property have been paid since 2001, no maintenance has occurred, and no insurance had been obtained. In her opposition, Higgins contends that Giordano raised her "rent" to a rate that was impossible to pay, amounting to a constructive eviction. She further contends that the notice of default and right to cure provided by Giordano was improper under the statute and that interest is not provided for in the contract.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Lmine v. R.B.K. Caly Coy., 2001 ME 77, q[4, 770 A.2d 653, 655. A material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.Sobus, 2000 ME 84, q[6,750 A.2d 573,575.
In support of a motion for summary judgment, a party must file a memorandum of law. M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3). Moreover, the moving party must include with the motion a Statement of Material Facts, and each such fact must contain a reference to the record supporting that fact. M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(l); see also Lmine, 2001 ME 77,

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