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STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-05-161 , -' -0 - ci
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YORK, ss.

DONNA MURRAY, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL MURRAY, Defendant ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Michael Murray's motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56 and Plaintiff Donna Murray's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Also before this Court is Defendant's

motion to strike Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment and specific paragraphs of her statement of material facts. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Donna Murray ("Plaintiff") mamed Defendant, Michael Murray ("Defendant") in 1983. They had begun dating in 1977, while still in h g h school, and, according to Plaintiff, the relationship was abusive almost from the beginning. Plaintiffs allegations include that Defendant isolated her from family and friends, made insulting and degrading remarks to her on numerous occasions, and threatened her. She alleges that Defendant physically abused her on multiple occasions over the duration of their relationship. Also, Plaintiff alleges in her affidavit that he assaulted her after he overheard her speaking with another abused woman, which made her reluctant to communicate her situation to others. According to Plaintiff, she remained

in the marriage, believing that Defendant's behavior stemmed from alcohol and drug abuse and would change if those underlying issues were addressed. The parties had a daughter born in 1986. They resided together in Maine until they separated in 2002. Defendant claims that the marriage ultimately dissolved

because he believed that Plaintiff was unfaithful to h m and exposed him to the AIDS virus. Plaintiff, however, maintains that she was not unfaithful, but that Defendant was on several occasions. Defendant filed for divorce in 2003, and Plaintiff counterclaimed for divorce. The Springvale District Court entered a divorce judgment on August 18,

2004 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, awarding shared parental rights and
specifying a property division. Under this judgment, Plaintiff was obligated to either refinance the marital home to pay Defendant his equity or sell the home, dividing the proceeds evenly with Defendant. She appealed the property division order to the Law Court, but the judgment was affirmed.
On May 20, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, alleging violations of Maine's

Civil k g h t s Act ("MCRA") (Count I), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 11), and punitive damages (Count 111). Defendant claims that Plaintiff is attempting to re-litigate the divorce judgment as it pertains to property. He has moved for summary judgment on Counts I and 111 on the grounds that MCRA does not provide a remedy based on Plaintiff's allegations and that the punitive damage claim is not a separate cause of action. He also moves to strike portions of her opposing statement of material facts ("SMF") because they do not comply with the requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 56(h). Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on Count I, which Defendant moves to strike as untimely.

DISCUSSION
1. Summarv Tudnment Standard.

Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

M R .Civ. P. 56(c);

see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Coup., 2001 ME 77,

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Maine Law