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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2005 ME 4
Docket: Yor-04-236
Submitted
On Briefs: October 6, 2004
Decided: January 10, 2005
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
NORTHWOODS LAND COMPANY OF MAINE, LLC
v.
KENNEBUNK, KENNEBUNKPORT & WELLS WATER DISTRICT
CALKINS, J.
[¶1] Northwoods Land Company of Maine, LLC, appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Brennan, J.) declaring that its petition to the York County Commissioners for an assessment of eminent domain damages was untimely and that the condemnation amount established by the Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water District was final. We agree with Northwoods that its petition to the county commissioners was timely, and we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water District is a quasi-municipal corporation created in 1921 by the Legislature, and its charter is found at P. & S.L. 1921, ch. 159, amended by P. & S.L. 1957, ch. 86. The Legislature granted the District the power of eminent domain. Pursuant to that power, the District issued a condemnation order for a parcel of land owned by Northwoods. It served the condemnation order on Northwoods on March 15, 2002, along with a check for $85,000.
[¶3] Northwoods returned the check to the District with a letter stating that it rejected the damages amount, specifying its reasons, and making a counter-offer. The District again sent the check of $85,000 to Northwoods and offered to discuss the condemnation order. A few months later the District notified Northwoods that the time to contest the condemnation award had expired.
[¶4] On May 27, 2003, Northwoods took two steps: (1) it filed a petition with the York County Commissioners asking them to assess damages for the taking of its land by the District; and (2) it filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court, seeking an interpretation of the District's charter and a declaration that Northwoods was not precluded by any time limitation from pursuing relief before the county commissioners. The commissioners stayed action on the petition pending the Superior Court decision. In the Superior Court, the District moved for a summary judgment, and the parties stipulated to the pertinent facts. The court entered a summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Northwoods had not filed a timely petition with the commissioners and that the condemnation award was final.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] It is axiomatic that we review the grant of a summary judgment de novo. The only issue we discuss is whether Northwoods' petition to the county commissioners is untimely.
[¶6] To determine whether Northwoods was too late to petition the commissioners to assess damages for the taking of its land, we look first to the provisions in the District's charter regulating its power of eminent domain. The charter requires the District to file with the county commissioners a plan containing the location of the land to be taken. P. & S.L. 1957, ch. 86, § 3. With regard to the amount of compensation to be paid for the land, the relevant portion reads:
If any person sustaining damages by any taking as aforesaid shall not agree with said district upon the sum to be paid therefore, either party, upon petition to the county commissioners of York county, may have such damages assessed by them. The procedure and all subsequent proceedings and right of appeal therefrom shall be had under the same restrictions, conditions and limitations as are or may be by law prescribed in the case of damages by the laying out of highways.
P. & S.L. 1957, ch. 86, § 3.
[¶7] The charter itself contains no time limitation for petitioning the county commissioners to assess damages. Because the charter adopts procedures for the assessment of damages by the commissioners from other laws concerning eminent domain proceedings for highways, we examine the statutory schemes for assessing damages for highway takings. The parties have called our attention to three different highway eminent domain laws. First there is the statutory scheme concerning town ways. 23 M.R.S.A. §§ 3021-3035 (1992 & Supp. 2004). The municipal officers or the municipality determines the amount of damages for eminent domain for town ways. 23 M.R.S.A. § 3023 (1992). A person aggrieved by that determination may appeal to the Superior Court within sixty days. 23 M.R.S.A. § 3029 (1992).
[¶8] Second are the statutes dealing with the laying out of county highways. 23 M.R.S.A. §§ 2051-2067 (1992 & Supp. 2004). The county commissioners estimate the amount of damages, 23 M.R.S.A. § 2057 (1992), from which an appeal may be taken to the Superior Court, 23 M.R.S.A. § 2058 (1992). The appeal must be filed within thirty days. Id.
[¶9] Third are the statutes concerning state highways. 23 M.R.S.A. §§ 151‑161 (1992 & Supp. 2004). The statutory scheme for determining damages when the State exercises eminent domain for state highways requires the Department of Transportation to negotiate an agreement of just compensation with the owner. 23 M.R.S.A. § 154(2)(H) (Supp. 2004). If the amount offered by the Department is not acceptable, the owner may apply to the Department for a referral to the State Claims Commission within sixty days. Id. Even if the owner does not apply, the Department, immediately upon the expiration of the sixty days,