Palleschi v. Palleschi
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT				Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	1998 ME 3
Docket:	Was-97-145
Argued:	November 13, 1997 
Decided:	January 2, 1998

Panel:		WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and
		SAUFLEY, JJ.

MICHAELE PALLESCHI

v.

DONALD PALLESCHI

RUDMAN, J.

	[¶1]  Donald Palleschi ("Donald") appeals from the judgment entered
in the Superior Court (Washington County, Alexander, J.) in favor of
Michaele Palleschi ("Michaele") awarding her $200,000 in compensatory
damages and $50,000 in punitive damages on her claims of intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress and assault.{1}  On appeal, Donald
argues that the trial court erred by:  (i) not imposing the preliminary burden
on Michaele to prove the impossibility of apportionment of her damages; (ii)
considering evidence of abuse prior to the applicable statutory limitations
period; (iii) not granting his motion for a new trial based on the insufficiency
of the evidence; and (iv) not granting his motion for remittitur based on the
lack of evidence to support the damages awarded.  We disagree and affirm
the judgment.
	[¶2]  Michaele and Donald were married in July, 1983, separated in
May, 1994, and divorced in April, 1996.  Donald had a severe alcohol and
drug abuse problem during the period of the marriage.  He subjected his
wife to threats, degradation, dominance, sexual and emotional exploitation,
force, and physical assaults.  The most severe physical and sexual abuse of
Michaele by Donald occurred prior to January 27, 1989 -- abuse which
caused emotional and physical injuries to Michaele.{2}  The trial court found
that Donald's abuse of Michaele after this date aggravated these injuries and
that Michaele now suffers from post traumatic stress disorder, a conclusion
supported by expert testimony.  This appeal followed.

I.

	[¶3]  Our decision in Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091 (Me.
1995), makes clear the policy choice that, as between an innocent victim
and a tortfeasor, the law burdens the wrongdoer with the difficulties of
apportionment.  This policy choice is inherent in the single injury rule{3} as
applied to pre-existing injuries in Lovely -- an actor cannot limit his liability
because the injured party cannot meet a burden of proof as to
apportionment.  Barring recovery by the injured party absent this showing
defeats this policy.   The actor takes his victim as he finds him.  It is thus
"logical to place the burden on defendant to establish that portion of
plaintiff's present condition for which he is not responsible." Brittis v.
Freemon, 527 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); see also Lovely, 658
A.2d at 1094 (Lipez, J. concurring) ("That burden [on the defendant to
prove apportionment] is inherent in the defendant's claim that there should
be apportionment.").

II.

	[¶4]  Contrary to Donald's contention, the trial court did not exceed
the bounds of its discretion in admitting evidence of abuse that occurred
prior to the statutory limitations period.  The evidence was properly
admitted for the limited purpose of establishing Michaele's reasonable fear
of continued violence within the statutory limitations period -- fear which
the court found accounted for her post-traumatic stress disorder.  See Caron
v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Me. 1990).
	[¶5]  Nor did the trial court exceed the bounds of its discretion in
refusing Donald's motion for a new trial.  The record contains testimony that
Donald inflicted physical harm upon Michaele.  The assessment of the
credibility of this testimony falls squarely within the province of the
factfinder.  See State v. Glover, 594 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Me. 1991).
	[¶6]  Finally, we also find that the compensatory and punitive damages
awarded to Michaele are supported by competent evidence in the record. 
Although a damage award must be supported by some evidence in the
record, the damages need not be proved to a mathematical certainty. 
Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957, 962 (Me. 1996).   Proof of financial loss
need not be proffered for a court to award compensatory damages for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Vogt v. Churchill, 679 A.2d 522,
524 (Me. 1996).  Punitive damages are available if the plaintiff can establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct was
motivated by actual ill will or was so outrageous that malice is implied.  Fine
Line, Inc. v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Me. 1996).  The record supports
the court's award of both compensatory and punitive damages. 
	The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
                                                                         
Attorneys for plaintiff:

John P. Foster, Esq., (orally)
P O 249
Eastport, ME 04631

Rebecca A. Irving, Esq.
38 Broadway
Machias, ME 04654

Attorneys for defendant:

John S. Bobrowiecki, Jr., Esq., (orally)
Farris, Susi, Heselton & Ladd, P.A.
P O Box 120
Gardiner, ME 04345-0120

Dennis L. Mahar, Esq.
Fletcher & Mahar
P O Box 402
Calais, ME 04619

FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} Donald has not challenged the availability of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim between former spouses, and we therefore do not address that issue. {2} This action was commenced on January 27, 1995. The statute of limitations period for an assault claim is two years and the statute of limitations period for an intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is six years. Thus, the relate back dates for the events comprising the assault and emotional distress claims are January 27, 1993, and January 27, 1989, respectively. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-754 (1980). {3} The single injury rule can be summarized as follows: when joint tortfeasors by their separate negligent acts cause a single injury that is incapable of apportionment, each actor is liable for the entire amount of the damages. See Paine v. Spottiswoode, 612 A.2d 235, 240 (Me. 1992).