Sourthern Maine Prop. v. Johnson
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	1999 ME 37
Docket:	Cum-98-185
Submitted
on Briefs:	October 28, 1998
Decided:	February 19, 1999

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and ALEXANDER, JJ.

SOUTHERN MAINE PROPERTIES CO., INC.

v.

STEVEN G. JOHNSON

DANA, J.

	[¶1]  Steven G. Johnson appeals from an order of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Mills, J.) granting an attachment and an attachment by
trustee process for back rent owed to Southern Maine Properties Co., Inc.
(SMP).  On appeal, Johnson argues that the court violated his constitutional
right to a hearing by granting the attachments without oral argument.  We
disagree and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
	[¶2]  Johnson is the principal shareholder and chief executive officer
of Occupational Medicine Associates (OMA).  In 1988 SMP and Johnson
entered into a five-year lease of office space in Portland.  In 1992 the parties
signed a five-year lease extension.  In October 1996, SMP and OMA began
negotiating over another amendment to the lease in which OMA would
become the tenant to the premises and assume Johnson's obligations.  An
amendment was drafted substituting OMA for Johnson, but negotiations
failed when Johnson refused to personally guarantee the rental obligation
and none of the parties signed the proposed amendment. 
	[¶3]  Johnson continued in possession of the premises after the
expiration of the 1992 lease.  In January 1998 the court issued a writ of
possession granting SMP the right to immediate possession.  SMP then filed
a complaint and a motion for an attachment and an attachment by trustee
process in the amount of $104,839.89.  In his answer, Johnson asserted
that SMP had either relieved him of his obligations pursuant to the 1992
lease or had agreed to its novation and the substitution of OMA as the tenant.
	[¶4]  On February 8, 1998, without oral argument, the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Mills, J.) granted SMP's motion for an attachment and
an attachment by trustee process.  On February 12 Johnson moved for
reconsideration of the court's order which the court denied on March 14. 
On April 3 Johnson appealed.

I.  REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION AND TIMELINESS OF APPEAL

	[¶5]  SMP argues that Johnson did not file a timely appeal.  In
response, Johnson argues that the filing of his motion for reconsideration
tolled the running of the appeal period.  We agree and conclude that
Johnson's appeal was timely.  The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not
specifically provide for a motion for reconsideration, however, we treat such
a motion as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P.
59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
Madore v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 1998 ME 178, ¶ 15, 715
A.2d 157, 161; see M.R. Civ. P. 59(e);{1} M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).{2}  A prejudgment
attachment order is not a proper subject of a motion seeking relief from a
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).  See Spack v. Puorro, 1997 ME 13, ¶ 2,
689 A.2d 589, 589.  To hold that Rule 59(e) is also inapplicable to
prejudgment attachment orders would require parties to appeal to the Law
Court to remedy even inadvertent errors by the trial court.  Consequently,
we treat Johnson's motion for reconsideration as a timely motion to alter or
amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).  The filing of the motion tolls the
running of the appeal period.  M.R. Civ. P. 73(a) ("[T]he full time for appeal
. . . commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of [an order] . . . 
granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend judgment
. . . .").  Johnson, therefore, filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.  ORAL ARGUMENT FOR MOTION FOR ATTACHMENT

	[¶6]  Johnson argues that the court violated his due process right to a
hearing when it ordered the attachment without oral argument.  We
disagree.
	[¶7]  A prejudgment attachment violates due process "if the owner of
the property attached has not had prior notice of the attachment and
opportunity at a meaningful time to be heard concerning whether the
attachment would arbitrarily or unfairly deprive him of his property." 
Perkins v. McGonagle, 342 A.2d 287, 291 (Me. 1975);  see also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).  Accordingly, M.R. Civ. P. 4A(c) requires
that an order approving an attachment "may be entered only after notice to
the defendant and hearing and upon a finding by the court that it is more
likely than not that the plaintiff will recover judgement . . . in an amount
equal to or greater than the aggregate sum of the attachment . . . ." 
	[¶8]  Notwithstanding the requirement of M.R. Civ. P. 4A(c) that the
court hold a "hearing," we have held that a formal hearing with oral
argument is not required in a motion for attachment.  See Atlantic Heating
Co. v. Lavin, 572 A.2d 478, 479 (Me. 1990) (trial court did not err when it
ruled on motion for attachment without oral argument).  Trial courts, as a
matter of general practice, should accord litigants an opportunity for a
hearing when that opportunity is provided in the Rules, as it is in Rule
4A(c).  In Cumberland County, by special order of the court, however, "[a]ll
non-dispositive motions will be decided by the court without oral
argument."{3}  Moreover, in this case, Johnson was given adequate
opportunity to make his position known to the court by filing memoranda,
affidavits, and anything else he chose to present, in writing, in opposition to
the motion for attachment.  In reviewing the record, he has not
demonstrated any prejudice that occurred to him as a result of not being
accorded an oral hearing following the written submissions he had the
opportunity to present.
	[¶9]  The vacating of an order entered after a procedural error is not
automatic.  To vacate such an order, this Court must determine that it was
entered after a process that was "inconsistent with substantial justice." 
M.R. Civ. P. 61.  We have held that an appellant, to be successful, must
demonstrate both error and prejudice resulting to the appellant from the
claimed error.  See Phillips v. Eastern Me. Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308
(Me. 1989); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 103.5 (4th ed. 1997). 
Because no prejudice is demonstrated from the lack of an in-court hearing
here, the error, if any, in not according an in-court hearing is harmless.
	[¶10]  Finally, we conclude that Johnson's remaining claims are
without merit.{4}
	The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorney for plaintiff:

Christopher G. Jernigan, Esq.
Drummond, Woodsum & MacMahon
P O Box 9781
Portland, ME 04104-5081

Attorney for defendant:

Ralph A. Dyer, Esq.
Suite 1010
477 Congress Street
Portland, ME 04101

FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . M.R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides: Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. {2} . M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in pertinent part: Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . . {3} . The Pilot Project directing all civil matters to be assigned to a single justice was established August 12, 1993 by order of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court (Delahanty, C.J.). Administrative Order SJC-323, Special Assignment of Civil Cases in Cumberland and Somerset Counties (Aug. 12, 1993). The Chief Justice of the Superior Court (Cole, C.J.) approved and extended the Pilot Project and the local rules on September 17, 1996. Amendment to Administrative Order SJC-323, Special Assignment of Civil Cases in Cumberland County (Sept. 17, 1996). The local rules include the Order Supplementing the Expedited Pre-Trial Order, providing that "[a]ll non-dispositive motions will be decided by the court without oral argument." Order Supplementing Expedited Pre-Trial Order, revised June 1, 1997, and June 9, 1998. {4} . Johnson's principal remaining claim is that SMP filed a supplemental affidavit and memorandum of law addressing deficiencies in SMP's motion called to the court's attention in Johnson's response. Johnson claims that he was not given an adequate opportunity to respond to SMP's supplemental affidavit and memorandum of law prior to the court's ruling. Any deficiencies or prejudice was remedied when the court reconsidered its order in response to Johnson's motion.