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REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 202 SEPTEMBER TERM, 1996 ___________________________________

FREDERICK W. AHALT

v.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND

___________________________________

Fischer, Hollander, Eyler, JJ. ___________________________________

Opinion by Hollander, J. ___________________________________

Filed: December 24, 1996

Frederick

W.

Ahalt,

appellant,

sought

a

service-related

disability retirement from the Montgomery County Department of Fire and Rescue Services. The Montgomery County Merit System Protection

Board ("Merit Board") concluded that appellant's disability was permanent, but it denied appellant a service-related disability retirement. Thereafter, appellant sought review in the circuit Appellant now presents the following issue

court, which affirmed. for our consideration:

Did the circuit court err in not holding that the decision of the Merit Board was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and unlawful when reviewed under the facts and law of this case? As we perceive neither error nor abuse, we shall affirm.

Factual Background Ahalt had been a firefighter in Montgomery County for 22 years. He had attained the rank of master firefighter when he Appellant

began to experience pain and stiffness in his joints.

first sought medical treatment from his family doctor for pain in his foot, caused by what was later diagnosed as a bone spur. He

also began to have pain and stiffness in his neck, elbow, and knees, and sought treatment from Dr. Wei, a rheumatologist, in February 1991. Dr. Wei diagnosed appellant with osteoarthritis, a degenerative disease of the joints. Appellant's duties as a master firefighter included such tasks as climbing up and down ladders, crawling through burning

buildings, lifting and carrying stretchers and loading them into

ambulances, as well as a number of training and maintenance tasks that involved long hours of standing or walking on hard surfaces. According to appellant, his pain and stiffness began to interfere with his work performance in about February 1991. Ahalt's supervisor, Captain John Harris, According to pain,

appellant's

stiffness, and slowness had begun to affect his work about one year earlier. Dr. Wei's records place the onset of appellant's work

performance difficulties as one year previous to Dr. Wei's first evaluation. Dr. Wei opined that while there was no causal

relationship between firefighting and the onset of osteoarthritis, "the duties of [appellant's] occupation aggravate his condition." In March 1991, appellant was placed on light duty. The County

requested that he file a disability retirement, but he preferred to continue working in order to reach 25 years of service with the County. Moreover, he was not aware of any positions within the On July 24, 1991,

department that he would be able to perform.

Ramon Granados, who at that time was the Director of the Department of Fire and Rescue Services, requested a disability retirement for appellant. The County's disability retirement administrator, the

Prudential Insurance Company, granted appellant a temporary nonservice-connected disability retirement, effective December 7, 1991. Appellant appealed the decision to the County's

Administrator, claiming that his disability was permanent and

2

service-related.

After a hearing, the Hearing Examiner issued an

opinion recommending a temporary non-service-connected disability retirement. Appellant appealed to the Merit Board, which, in July 1993, issued an opinion recommending a temporary, non-service-related disability retirement, after review of the record but without holding a hearing. Thereafter, upon Ahalt's appeal, the circuit

court remanded the matter to the Merit Board for a de novo hearing. Subsequently, the Merit Board's Hearing Examiner determined that appellant had a total and permanent disability, "which was aggravated in an unspecified manner by his work environment." Nevertheless, the Hearing Examiner recommended denial of the

service-connected disability retirement, reasoning that "[t]he determinative issue on the Appellant's eligibility for a service connected disability retirement is purely a question of law and turns on whether or not the Appellant must show a link between his total incapacity and the aggravation of his condition in the work environment." Disagreeing with appellant's position that he was

required only to show that his condition was aggravated by the performance of his duties in order to receive a service-connected disability retirement, the Hearing Examiner concluded: The provision requires total incapacity for duty "as the natural and proximate result of" one of three events: an accident, an occupational disease, or a condition aggravated. Thus, a link must be established between the total incapacity and the event. The Appellant's condition, osteoarthritis, is the underlying cause of his 3

total incapacity based on uncontradicted medical evidence. The total incapacity was not caused by whatever aggravation the Appellant's job may have produced. This aggravation must be the natural and proximate cause of the total incapacity if the Appellant is to prevail and the evidence does not remotely suggest this possibility. It is clear that the Code provision requires an aggravation which is so significant that it has a causal effect on the totality and permanence of the incapacity. The Merit Board accepted the recommendations of the Hearing Examiner; it denied appellant a service-related disability pension. After appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision in the circuit court, he noted this appeal.

Discussion I. Our role in reviewing an administrative decision is "precisely the same as that of the circuit court." Dep't of Health & Mental

Hygiene v. Shrieves, 100 Md. App. 283, 303-304 (1994); see Moseman v. County Council, 99 Md. App. 258, 262, cert. denied, 335 Md. 229 (1994). Like the circuit court, we must review the administrative Public Serv. Comm'n v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,

decision itself.

273 Md. 357, 362 (1974); see Dep't of Econ. & Employment Dev. v. Hager, 96 Md. App. 362 (1993). "Judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow." United Parcel Serv. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 576 (1994). In reviewing the Board's decision, this Court

4

must not engage in judicial fact-finding.

Anderson v. Dep't of

Pub. Safety, 330 Md. 187, 212 (1993); Board of County Comm'rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 218 (1988). Nor may we supply factual Ocean Hideaway Condo.

findings that were not made by the Board.

Ass'n v. Boardwalk Plaza Venture, 68 Md. App. 650, 662 (1986). Moreover, this Court may not uphold the agency's decision "unless it is sustainable on the agency's findings and for the reasons stated by the agency." United Parcel Serv., 336 Md. at 577

(quoting United Steelworkers v. Beth. Steel, 298 Md. 665 (1984)); see Harford County v. Preston, 322 Md. 493, 505 (1991). Factual findings made by an agency are binding upon a

reviewing court, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. United Parcel Serv., 336 Md. at 577; Mortimer, 83 Md. App. at 441; Floyd v. County Council of Prince George's County, 55 Md. App. 246 (1983). than a scintilla of Substantial evidence has been defined as more evidence. Montgomery County v. Greater Further,

Colesville Citizens Ass'n, 70 Md. App. 374, 382 (1987).

the inferences reasonably to be drawn from the facts are also left to the Board. Holbrook, 314 Md. at 218 (citing Snowden v. Mayor

and City Council of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 448 (1961)); see Moseman, 99 Md. App. at 265. "'The Court may not substitute its

judgment on the question whether the inference drawn is the right one or whether a different inference would be better supported. The test is reasonableness, not rightness.'" Snowden, 224 Md. at 5

448 (citations omitted).

See People's Counsel for Baltimore County Moreover, an appellate in the light most

v. Mangione, 85 Md. App. 738, 751 (1991). court must "review the agency's

decision

favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity." Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass'n v. Employment

Security Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662-663 (1985). As we said in Mortimer v. Howard Research, 83 Md. App. 432, 441 (1989), a decision is "not in accordance with law" when it is arbitrary, illegal or capricious. In making a determination of whether the Board of Appeals' decision is arbitrary, illegal or capricious, the reviewing court must decide whether the question before the agency was fairly debatable. An issue is fairly debatable if reasonable persons could have reached a different conclusion on the evidence and, if so, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. The fairly debatable test is analogous to the clearly erroneous standard under Rule 8131(c) and a decision is fairly debatable if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. (Internal citations omitted.) In contrast of to law findings is not of fact, however, to an agency's Caucus

interpretation

entitled

deference.

Distributors v. Maryland Securities Comm'r, 320 Md. 313, 324 (1990); Maryland Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 59 (1958) cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). Arundel County, 73 Md. App. 301, 307 (1987). Gray v. Anne

When the question

before the agency involves interpretation of an ordinance or 6

statute, our review is more expansive.

Liberty Nursing Ctr, Inc.

v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 330 Md. 433, 443 (1993). We are not bound by the agency's interpretation. Id.; Department

of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Riverview Nursing Centre, 104 Md. App. 593, cert. denied, 340 Md. 215 (1995); Department of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Reeders Memorial Home, Inc., 86 Md. App. 447 (1991). Thus, "a reviewing court is under no constraints in

reversing an administrative decision which is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law." People's Counsel for Baltimore

County v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 316 Md. 491 (1989).

II. The parties agree that appellant is permanently disabled. Their dispute centers Appellant on whether a the disability is service-

connected.

seeks

service-connected

disability

retirement pursuant to

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