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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 18 September Term, 2009

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. RICHARD J. HAAS

Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Barbera JJ.

Opinion by Bell, C.J.

File: February 17, 2010

The issue this case presents is whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed in this case or, as the responde nt, Richard J. Haas, arg ues, a diffe rent and a m ore lenient sa nction is warranted. On motion of the Committee on Professional Standards (the Committee), the respondent was suspended from the practice of law by order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Cou rt, Th ird Ju dicia l Departmen t of N ew Y ork, date d M ay 5, 1997, pending compliance 1 with that court's February 14, 1997 order directing him to appear before the Committee to be examined under oath and to produce record s. In re Haas, 239 A.D.2d 658, 657 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1997). Neither what precipitated the motion leading to the order nor the docume nts the Committee sought is reflected in the record.2 In any event, the respondent

The court's order provided that the respondent be "suspended from practice, effective immediately and until further order of this court, pending his com pliance with this court's order entered F ebruary 14, 1997," and tha t, "for the period of suspension, respondent be ...commanded to desist and refrain from the practice o f law in an y form, either as principal or a s agent, clerk or employee of another;...[be] forbidden to appear as attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other pub lic authority or to giv e to anothe r an opinion as to the law or its application, or [of] any advice in relation thereto;" and that he "shall comply with the provisions of section 806.9 [22 NYCRR 806.9] of the rules of this C ourt reg ulating t he con duct of suspen ded atto rneys." Section 806.9 prescribes conduct that is prohibited after suspension and that which a suspended attorney must do insofar as notice to clients is concerned, requires filing proof of com pliance and de lineates require d recor dkeep ing.

1

According to the respondent, the order was the result of inquiries made by some of the respondent's former clients when they were unable to contact him and some of the documents sought were escrow documents related to a civil judgment that the respondent

2

subseque ntly filed, in A pril 200 3, for re instatem ent to the practice of law . His application was denied . Matter of Haas, 308 A .D.2d 6 56, 764 N.Y.S.2d 657 (2003). W hile the respondent's application to be reinstated to the practice of law was pending, the Committee filed petition of charges ag ainst the respo ndent. Matter of Haas, 3 A.D .3d 732 , 770 N .Y.S.2d 663 (2 004). The charges grew out of the respondent's representation of a defendant in the appeal of his mu rder co nviction . Id. As to that representation, the court found: "He neglected th e matter in vio lation of the a ttorne y disciplinary rules (see 22 NYCRR 1200.30 [a] [3]). Respondent accepted $ 15,000 as a retainer on the appeal but thereafter provided little or no legal services and converted the fee to h is own use (see 22 NY CRR 1200.3 [a] [5] [7]; 12 00.46 [ a], [c] [4 ])." Noting the reimbursement of the client by the Lawyers' Fund for Client P rotection, the respondent's having reimbursed to the Fund the sum of $ 600 and having confessed judgment to the Fund for the full am ount, the court conclude d, despite having heard the respondent's mitigation - the respondent suffered from end stage liver disease, which had "serious adverse effects on respondent pe rsonally and professionally" and required two suc cessive liver tra nsplants - that the respondent was "guilty of professional misconduct." Id. misconduct, it ordered3 : As the sanction for that

had recovered for one of those clients.
3

The court's order, in its entirety, stated: "Ordered that respondent is found guilty of professional misconduct as charged and specified in the petition; and it is further ordered that respondent is suspended from practice for a period of three years, effective May 18, 1998, and until further order of this Court; and it is further ordered that respondent is commanded to continue to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk, or 2

"that respondent should be suspended from practice for a period of three years, nunc pro tunc to May 18, 1998, the date of a letter from respondent to petitioner in which he admitted the conversion. Upon any reapplication for reinstatemen t, respondent shall make the showing required by this Court's rules (see 22 NYCRR 806.12 [b]), including the restitution ordered by this Court's decision which censured respondent in 1997 (Matter of Haas, 237 A.D.2d 729, 654 N.Y.S.2d 479 ), medical opinion ad dressing his current cap acity to practice law , complianc e with the attorney registration requirements (see Judiciary Law

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