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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG) No. 21 September Term, 2006

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Bonar Mayo Robertson

Bell, C.J. Raker *Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned) JJ.

Opinion by Bell, C.J. Harrell, J., Concurs

Filed: August 3, 2007 *Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Co urt; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Co unsel, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Bonar Mayo Robertson, the respondent. The petition charged, as a result of a complaint by Bar Counsel, that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, Competence,2 1.3, Diligence,3 1.4, Communication,4 5.5, Unauthorized Practice of Law,5 and 8.4, Misconduct, 6 of the M aryland R ules of Profe ssional C onduc t, as ado pted by M aryland R ule 16- 812.

Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: "(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approva l of the Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petitio n for D isciplina ry or Rem edial A ction in t he Co urt of A ppeals ." See also Rule 16-743, which specifically provides, in the context of the Peer Review Committee recommendation, that "[t]he Commission may (1) approve the filing of a Petition for Di sciplina ry or Rem edial A ction." Rule 1.1 imposes on lawyers the responsibility to "provide competent representation to a client, which the Rule defines as "requir[ing] the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Rule 1.3 re quires "[a] la wyer [to] act w ith reasonab le diligence a nd prom ptness in represe nting a c lient."
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Rule 1.4 provides: "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. "(b) A law yer shall explain a matter to the extent reaso nably necessa ry to permit th e client to make inform ed dec isions re gardin g the rep resenta tion."
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Rule 5.5 (a) prohibits a law yer from "practic[ing] law in a jurisdiction where doing s o violate s the reg ulation o f the leg al profe ssion in that jurisd iction."
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Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: "It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: * * * * "(d) en gage in condu ct that is p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice ." * * * *

We referred the case, pursuant to Rules 16-752 (a),7 to the Honorable Toni E. Clarke, of the Circuit Court for Princ e George's C ounty, for hearing pursuant to Rule 1 6-757 (c). 8 Following a hearing, at which the resp ondent appeared and participated, the hearing co urt found facts by the clear and convincing standard, as follows: "Upon consideration of the evidence presented, including assessing the credibility of the witness, this Court find s, by clear and c onvincing evidence the facts as set forth herein. "Defendant was admitted as a Member of the Bar of this Court on December 19, 1990. By Order of the Court of Appeals entered February 7, 2005, by consent, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law in the State of Maryland, effective May 1, 2005. "In May 2002, Ms. Donna Belle-Trottman, (hereinafter `Ms. Belle-Trottman' or the `Client'), retained Respondent to represent her as personal representative of the estate of her deceased daughter in a wrongful death suit. On June 8, 2004, Respondent filed suit in the

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Maryland Rule 16-752 (a) provides: "(a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing."
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Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: "(c) Findin gs and co nclusions. T he judge s hall prepare and file or d ictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party." 2

Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Spiniello Companies and the Washington Subu rban S anitary C omm ission. Petitioner 's Exhibits 2 and 3 . "On February 7, 2005, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law by Order of the Maryland Court of Appeals. This was a 90-day suspension, to begin on May 1, 2005. Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 3. Thereafter, sometime in the spring of 2005, before the effective date of suspension, Respondent and Ms. Belle-Trottman met in his office for her deposition. At that time, Respondent told Ms. Belle-Trottman that he was considering running for political office in Guyana and that, if he did so, William Jack son, Esquire, (hereinafter `M r. Jackson'), would handle her case. He told Ms. Belle-Trottman that he would let her know if he decided to do this. He did not tell her that he was to be suspended as of May 1, 2005. Respondent never advised Ms. Belle-Trottman that he was running for office or that he would be away in the summer of 2005. When Respondent's suspension took effect on May 1, 2005, Respondent was the only counsel of record in Ms. Belle-Trottman's wrongful death case in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland. "In conjunction with Respondent's Joint Petition to the Court of Appeals requesting a 90-day suspension, he signed an Affidavit stating that he would comply with Maryland Rule 16-760. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-760 (c), Respondent had a duty to write Ms. Belle-Trottman a letter within fifteen days of the date of the Order, advising her of the Order suspending him from the practice of law and the fact that he would be unable to practice law after the effective date of that Order. The incontrovertible testimony of Respondent was that he did not completely read the Affidavit he signed, nor did he read Maryland Rule 16-760.

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Petitioner's Exhibit 3 at 3, 10, 11, 52-53, and Exhibit 9 . Respon dent did no t at any time ma il Ms. Belle-Trottman a letter advising her of his suspension, as required by Maryland Rule 16760, nor did he know what that Rule required. Respondent did not withdraw as counsel of record as required by Maryland R ule 16-760(c)(5), [9] nor did he, at any time advise Ms. BelleTrottman that M r. Jackson, or any other attorney, would be representing her. "Shortly after the suspension took effect, Respondent left the Washington, D.C. area. At that time, he believed that reinstatement would be automatic and that he would not have to file a Petition for reinstatement, as required by Maryland Rule 16-781. Respondent has never filed a Petition fo r reinstateme nt. "On or about June 6, 2005, Defendants Spiniello Companies and Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in Ms. BelleTrottma n's wrongf ul death cas e. Shortly after the filing of this motion, Mr. Jackson, and a paralegal in that office, told Respondent that a Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 [at] 15. Respon dent asked if his name was still on the case and said that if it was , he had to take c are of it. Petitioner's Exhibit 3[at]14-15. Respon dent did not advise Ms. Belle-Trottman of the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, or cause anyone to advis e her of the filing . Petitioner's Exhibit 3 [at] 15. Respondent did not file a Motion to Withdraw as c ounsel after learning of the Motion for S ummary Jud gment. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 [at] 15. Respondent's uncontested testimony was that he believed he

The requ irement that a responde nt withdraw from a clien t matter is con tained in Rule 16-7 60 (c) (6). Su bparagrap h (c) (5) perta ins to the resp onsibility of the law yer to notify the client of the susp ension within 15 days o f the su spensio n order . 4

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would be automatically reinstated before the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment and would be able to file a res ponse to it. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 [at] 19-21. No one filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment within the time required by M aryland Rule 2-311(b). "In July 2005, Re sponden t received a c all from the A ttorney who represented him in the suspension case, Thomas Witkop, Esquire, (hereinafter `Mr. Witkop'), advising Respondent that additional steps needed to be taken to comply with the Court's suspension Order, before Respondent could be reinstated. When Respondent received th is message, he was out of the country and advised Mr. Witkop that he would take care of these matters when he returned. Towards the end of July or the beginning of August 2005, Respondent realized that his reinstatement to the practice of law would not automatically occur after the expiration of the 90-day suspension. "Respondent continued to remain of record in Ms. Belle-Trottman's case; she did not learn of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment through Respondent, or any other attor ney. Ms. Belle-Trottman testified that Respondent never advised her of his suspension and that he had to withdraw from her case, nor did he advise her of the pending Motion for Summ ary Judgme nt. "In September 2005, Respondent, with the assistance of a law clerk, prepared a response to the Mo tion for Su mmary Jud gment in Ms. Belle-Trottman's case. The response to the motion carried a signature line for Respondent and no signature line for any other attor ney. Petitioner's Exhibits 3 & 5. Respondent gave Mr. Jackson the response to the

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Motion for Summary Judgment right before the hearing on the M otion. Petitioner's Ex hibit 3 [at] 24. On September 21, 2005, Mr. Jackson appeared on behalf of Ms. Belle-Trottman and filed a Line substituting his appearance as counsel for Respondent's appearance. On the same date, he filed the respon se to the Motio n for S umm ary Judg ment. Petitioner's Ex hibit 2 . After a he aring on the Motion , judgmen t was entered against Ms. Belle-Trottman. Petition er's Exhibit 2 . Respondent never advised her that the judgment had been entered against her. No one advised Ms . Belle-Trottm an that M r. Jackson w as going to enter his appea rance f or her a nd opp ose the Motio n for S umm ary Judg ment o n her be half." From these facts, th e hearing court drew conclusions of law, deciding that the respon dent, as charge d, violate d Rule s 1.1, 1.3 , 1.4, 5.5 ( a) and 8 .4 (d). As to the respondent's competence, the hearing court concluded: "Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 by remaining of record in Ms. Belle-Trottman's case when his license to practice law was suspended, and by failing to advise her that he had been suspended. As a resu lt of these fa ilures, Respondent's client was unaware that she was without representation for a period of more than four months, during which time a motion for Summ ary Judg ment w as filed and, gra nted, ag ainst." Referencing the obligations of a lawyer who has been suspended from the practice, set out in Rule 16-760 (c ) and noting specifically that the responde nt failed to comply with subparagraph (c) (5), requiring that he notify his client of th e sus pension with in 15 days of the order and subparagraph (c) (6), requiring his withdrawal from client matters within 30 days, and did so intentionally, after having been advised, by his counsel, of that unfulfilled obligation, the hearing court reasoned that the respondent's default was "a complete lack of

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thoroughness and legal knowledge" - "[h]ad Respondent exercised any thoroughness, he would have re ad the a ffidav it and the Rule g overni ng his d uties up on susp ension ." The hearing court made a similar conc lusion with regard to the resp ondent's failure to withdraw as counsel in the Belle-Trottman case. Rejecting the explanation that it was an oversight and noting the respondent's deposition testimony that h e told his paralegal of the need to withdraw from the c ase and h is testimony at the d iscipline proc eedings tha t "he did not want to ad vise [his clien t] that he had been susp ended, fig uring that no thing would happen in her case u ntil after the 90 days, when he wou ld just pickup wh ere he left of f in representing her," it also viewed the failure to withdraw as a lack of thoroughness and legal knowledge. Of further concern to the hearing court was the effect on the client of the

respondent's failures to inform and to withdraw - "the client was left without representation from May 1, 2005 to September 21, 2005, and did not know it." Relying on Attorney

Grievance Comm'n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 388, 784 A.2d 516, 523 (2001), in which the Court sustained the petitioner's excep tion to a find ing that the fa ilure of the re sponden t, experienced in the kind of case at issue, to appear in court d id not v iolate R ule 1.1, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 59, 74, 753 A.2d 17, 26 (2000), stating that "a complete failure of representation is the ultimate incompetency," and Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Granger, 374 Md. 438, 462, 823 A.2d 611, 625 (2003), ho lding that failu re to file a bankruptcy petition, for which the lawyer was retained and qualified, was a violation of Rule 1.1, it concluded that this was "an additional reason for which Respondent is in violatio n of M RPC 1.1."

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These factors formed the basis for the hearing court's conclusions with regard to the respondent's diligence, Rule 1.3, and his duty to "keep a client reasonably informed about a matter," Rule 1.4 (a). The respondent's failure to withdraw from his represen tation of his client was also a factor in the hearing court's determination that the respondent practiced law unautho rized ly. The other was the finding that the respondent prepared, while suspended, the opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed in the Belle-Trottman case, for which proposition the hearing court cited Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 523, 823 A .2d 651, 662 (200 3). With regard to the Rule 8.4 (d) violation, the hearing court observed: "Respondent violated this MRPC when he remained of record after he was required to withdraw , and failed to fulfill his duty to advise his client of his suspension. As a resu lt of these fa ilures, the client was left without representation during a tim e when an answ er to a Mo tion for Summary Judgment should have been filed in her case, and was unaware of the fact that no one was protecting her legal rights. This is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justic e. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Singleton, 315 Md. 1[, 6, 553 A.2d 22 2, 224 ](19 89) (failure to notify client of su spension is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). In addition, the Court of Appeals has held that an attorn ey who co ntinues to pr actice wh ile suspended in violat ion of M RPC 5.5, as R espon dent did in this ca se, also violates MR PC 8.4 (d). Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505[, 523, 823 A .2d 651, 662 ](200 3). The petitioner did not take any exceptions to the findings and conclusions. It did, however, file Petitioner's R ecomm endation F or Sanction , in which it urg es this Court to suspend the respon dent ind efinitely. The respondent filed seven (7) exceptions, challenging, in addition to each of the violations found, the hearing court's den ial of his mo tion in limine a nd its "findin g that a

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violation of Maryland Rule 16-760 is a violation of [the] Maryland Rules of Professional Cond uct." practice. We review de novo the conclusions of law drawn by the hearing court. Rule 16759(b)(1). 10 See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 27-28, 922 A.2d 554, 569-70 (2007); Atto rney Grievance Comm'n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 265-66, 920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700, 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hodgson, 396 Md. 1, 6-7, 912 A.2d 640, 644 (2006); Attorney Grievanc e Comm 'n v. McL aughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Joehl, 335 Md. 83, 88, 642 A.2d 194, 196 (1994) (noting that the ultimate decision as to whether an attorney has eng aged in We w ill address each of them, in turn, after we have reviewed our "exception"

professional misconduct rests with this Court). When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions d rawn from the m are supported by the facts found, exceptions

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Maryland Rule 16-759(b) provides: "(1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge's conclusions of law. "(2) Findings of Fact. "(A) If No Exceptions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purp ose o f det ermining approp riate sanc tions, if a ny. "(B) If Exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Co urt of Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been pro ven by the req uisite standard of proof set out in Ru le 16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibil ity of witn esses."

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to conclu sions o f law w ill be ove rruled. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 700, 919 A.2d at 675; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 396 Md. 134, 146-47, 913 A.2d 1 , 8 (200 6). Moreover, a hearing court's findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that they are clea rly errone ous. Mahone , 398 Md. at 26 5, 920 A .2d at 463; Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Guida, 391 M d. 33, 50, 89 1 A.2d 1 085, 109 5 (2006). " Weighin g the credib ility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the f act find er." State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 750, 720 A.2d 3 23, 331 (1998). Maryland Rule 2-424 permits a par ty to se ek ad miss ions from the o pposing party. Subsection (a).11 When a party does so, "[e]ach matter of which an admission is requested shall be deem ed ad mitte d unless, with in 30 days afte r serv ice o f the requ est or within 1 5 days after the date on which that party's initial pleading o r motion is required, whicheve r is later, the party to whom the request is directed serv es a r espo nse s igne d by th e par ty or th e par ty's attorney." Subsection (b). 12
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Unless a party admitting a fact is permitted by the court to

That subsection provides: "(a) Request for Admission. A party may ser ve one or more w ritten requests to any other party for the admission of (1) the genuineness of any relevant documents described in or exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any relevant m atters of fac t set forth in the request. Co pies of do cuments s hall be served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. Each matter of which an admiss ion is req uested shall be separa tely set fort h."

Maryland Rule 2-424 (b) provides: "(b) Response. Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within 15 days after the date on which that party's initial pleading or motion is required, whichever is later, the party to whom the request is directed serves a response signed by the party or the party's attorney. As to each 10

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withdraw or amend the admiss ion, "[a]ny m atter admitted under this R ule is conclu sively establish ed." Subsection (d). 13 On motion, the court may permit withdrawal or amend ment, if it "finds that it would assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amend ment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits." Id.

matter of which an admission is requested, the response shall set forth each request for admission and shall specify an objection, or shall admit or deny the matter, or shall set forth in detail the reason why the respondent cannot truthfu lly admit o r deny it. T he reas ons fo r any obje ction sh all be sta ted. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is true and deny or qualify the remainder. A respondent may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the respondent states that after reasonable inquiry the information known or readily obtainable by the respondent is insufficient to enable the respondent to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission is requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request but the party may, subject to the provisions of section (e) of this Rule, deny the matter or set forth reasons for no t being a ble to ad mit or de ny it."

Maryland Rule 2-424 (d) provides: "(d) Effect of Admission. Any matter a dmitted un der this Ru le is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendmen t. The court may permit w ithdrawal or amen dment if the court finds that it would assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this Rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other purpo se, nor m ay it be use d again st that pa rty in any oth er proc eeding ."

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The respondent served on the petitioner requests for admissions on September 22, 2006. Among the admissions sought was the truth of the respondent's testimony concerning what he told the complainant about his being away from his practice and whether he introduced her to counsel who would be handling her case. That testimony contradicted the complainant's testimony, which was that the respondent did not advise her that a lawyer other than himself would be handling her case or introduce her to that lawyer. When, on

November 14, 2006, mo re than thirty days later, h e had not re ceived a re sponse af firmatively making the admissions or denying the requests, the respondent wrote the petitioner, advising it that he was "taking the request to be admitted." That prompted the petition er to mail

Petitioner's A nswer to Respondent's Request for Admission to the respondent, which was done on November 16, 2006. The answer was delivered on Saturday, November 18, 2006, and the respondent, having been out of the country, received it on Monday, November 20, 2006. Whether taking the Saturday or the Mo nday delivery date as disp ositive, at mos t,

there was one business day between delivery and the November 21, 2006 hearing date. On the morning of the hearing, the respondent moved in limine to have the hearing court enforce Rule 2-424 and disallow any testimony by the petitioner's w itnesses that w ould be inconsistent with the request for admissions, thus giving effect to the provisions of subsection (b) requiring timely response to requests for admissions. Specifically, he asked the hearing court "to preclude the petitioner from add ucing any ev idence that w ould tend to contradict the Request for Admissions that were served on the pe titioner." Arguing that

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Rule 2-424 is clear and mandatory and does not require a showing of prejudice,14 although the respondent proffered that, given the lateness of his receipt of the pe titioner's answer, prejudice, in the form of h is inability adequa tely to respond to the denial an d generally to prepare his case, did, in fact, result, 15 the respondent relied on Attorney Grievance C omm'n v. Kapoor, 391 M d. 505, 5 30, 894 A. 2d 5 02, 517 (2006 ), a case handled by the same counsel for the petitioner as in this case and in which this Court, citing Rule 2-424, observed: "[b]ecause Respondent did not respond to Petitioner's Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents, each matter of which an admission was requested was deemed admitted and conclusively established as a matter of law."

This argument is simply wrong. As we have seen, Rule 2-424 (d) permits the court to allow withdraw al or amen dment of admission s. A factor in the decision to permit with drawal o r amendm ent is whe ther "the pa rty who obta ined the ad mission fa ils to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits."
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The respondent explained: "[T]here are statements that were provided and that is why the Request for Admiss ions [wa s] critical, becau se my conten tion is that the sta tements were no t complete. If I had gotten a response within 30 days, which w ould have been the 22nd of October, I would have been in a position to depose both the in vestigato r and Ms. Trottma n, if I thou ght it nec essa ry. * * * * "If they were to admit the investigative report, my contention was it was incomplete. "With resp ect to the statem ent taken f rom me, m y position wa s that it was inaccurate. This was an opportunity, economically, for me to correct that mistake. Our Honor, depositions cost money. And, frankly, I was trying to conserve. If I had to do it, I had to do it. But if I could achieve the same goal in a less expensive way, I attempted to do that. And, Your Honor, I think I was entitled to exercise judgment at that time that was not going to be an issue, that the reports of the investigator were going to be chang ed to ref lect the a dmissio ns, so it w ould no t have b een an issue. There was n o need for me to take tw o depo sitions." 13

The petitioner did not deny that its answer to the request for admissions was late; indeed, it confirmed the timing of the mailing, as proffered by the respondent. Rather, the petitioner asked the court to "permit me, in accordance with the rule, to amend the answer and permit th e filing o f the late reques t." 16 In suppor t, it argued that the admissions pertained to witness reports, "about which Mr. Robertson has had reports for a substantial period of time" and that, with regard to the complainant, she would testify under oath as to what she told the p etitio ner's inv estig ator, and , in an y even t, "M r. Ro bertson i s aw are, g ener ally, through [a report he received] what [the complainant's] testimony is going to be because she was his client. So he's had a chance to depose her and he knows who she is." The petitioner denied that there was prejudice, asserting: "I think it would be appropriate if Mr. Robertson could produce some witness if he believes that these matters were uncontested. He makes no such showing. He's here. He's the o nly one witne ss that he w as ever go ing to call, and he can certainly co ntradict, to the extent that he has personal knowledge, what M s. Trottm an has t o say." The hearing court denied the motion in limine. It did so, with regard to some of the requests, because they sought admissions as to the ultimate issue. It also noted that " quite

The respondent challenged the propriety of the court allowing the withdrawal or amendment of an admission when the request to do so comes after the time for response has passed and, therefore, after the admission has been made by default. He reasoned: "the alteration that counsel refers to in [Rule] 2-424 contemplates a response. If a response is forthcom ing within the 30 days, then un der certain circumstances the Court may allow the responder to alter or amend. It is not meant to be a substitute for responding w ithin the 30 days." The plain langu age of the Rule b elies the respondent's argument. Subsection (d) does not differentiate between admissions by default and admissions by response. It simply gives the court the authority to excuse admissions under t he enu merate d circum stances . 14

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a few [of the requests] were admitted anyway, so I think the argum ent is moot a s to thos e." With regard to the requests that were left, requests that the hearing court characterized as involving "what the investigator was or was not told or did or did not see or did not do," the hearing court ruled: "All right. Well, I've considered the arguments. I've looked briefly at the rule. I've looked at th e rule, and I've looked, briefly, at some of the annotations. I am presuming that, as counsel said, you got this from the reports that were generated as a result of counsel's investigation. A t counsel's direction, the investigator went out and investigated the matter and generated a report. So, ba sed on all of that, I am go ing to deny your m otion in limin e to the exte nt that an y testimon y would be inco nsistent. I don't even know that that's going to be an issue, but I am going to deny your motion and file the written motion in the file ." The respondent has taken an exception to this ruling. He argues that he was entitled to a favorable ruling as a matter of law, given the wording of the Rule and the circumstances surrounding the petitioner's non-compliance with it. This is especially the case, he

continues, when the effect of the ruling wa s to admit evidence critical to the petitioner's case - that the respondent did not advise the complainant of his being away from his practice or introduce her to the counsel that he had obtained to handle her case - evidence that contradicted the admissions that the petitioner made by not timely responding to the respon dent's re quests f or adm issions, w hich w as then accep ted by the hearing court. We shall sustain the respondent's exception. At the outset, we reject the respondent's argument that withdrawal and/or amendment of an admission is permitted only if the responder has filed a re sponse, in which he or she has made the admission. To be sure one may make an adm ission by timely filing a response to the request; how ever, by its terms , see

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Rule 2-424 (b), that same result occurs by default whenever the request for admissions is not timely responde d to. The R ule does n ot, certainly not by its terms, endorse withdrawal or amendment in the case of the former, but not in the case of the latter. It simply does not differentiate between them, providing only that, if the court makes certain determinations, it may permit withdrawal or amendment. The required determinations are, as we have seen, that allowing withdraw al or amen dment "w ould assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the pa rty who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits." Neither of these determinations factored into the hearing court's decision to deny the respondent's motion in limine. It was the fact that "the reports ... were generated as a result of counsel's investigation" and that the responde nt obtained the inform ation he inten ded to contrad ict by askin g the pe titioner to admit th e oppo site or the conve rse. Whatever the source of the information, on the basis of which the respondent sought to seek admissions, an admission already made will be excused, pursuant to Rule 2-424 (d) only if to do so would assist the presentation of the merits of the case, while not prejudicing the party in whose favor the admissions were made. In this case, the denial of the motion in limine has relevanc e to the Ru le 1.4 Rule violation, for, in the word s of the resp ondent, "the Petitioner's w itness's versio n of even ts anchored the C ourt's finding" in that regard and Rule 5.5 (a), by strengthening the basis for the court's f inding of a vio lation of that Ru le. The effect of o ur decision to sustain this exception is to reverse the conclusion of the hearing court as to the Rule 1.4 violation. Whether the strengthening of the Rule 5.5 violation

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rationale should ha ve the sam e result mus t await our c onsideration of the exception raised as to it. The respondent's next ex ception relates to the hearing cou rt's focus and reliance on his failure to comply with Rule 16-760 (c), pertaining to a suspended lawyer's oblig ation to his or he r clie nts and th e public a t larg e, on e of w hich , sub para grap h (6) , is "[ w]ithin 3 0 days after the date of the order, [to] withdraw from all client matters, when determining whether the respondent violated each of the charged Rules violations." Indeed, that required duty was implicated and formed the basis for the hearing court's findings and conclusions with respect to each o f those violatio ns. The respondent urges that "a finding of a Rule 16-760 (c)

violation does not a violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) make ." That, however, is what has occurred in this case, he subm its. Noting tha t the Rule prescribes the sanctions for its violation, one of which is the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Rule 16-760 (m ) (2),17 he argues that, although the

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Maryland Rule 16-760 (m), in its entirety, provides: "(m) Sanctions for Violations. "(1) Ineligibility for Reinstatement. A petition for reinstatement filed pursuant to Rule 16-781 may be dismissed if the respondent fails to demonstrate (A) substantial compliance with sections (c) and (d) of this Rule and the order of the Court of Appeals, or (B) good cause for noncompliance. "(2) Disciplinary or Remedial Action. Upon receiving information from any source that a respondent has violated sections (c) or (d) of this Rule or the order of the Court of Appeals, and in addition to any other remedy, Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action pursuant to Rule 16-751 based upon the violation. "(3) Injunction Against Unauthorized Practice. Upon 17

petitioner elected that option, it really charged him with "failure to withdraw from the BelleTrottm an ma tter." We are not persuaded and, so, ove rrule the exc eption. As it was perm itted to do, the petitioner charged the respondent "based upon the violation." Rule 16-760 (m) (2). To be

sure, failure to withdraw is a violation of Rule 16-760 (c) (6), which could have been charged expressly, that conduct implicates other Rules of Professional Conduct, namely those charged in the case sub judice. That the petitioner chose to support its allegation of Rule violations other than Rule 16-760 (c) (6) with the conduct constituting that violation is not a basis for not considering those charges. As we have seen, the hearing court dete rmined tha t the respon dent's failure to withdraw from the c omplaina nt's matter w as "a com plete lack of thoroughness and legal know ledge," reasoning that, "[h]ad Respondent exercised any thoroughness, he would have read the affidav it and the R ule govern ing his d uties up on susp ension ." Maintaining that the

receiving in formation from any so urce indica ting that a respondent is violating section (d) of this Rule, Bar Counsel shall investiga te the matter a nd may institute or intervene in an action in any court to enjoin the respondent from further violations. "(4) Contempt. If a respondent violates section (c) or (d) of this Rule or the order of the Court of Appeals, the Commission may request the initiation of a proceeding for constructive criminal contempt in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15-205 and may initiate a proceeding for constructive civil contempt in accordance with the provisions of Ru le 15-2 06."

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focus of the hearing court was misplaced, being on what the respondent did after h is suspension, rather than on "inquiry into and analysis of the f actual and le gal elemen ts of the problem, and use of methods and procedures," and on whether the respon dent adeq uately prepared to handle the case. Comment, MRPC 1.1. He argues, moreover, that "Cases in which this cou rt has fo und M RPC Rule 1 .1 competency violations generally involve the attorney's failure to adequa tely investigate issues and motions pertinent to the client's case or other conduct that has a detrimental effect on the c lient's ca se, or on the clien t's positio n afterw ards." The respondent relies on Awuah, 374 M d. at 522, 823 A.2d at 661 (failure to file the requisite appeal and/or motion to reconsider within the tim e period an d inadequ ate counseling of client to consent to deportatio n); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 22 , 762 A.2d 950 , 961 (2000) (failure to research removal issue). A lawyer suspe nded fro m the prac tice of law is charged, to be sure, w ith reading all necessary docume nts to unde rstand his or h er obligations and responsibilities before and after the suspensio n so as to be able to discharge th em timely and appropriate ly. The failure to discharge that responsibility, while certainly not commendable and indicating a lack of diligence, perhaps competence, in that regard, does not establish a lack o f compe tence to handle a particular matter, that the lawyer does not possess or has not provided representation characterized by "the legal know ledge, skill, thoro ughness a nd prepa ration reason ably necessary for the representation." Rule 1.1. Whether a lawyer has e mployed the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter is determined by cons idering "relevant factors including the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experienc e in the field in qu estion." Co mment, R ule 19

1.1. While the failure to withdraw from a client matter, as required, and to inform the client that the lawyer has been suspended is a violation of some of the Rules of Professional Conduct, it simply does not address, and is not dispositive of, a lawyer's competence to handle a particular matter. We sustain the respondent's exception. As with the co mpetenc y violation, the he aring court premised the violation o f Rule 1.3 on the respondent's failure to withdraw from the complainant's matter prior to the effective date of his suspension, thus remaining of record, after his suspension and as of the filing of the m otion for su mmary judg ment. The respondent rejects the hearing court's rationale for finding a lack of diligence violation. In addition to denying that the petitioner prese nted any evidence to supp ort the charge, he argues: "The circumstances which spawned Petitioner's complaint was the Responden t's omission to file a line of withdrawal in a matter for which he remained the attorney of record even after the effective date of his suspension. The only evidence presented by the Petitioner to prove lack of diligence involved conduct that occurred after the effective date of suspension. As of the effective d ate of suspen sion, Resp ondent co uld not com ply with Md. R ule 1.3 since Respondent's suspension severed the ability of Respondent to stand in a repr esentati ve cap acity relativ e to all clie nts." We agree. Although, by his non-compliance with Rule 16-760 (c), the respondent remained counsel of record after the effective date of his suspension from the practice of law, he could not, by virtue of that suspension have represented the complainant; to do so, as we shall see, would have been unauthorized practice of law. The hearing court conc luded that, on the basis of inaction and omissions occurring when he was entitled to practice, but which were designed to terminate the client relationship, the respondent failed reasonably, diligently 20

and promptly to rep resent his client and the petitioner would have us sustain that conclusion. We are not persuaded that an omission to inform that would terminate representation can support a Rule 1.3 violation, the gravamen of which is representation or that conduct occurring after represe ntation has c eased can qualify as repre sentation. exception. We addressed the respondent's Rule 1.4 (a) violation when w e considere d his exception to the denial of his motion in limine. We sustained that exception and the related Rule 1.4 exception. The respondent's Rule 5.5 (a) exception proceeds on the basis that the f acts on which the hearing court relied to conclude that there was a violation of that Rule did not support the conclusion. The short answer is that they most certainly do. Inde ed, in reciting th e facts found by the hearing court, the resp ondent om its the most im portant one , that "Resp ondent, with the assistance of a law clerk, prepared a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment in Ms. Belle-Trottman's case. The response to the motion carried a signature line for Respondent and no signature line for any other attorn ey." The prep aration of a response to a motion for summary judgment, when suspended from the practice of law, is unauthorized practice of law . Awuah, 374 Md. at 523, 823 A.2d at 662. The respondent concedes the point, but submits that "this Court has not sanctioned such action when it is done under the supervision of a lice nsed at torney." (f ootnot e omitte d). He also c ontends th at, because h is signature was not a ffixed to the signature line of the response, there was no evidence that he continued to represen t clients after his suspensio n. With reg ard to the su pervision a rgumen t, W e sustain this

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the hearing court found just the opposite, that he and a paralegal prepared the respon se; it did not find that they did so under the supervision of a licensed attorney. Similarly, the hearing court's findings control as to the sign ificance of the unsigne d pleading. The resp ondent's exception is overruled. The respondent's final exception is to the hearing court's conclusion that the respondent engaged in condu ct prejud icial to the admin istration o f justice . His argument

is that the failure to withdraw f rom the comp lainant's matter and inform the complainant of the fact that he was suspended is not such conduct. We do not agree. "[C]ond uct [that] refle cts negative ly on the legal pro fession an d sets a bad example for the pub lic at large " is preju dicial to th e adm inistratio n of jus tice. Goff, 399 Md. at 22, 922 A.2d at 566, quoting the hearing court in that case. The phrase, "conduct prejudicial

to the administration of justice," was considered in Rheb v. Bar Ass 'n of Baltim ore City, 186 Md. 2 00, 203 , 46 A.2 d 289, 2 91 (19 46). This Court made clear in that case that "`conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,' delegates or confirms to the courts the power and duty to consider particular conduct of one who is an officer of the court, in relation to the privileges and duties o f a pub lic calling that spe cially invite s comp lete trust a nd con fidenc e," id . at 205, 46 A .2d at 291; see Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 100, 710 A.2d 935, 942 (1998), and that it should not be given "restricted meaning." Rheb , 186 Md. at 205, 46 A.2d at 291. Thus, "[i]n the last analysis the duty rests upon the courts, and the profession as a whole, to uphold the highest standards of professional conduct and to protect the p ublic from imposition b y the unfit or unscrupulous practitioner." Id . In short,

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"[b]ehavior that may seriously impair public confidence in the entire profession, without extenuating circum stances , may be c onduc t prejud icial to the admin istration o f justice ." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 222, 89 2 A.2d 533, 54 0 (200 6). See Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 701, 919 A.2d at 676. When one is susp ended fro m the prac tice of law and fails to discharge the responsibilities imposed on him or her by the Rules, which include informing the client and withdrawal from all client representation matters, he or she engages in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. That con duct could , and mos t likely would, "im pair public confidence in the entire profession." Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540. overrule this exception. This leaves for resolution the sanction to be imposed. The petitioner recommends an indefinite suspension. It reasons: "[T]he evidence is that after he agreed to a suspension, respondent displayed no interest in the ef fects of the suspensio n and con tinued to remain of record in Ms. Donna Belle-Trottman's law suit knowing that he could not represent her. His cond uct show s that he is no t yet ready to return to the practice of law. ... At no point has [the respondent] taken any steps to apply for reinstatement after the ninety-day suspension, even after he was advised by his counsel that he needed to take additional steps to gain readmissio n in July 2005 . Instead of a ttempting to bring himself into compliance, he took no action and remained of record in Ms. Belle-Trottman's case knowing that he was suspended. In addition to the suspension imposed in 2005, respondent received a reprimand on December 7, 2004 from the Court of Ap peals fo r violatio ns of ru le 1.4, 1.5 and 8.4 (d). Attorney Grievance Commission v. Robertson, 384 Md. 154[, 862 A.2d 99 1] (2004). The respondent concedes that an intentional failure to withdraw from th e 23 We

complainant's matter is sanctionable. He recommends, nevertheless, noting the purpose of attorney discipline - to protect the unsuspecting public, not to punish the erring attorney - , that his case sho uld be rem anded to B ar Coun sel "to allow consideratio n of a disposition under Md. R ule 16-73 6 (Diversio n)." Alterna tively, relying on Attorney Grievance C omm'n v. Singleton, 315 Md. 1, 553 A. 2d 222 (1989), he recommends that he be required to repeat the original period of suspension. The respon dent co rrectly state s the go al of atto rney disci pline. See Goff, 399 Md. at 30-31, 922 A.2d at 571; Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 703, 919 A.2d at 67 7; Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Rees, 396 Md. 24 8, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006). W e have made it qu ite clear, however, that critical to the goal is the protection of the public's confidence in the legal profession. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 639, 861 A.2d 692, 701 (2004). We recently addressed how the goal is achieved: "Protecting the integrity of the legal profession and "deter [ing] other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct," are also reasons for sanction ing attorneys who v iolate the rules. Attorney Griev. Com m'n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 68 9, 698, 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001 ). "Determining the approp riate sanction requires the C ourt to cons ider the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including consideration of any mitigating factors." Attorney Griev. Com m'n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 71, 839 A.2d 718, 724 (2003). In a ddition, "`the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which the y were committed'" are relevant considerations. Id. (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm'n of Maryland v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997)). We also have considered " the a ttorn ey's prior grievance history ... the attorney's remorse for the misconduct, and the likelihood of the conduct being repeated." Post, 379 M d. at 71, 839 A.2d at 724-725 (citations omitted). As stated in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Monfried , 368 M d. 373, 794 A.2d 92 (2002), to d etermine an appropriate sanction w e will, "examine the natu re of the miscon duct, the lawyer's state of 24

mind which underlies the misconduct, actual or p otential injury flowing from the m isconduc t, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public in allowing the respondent to continue in practice, and any mitigating or aggrav ating fa ctors. "Monfried, 368 M d. at 396 , 794 A .2d at 10 5." Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 534, 876 A.2d 79, 97-98 (2005). Applying these factors, we believe that the petitioner's recommended sanction is the more appropriate sanc tion. Acco rdingly, we sh all order the re sponden t indefinitely

suspen ded fro m the p ractice o f law.

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRAN SCRIP TS, PURSUANT T O MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR O F T H E A T T O R N E Y G R I E V A N CE COMMISSION AGAINST BONAR MAYO ROBERTSON.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG) No. 21 September Term, 2006 _______________________________________

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. BONAR MAYO ROBERTSON

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Bell, C.J. Raker *Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, specially assigned), JJ.

Concurring Opinion by Harrell, J.

Filed: August 3, 2007 *Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active mem ber of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. I concur in the Majority opinion's reasoning and result, except as to sustaining Responden t's exception to the hearing court's disposition of his motion in limine. Maj. slip. op. at 12 -17. Consequently, I also disagree with the ripple effect that the Majority opinion sees as flowing from sustaining this exception, i.e., sustaining Respondent's exception to the finding of a violation of MRPC 1.4(a). Maj. slip. op at 22. The Majority opinion spies merit in Re sponden t's exception to the denia l of his motion in limine see king to restrict Bar Counsel from adducing testimony or other evidence of the Complainan t's claim that Respondent failed to advise her that anothe r attorney wou ld be handling her case or to introduce her to the other attorney. The basis for the motion in limine was Bar Counsel's tardy denial of one of Respondent's Requests for Admissions claiming to the con trary of C ompla inant's a ssertion . The hearing judge granted relief to Bar

Coun sel and allowe d the co nflicting eviden ce of C ompla inant on this scor e. The M ajority opinion finds fault with the hearing judge's exercise of discretion under Md. Rule 2-424(d) because the hearing judge, in her oral ruling, did not address in so many words that she considered whether allowing withdrawal of the default admission "would assist the presentation of the merits of the action" and whether prejudice would accrue to Respondent "in maintaining the . . . defense on the m erits" if relief from the default adm ission were granted. Maj. slip op. at 17. While it may be said, in the abstract and in certain circumstances, that Justice is blind, my vision has been corrected to 20-20 for a long time. To me, it is clearly implicit in the hearing judge's rem arks that she considered both factors that the Majority opinion perceives as lacking. First, it is pa tent that th e poten tial for p rejudice was ar gued to her. Compare Maj. slip op a t 13, n 15 with slip op. at15. From the comp eting presen tations, it is abun dantly clear that Respondent offered no specific indicia of how he would be prejudiced, choosing instead to mouth only generalities and conclusory arguments. Not once did Respondent argue the unava ilability, because of Bar Co unsel's late response, of a specific and refu tatory item of physical evidence or a specific witness who would corroborate his version of what transpired between himself and Ms. Belle-Trottman on whatever day in the Spring of 2005 the pertinent meeting in Respondent's office occurred, at which her deposition in the wrongful death case was to be taken. To the contrary, Bar Counsel argued essential ly the situation was a "he said, she said" one where only Responden t and Complaina nt were present. The only surprise to Respondent in the hearing judge's ruling should have been that

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he was going to have to put his veracity to the test instead of enjoy the "walk-over" that he anticipated. Implicit in the hearing judge's verbal explanation for denying Respond ent's motion in limine is consideration of both assistance in presenting the merits of the allegations and whether Respondent would be prejudiced in a cognizable way that the law might recognize as unfair. She spoke to Respondent's awareness of what the Complainant contended occurred in her statements to Bar Counsel's investigator, a copy of which Respondent received before the tardy response to the Request for Admissions (putting aside the fact that Respondent was present on that fine Spring 20 05 day wh en the relev ant interaction with his client occurred). It was just as obvious to the hearing jud ge, as it appa rently is to this Cou rt, that the contradictory versions of that encounter were critical to the determination of some of the alleged MRPC violations; hence, the evidence sought to be excluded w ould be of assistance in resolving the merits. Moreover, because Respondent could not muster any specific replies to Bar Counsel's argument that he would suffer no prejudice to the preparation of his defense because he was his only witness on this matter, the hearing judge was entirely within the proper range of her discretion to deny the motion in limine. In accord with my view of the propriety of the hearing judge's ruling (and the resultant error in the Majority opinion sustaining Respo ndent' s excep tion ther eto), I would hold that Respondent violated MRPC 1.4(a), in addition to the violations otherwise held by the Majority opinion.

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