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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. Misc. AG 23 September Term, 2005 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION v. DAVID D. SUTTON ________________________________________ No. Misc. AG 24 September Term, 2005 _______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION v. DAVID D. SUTTON ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wilner, J. ______________________________________ Filed: August 29, 2006

In July 2005, petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), through Bar Counse l, filed two p etitions again st David D. Sutton, respondent, alleging numerous violations of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC).1 Pursuant to Md. Rule 16 -752, we referred b oth petitions to Judge Lynn K . Stewart of the Circuit C ourt for Baltimore City to conduct a hearing and make findings and proposed conclusions of law. For the reasons stated below, we sustain the findings of misconduct, sustain some, but not all, of Bar C ounsel's ex ceptions, an d accept the recomm endation of Bar Counsel that respondent be disbarred.

BACKGROUND Respondent is a solo practitioner who was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 21, 2000. It appears that within two years after being admitted, respondent began having difficulty which re sulted in complaints from eight different clients between November, 2002 and December, 2004. Six out of the eight complaints are set forth in Bar Counsel's first petition, Misc. Docket AG No. 23, wherein Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1 (com petenc e), 1.3 (d iligence ), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.15 (safekeeping), 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), 8.1 (cooperation with Bar

The MLRPC w as revised in 2005. These matters arose under and are governed by the former Rules which, as applicable here, are not substantially different than the current Rules. -1-

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Coun sel), and 8.4 (misconduct). Bar Counsel's second petition, Misc. Docket AG No. 24, charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 , 8.1, and 8.4 s temming from his representation of one client in a bankruptcy proceeding and anoth er client in a tax sale matter.

Misc. Docket AG No. 23 A. Complaint of Julius William Pitts, Sr. As his mother 's caretaker, Ju lius Pitts applied , on behalf of his mother, for medical assistance from the M aryland Dep artment of Huma n Resou rces on or a bout June 9, 2003. A caseworker informed Mr. Pitts that his mother's assets exceeded the acceptable limit of $2,500 by approximately $1,700 and instructed Mr. Pitts to transfer ownership of his mother's life insurance policy to the William C. Brown F uneral Home . A few w eeks later, Mr. Pitts transferred ownership of the policy to the funeral home and reapplied for medical assistance in August, 2003. Upon reapplying, M r. Pitts was informed that, due to a change in regulations, h is transfer of ownership to the funeral home was not acceptable and that he should have transferred the ownership of the poli cy to himself a s the represe ntative of h is mother. This chan ge resulted in a denial of his second ap plication because his mo ther's assets were still greater than the accepta ble limit. Mr. P itts then filed an appeal, but be fore his appeal was he ard, h is mo ther pass ed aw ay. Mr. Pitts was ref erred to respondent and met with him in October, 2003. At this initial

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meeting, respondent collected $1,000 of a total agr eed-up on fee of $1,5 00. A hearing on M r. Pitt's appeal was scheduled before an Administrative Law Judge for October 14, 2003. Respondent appeared on that day and requested a postponement, which was granted. The hearing was resch eduled fo r Octobe r 28. Resp ondent no t only failed to advise his client of the postpone ment but f ailed to app ear himself on the 28 th , and, as a result, the appeal was dismissed and the case closed. Respondent failed to advise his client of the dism issal. Mr. Pitts made sev eral attempts to contact respondent to determine the status of the m atter, all to no avail. Finally, in April, 2004, he filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel requested a response to Mr. Pitt's complaint, but received none. The hearing jud ge conclu ded that, w ith respect to h is representa tion of M r. Pitts, respondent had violate d ML RPC 1 .1 by failing to compete ntly represent his client because he was not thoroug hly prepared for representing Mr. P itts at an initial hearin g or at a subsequent re-scheduled hearing, MLRPC 1.4 by failing to communicate with his client sufficiently and by failing to keep M r. Pitts inform ed of the sta tus of his case, and MLRPC 8.1 by failing to respond to Bar Counsel's numerous requests for information, and by failing to provide Bar Counsel with information regarding retention of the fee paid by Mr. Pitts. Respondent did not file exceptions to any of the hearing judge's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bar Counsel excepted to her failure to find a violation of MLRPC 1.3, 1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d). We will sustain Bar Counsel's exceptions with respect to MLRPC 1.3 and 8.4(d). We agree with Bar C ounsel that th e facts fully support a conclusion

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that respondent failed to represent Mr. Pitts in a diligent and prompt mann er (1.3), and engaged in conduc t that is "prejud icial to the admin istration o f justice ." (8.4(d )). We sha ll overrule Bar Co unsel's exceptions as to M LRPC 1 .5(a) and 1.16(a).

B. Complaint of Brenda A. Myers On December 20, 2002, Ms. Myers filed an application for disability retirement with her employer, the Social Security Administration (SSA), seeking retirement benefits under the civil service retire ment system. M s. Myers, who had been employeed by SSA for 35 years, suffered from lower back pain and headaches. On June 18, 2003, she received a letter informing her that, due to insufficie ncy of evide nce, she did not qualify fo r disability retirement benefits. On July 10, 2003, Ms. Myers requested reconsideration of the initial determination and met with respondent for the first time. At their initial meeting, Ms. M yers provided respondent with x-rays, doctors' reports, correspondence regarding her claim and a signed release authorizing respondent to obtain medical information from her health care providers. Respondent did not charge Ms. Myers a flat fee or provide her with an up-front rate at this initial meeting. Within a few days after being retained, respondent mailed a letter to the SSA asking that Ms. M yers's application be reconsidered. On September 17, 2003, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) disallowed the request for reconsideration because there was insufficient documentation to supp ort it. Ms. Myers ha d until Octob er 27 , 200 3

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