Preview:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brian L. Wallace AG No. 6, September Term, 2001 Headno te : Attorney's lack of diligenc e, lack of pr eparation, fa ilure to com municate with clients, charge of unre asonable fees, failure to acco unt for and return monies, misrepresentations, an d failure to comply with B ar Counsel's requests all lea d to the mo st severe san ction of disb arment.

Circuit Co urt for Anne A rundel Co unty Case # C-2001-71334 OC

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 6 September Term, 2001

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

v.

BRIAN L. WALLACE

Bell, C. J. Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ.

Opinion by Cathell, J.

Filed: March 7, 2002

On April 12, 2001, the Attorney Grievance Commission, petitioner, by Bar Counsel and Deputy Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Brian L. Wallace, responde nt. The petition, based on six complaints filed against respondent, alleged that respondent had violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d). 1

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The relevant MRPC state:

" Rule 1.1. Competence. A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representatio n requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Rule 1.3. Diligence. A lawyer shall ac t with reaso nable diligence and p romptnes s in representing a client. Rule 1.4. Communication. (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. Rule 1.5. Fees. (a) A lawyer's fee sha ll be reas onable . The fac tors to be co nsidered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, a nd the skill requisite to perform the legal service prop erly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment w ill preclude other employmen t by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the prof essional relatio nship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers (contin ued...)

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(...continued) performing the services; and (8) wheth er the fee is f ixed or con tingent. Rule 1.15. Safekeeping property. (a) A lawyer sh all hold property of clie nts or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Ch apter 600 o f the Ma ryland Rules. O ther proper ty shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. (b) Upon re ceiving fu nds or othe r property in w hich a client o r third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third p erson, shall p romptly rende r a full acco unting re gard ing s uch prop erty. Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation. (a) Excep t as stated in parag raph (c ), a law yer shall not repr esent a client or, where representation h as commenc ed, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: . . .

(2) the lawyer's p hysical or men tal condition m aterially impairs the lawyer's ability to rep resent th e client . . . . . . .

(d) Upon termina tion of r eprese ntation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonab le notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other co unsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not b een earne d. The law yer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. (contin ued...) -2-

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752,2 we transmitted the matter to Judge N ancy Davis -Loomis
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(...continued) Rule 3.2. Expediting litigation. A lawyer shall make rea sonable ef forts to expedite litigation consistent with the inte rests of the clie nt. Rule 8.1. Bar admission and disciplinary matters. An applicant for admission or reinstateme nt to the bar, o r a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary ma tter, shall not: . . .

(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the p erso n to h ave a risen in the ma tter, o r kno wingly fail to respond to a lawful d ema nd for inform ation from an ad miss ions or disciplinar y auth ority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. Rule 8.4. M isconduct. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . .

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct th at is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . ."

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Maryland R ule 16-75 2 states, in relev ant part:

" Rule 16-752. Order designating judge. (a) Order. Upon th e filing of a P etition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The orde r of design ation shall req uire the judge, after consultation (contin ued...) -3-

of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for her to conduct a hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. On July 31, 2001, an evidentiary hea ring was h eld before the hearing judge. Neither respondent nor a representative of respondent appeared at the hearing. On October 4, 2001, Judge Davis-Loomis filed her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The record was then transfe rred from the hearing judge to ou r Court fo r oral argum ent. I. Facts Respondent was admitted to the Bar of Marylan d on D ecemb er 8, 198 7. The Petition for Disciplinary Action filed in this case was based on six complaints. Respondent was served with the Petition, Interrogatories, and a Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents. Respondent failed to answer all three.3 Respon dent also did
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(...continued) with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the co mpletion of discovery, filing of motion s, and h earing."
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Maryland Rule 16-754 states:

" Rule 16-754. Answer. (a) Timing; contents. Within 15 days after being served with the petition, unless a dif ferent time is ordered, the respondent shall file with the designated clerk an an swer to the petition and serve a copy on the petitioner. Sections (c) and (e) of Rule 2-323 apply to the answer. Defenses and objections to the petition, including insufficiency of service, shall be stated in the answer and not by preliminary motion. . . . (contin ued...) -4-

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(...continued) (c) Failure to answer. If the time for filing an answer has expired and the respondent has failed to file an answer in accordance with section (a) of this Rule, the co urt shall treat the f ailure as a de fault and th e provisions of Rule 2 -613 sh all apply."

Maryland Rule 2-613 provides for a default judgment to be entered by the court, which was done in this case by the hearing judge. Maryland Rule 2-323 provides the procedure for filing an answ er to the p etition. A failure to file an answer is covered in Maryland Rule 2323(e), which states: " Rule 2-323. Answer. . . .

(e) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damages, are admitted unless denied in the responsive pleading or covered by a general denial. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted sh all be taken a s denied o r avoided. W hen appr opriate, a party may claim the inability to admit, deny, or explain an averment on the ground that to do so wou ld tend to incriminate the party, and such statement shall not amou nt to an a dmissio n of the averm ent." Respondent's failure to respond to petitioner's Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents would also lead to facts and documents being admitted. Maryland R ule 2-424 states, in relevan t part: " Rule 2-424. Admission of facts and genuinen ess of documents. . . .

(b) Response. Each m atter of wh ich an adm ission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request o r within 15 days after the date on which that party's initial pleading o r motion is required, whichever is later, the party to whom the request is directed serves a response s igned by the p arty or the party's attorney. As to each matter of (contin ued...) -5-

not appear for the evidentiary hearing before the hearing judge and for oral arg ument before this Court. BC Do cket No. 2000 -428-4-2 Complaint of Herbert Miller, Esquire Mr. Miller represented a client in a case involving a party being represented by responde nt. Mr. M iller sent a letter to re sponden t with allegatio ns that respondent, or respondent's client, was engaged in delaying tactics and dece itful condu ct in an attem pt to prejudice Mr. M iller's client. Respondent failed to respond to Mr. Miller's letter and also failed, on several occasions, to respond to petitioner's investigator about the allegation. The hearing judge found by clear and co nvincing evidence that respondent's failure to respond to petitioner wa s a violation of MR PC 8.1(b). BC Do cket No. 2001 -132-4-2

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(...continued) which an admission is requested, the response shall specify an objection, o r shall admit or deny the matter, or shall set forth in detail the reason why the respondent cannot truth fully admit or deny it. The reasons for any objection shall be stated. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested , the party shall specify so much of it as is true and deny or q ualify the remain der. A respondent may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the respo ndent states th at after reaso nable inquiry the information known or readily obtainable by the respon dent is insufficient to enable the respondent to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter o f which a n admissio n is requeste d presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request but the party may, subject to the provis ions of sec tion (e) of this Rule, deny the matter or set forth reasons for not being able to admit or deny it." -6-

Complaint of Ida M. Oxford Ms. Oxford was the personal representative of the estate of Ralph Clayton S mith, Jr., and she had retained respondent in February of 2000 as the estate's attorney. In the course of his representation of the estate, respondent, after already obtaining a time extension, failed to file a timely administration account or to seek a further time extension w ithin which to submit the administration account. Respondent also failed to take any further substantive action with respect to the estate and to respond to Ms. Oxford's requests for information. Ms. Oxford repeatedly tried to obtain her f ile from resp ondent an d, despite his obligation to release the file, respondent failed to respond to Ms. Oxford's requests. It was not until after an Inquiry Panel hearing was h eld regarding Ms. Oxford's complaint that respondent released her file. Respo ndent also f ailed to respo nd to petition er's requests for information concerning Ms. Oxford's complaint. At the inquiry panel hearing, respondent indicated that he wa s unable to properly represent Ms. Oxford because he was suffering from personal and psychological problems. The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), and 8.1(b). Specifically, she made the following findings in support of the violation: respondent did not have the legal knowledge or skill to represent Ms. Ox ford, responden t did not exe rcise the requ isite thoroughness or prepara tion in his repr esentation, res ponden t failed to act w ith reasonab le diligence in representing Ms. Oxford, respondent failed to keep Ms. Oxford informed about

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the status of her case or to reply to her phone calls and written correspondence, respondent failed to properly exp lain the proc eedings in her case to Ms. Oxford in a manner th at would allow her to make informed decisions about her case, responde nt failed to w ithdraw fr om his representation when he realized that his personal problems were interfering with his ab ility to represent Ms. Oxford, respondent failed to reasonably attempt to protect M s. Oxford's interests and to pro vide M s. Oxford with her file when it w as requested, and respondent failed to respond to inquiries fro m petitioner. BC Do cket No. 2001 -86-4-2 Comp laint of Jac queline O . Uzzell Ms. Uzzell was the personal representative of the estate of Mamie L. Gibson and she retained respondent at the end of 1997 as the estate's attorney. In February of 1998 Ms. Uzzell paid respondent $790.00 and in M arch of 19 99 she pa id him an additional $1,000.00. The only asset of the estate was a house with an appraised value of $49,000.00. In the course of his representation of M s. Uzzell, resp ondent fa iled to timely file appraisals, an in ventory of the estate, and accountin gs. He also failed to resp ond to delinquency notices issued by the Register of Wills for Baltimore City. Respondent also made misrepresentations to Ms. Uzzell about the work he was allegedly completing on her case and, when he was not making misrepresentations, he failed to respond to a majority of Ms. Uzzell's phone calls. Respo ndent failed to respond to petitioner's inquiries concerning Ms. Uz zell's comp laint. The hearing jud ge found by clear and c onvincing evidence that in the course of h is -8-

representation of the estate respondent had v iolated MRP C 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c). 4 Specifica lly, she made the following f indings in support of the violations: respondent did not have the legal knowledge to represent Ms. Uzzell, respondent did not exercise the proper p reparation and thoroughness in the course of his representation, respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence as evidenced by the filing of delinquent notices by the Registe r of Wills fo r Baltimore City, responde nt failed to ke ep Ms. U zzell informed about the status of her case, respondent made misreprese ntations to M s. Uzzell about the status of her case, his misrepresentations and failure to adequately explain the status of her case left Ms. Uzzell unable to make informed decisions about her case, and respondent failed to respond when petitioner requested informa tion about Ms. U zzell's complain t. BC Do cket No. 2001 -133-4-2 Complaint of Diane Kent Ms. Kent hired respondent to represent her in an employment discrimination case. She paid the respondent $1,000.00; respondent stated that he placed these fund s in his trust account. Respondent filed suit on behalf of Ms. Kent in the United States District Court for the District of Marylan d. Prior to filing suit, respondent did not obtain any information about

We note that in the Petition for Disciplinary Action, petitioner stated that respondent had violated MR PC 8.4 (c). In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the hearing judge stated that petitioner had charged MRPC 8.4(d). Nevertheless, the hearing judge made a finding of fact and a conclusion of law to support a violation of MRPC 8.4(c). We agree with he r findin g of a v iolation of M RPC 8.4(c). -9-

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the case as he failed to make any contact with the defendant, its employees, agents, or attorneys. After filing the complaint respondent failed to take any substantive action on Ms. Kent's behalf. The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and respondent failed to file a response. The motion was granted and on February 17, 2000 Ms. Kent's case was dismissed with prejudice. Respondent failed to notify Ms. Kent that her case had been dismissed. She learned of the dismissal in April of 2000 when she personally reviewed her file at the courthouse. Respondent had not returned Ms. Ke nt's repeated telephone calls both before and after her case was dismissed. In Septemb er of 200 0 respond ent promis ed to return $500.00 of his fee to Ms. Ke nt, but he failed to keep his promise. Respondent failed to account for the money he received from Ms. Ke nt and he w as unable to determine how much of the $1,000.00 he received from Ms. Kent should be returned to her. This was caused by the respondent's failure to keep accurate tim e records w ith respect to h is representa tion of M s. Kent. Respondent failed to resp ond to petitio ner's reque sts for information concerning the complaint of Ms. K ent and he also failed to comply with a subpo ena issued by the Inquiry Panel in its inv estigation of Ms. Ke nt's comp laint. The hearing jud ge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15(a) and (b), and 8.1(b). Specifically, the hearing judge made the follow ing findings in suppo rt of the violations: respondent does not have the

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legal knowledge required to represent a client in this type of case, respond ent failed to exercise the requisite thoroughness and preparation in the course of his representation, respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence by not investigating the case and by his failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, respondent did not return repeated phone calls from M s. Kent, respondent did not keep Ms. Kent adequately informed about the status of her case, respondent failed to advise Ms. Kent of the Motion to Dismiss so she could make an informed decision reg arding the re presentation and her ca se, respond ent failed to keep accurate accounting records for the funds paid to him by Ms. Kent, respondent failed to keep adequate time records with respect to his repres entation of Ms. Ke nt, respond ent failed to promptly return funds to Ms. Kent that she was entitled to receive, and respondent failed to respond to petitioner's request for information about Ms. Kent's complaint and failed to respond to a subpoe na issued b y the Inquiry Pan el. BC Do cket No. 2000 -382-4-2 Complaint of Leon Johnson In November of 1998, M r. Johnson retained respondent to represent him in a race discrimination action against Three Lower Counties Communit y Services, Inc. (TLCC S). Mr. Johnson paid respondent a fee of $2,000.00, which respondent deposited into his escrow account. In December of 1998 respondent transferred $1,000.00 of Mr. Johnson's payment from the escrow account as a fee. Respondent filed suit on beh alf of M r. Johnson in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on November 19, 1998. After filing suit, respondent failed to take -11-

any further action on Mr. Johnson's case, including failing to have TLC CS served w ith Mr. Johnson's complaint. In June of 1999, Mr. Johnson's case was dismissed for want of prosecution. Respondent did not inform Mr. Johnson that his case had been dismissed. During the course of his representation, respondent failed to reply to Mr. Johnson's written requests for an update on his ca se and he also failed to pro vide Mr. Johnson with an accounting of the funds he had paid to respondent. Respondent also failed, despite Mr. Johnson's repeated requests, to refund any of the $2,000.00 that respondent had collected from Mr. Johnson. On March 13, 2000, Mr. Johnson filed a complaint with petitioner. On the day of the Inquiry Panel hearing in this case, respondent informed Mr. Johnson that he had decided against pursuing Mr. Johnson's case because he felt the case had little or no merit. During petitioner's investigation of this com plaint, responde nt failed to rep ly to petitioner's req uests for information. The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated MRPC 1.1, 1 .3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1 .5(a) , 1.15 (b), 1 .16(d), 3.2, an d 8.1 (b). S peci fica lly, the hearing jud ge made the follow ing finding s in suppo rt of the viola tions: respon dent did not have the legal knowledge or skill reasonably necessary to represent Mr. Johnson, respondent failed to act with the requisite thoroughness and preparation in the course of his representation, respondent failed to act w ith reasonable diligence in his pu rsuit of Mr. Johnson's claim, respondent failed to keep Mr. Johnson appraised of the status of his case,

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respondent failed to pro perly explain M r. Johnson 's case to him so that M r. Johnson could make informed decisions about his case, respondent advised M r. Johnson over two years after accepting his case that he thought M r. Johnson 's case had little or no merit, respondent did not charge a reasonable fee, he failed to pro vide M r. Johnson with an ac counting o f his funds, respondent failed to provide Mr. Johnson with a refund, respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with Mr. Johnson's interests, and responde nt failed to pr ovide petition er with info rmation co ncerning th is complain t. BC Do cket No. 2000 -515-4-2 Complaint of Christopher Smoke Mr. Smoke retained resp ondent to represent him in a personal injury case arising out of an incident on September 21, 1995, when Mr. Smok e sustained burn injuries at an Exxon service station. On S eptembe r 21, 1998 , responde nt filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's Coun ty against E xxon C orpora tion and Calve rton Ex xon. Exxon Corporation filed a Motion for Production of Documents, which respondent failed to respond to and which failure resulted in the claim against Exxon Corporation being dismissed. The other defendant was an entity that had no legal existence. Respondent's failure to correct this mistake and obtain service on the second defendant in a correct name resulted in the claim against the second defendant also being dismissed on October 26, 1999. Throughout his represen tation of M r. Smoke , responde nt failed to co mmun icate with Mr. Smoke as to the status of his claim and respondent also failed to inform Mr. Smoke that the claim had been dismissed. Respondent also failed to respond to petitioner's inquiries -13-

about this co mplaint. The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d). Specifically, the hearing judge made the following findings in support of the violations: respondent did not have the legal knowledge or skill to handle Mr. Smoke's claim, respondent did not exercise the requisite thorough ness and p reparation in his handling of the claim , responde nt failed to exercise reasonable diligence in responding to Exxon Corporation's Motion for Production of Documents and correcting the co-defendants name and obtaining service of process, respondent failed to keep Mr. Smoke reasonably informed about the status of his case, respondent's failure to communicate with Mr. Smoke did not allow Mr. Smoke to make informed decisions about resp ondent's re presentation , responde nt did not m ake reason able efforts to expedite litigation cons istent with M r. Smoke 's interests, respondent fa iled to answer a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority, respondent failed to appear at a hearing of a disciplinary authority, and respond ent engag ed in cond uct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. II. Discussion Respondent filed no exceptions to the hearing judge's findings of fact or conclusions of law. The "hearing court's findings of fact are prima fac ie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are sh own to be clea rly errone ous." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.

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Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)). After a review of the record, we hold that the findings of fact of the hearing judge are not clearly erroneous. We hold that the hearing judge's conclusions of law are supported by the facts. We examined the purpose behind the attorney grievance procedure and the appropriate sanction for an attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Franz , 355 Md. 752, 760-61, 736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999), when we stated: "It is well-settled that the purpose of disciplinary proceed ings is to protect the public rather than to punish the erring attorney. Attorney Grievance Comm 'n of Maryland v. Myers , 333 Md. 440, 446-47, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Goldsborough , 330 Md. 342, 364, 624 A.2d 503, 513 [(1993)]; Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 1 05 (1993 ); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Myers , 302 Md. 571, 580, 490 A.2d 231, 236 (1985); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Velasquez, 301 M d. 450, 459 , 483 A.2d 354, 359 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. M ontgomery , 296 Md. 113, 119, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983). The public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolera ted. Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 382, 420 A.2d 9 40, 959 (1980 ), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970, 101 S. Ct. 1492, 67 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981 ). By imp osing s uch a sa nction, t his Court fulfills its responsibility `to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the B ar and to prevent the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute .' Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Agnew , 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974). Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect general and sp ecific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplin ary rules. See Protokowicz, 329 Md. at 262-63, 619 A.2d at 105; Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587 A.2d 511, 521 (1991); Attorney Griev. Co mm'n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 54041, 565 A.2d 66 0, 668 (1989). Of course, what the appropriate sanction for the particular m isconduc t is, in the public interest, generally depends upon the facts and circum stances of the c ase. Attorney G riev. Com m'n v. Ba bbitt , 300 Md. 637, 642, 479 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1984) (the facts and circumstances of a case will determ ine how severe the s anction sho uld be); Montgomery , 296 Md. at 120, 460 A.2d at 60 0; Attorn ey Grie v. Comm'n v. Pollack, 289 Md. 603, -15-

609, 42 5 A.2d 1352, 1 355 (1 981). The attorney's prior grievance history, as well as facts in mitigation, constitutes part of those facts and circumstances. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus , 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975 )." Petitioner contends that the appropriate sanction in the case sub judice is for respondent to be disb arred. Pe tition er sta tes th at res pondent's ac tions we re marke d by a total lack of diligence and an indifference to his legal obligations. Respondent failed to return monies that his clients we re entitled to rec eive. In ever y case, respond ent refused to cooperate with Bar Counsel. Petitioner states tha t the cumu lative effec t of the six

complaints, combine d with the s everity of the violations in those complaints, result in the appropriate sanction be ing disbarm ent. We have disbarred attorneys for neglecting their clients and ignoring Bar Counsel when the a ttorn ey had alrea dy received a pre vious re priman d or sus pensio n. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Singleton, 315 Md. 1, 553 A.2 d 222 (19 89); Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Sinclair , 305 M d. 430, 505 A.2d 10 6 (1986); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Stewart , 285 Md. 25 1, 401 A.2d 10 26 (1979); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 347 A.2d 556 (1975). We have also held that neglectful conduct, without receiving a previous sanction to serve as a warning, can resu lt in disbarment. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Manning, 318 Md. 697, 569 A.2d 1250 (1990), we held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who had neglected his clients' cases, had failed to communicate with his clients, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings. In a previous preceding that included four com plaints of neglect, Philip Manning had received -16-

an indefinite su spension w ith the right to apply for reinstatement within ninety days. The second proceeding also involved four complaints that occurred at the same time as the previo us com plaints. In reviewing the appropriate sanction for the second proceeding, we stated: "In determining the proper course to follow when confronted with an attorney who has neglected the needs of his clients and failed to com municate with them, we have `consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client's interests to be a violation of the Canons of Ethics warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanction.' Attorney G rievance C ommis sion v. Gallagher, 306 M d. 107, 1 15, 507 A.2d 625, 62 9 (1986); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547, 391 A.2d 434, 436 (1978); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 237, 369 A.2d 6 1, 68 (1 977). . . . "In Gallagher we determined that the proper sanction for the neglect evidenced in that case w as a forty-five d ay suspension . We poin ted out, however, that our `action . . . should in no respect be viewed as an indication that the neglect of clients' affairs , no matter h ow gros s, [would ] never lead to disbarment.' Gallagher, 306 Md. at 116, 507 A.2d at 629. . . .

"It is clear then that willful and flagran t neglect of a client's affairs is, in and of itself, the kind of m isconduc t by an attorney w hich can lea d to disbarment. As is obvious, the nature and persistence of this kind of inattentio n may an d does vary. . . . "In recent years, however, we have noticed too many instances when lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in part or in whole, only to completely neglect these same legal problems, causing the same clien ts emotional distress, financial loss, or other varying kinds of inconvenience. More often that not, these situations have been exacerbated by the lack of respect and attention extended to the courts as evidenced by the failure to f ile timely pleadings o r to make a ppearanc es as sched uled befo re the court to enable procee dings to be con ducted . It seems to us that this kind of persistent conduct is evidence of a lawyer's disregard of his obligation. -17-

"The instant case is a clear example of such attitude. Respondent is presently under suspension for acts of neglect which occurred in the same time period as the instant com plaints. Altho ugh the su spension h e is presently serving could not have had a deterrent effect on the previously committed violations, the large number of sim ilar complaints over a mo re than two-year span demonstrates a disturbing pattern. "Ad ditio nally, Respondent has shown the same disregard towards b oth of these proceedings as he has shown toward his clients. He has failed to respond to letters, notices, and Petitions for Disciplinary Action from Bar Counsel just as he failed to respond to communications from clients. Respondent also failed to appear at the two hearings before Judge Chasanow. He did appear before us in the prior proceedings. In the instant proceeding, he did not appear before this Court despite the fact that Bar Counsel indicated that he was seeking disbarment. His conduct demonstrates insensitivity to the seriousness of these ch arges. As w e see it, disbarment is the proper sanction under a ll of thes e circum stances ." Id. at 703-05, 569 A .2d at 1253-54 (alteration in origina l). In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sherman , 297 Md. 318, 465 A.2d 1161 (1983), we accepted the findings of the hearing judge, which found that Sherman's conduct "encompassed not only negle ct, intentional fa ilure to seek the lawful objectives o f his clients and prejudice, but also the makin g of misre presentation s both to his clients a nd to ot hers." Id . at 327, 465 A.2d at 1166. We found disbarment to be the appropriate sanction. At the time of the case, Sherman was suspended from the practice of law as a result of a previous sanction from this Court. The conduct that led to the previous sanction had occurred at the same time as the conduct that led to this second proceeding. In finding disbarment to be the appropriate sanction we stated: "After carefully considering the matter, we accept the findings of Judge Hamme rman and conclude, in the circumstances, that disbarment is the -18-

appropriate sanction. In so determining, we note that the time period involved in the present case encompasses the same period of time which was involved in the earlier disciplinary matter. We think it evident that Sh erman's misconduct over a long period of time is reflective of an utter disrega rd fo the interests of his clients and is further aggravated by the numerous misrepresentations made to his clients. We think Sherman's misconduct clearly demonstrates that he is unfit to con tinue as a m ember of the Bar of this State." Id . at 327-28, 465 A.2d 1166. The record in the case at bar do es not indicate that responden t has received any previous reprimands or sanctions from this Court; nevertheless, the volume and severity of the complaints against respondent lead us to conclude that the appropriate sanction against respondent is disbarment. Respondent has engaged in a pattern o f conduc t that only the most sever sanction of disbarme nt will provid e the protec tion to the public that this proce dure is supposed to provide. R esponde nt's lack of d iligence, his lac k of prep aration, his failure to commu nicate with his clients, his charging of unreasonable fees, his failure to account for and return monies, his misrepresentations, and his failure to comply w ith Bar Counsel's reques ts all lead to the m ost seve re sanc tion of d isbarm ent. IT IS SO ORD ERED ; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COST S AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRA NSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RUL E 16761(b), FOR W HICH SU M JUD GME NT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY G R I E V A N C E C O M M I S S I O N OF M A R Y L A N D A G A I N S T B R IA N L . WALLACE.

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