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Appellants, Reynaldo Barrios, Dajuan Graham, Antjuan Hillson, and Pablo Diaz, were convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Pincus, J., presiding) of two counts of assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension and one count of obstructing and hindering a police officer. and Hillson were sentenced to concurrent Appellants Barrios five-year terms of

incarceration, with all but sixteen months suspended, for each of the convictions. Appellant Graham was sentenced to ten years

imprisonment on one count of assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension and concurrent five-year terms for the remaining convictions, all but sixteen months of each sentence was suspended. Appellant Diaz was sentenced to concurrent five-year terms of incarceration, conviction. with all but one year suspended, for each

Appellants noted timely appeals and present three

questions for our review: I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motions for mistrial based on courtroom security measures that allegedly prejudiced the jurors against appellants? Did the trial court err in declining to give appellants' requested jury instruction on the definition of assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension? Was the evidence sufficient to sustain appellants' convictions?

II.

III.

FACTS On April 27, 1996, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Sergeant Ronald

Hardy of the Montgomery County Police Department responded to Edgewood Park for a report of a fight in progress. Tom Berson, a

reporter for the Montgomery Journal, was riding with the sergeant at the time. Upon arriving at the park, the sergeant saw no signs He did see a group of about twenty individuals, As Sergeant Hardy

of a disturbance.

ages fourteen to twenty, walking up a footpath.

turned to leave, he observed a verbal altercation erupt between two young men. At trial, the sergeant testified that Appellant Hillson In order to break up

was one of the men involved in the argument.

the altercation, the sergeant grabbed Appellant Hillson by the arm and told him to calm down. Approximately ten black males

approached the scene and cursed the sergeant, telling him that he had no right to stop Hillson. then arrived on the scene. Officers Gary Turner and Gill Lee

The officers calmed the group down and As the

were leaving the park when another argument broke out.

three officers approached the individuals who were arguing, they observed another young man, later identified as Leon Boyd, swing a tree branch at several other young men. Boyd to drop the branch. Officer Turner yelled at

Boyd did so and ran into a nearby The officers

apartment building with Turner and Hardy in pursuit.

testified at trial that they pursued Boyd because there were open warrants for his arrest. Officer Turner stopped Boyd in the hallway of the apartment building, told him that he was under arrest, and ordered him to get

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on the ground.

Officer Turner testified that Boyd responded that The officer took hold Sergeant Hardy Boyd

the officer was going to have to shoot him.

of Boyd to effect the arrest and Boyd resisted.

then stepped into the hallway and assisted Officer Turner.

continued to struggle and Sergeant Hardy was able to place the handcuffs only on Boyd's left wrist. As the officers started to

pull Boyd's right arm behind his body, a crowd of about twenty to twenty five individuals ran into the hallway. on Boyd and tugging at Sergeant Hardy. They began pulling

The crowd was also yelling

at the officers to leave Boyd alone and that he had not done anything. The officers told the crowd that Boyd was under arrest Officer Lee had

and that they should get back and calm down.

entered the hallway with the crowd and attempted to aid the other officers. Sergeant Hardy testified that members of the crowd were

tugging on his arm and pulling the officers and Boyd toward the front of the building. Officer Turner testified that the four appellants were in the hallway, refused to back up, and were chanting, "Let him go; let him go...." Officer Turner added that Appellant Barrios pushed him

back against the wall and that Appellant Graham was pushing into the crowd that was pushing against the officers. The officer

further stated that Appellants Hillson and Diaz grabbed Boyd and attempted to pull him away from the officers. During the

altercation, Boyd bit Officer Turner on the arm. At some point, Officer Lee informed the other officers that 3

someone was trying to take his gun. Turner's radio from his body.

Someone ripped Officer

Sergeant Hardy pushed the emergency Sergeant

button on his police radio to call for immediate help.

Hardy then decided to release Boyd because Boyd was being arrested on open misdemeanor warrants, the officers knew who he was, and the sergeant was concerned for the safety of the officers and the individuals in the crowd. knew the individuals Sergeant Hardy added that Officer Turner in the altercation. When the

involved

officers released Boyd, he ran out of the building, across the parking lot, and disappeared. The crowd immediately dispersed.

Sergeant Hardy was unable to identify anyone in the hallway except for Boyd and did not recall seeing any of the appellants there. Officer Turner testified that the appellants were the first He

four individuals in the crowd that entered the hallway.

conceded that in the report he wrote six days after the incident, he did not name any of the appellants as having been in the hallway. Officer Turner also testified that prior to the date in

question, he had informed Appellants Diaz, Graham, and Barrios that there were outstanding warrants for Boyd's arrest. The officer had

never informed Appellant Hillson of the outstanding warrants. Donna Chandler, who lived at the apartment complex, heard the commotion in the hallway and observed the three officers struggling with about twenty individuals. Ms. Chandler called the police.

Ms. Chandler also testified that she saw a young man with one handcuff on his wrist stumble out of the building. 4 His friends

helped him get away and told him to get up and run. Tom Berson, the reporter riding along with Sergeant Hardy, testified that as Sergeant Hardy tried to calm down the young people, Berson walked away to speak with some other individuals and eventually lost sight of the sergeant. Later, Mr. Berson observed

a group of about twenty younger people, who had been gathered around a building, run off in different directions. In the defense case, Grace Broadus, Appellant Hillson's

mother, testified that she was visiting with a friend who lived near Edgewood Park when she observed two police cars go by. Ms.

Broadus stated that two of her sons were at the park so she left her friend's house and drove there. At the park, Ms. Broadus saw

her stepson, who informed her that Sergeant Hardy had been in contact with her son, Appellant Hillson. Ms. Broadus testified

that she began to look for Sergeant Hardy to discuss what had happened. In looking around the park, she ended up at the

apartment building in question and heard a young woman yelling. "[T]hey are beating him." Ms. Broadus stated that she looked in

the apartment building and saw the three officers struggling with four or five people. She stated that she came to the officers' aid She added that

and helped to pull someone off of Sergeant Hardy.

her son was not involved with the officers, but that he tried to protect her. At one point, Ms. Broadus was knocked to the ground Ms.

and Appellant Hillson tried to pull her out of the crowd.

Broadus stated that after the crowd had dispersed, she walked with 5

the officers back to the parking lot and Officer Turner informed her that "all gloves were off, and that he would have all of them arrested." Ms. Broadus added that she did not see Appellants

Graham, Barrios, or Diaz in the hallway while she attempted to assist the officers. Betty Smith testified that on the date in question she was residing in the apartment building directly across from the

building where the altercation occurred.

She stated that from her

balcony she observed a young man run from the apartment followed by a crowd of teenagers. Ms. Smith stated that she also saw Appellant

Barrios, but that he was standing beside another building, a good distance away from the scene. Kimberly Jones testified that Appellant Graham was her cousin and that at the time of the incident in question, he was living in her house. Ms. Jones stated that she was at Edgewood Park with her Ms.

daughter and two nieces on the afternoon of the altercation.

Jones stated that a fight erupted, a group of people started running, and Appellant Graham attempted to go with the crowd, but Ms. Jones prevented him from doing so. Ms. Jones testified that

she grabbed him, placed her arm around his neck, and told him that he did not need to go with his friends and that he was staying with her. Lisa Atkins corroborated Ms. Jones' testimony, stating that she was in the park on the day in question and observed Ms. Jones prevent Appellant Graham from going to the apartment building where 6

the police officers had chased a young man.

Ms. Atkins also stated

that Appellants Diaz and Barrios left the area before the crowd moved toward the apartment building. Appellant Hillson did not make his She further testified that way toward the apartment

building until five or ten minutes after the crowd had headed in that direction. India Taylor testified that she was also in Edgewood Park on the date in question and that she and Appellant Diaz left the park together and went to his home. She stated that as they were Annie Diaz,

leaving the park, she heard yelling and shouting.

Appellant Diaz's sister, testified that Ms. Taylor and Appellant Diaz came home together and stayed there. We will include additional facts as necessary in our

discussion of the questions presented.

DISCUSSION I. Prior to trial, appellants objected to the presence of a metal detector in the hallway outside the courtroom. Counsel stated that

Appellant Hillson's defense counsel "had heard a statement by a person who was a prospective juror in another case in another courtroom which as I understand -- as I took it down is, I wonder why they are doing all the security for that case." continued: Counsel

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And since metal detectors and security are not usually present in trials in Montgomery County Circuit Court, there is an implication by the fact that they are present here that these defendants and or their relatives or associates are people about whom the prospective jurors and jurors need to be concerned -- for potential for violence, and we would object for that reason. The trial court did not respond to counsel's objection. Thereafter, prior to the afternoon session on the second day of trial, a motion for mistrial was made by Appellant Hillson's counsel. Counsel alleged that shortly after the lunch recess, and before the jury had completely cleared the courtroom, there was an incident or altercation between my client, Mr. Hillson, and a member of the sheriff's department here in the courtroom. Apparently some words were exchanged between the two. * * *

Not [a] physical altercation, Your Honor, a verbal altercation, an interplay between the two. And the -- according to a witness who was present in the courtroom, this conversation was overheard and observed by members of the jury who had not yet cleared the courtroom. In addition to which, after the lunch recess, and while the jury was in the hallway, a member of the Sheriff's Department approached me in a way that was clearly observable to the members of the jury in the hallway and began to discuss this incident in a way that, in my opinion, was clearly apparent to the members of the jury in the hallway. I think [this] creates clear prejudice on the part -- in the minds of the jurors as to the combination of these events combined with 8

the undercover officers who are here in the courtroom. There has been as far as I know perhaps one spectator who is not a member of either the Sheriff's Department or an undercover police officer or sheriff in the courtroom, and at this impression [sic] it is clearly apparent to the jury and creates prejudice on behalf -- prejudice against Mr. Hillson sufficient to warrant a mistrial. Counsel for Appellant Diaz joined the motion for mistrial based on "the excessive police presence within the courtroom and outside in the immediate waiting area." Counsel for Appellants

Graham and Barrios also joined the motion for mistrial. The State's Attorney proffered that he had observed the

incident in question and explained that it arose from some visual contact between Appellant Hillson, who was free on bond, and Appellant Diaz, who was incarcerated at the time of trial. The

State's Attorney explained that it was important to prevent the two incarcerated defendants from having contact with the defendants who were free on bond, as they could be passing something between them.1 In addition, if any contact occurred, the sheriffs would The court The court

have to search the incarcerated defendants again. renewed its admonition that appellants have no contact. then denied the motions for mistrial, stating: [I]t has been made apparent to the Court starting yesterday that the sheriffs have good

Appellants Hillson and Graham were free on bond at the time of trial. Appellants Diaz and Barrios were incarcerated during trial. 9

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reason to have knowledge that there is -- the potential for problems in this case securitywise -- and additionally this morning, there was something of a significant happenstance when one of the defendants refused to go to his cell and had to be coerced, if you will, or wrestled into the cell. And another of the defendants apparently mouthed off quite a bit to the sheriffs ..., so they are just doing their job, but I am going to deny the grounds for mistrial. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court gave the following curative instruction: I just wanted to say one word, that anything that any members of the jury may have seen, or if there is anything in the future that may occur, but particularly anything that may have occurred after I excused you, or that some of you may have witnessed, anything that went on between any counsel in this case and any court personnel is to be completely disregarded by you. It has nothing to do whatsoever with the merits of this case. Anything you may or may not have witnessed, it is immaterial completely and completely irrelevant to this case, so just please disregard [it]. At the close of all the evidence, counsel for Appellant Diaz again moved for mistrial, which counsel for the remaining

appellants joined, and the following exchange occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Diaz at this time I would once again move for mistrial. And the basis for my motion at this time is the undue and excessive security presence in the courtroom and in the lobby area outside of the courtroom. At one point yesterday afternoon, counsel was able to observe in the gallery and in the courtroom eight uniformed members of the 10

Sheriff's Department. There were no civilians in the gallery at that time, so that the view which I had of the gallery was exactly the view which each and every member of the jury panel had. They have been sitting in the lobby area. They have not been confined to the jury room during the recesses or during the gathering times before court begins in the morning. THE COURT: detector outside. There is also a metal

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So that when they sit in the lobby area, they are aware of the fact there are two courtrooms where a trial has gone on this week on this floor. THE COURT: the record. There are probably four for

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, four trials. And that jurors in those -- those other two courtrooms have not gone through a metal detector. They obviously have seen sheriffs present at this end of the hall and not at the other end of the hall where there are two courtrooms where trials have gone on during the same period of time. There is absolutely -- it is my argument to this Court that no reasonable juror sitting there in that juror box or out in the lobby area can but wonder and speculate why. What is different about this trial? What is different about these young men who have been accused of crimes? That there are police witnesses in this case. The possibility for speculation is such a level that my client's ability receive a fair trial in this courtroom been irreparably damaged, and I would move a mistrial on those grounds. 11 at to has for

THE COURT: Okay. It will be denied. And for the record, I will state that from the beginning of this trial when the sheriff came to this member of the bench and indicated what their security plans were, their heightened security plans, they based it on the fact that they had information that there was a real responsibility [sic] for violence. I will note that this is Thursday. That on Tuesday morning, there was an incident in lockup with at least two defendants. One of whom tussled with the sheriffs with respect to going into his cell. And I am just informed this morning that a very similar incident occurred again this morning where there was real resistance to placing a particular defendant in the cell or in the cell block, although I am not privy to the exact details. In any event, there may be more. I am not sure, but that is what I am aware of. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: To complete the record then, when I asked the captain in charge the reason for the use of the metal detector on the first day of trial before jury selection had been begun, I was informed that the presence of an individual in the gallery together with four defendants in one trial were the factors which necessitated this extremely unusual action. The individual who was present in the gallery for one day of this trial, it is my understanding, was convicted in another courtroom in this courthouse this week. And I do not believe that the metal detector nor eight sheriffs were used in that particular courtroom. THE COURT: And in closing before we bring the jury back in, I will note that there is a permanent metal detector in the Domestic Relations branch of this court. 12

Appellant Hillson's counsel added that "whatever may or may not have happened with the two defendants that are incarcerated should not in any way cause this jury to speculate, be tainted in any way to my client, Mr. Hillson, who is not incarcerated." trial court responded: That will be denied. And I will just answer briefly, I suspect, by the fact that coupled with threats of potential violence, I suspect, enhanced or reinforced the sheriff's feelings about the necessity for heightened security in this matter. Appellants contend that "no adequate basis was shown for the extreme security measures taken at [their] trial." They stress The

that a metal detector was placed outside the courtroom when such detectors were not located outside other criminal courtrooms, that two of the appellants were free on bail, and that almost all of the spectators at their trial were law enforcement personnel.

Appellants claim that this was security "overkill" and that "[t]he jurors would inevitably conclude that there was information known to law enforcement officers that the [a]ppellants were very

dangerous and violent criminals."

Accordingly, appellants allege

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motions for mistrial. "`[T]he declaration of a mistrial is an extraordinary act which should only be granted if necessary to serve the ends of justice.'" Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 422 (1990), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 835 (1991) (quoting Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 587 13

(1987)).

The granting of a motion for a mistrial is committed to Poole v. State, 295 Md.

the sound discretion of the trial court. 167, 183 (1983).

"We will not reverse a trial court's denial of a

motion for mistrial unless the defendant was so clearly prejudiced that the denial constituted an abuse of discretion." at 422. "The trial judge has broad discretion in maintaining courtroom security." Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 84 (1995), cert. "The reviewing court should not Hunt, 321 Md.

denied, 116 S.Ct. 1021 (1996).

determine whether less stringent security measures were available to the trial court, but rather whether the measures applied were reasonable and whether they posed an unacceptable risk of prejudice to the defendant." Hunt, 321 Md. at 408. In Bowers v. State, 306

Md. 120, 133-34, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986), the Court of Appeals quoted from United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971) (citations omitted), to discuss the issue of discretion: It is [the trial judge] who is best equipped to decide the extent to which security measures should be adopted to prevent disruption of the trial, harm to those in the courtroom, escape of the accused, and the prevention of other crimes. As a discretionary matter, the district judge's decision with regard to measure[s] for security is subject to limited review to determine if it was abused. We stress that the discretion is that of the district judge. He may not, as is suggested at one part in the record before us, delegate that discretion to the Marshal. Of course, he should consult 14

with the Marshal when other than ordinary security such as the general presence of guards in the courtroom is contemplated, and he may rely heavily on the Marshal's advice as to what may be required since it is the Marshal who has the experience in the keeping of prisoners and who must provide the guards and bear the major responsibility if untoward incidents occur. In the present case, increased security was required as there were four defendants on trial in one courtroom. apparent from the above quoted exchanges that It is also the Sheriff's

Department met with the trial court concerning security measures as threats of violence had been made in regard to the trial.

Furthermore, one or both of the appellants who were incarcerated at the time of trial were uncooperative with the sheriffs and had to be physically forced into their cells. Finally, there was a

concern of contact between the appellants who were free on bail and those who were incarcerated. At one point, there was a visual

exchange between an appellant who was incarcerated and Appellant Hillson, who was not incarcerated. Although two of the appellants

were free on bail, based on the nature of the crimes charged and the attempted communication between appellants after they had been admonished to conduct no such communications, there was the real possibility that the two appellants who were not incarcerated would support or further any disruptive behavior on the part of the incarcerated appellants. We perceive no abuse on the part of the

trial court in approving the sheriff's security measures and, thus, hold that the trial court properly denied appellants' motions for 15

mistrial.

II. At the close of all the evidence, appellants, through

Appellant Graham's counsel, requested that the trial court instruct the jury that in order to convict appellants of the crime of assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension, the jury must find that ... the defendants knew that the apprehension or detention of Leon Boyd that was being attempted was lawful, and that the jury must also find that it was Leon Boyd, and the defendants knew it was Leon Boyd who the officers were trying to apprehend. The trial court declined to give the instruction, finding that the State had to prove only that there was a lawful apprehension or detention and that the appellants did not have to make a

determination as to the legality of that apprehension or detention. Appellants objected to the court's failure to give the instruction. Appellants allege that Md. Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol), Art. 27,

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