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Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc. - No. 128, 1995 Term ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES -- Board of Liquor License Commissioners may impose binding restrictions on a liquor license with consent of the licensee. Additional restrictions may not be imposed as a sanction.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 128 September Term, 1995 ___________________________________ BOARD OF LIQUOR LICENSE COMMISSIONERS FOR BALTIMORE CITY v. FELLS POINT CAFE, INC. ___________________________________ *Murphy, C.J. Eldridge Rodowsky Chasanow Karwacki Bell Raker JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Chasanow, J. ___________________________________ Filed: November 13, 1996

*Murphy, C.J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the

Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and the adoption of this opinion.

In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City possessed the authority to impose restrictions on an individual license with the consent of the licensee and whether additional restrictions may be imposed on the license thereafter as a sanction for violating the consented to restrictions. For the following reasons, we answer

the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. We also hold, as a preliminary matter, that the

Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal.

I. The facts in this case are as follows. On November 4, 1993,

a hearing was held by the Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City ("the Board") on an application to transfer the ownership of a liquor license to the Licensees1 and to modify the restrictions that had been placed on the license. The restrictions

had been placed on the license as a result of protracted conflict between the previous license holders and the neighborhood residents over the operation of a club called the Sanctuary. Homeowners' Association ("the FPHA"), an The Fells Point organization of

neighborhood residents, initially opposed the transfer of the license to the Licensees, most likely because they feared another club like the Sanctuary. In an effort to convince the FPHA not to

oppose the transfer of the license, the Licensees agreed to have The Licensees Christopher Francis.
1

are

Justin

Walters,

Thomas

Hicks

and

-2certain conditions placed on their operations that would make the establishment more compatible with neighborhood living. The FPHA

agreed not to oppose the transfer of the license at the November 4, 1993 hearing in exchange for the concessions by the Licensees. At the November 4, 1993 hearing, the Licensees argued that the Board should transfer the license because the Licensees and the FPHA had "entered into a written agreement which set[] forth restrictions on the [l]icense which [met] the needs of both sides." The Licensees requested that the written agreement dated November 4, 1993 be incorporated into the license "as a restriction." The

restrictions in the agreement included what kinds of music and other entertainment were prohibited, under what conditions dancing would be allowed, what percentage of revenue had to be derived from the sale of food and specific restrictions on the sale of beer, wine and liquor. Before the Board would agree to the transfer,

however, it questioned the prospective Licensees extensively and sought assurances that the premises would be operated as a

restaurant and not as a nightclub or bar.

It appears from the

transcript of the November 4, 1993 hearing that the Board had had some problems with the establishment formerly known as the

Sanctuary,

which was a nightclub, and that the license was only

transferred because the Licensees had expressly agreed that the premises would be used as a restaurant.2
2

The Board granted the

The agreement actually covers all "the property of 723 South Broadway." 723 South Broadway houses three separate entertainment

-3application to transfer the license subject to the restrictions set forth in the agreement and on the license. contains the following restriction: conditions set forth in the The face of the license

"Must operate in line with the with the Fells Point

agreement

Homeowners Association, the agreement dated November 4, 1993." On December 1, 1994, a public hearing was held by the Board to determine, among other things, whether the Licensees had violated the restrictions contained in the November 4, 1993 agreement.3 At

the hearing, the Licensees moved to dismiss the charges against them on the ground that the November 4, 1993 agreement was binding on the community and the Licensees only and was not enforceable by the Board. The Licensees asserted that, as to the Board, the The Board

restrictions in the agreement were "null and void."

argued that it did have the power to restrict an individual license and that it had been doing so for many years, whenever it believed that such restrictions would be in the best interests of the community. The Board concluded that the November 4, 1993 agreement had been accepted by the Licensees and the FPHA and that the Board had

establishments. The large room in the front of the premises, formerly the Sanctuary, is the area that was to become a restaurant. The smaller front room is the Fells Point Cafe and the large room in the rear is a theater; neither of these establishments is at issue in this case. The violations were alleged to have occurred in only one of the entertainment establishments, the large room in the front of the premises formerly known as the Sanctuary.
3

-4accepted the agreement as a binding restriction on the license. The Board also stated that it had the authority, under Article 2B, to impose such restrictions. After finding that the Licensees had

violated many of the restrictions in the agreement and that the premises were being used primarily as a nightclub or bar, the Board imposed the following, additional restrictions, effective December 8, 1994: no live entertainment, no D.J., no dancing, no exotic

entertainment. The Licensees sought judicial review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and obtained a stay of the Board's Order. (collectively petition. The Board and several interested individuals4 "the Petitioners") responded to the Licensees'

A hearing was held on May 15, 1995 before the Honorable Judge Caplan found that the Board lacked

Hilary D. Caplan.

statutory authority to impose any restrictions on a license not expressly provided for in Article 2B and he stated: of the Board of Liquor License "the decision is hereby

Commissioners

reversed...." effect.

The Judge asked counsel to prepare an order to that

An order was prepared and was signed by Judge Caplan on The order stated that the decision of the Board was

May 17, 1995.

"REVERSED for the reasons articulated by the Court in its oral ruling from the bench and in the Court's Memorandum Opinion

The individuals are: Courtney Capute, Arnold Capute, Thomas Durel, Timothy Duke, Cecilia Ives and MaryRose Whelley.

4

-5attached hereto."5 docket entry read: The Order was docketed on the same day; the "ORDER OF COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE BOARD

IS REVERSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS (CAPLAN, J)." On May 23, 1995 and May 25, 1995, the Board and the interested individuals, respectively, filed motions for reconsideration. Licensees filed a motion in opposition to the motions The for

reconsideration on June 8, 1995. the motions on June 16, 1995.

Judge Caplan held a hearing on After arguments on the motions

concluded, Judge Caplan gave the parties ten days to present any additional materials for consideration on the motions. He told the

parties to expect his ruling "sometime by the middle of July." Later in the day, on June 16, 1995, the Board and the interested individuals, apparently believing that an appeal had to be filed within 30 days of the May 17, 1995 docket entry, filed notices of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. On July 19,

1995, Judge Caplan filed a Memorandum Decision and Order, which restated his conclusion that the Board lacked authority to impose restrictions on the license and which implicitly disposed of the outstanding motions. The Licensees filed, in the Court of Special Appeals, a Motion to Dismiss the appeals of the Board and the individual appellants on the grounds that they failed to note timely appeals pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-202(a). The Court of Special Appeals denied the

5

There was no Memorandum Opinion attached to the Order.

-6motion on September 26, 1995. We granted a writ of certiorari, on

December 19, 1995, before the case could be reviewed on its merits by the Court of Special Appeals in order to consider the important issues raised by the appeal. Licensees have again moved In their brief to this Court, the to have the Petitioners' appeals

dismissed on the grounds that they were not timely.

II. The threshold issue that we must address is whether the Petitioners filed timely notices of appeal. A notice of appeal

must be filed within thirty days after the entry of the judgment or order from which an appeal is to be taken. Maryland Rule 8-202(a).

The Licensees argue that when the Petitioners filed their notices of appeal, on June 16, 1995, in response to the Order docketed May 17, 1995, there was no final judgment from which an appeal could be taken. The Licensees argue that a final judgment was entered in

the circuit court on July 19, 1995, the date that Judge Caplan filed the Memorandum Decision and Order. The Licensees assert that

because the Petitioners did not file additional notices of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the Memorandum Decision, their opportunity for appellate review expired. The Petitioners filed a response to the Licensees' motion in which they argued that Judge Caplan rendered a judgment on May 15, 1995, which became final when the order was signed and entered on the docket on May 17, 1995. The appellants argue that their

-7appeal, filed on June 16, 1995, was timely because it was filed on the thirtieth day after the final judgment was entered. We agree,

and we hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted a final judgment, from which the Petitioners could appeal, on May 17, 1995. The Maryland Rules define a judgment as "any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules." Rule 1-202(m). Maryland

Maryland Rule 2-601 prescribes the manner in which

a judgment must be entered: "(a) When Entered.--Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise. Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the clerk shall enter the judgment as directed by the court. Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending a determination of the amount of costs. (b) Method of Entry--Date of Judgment.--The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment." Maryland Rule 2-601(a),(b). Rule 1-202(m) and Rule 2-601, taken together, "make clear that two acts must occur for an action by a court to be deemed the granting of a judgment: the court must render a final order and

-8the order must be entered on the docket by the clerk." Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710, 646 A.2d 365, 370 (1994). Davis v.

Once both steps

have occurred, rendition and entry, a judgment has been created. Id. "Rendition of judgment is ... the court's pronouncement, by

spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication." Id. The entry of a judgment is the "purely ministerial act" of Id.

placing a judgment in the permanent record of a court.

Whether a judgment has been rendered is a determination that must be made on a case by case basis and that "turns on whether the court indicated clearly that it had fully adjudicated the issue submitted and had reached a final decision on the matter at that time." Davis, 335 Md. at 710-11, 646 A.2d at 370. A reviewing

court will focus on the words spoken and the actions taken in the lower court to make such a determination. 646 A.2d at 371. On May 15, 1995, Judge Caplan stated: "So the decision of the Davis, 335 Md. at 711,

Board of Liquor Commissioners is hereby reversed, and costs will be paid by the Board. Thank you." These words clearly indicate that

the court "had fully adjudicated the issue submitted and had reached a final decision on the matter at that time." Furthermore,

Judge Caplan twice referred to the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals that he knew was imminent. In reference to his reversal of "If

the Board, Judge Caplan said of the Court of Special Appeals:

-9I am wrong, they will correct me." In response to a question from

Licensees' counsel regarding restrictions on the license, Judge Caplan responded: "I am not going to lift them until ... the Court I am at this juncture reversing the

of Special Appeals has spoken. Board."

We think the Petitioners could justifiably conclude that

Judge Caplan reached a final decision and rendered a judgment. The order signed by the court on May 17, 1995 was entered on the docket the same day. follows: The docket for May 17, 1995, reads as

"ORDER OF COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE BOARD IS In the

REVERSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS (CAPLAN, J)."

margin next to those words is the abbreviation "CLOS," the clerk's notation that the case was closed on that day. Thus it appeared

from the docket entries that there was a final judgment on May 17, 1995, when the decision that was rendered by the circuit court was entered on the docket. Whether a party may appeal a judgment of a court depends on whether that judgment is "final." Maryland Code (1995 Repl. Vol.),

Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article,

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