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Brewster v. Woodhaven Building & Development, No. 82, September Term, 1999. CIVIL PROCEDURE--FINAL JUDGMENTS--TRANSFER OF VENUE-- A trial court's order transferring a civil case from one circuit court to another circuit court is a final judgment and thus immediately appealable.

Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. C98-10180 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 82 September Term, 1999

ANDRE W. BREWSTER, et al. v. WOODHAVEN BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al.

Bell, C.J. Eldridge Rodowsky Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell, JJ.

Opinion by Raker, J. Rodowsky, Wilner and Cathell, JJ., dissent.

Filed: August 22, 2000

The issue in this case is whether a trial court's order transferring a civil case from one circuit court to another circuit court is a final judgment and thus immediately appealable.

Petitioners in this case appealed the Court of Special Appeals' dismissal of their appeal from a transfer of venue, in a suit claiming injury to real property caused by Respondents' channeling of water into a stream that runs across the property. We shall hold that the transfer order is an immediately appealable final judgment, and we shall remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals to consider the merits of the appeal.

I. Petitioners, plaintiffs below, are Andre W. Brewster, three other owners of riparian land along the Piney Run in Baltimore County, and the Piney Run Preservation Association. The Piney Run, according to the complaint, is a stream that begins at its headwaters near the border between Baltimore and Carroll counties, crosses northern Baltimore County, and joins the Western Run, which, in turn, flows to the Loch Raven Reservoir. Respondents, defendants below, are Woodhaven Building and Development, Inc. ("Woodhaven"), the Town of Hampstead, Maryland ("Hampstead"), the County Commissioners of Carroll County ("Carroll County"), The Fields Homeowners Association ("The Fields"), Hill/Reedy, Inc. ("Hill/Reedy"), and Carroll County employees Myron R. Frock and James E. Slater, Jr. ("Frock" and "Slater"). The complaint, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 10, 1998, alleges that Woodhaven built the Roberts Fields housing development and shopping center in Carroll County; that polluted storm water runoff from the development and shopping center are channeled into the Piney Run; that The Fields, as the homeowners' association for the Roberts Fields development, owns the holding ponds from which the runoff flows; that Hill/Reedy owns part of the shopping center; that Hampstead owns the storm drains that direct

-2the Roberts Fields storm water into the Piney Run; and that Frock and Slater are responsible for reviewing storm water management plans for the vicinity of the headwaters of the Piney Run in Carroll County. The complaint also states that Carroll County owns the Hampstead Waste Water Treatment Plant, and that the plant discharges its effluent into the Piney Run. The complaint alleges that the water added to the stream by Respondents pollutes the stream and otherwise damages Petitioners' property; it asserts theories of liability under the headings of riparian rights, negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability; and it seeks a permanent injunction and damages. Woodhaven and Hill/Reedy answered the complaint. The Fields, Hampstead, Carroll County, Frock, and Slater moved to dismiss on grounds of improper venue, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(a)(2). The Fields and Hampstead also moved, in the alternative, for transfer to a more convenient forum, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-327(c). Conducting no hearing, the Baltimore County trial judge granted the motion of The Fields, and issued an order on February 1, 1999, stating that "as a matter of convenience, this claim shall be transferred to the Circuit Court for Carroll County, Maryland or for proper venue. Vast majority of parties and witnesses are in Carroll Co. and this makes venue in that Co. much more convenient." Petitioners filed a motion for a hearing and for reconsideration of this ruling on February 4, 1999; their motion also points out that the court's order of February 1, 1999 did not rule on the motions of the other defendants. On February 5, 1999, the court denied Petitioners' motion, and issued an order on the docket sheet, stating as follows: Obviously it was not the intention of the Court to have one

-3defendant's case tried in Carroll Co. and the rest in Balto. Co. Thus the case was transferred as to all defendants and such Motions were granted. If for some reason convenience is the only reason to transfer as said in Order of 2/1/99 the case is transferred to Carroll Co. for that reason. For clarity, the entire case is moved to Carroll Co. Petitioners noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Fields moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that a circuit court's order transferring a case to another circuit court is not immediately appealable because it is not a final judgment. The Court of Special Appeals granted the motion, in an order issued without opinion on June 3, 1999. We granted a writ of certiorari.

II. Petitioners argue that a trial court's order is immediately appealable if it is either a final judgment or a collateral order, and that the transfer order in this case was both. It is a final judgment, they argue, because it terminated the litigation in the court that issued it, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Petitioners argue that the transfer order in this case is appealable also because it satisfies the collateral order doctrine as set out in Pittsburgh Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 728 A.2d 210 (1999). We need not address their argument on this point because, as we explain below, the transfer order is immediately appealable because it is a final judgment. Respondents initially argue that under Maryland Rule 2-602, an order that fails to dispose of the merits of a case is not a final judgment. Rule 2-602 provides, in pertinent part,

-4that an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether raised by original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action: (1) is not a final judgment. Because the order in the present case did not adjudicate the merits of the case, Respondents argue, it is not a final judgment under Rule 2-602. Respondents' main argument, however, is that although an order need not necessarily dispose of the merits of a case to be a final judgment, an order's effect of terminating a case in a particular court does not suffice to make the order a final judgment. Rather, they contend, the order must also deprive the party of the means to pursue the claims at issue in any court.

III. The final judgment rule1 derives originally from the English common law principle that

The statutes concerning final judgments do not take us very far. They establish a right of appeal from a final judgment, but do not indicate which orders constitute final judgments. Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.)

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