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Ronald Lee Broadwater, Sr. et al. v. Matilda Woodward Dorsey et vir. No. 6, September Term, 1996. [TORTS--NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT--The doctrine of negligent entrustment is generally limited to those situations in which the supplier has the right to permit or prohibit use of the chattel at the time of the accident. TORTS--NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT--Parents who sell or make a gift of an automobile to an adult child are not ordinarily responsible for damages caused by the adult child's negligent use of the automobile when the parents lack the right to control the adult child or the automobile at the time of the accident.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 1996 ___________________________________

RONALD LEE BROADWATER, SR. et al.

v.

MATILDA WOODWARD DORSEY et vir.

___________________________________

Bell, C.J. Eldridge Rodowsky Chasanow Karwacki Raker *Murphy, Robert C., (retired, specially assigned) JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Raker, J. ___________________________________

Filed:

February 14, 1997

This case concerns the tort doctrine of negligent entrustment. The issue we must decide is whether the parents of an adult child who sell or who make a gift of an automobile to their adult child, with knowledge of the child's reckless conduct, may be held

answerable in damages to a third person subsequently injured by the son's negligent operation of the automobile. The claim of

liability is predicated upon the principle of legal responsibility for the negligent entrustment of an automobile to an allegedly incompetent driver. Specifically, we must decide whether a parent

who negligently entrusts a chattel to an adult son is responsible for damages subsequently incurred by a third party when the parent does not have the power of control over either the automobile or the son at the time of the accident. We conclude that parents who

sell or give an automobile to an adult child are not responsible for damages when they lack the power to control the child or the automobile. On October 2, 1992, Ronald L. Broadwater, Jr., then age twenty-six, drove his automobile across the center line, colliding head-on into the vehicle driven by Matilda Dorsey and seriously injuring her. Along with her husband Dr. James H. Dorsey, she

filed a lawsuit against Ronald, Jr., and Dr. and Mrs. Ronald L. Broadwater, Sr. The complaint alleged that Ronald, Jr., the owner

of the automobile, breached his duty to drive his vehicle in a safe, reasonable and non-negligent manner, and the breach of that

- 2 duty resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The complaint further

alleged that Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater negligently entrusted the automobile to Ronald, Jr., their adult son, by purchasing the vehicle and giving it to Ronald, Jr., knowing at the time they gave the vehicle to Ronald, Jr. it was likely, because of his driving record and drug abuse problems, that he would drive the vehicle recklessly and pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others. The case proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The Broadwaters filed a motion for summary judgment on the

grounds that they had no power to control the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and that they lacked sufficient knowledge to put them on notice that their son posed an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The court denied the motion. The jury found that

Ronald, Jr. negligently operated his motor vehicle on October 2, 1992, and as a result caused injury to Mrs. Dorsey. The jury also

found that Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater had negligently entrusted the Mazda RX 7 to Ronald, Jr. The jury awarded damages to the

plaintiffs, Dr. and Mrs. Dorsey. Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the trial court had erred in concluding that they could be liable on a theory of negligent entrustment. The Court of Special Appeals, by a divided panel, affirmed the

- 3 judgment. Broadwater v. Dorsey, 107 Md. App. 58, 666 A.2d 1282 (1995). This Court granted certiorari.

The facts were set out in great detail by the intermediate appellate court as follows: "In November, 1990, appellants owned or had in their possession five cars, all insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company--a 1986 Mercedes, a 1988 Toyota, a 1990 Plymouth Laser, a 1956 Ford Thunderbird, and a 1988 Corvette. The Ford and the Corvette, they

contended, were not driven. "Ronald, Jr. was, to say the least, not a highly motivated person. He was born in June, 1965, and thus, After graduating

by November, 1990, was 25 years old.

high school in 1984 or 1985 (when he was 19 or 20), he attended three different colleges for varying periods but, despite five or six years of effort, had not

graduated from any of them and had not even earned sufficient credits for an A.A. degree. Except for a

brief period when he lived in an apartment paid for by his parents while he was attending one of the colleges, he lived at home or stayed with friends. Although he

worked part-time for his father for a while (there is some conflict in the evidence as to whether he was paid

- 4 for his services), he never had a steady, permanent job. He was almost totally supported by his parents. "Between August, 1982 and October, 1989, Ronald, Jr. amassed 10 points on his driving record, for seven separate incidents of failing to obey traffic signals or speeding. Mrs. Broadwater paid a number of fines for her

son and also paid for an attorney to represent him on one or more occasions. In 1980, when he was 15, Ronald, Jr.

was involved in a motorcycle accident, as a result of which, in 1983, Dr. Broadwater was sued for having negligently entrusted the motorcycle to his son. case was apparently settled. "Beginning in November, 1990, and continuing through February, 1991, State Farm informed the Broadwaters that it would decline to renew the insurance on any of the five vehicles then owned by them unless Ronald, Jr. was excluded from the coverage. based on three recent Those notices were each by Ronald, Jr.-The

violations

speeding in April and October, 1989 and failing to obey a traffic signal in July, 1988 -- and one accident. October, 1990, he ran into a concrete bridge. In

Although

the Broadwaters initially protested these notices, they eventually acceded to State Farm's decision and, in August, 1991, signed an agreement excluding Ronald, Jr. from coverage.

- 5 "The son's irresponsible conduct may, in part, be explained by the fact that he was a drug addict. On

September 20, 1991, the Broadwaters filed a petition with the District Court for an emergency evaluation of Ronald, Jr. Although Dr. Broadwater claimed in his testimony

that the evaluation was "so that he would be forced to have his bipolar mental problems straightened out," in the petition he and his wife noted that Ronald, Jr. had a history of drug abuse dating back to 1980. During the

most recent period, 1989-1991, they implied that he was taking cocaine intravenously in both arms. In response

to the question asking them to document the behavior leading them to believe that their son had a mental disorder and was in imminent danger of doing bodily harm to himself or others, they wrote, in longhand: "Drug Abuse (Addiction)--1980-83 (Cocaine + Pot) Leading to seizure--transfer U. of Md. Shock Trauma--Never would agree to treatment-1989-91 back on drugs + IV cocaine (needle tracks both arms) June '91--Again would not agree to treatment--Last 8 wks behavior erratic--stole 2 of our cars [unclear] abuse to his mother could not finish college [unclear] Talks irrational. Has been constantly stealing money from parents. Life seems to be controlled by need for drugs. He is threat to his self mentally + physically + to the community." "As a result of this petition, Ronald, Jr. was committed for evaluation and, according to his mother, remained hospitalized for four to six weeks. She was

- 6 asked, but claimed that she could not recall, whether, as a further result of the petition, criminal charges were filed against Ronald, Jr. for assaulting and battering Mrs. Broadwater. "On December 16, 1991, Mrs. Broadwater purchased a 1982 Mazda RX 7 sports car from a friend for $2,750. On

or about February 2, 1992, Mrs. Broadwater transferred the car to Ronald, Jr., who had the vehicle retitled in his name. Prior to that transfer, Ronald, Jr. received

three additional speeding tickets, one of which had already resulted in a conviction. "Although the Broadwaters insist that the transfer was an arms-length sale, the fact is that the son paid nothing for the car and the Broadwaters paid the

insurance premium to permit their son to obtain the minimum required insurance coverage from the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund. In a document dated February

2, 1993, which he captioned as "Agreement of repayment," and on which he referenced the Mazda, Ronald, Jr. stated "I, Ronald L. Broadwater, Jr. noted on this date that I agree to pay back Eleanor V. and Ronald L. Broadwater Sr. the sum of $2750.00, for the above automobile when I have completed my college degree." As of July, 1994, no

payments had been made on that promise.

- 7 "Once the car was turned over to Ronald, Jr., he apparently used and regarded it as his own. As noted,

the Broadwaters disclaimed much knowledge about their son's activities and whereabouts thereafter. The

accident that led to this lawsuit occurred in October, 1992. Ronald, Jr. was driving the Mazda that had been

given to him by his mother eight months earlier." Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 62-65, 666 A.2d at 1284-85. The doctrine of negligent entrustment as stated in the Second Restatement of Torts

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