Preview:

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 850 September Term, 2007

CHRISTOPHER ALAN BUCK v. STATE OF MARYLAND

Eyler, De borah S ., *Barbera, Thieme, Raymond G., Jr. (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

Filed: September 11, 2008 *Mary Ellen Barbera, J., now serving on the Court of Appeals, participated in the hearing and conferen ce of this ca se while an active member of this Court; she participated in the adoption of this opinion as a specially assigned membe r of this Co urt.

In the Circuit Court for Charles County, Christopher Alan Buck w as charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and c arrying a dead ly weapon o penly with the intent to injure. He entered a plea of not criminally responsible. Be fore trial, he moved to suppress stateme nts he m ade to th e police . The co urt den ied the s uppres sion m otion. In a trial to the court, Buck was found guilty on all counts. The court further ruled that he had failed to prov e that he was not crim inally responsible for his actions. The cou rt sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree murder and a three-year concurrent term for carrying a deadly weapon. The first-degree assault conviction was merged for sentencing. On appeal, Buck raises three questions, which we have reordered and reworded: I. Did the circuit court err in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the police? Was the e vidence leg ally sufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction? Did the trial court err in finding him criminally responsible?

II.

III.

For the following reason s, we shall reverse the judgments of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. I. Motion to Suppress Inculpatory Statements to Police The following facts were adduced at the suppression hearing, or are uncontested and included f or context. 1

As noted infra, all of the witnesses at the suppression hearing were law enforcement officers called by the State.

1

This case arises out of the stabbing death of Edward Baroody, age 74. On February 28, 200 5, at 6:30 a.m., Bonnie G oldsmith, B aroody's w ife, found his body in the driveway of their home at 6769 A mherst Road, in the B ryan's Road com mun ity in C harles Coun ty. Officer Patrick McDonald, of the Charle s County Sheriff's Office, responded to a call from Goldsmith.2 He f ound Ba rood y's bo dy lying near the sidewalk in front of the house. The body was "ve ry cold to the touch, and had mild rigor setting in." There was $1,400 in cash in the vic tim's pockets. Nothing appear ed to have bee n tak en fr om the body. Sergeant Carlson3 responded to the scene and saw the victim lying on his back in the drivewa y. He and another officer rolled the body over and saw "a puncture hole in the jacket in the ce nter of t he bac k near th e top w ith a bloo d stain a round it that app eared f resh." Goldsm ith told the police she had returned home from work the evening before (February 27), at ab out 8:0 0 p.m., a nd "ev erything w as fine." Bonnie Carpenter, the neighbor across the street, told the police that at about 8:20 or 8:30 p.m. that same evening, her daughter told her she was in her bedroom in the front of the house when she heard someone cry out for help. Carpenter went outside, but did not notice anything amiss. Melissa Roberts, also a neighbor, reported that, at about 8:15 p.m. that evening she was driving on Amherst Road when sh e saw an older man walking a t a "moderate stroll," near a stop sign. She noticed another man quickly walk up behind the older man. The second man had his right All of the police officers involved in investigating this case were with the Charles County Sheriff's Office.
3 2

The record does not reveal Sergeant Carlson's first name. 2

hand "[t]ucked down in to [his] waistband." He was wearing a "[m]edium gray hoodie" that was pulled so tightly on his face that only his eyes, nose, and mouth could be seen. On the evening of March 1, 2005, Detectives Tim Minor, James Martin, and Charles Bean were in the neighborhood of the Baroody killing, investigating. Detective Minor noticed a man (Buck) walking about. He fit Melissa Roberts's physical description of the murde r suspe ct and w as wea ring a g ray hood ed sw eatshirt. The detectives ap proached Buck an d asked h im if he had heard of any recen t incidents in the neighborhood. He replied no, but within seconds added, "Oh, you mean the stabbing?" When asked where he had been on the night of February 27, 2005, Buck said it was his routine every night at about 8:00 p.m. to walk from his house in the Bryan's Road neighborhood to the BP station, to buy cigarettes; and that is what he ha d done on Fe bruary 27.4 Detective Minor observed that Buck became nervous as the officers were speaking with him. Dete ctive Bean asked B uck if he c ould take so me digital ph otographs of him. Buck said yes, and the detective took the pictures. Also during this encounter, Detective Minor telephoned Detective Joe Piazza, the lead investigator on the Baroody case, and said, "I think we got him." That call was made in Buck's presence and was heard by him.

The gas station in question is referred to at various times in the transcripts as a BP station or an Amoco station. For the sake of clarity, we shall call it a BP station. 3

4

Buck told the detectives that he was on his way to the BP station to purchase cigarettes. Detective Martin offered to give him a ride, and he accepted. In the meantime, Detectives Bean and Minor drove to the house where Buck, then 21 years old, was living with his parents a nd two you nger sisters. T he detective s spoke to his mother, Diane Buck.5 Mrs. Buck told them she feared that her son might have been involved in the Baroody murder. She explained that Buck had been suffering from "severe depression" for three or four years for which he had been prescribed "a couple" of medications. His behavior was unpredictable. He usually would sleep all day while she and her husband were at work. Often, he would walk around the neighborhood at night. Mrs. Buck also told the detectives that, recently, Buck had not been taking his medications. The detectives also learned that both she and Mr. Buck worked during the day and w ere gone from the home by 9:00 a.m. on weekdays, leaving their son alone in the house at that time. On the morning of the next day, March 2, 2005, the detectives investigating the Baroody murder sought and obtained a search warrant for Buck's house. The warrant authorized the seizure of, among other things, knives and clothing. The detectives did not execute the warran t immediately, however. In the early afternoon of that same day, Detective Piazza and Detective Shane Knowlan, wearing plain clothes, drove to Buck's house in an unmarked car. Detective

Mrs. Buck died on May 4, 2005, of a pulmonary embolism that developed after an ankle fracture. 4

5

Piazza had talked to Detective Minor previously and knew what Mrs. Buck had told him. Detective Piazza planned to have the search warrant executed when Buck was not at home. The detectives arrived at about 12:45 p.m. and found Buck at home. He was wearing shorts and a T-s hirt. Detective Piazza asked if Buck would be willing to come to the Sheriff's Office Headquarters ("the station hous e") in La P lata for an inte rview in connection with the Baroody murder. Detective Piazza told Buck that he would not be under arrest and would be free to leav e at a ny time. He testified: "All he had to do was say the word and I would bring him home. And since, I told him that, I would not be arresting him." Buck responde d that he ha d to chang e his clothes b efore leav ing. Detective Piazza followed him upstairs to his bedroom and watched as he got dressed. Detective Knowla n remained at the bottom of the steps. After Buck had put on clothes, he and the officers went outside. Buck got in the front passenger's seat of the police cruiser and put his seat belt on. He was not handcuffed or restra ined. Detective P iazza drov e and D etective Kn owlan sa t in the seat behind Buck. During the 30-minute drive from Buck's house to La Plata, Detective Piazza asked Buck about his family, friends, and daily activities. Buck answered the detective's questions. At some point, the conversation turned to the Baroody murder. Buck mentioned that a clerk at the BP station had commented that he (Buck) rese mbled the suspect the p olice were looking for. Detec tive Piazza a sked Bu ck if he tho ught of h imself as a suspect. Buck replied, "I hope I'm no t a suspe ct," and then pa used an d said, " becau se I didn 't do it."

5

Detective Piazza noticed a faint odor o f alcohol a nd asked Buck h ow mu ch he had had to drink that day. Buck responded that he had had one beer that morning. Buck said he was not intoxicated, and Detective Piazza did not observe any signs of intoxication. When the officers and Bu ck arrived a t the station ho use, Buck was taken to an interview room in a se cure part of the build ing. He w as given a p ass that perm itted him to walk within the station house only if escorted by an officer. The interview room was 10 feet by 10 feet and had two chairs and a table. There were no windows. There was a one-way mirror by which the detectives could see into the room without being seen. There also was a camera in the ceiling that allowed occupants of another room to watch and hear the interview on a mo nitor. The interview lasted five hours, from 1:20 p.m. to 6:20 p.m. There were times when Buck was alone in the interview room. Otherwise, he was accompanied by at least one officer, and more often by two.6 He never was physically restrained and no w eapons were displayed or drawn. Buck did not ask to call anyone. Detective Piazza began the interview. He asked Buck how he felt and inquired about the last time he had taken his medications. Buck responded that he had taken his medications "last night" and that he felt okay, "just anxious." The detective asked Buck if he "wanted a drink or needed a restroom"; he responded no. Detective Piazza spoke with Buck about

According to Detective Minor, Buck would not have been accompanied by an officer to the restroom. The record does not reveal whether he used the restroom, however. 6

6

his family and friends and then turned his attention to the night of February 27, 2005. Initia lly, Buck sa id his only activity that night w as to walk to the BP station to buy cigarettes. Detective Piazza told Buck he had reviewed the BP station's surveillance tapes from that night and the y did not s how h im there . Buck becam e "notic eably . . . uncomfortable at that point." Detective P iazza we nt on to say that the police were at that very moment executing a search warrant for Buck's house, looking for evidence related to the murd er, particularly Baroody's DNA. The detective asked Buck if he thought the police would find any evidence of the m urder a t his hou se. Buc k respo nded, " I don't th ink so" or "I do ubt it." Buck asked for a break so he could smoke a cigarette. Detective Piazza instructed Detective Shankster7 to accompany him. He told Detective Shankster that Buck was not under arrest and that the detective should "let [Buck] out the door and [] let him in when he was done" smoking. Detective Piazza further informed Detective Shankster that, if Buck asked to leave, he (Detective Piazza) would give him a ride home. Although the evidence on this point is unclear, it appears that this convers ation did not take place in Buck 's presence. When Buck returned from the cigarette break, he asked Detective Piazza if the police had found anything when they executed the search warrant. The detective responded by asking Buck w hat he thought the police might have f ound. Buck respon ded, "m y pants."

7

Detective Shankster's first name does not appear in the record. 7

Detective Piazza then asked for, and Buck agreed to give, a DNA sample. At that point, Detec tive Piaz za left th e intervi ew roo m. Soon thereafter, at about 4:25 p.m., Detective Minor entered the interview room and spoke to Buc k abou t signing a conse nt form for the D NA s amplin g. Detective Minor used a buccal swab to collec t the sam ple from inside B uck's c heek. Buck mentioned that, when the police had interviewed him on the street, he had overheard Detective Minor say, "I think we got him." He said he took that to mean that the officers thought he had kille d Ba rood y. As Detective Minor collected the sample, he told Buck that he had spoken with Mrs. Buck the night befo re. Detective Minor c ommen ted that he h imself had thought ab out killing people before. He asked Buck wh ether he had ever "thought about killing people." Buck said he had no t. Detective Minor then asked Buck "how it felt to kill th at ma n," m eani ng B aroo dy. Buck proceeded to confess to the murder. He told the detective that, on the evening of February 27, 2005, he was "pumped up" from listening to rap music all day. He had not taken his medications. He d ecided to carry a kitchen knife with him on his nightly walk. He stabbed Baroody with the kitchen knife, killing him, because Baroody looked like an "easy target." His hands had shaken when he stabbed Baroody. He did n ot rob Ba rood y.

Afterwards, he ran home, washed the blood off the knife, and put it back in the knife block where he had found it. He vom ited, smoke d some c igarettes, and w ent to bed. B uck told

8

Detective Minor that right then (during the interview) he was wearing the same sweatshirt and sh oes he h ad wo rn wh en he st abbed Baroo dy. Detective Minor lef t the interview room an d told Detective Piazza that Buck just had confessed to the murder. Detective Piazza directed Detective Bean to begin drafting a statement of charges for an arrest warrant for Buck. Detective Piazza then rejoined the interview. When Detective Piazza walked into the interview room, Buck apologized for lying to him, saying, "I wanted to tell you the truth, but I felt bad." Buck shook Detective Piazza's hand. At that point, the detectives took Buck's sweatshirt and shoes and gave them to another of ficer. It is not clear from the hearing testimony whether Detectives Minor and Piazza asked Buck's permission to take his sweatshirt and shoes or whether they directed him to remove those items of clothing. Both detectives testified, however, that during the interview neither one "ordered" Buck to do anything.8 Buck asked for another cigarette break. This time, Detective Minor and Detective Moody accompanied him outside. Detective Minor asked Buck to describe how he had stabbed "the old man." Buck procee ded to p hysically re-e nact the stabbin g. With Detective Minor p retending to be Baroo dy, walking s lowly down the street, Buck demonstrated how he had approached Baroody quickly from behind and stabbed him once in the upper back. At about 5:00 p.m., when the detectives and Buck returned to the interview room from the cigarette break, Detective Piazza took a written statement from Buck about the Baroody

8

The record does not reveal whether Buck was given replacement clothing. 9

killing. Detective Piazza would type a question, Buck would answer it, and Detective Piazza would type in Buck's answer. He and Buck then reviewed the statement, page by page, and signed it. (Detective Piazza signe d it as well.) The first question, to which Buck answered, "Yes sir," was: "Do you understand that you are not under arrest and are free to leave at anytime?" When asked why he had killed Baroody, Buck sa id, "I was an gry. I wasn't pla nning on killing anyone. I just though t if anyone came, I would stab him." Buck said he had not taken his medications on the day of the stabbing and that "his nerv es hurt." He identified his m edications as "Rispod al [sic], Luvox, and Norotin." He described how he walked up behind Baroody as Baroody was standing looking at a "For Sa le" sign and stabbed h im in the ba ck. Baroo dy fell down , with the knife in his back. Buck removed the knife and ran home. He had blood on his shoes. He washed the knife off and put it back inside the knife block. He used toilet paper to wash the blood o ff his sh oes. The seco nd to last que stion to Bu ck was: "When I met you at your house earlier today I told you that you did not have to come with me or talk to me. Is that correct ?" Bu ck answ ered, "T rue." After the statement was signed, Detective Piazza showed Buck a photograph, taken when the search w arrant was executed , of the knif e block an d various c utlery in the kitchen at his house. He asked Buck to point out the knife he had used to stab Baroody. Buck circled o ne of th e knive s in the p hotogr aph an d signe d his na me ne xt to it.

10

Detective Piazza told Buck he was not under arrest. He instructed Detectives Minor and Moo dy to drive Buck home . During the drive, Detective Minor asked Buck to show him where the stabbing occurred. B uck directe d Detectiv e Mino r to the exac t location where Baroody's body had been found. The detectives accompanied Buck inside his house. In front of Buc k's family members, Detective Moody asked Buck if he had killed Baroody. Buck nodded yes. At about 6:50 p.m ., the dete ctives le ft the B ucks' h ome. They stayed in the neighborhood, however. Before Buck's arrival home, at Detective Piazza's direction, plainclothes police officers had positioned themselves outside the house. Detective Minor called Detective Piazza to say that Buck had been dropped off at hom e and it wa s time to sub mit the application for arrest w arrant for ap proval. An arrest warrant fo r Buck was issu ed by a court commissioner at 7:07 p.m. Minutes later, Detective George Higgs, one of the officers staked out near Buck's h ouse, receiv ed a radio communication instructing him to arrest Buck, which he did. Thus, a little less than 20 minutes elapsed from the time the officers left Buck at his house until the time Buck was arrested. When arresting Buck, Detective Higgs spoke to Buc k's pare nts. They told him he was on severa l medic ations. Buck was handcuffed and driven to the Charles County Detention Cente r, also in L a Plata. As Detective Higgs was processing Buck's paperwork, Buck asked if they could speak in private. Detective Higgs escorted Buck to an interview room and advised him of his

11

Miranda rights by reading them to him from a card.9 This was the first time in the course of the investigation that Buck was given Miranda warnings. Detective Higgs asked Buck if he understo od his rights and w anted to an swer som e questions . Buck resp onded yes to both questions. He then denied any involvement in Baroody's death and asked to speak to the investigating detectives. Detective Higgs returned Buck to the processing area. Detective John Elliott took over processing Buck. He took Buck to an interview room, read him his Miranda rights, and asked him if he understood those rights. B uck said yes and further stated that he knew he had "the right to remain silent." Detective Bean joined the interview. Buck agreed to sp eak with th e detectives a nd claime d that he ha d initially confessed to killing Baroody because "Detective Piazza had hou nded him ." Detective Elliott asked Buck if Detective Piazza had threatened him or otherwise treated him unfairly. Buck responded that "he was treated fair ly, and that during the interview he k new he w as there volunt arily." Detective Elliott then said, "There's a lot of other things here other than your statement alone to Detective Piazza. There's physical evidence and a lot of other things here that indicate that you committed this." At that point, Buck "put his head down and said, `I told the truth.'" 10

9

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1 966).

It appears from the record that Detective Elliott did not specify for Buck the "physical evidence" and "other things" he was speaking of. At trial, the State introduced evidence that DNA found on the knife Buck indicated he had used to kill Baroody was consistent with Baroody's DNA. 12

10

Detective Elliott then asked Buck whether the details of the demonstration he had given Detective Minor earlier that day were accurate. Buck replied, "yes." Detective Bean asked Buck wheth er "he h ad take n his m edicatio ns." Buck responded that he had not taken his medications on February 26 and February 27, 2005. During the interview, Buck asked to take his medications on "several occasions," but the detectives did not halt the interview to retrieve the medications. Detective Bean further asked whether Buck h ad told his pa rents that he had killed Baroody. Buck responded that he had told his parents initially that he did not kill Baroody but later told them that he in fact had done so. On April 12, 2005, Buck moved to suppress the statements he made to the police in his first interview on March 2, at the station house and during the drive to and from, on the ground that they were obtained b y custodial interro gation, but w ithout Miranda warnings. He further moved to suppress the statement he made to the police in his second interview that day, after he was arrested, at the detention center, on the ground that, although he was given Miranda warnings, his statement was elicited in violation of the principles in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U .S. 600 (2004 ); and als o on the groun d that the y were in volunt ary. At a suppression hearing on October 19, 2006, the S tate called Detectives M inor, Piazza , Higgs , and E lliott to testi fy. The d efense did not call any w itnesses . When Detective Piazza was asked on cross-examination w hy he had ch osen not to arrest Buck at the station house, when Buck confessed to killing Baroody, the detective replied, "I promised that I wouldn't arrest [Buck] that day if he comes down and talk s to us."

13

On redirect, the detective clarified that he did not remember using the word "p romise" in speaking with Bu ck. He ha d only meant to say that he had "assured" Buck that he was not going t o be arr ested th at day. Defense counsel pressed Detective Piazza as to why he had not re ad Buck his Miranda rights at the outset of or at some time during the interview at the station house. The following colloquy ensued: [DEFENSE COU NSE L]: . . . . Wh y did you not read [Buck] his Miranda rights [before or during the initial interview], sir? WIT NESS O FFICER PIA ZZA : He cam e voluntarily. [DEFENSE COU NSE L]: Ok ay. Was that a procedure that had been discussed among the members of the Sheriff's Department on how to conduct interviews in general? WITNESS OFFICER PIAZZA : I don't know how that came about. It's just one of th e . . . one of the ways we d o it, either in cu stod y or vo luntary. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Okay. And, so one of the ways is to, as you've already talked about, tell someone that they're not under arrest; bring them down; interview them without the benefit of Miranda ; bring them home; and then arrest him with a warrant. That's the procedure you follow? WITNESS OFFICE R PIAZZA: It has happened before. In response to a similar line of questioning as to whether it was standard practice of the Sheriff's Office to allow a confessed killer to "wan der free on the s treets of Charle s Cou nty," Detec tive M inor said , "We' ve don e it in the p ast." The court reserved decision at the close of the hearing and offered counsel the opportun ity to submit memoranda of law, which they did. Thereafter, at the outset of the first 14

day of trial, the court denied the motion to suppress. The court ruled that Buck had not been "in custody" during the station house interview , and theref ore did no t need to be read his Miranda rights. Specifically, the court stated: I find that Mr. Buck was not in custody; that these officers would not have arrested Mr. Buck if he had begged them to do so under these circumstances. He has no right to be arrested. I do find [the police] took care, almost t extboo k care, to ensure that he w as not in custod y. . . . Having so ruled, the c ourt did no t reach the q uestion w hether the h olding in Missouri v. Seibert applied to exclud e Buc k's pos t-arrest, w arned c onfes sion. The court also found that Buck's statements to the police were freely and voluntarily made. On appeal, Buck first argues that his statements during the initial, unwarned, interview with Detectives Minor a nd Piazza were the p roduct of c ustodial interro gation, but w ithout the benefit of Miranda warnings, and therefore were inadmissible. Second, Buck argues that the process by which he was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, released from cus tody, and then arrested min utes later wa s a deliberate two-step police strategy carried out to render ineffective the Miranda warnings he then was given before the second interview, and hence was prohibited b y Missouri v. Seibert, supra . Therefo re, his post- Miranda warnings statements also were not admissible. Independent of those grounds for suppression, Buck also argues that his statements w ere involuntary because they were improper ly induced by Detective Piazza's "promise" that he would not be arrested if he came to the Depa rtment; and because h e was no t on his med ications and had told the detectives

15

that he "w asn't fee ling righ t," but the detectives improperly "blurred through a reading of the Miranda warnin g in abo ut twen ty second s." (A) Admissibility of Unwarn ed Statements - Miranda "In Custody" Issue In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that before a person is subjected to custodial interrogation by a government agent, he must be advised of certain important legal rights, including the right to remain silent. Id. at 444-45. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that, on March 2, 2005, when Buck was questioned by various detectives during the ride to the station house, at the station house, and during the ride home from the station house, he was being interrogated. The point in dispute is whether, at those times, Buck was "in custody." If indeed he was, the detectives violated the rule of Miranda by not advising him of his rights before interrogating him. Buck challenges the circuit court's ruling that he was not in custody during those critical interrogation periods and therefore did not have to be "Mirandized" before speaking with the police. Whether a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes is an objective inquiry that is to be made based upon the totality of the circum stances . Stansbur y v. Californ ia , 511 U.S. 318, 323 (199 4); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (19 77); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 34 1, 346- 47 (19 76). See also Argueta v. State , 136 M d. App . 273, 28 2, cert. denied, 364 Md. 142 (2001). A court's examination of the totality of the circumstances must

16

be informed by the underlying purpose of the Miranda rule, namely to protect individuals from c ompe lled self -incrim ination. Berkem er v. McC arty , 468 U .S. 420 , 433, 43 7 (198 4). In Owen s v. State , 399 M d. 388 ( 2007) , cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1064 (20 08), the Court of Appeals gave the following overview of the law of "custodia l interrogation" under Miranda : A significant body of law has developed around the questions of what constitutes "custody" and "interrogation" for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by the law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. " Custody," though typically associated with formal arrest or incarceration . . . , is not a lways so clearly a delineated concept. The Supreme Court declared in California v. Beheler that "the ultimate inquiry is simp ly whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movemen t' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." 463 U .S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U .S. at 495 ) (emph asis add ed). In f act, a person is considere d "in custod y" when "a reasonab le person [ would] h ave felt he or she was not at liberty to te rminate the inter rogatio n and le ave." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S . 99, 112 (19 95); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004); accord [ State v.] Rucker, 374 Md. [19 9], 209 [(20 03)] ; Whitfield v. Sta te , 287 Md. 124 , 141 (1980). **** The question of whether a suspect is "in custo dy" is determined obje ctive ly, to the exclu sion of the s ubjective inte nt of law enforcem ent, in light of the totality of th e circum stances of the s ituation . [ Yarborough,] 541 U.S. at 667; Stansbury , 511 U.S . at 323, 322 ; accord Whitfield , 287 Md. at 140. Among the circumstances which should be considered in determining whether "custodial interrogation" took place are: when and where [the interrogation] occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and defendant said and did, the presence of actual ph ysical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard 17

stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning[,] w hether he c ame com pletely on his ow n, in response to a police requ est or esc orted by p olice officers . Finally, what happened after the interrogation whether the defendant left free ly, was detained or arrested may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. 399 Md. at 427-29 (quoting Whitfield, supra, 287 Md. at 14 1, in turn quoting Hunter v . State , 590 P .2d 888 , 895 (A laska 1 979)) (f urther c itations o mitted). On review of a circuit court's suppression motion ruling on the issue of custody for Miranda purposes, we accept the factual findings o f the court, unless clearly erroneous, but determine de novo the constitutional significance of thos e findin gs, i.e., whether o n the facts as found, the defendant was or was not "in custody." Owens, supra , 399 Md. at 403. As noted, in the case at bar, only the State called witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing; Buck did not testify himself, and called no witnesses. The first-level factual findings as adduced at the suppression hearing were not disputed. (i) Buck maintains that his mental illness, which was known to the inv estigating officers through their communications with his mother, was a factor that should have been considered by the court in deciding whether he was "in custody" and, had it been considered, would have militated stron gly in favor of a finding that indeed he was in custody. The court erred, he

18

argues, by not consid ering his m ental illness in re aching its ultim ate "not in cu stody" decision. Buck's assertion that the circuit court should have considered his m ental illness in deciding the issue of custody, and should have conclude d that a perso n in his situation , with his mental illness, would have believed he was not f ree to leave, is not supported by Supreme Court p recede nt. In Yarborough v. Alvarado, supra , 541 U.S. 652, A lvarado petitioned for f ederal habeas corpus relief, arguing for vacation of his convictions for murder and attempted robbery on the ground th at the state trial court allow ed into evid ence a statem ent he gav e to the police without being advised under the rule of Miranda . The question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court had considered the proper factors and reached a reason able co nclusio n that A lvarado was n ot in cus tody durin g his po lice interv iew. Alvarado, just short of his 18th birthday, and a friend, Paul Soto, were mingling among a large grou p of teena gers in a shopping mall parking lot when Soto, who was armed with a handgu n, decided to steal a truck . Alvarado agreed to help. Soto approached the driver of the truck, demanding money and the keys to the truck. When the truck driver refused, Soto shot and killed him. Alvarado helped hide the murder weapon. About a mon th after th e murd er, the lead detective on the case "left word" at Alvarado's house, and with his mother at work, saying the police wanted to speak to him. During a lunch break on a day soon thereafter, Alvarado's parents drove him to the police

19

station to be interviewed. Alvarado asked for his parents to be able to sit in on the interview, but his re quest w as deni ed. He was tak en to a s mall inte rview r oom. Questioning started a t about 1 2:30 p.m . The in terview , which was re corded , was about two hours long. Alvarado was not advised of his Miranda rights. Only the lead detective and Alvarado were present in the room. The detective asked Alvarado to recount the events of the n ight of th e shoo ting. Alvarad o said he had be en drinking alcohol at a p arty at a friend's house; and that a few hours later, a part of the group went home and the rest, including him, walk ed to the m all to use the pay telephones. A t first, he ended the story there. When pressed, he eventually acknowledged being present when another person, whom he later admitted was Soto, tried to highjack a truck; that he knew Soto was armed but did not expect him to kill anyone; and that, after the shooting, he helped S oto discard the murder weapon. When the interview was almost over, the detective asked Alvarado if he needed a break. He said no. The dete ctive then retu rned Alv arado to the lobby, where his parents were w aiting. H is fathe r drove him ho me. A few month s later, Alvarado and So to were charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. Alvarado moved to suppress his statements to the lead detective on Miranda grounds. In an evidentiary hearing, he agreed that his conversation with the detective was "pretty friendly" and that he "did not `feel coerced or threatened in any way'" during the interview. 541 U.S. at 608 (quotation to the record). The motion judge ruled that the interview was non-custodial. Alvarado was convicted and the convictions were affirmed

20

on direct appeal. In a habeas corpus proceeding in the fed eral district court, the court agreed that Alv arado h ad not b een in c ustody du ring the interrog ation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the state court had erred by not taking into account A lvarado's "youth and inexp erience when ev aluating whether a reasonab le person in his position would have felt free to leave," and that "the effect of [Alvarado's] age and in experience was so substantial that it turned the interview into a custodial interrog ation." Id. at 659-60 (discussing Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F. 3d 841 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. It reje cted the arg ument tha t a defendant's particular characteristics (in that case young age and inexperience with the law) must be factored into the decision whether he was "in custody," under the rule of Miranda , when he was interrogated. Emphasizing that its "more recent cases instruct that custody must be determ ined based on how a reasonab le person in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances," the Court held that the objective test for custody under Miranda does not "`place upon the p olice the bu rden of an ticipating the f railties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they que stion.'" Yarborough , 541 U.S. at 662 (quoting Berkem er v. McC arty , 468 U.S. 420, 442, n.35, in turn quoting People v. P., 21 N.Y .2d 1, 9- 10 (19 67)). See also Beheler, supra , 463 U.S. at 1123-24 (holding that how muc h interrogating police officers knew about the suspect and how much time had elapsed since the crime occurred were not relevant to issue of c ustody); Stansbury, supra , 511 U.S. at 323 (stating that "the initial

21

determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned"). The Co urt reaffirm ed its "in custo dy" test as descr ibed in Thompson v. Keohane , supra , 516 U.S. at 112: Two discrete inqu iries are essen tial to the determ ination [of custody]: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of mov ement of the degree associated w ith a forma l arrest. 541 U.S. at 663. The Ninth Circuit had fram ed the "ob jective" custo dy issue in the ca se as wha t a "reasonab le 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police interviews," would perceive. 316 F.3d at 854-55. The Court rejected that effort to "subsume a subjective factor into an objective test b y making the latter more sp ecific in its formulation," 541 U .S. at 667. It reasoned that the Miranda "custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's individual characteristics including his age - could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry." Id . at 668. The Cou rt explained that it would be improper to consider a suspect's prior history with law enforcement in deciding the issue of custody because, "[i]n most cases, police off icers will not know a suspect's in terrogation h istory, . . . [and] [e]ve n if they do, the re lationship

22

between a suspect's past experiences and the likelihood a reasonable person with that experie nce w ould fe el free to leave o ften w ill be spe culative ." Id . The holding in Yarborough cuts strongly against Buck's argument that, in deciding whether he was "in custody," within the meaning of that phrase in Miranda jurisprudence, during the initial unwarned interrogation, the circuit court should have taken into account his mental illness, asking, in effect, whether a reasonab le mentally ill person in Buck's position would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. To be sure, the interrogating officers knew that, according to Mrs. Buck, Buck had been suffering "severe depression" for several years and had been prescribed medication s for that con dition. As w e shall discuss, infra, that factor is one of many relevant to whether Buck's confessions were voluntary. Under Supreme Court case law, however, notwithstanding that Buck had been diagnosed with and was being treated for depression, the Miranda custody issue before the circuit cou rt remained whether a reasonable person in Buck's position -- not a reasonable person experiencing depression or other m ental illnesses -- would have f elt free to break off questioning and leave. The court did not err in the standard it applied in answering that question. (ii) Buck's more gen eral Miranda "in custody" argument is that, when considered in light of the factors relevant to the question whether custody exists, the facts in the suppression hearing record can not reason ably yield the conclusion that he was not " in custody" when he

23

made his initial u nwarn ed statem ents to th e police . In othe r word s, applying a strictly objective test, as mandated by the Supreme Court, on the facts as established at the suppression hearing, it is unreasonable to conclude that a reasonable person in his position would have felt fre e to terminate the interrogation and leave; therefore, he was "in c usto dy" during the initial, unwarned interrogation. In advancing this argument, Buck places most reliance upon Bond v. S tate , 142 M d. App . 219 (2 002). Bond is readily distinguishable. There, witnesses saw Bond crash his vehicle into two cars, causing damage, and then leave. The police were called and from information gathered at the scene determined that Bond lived at a particular a ddress in a trailer park. Three uniformed and armed offic ers w ent to the tr ailer and wer e let in by B ond's 11 year old nephew, who was the only occu pant of the trailer other than Bond. B ond wa s in his bedroom, undressed and in bed. The three office rs entered the bedroom and stood in between the bed and the do or. Bond w as awak e. The off icers question ed him ab out the hit and run incident. They did not give him Miranda warnings or tell him he did not hav e to speak with them or could tell them to leave. At the end of the interrogation, the officers told Bond they were not placing him under arrest right then and there because, if they did so, there would be no adult to care for the 11 year old. On appeal afte r conviction , this Court held that Bond was "in custody," for Miranda purposes, when he was questioned in his bedroom: We must determ ine, from a n objective standpoin t, and keeping in mind the underlying purpose of the Miranda decision, whether there was a coercive 24

aspect to the circumstances in which [Bond] was questioned , so as to constitute custodial interrog ation. We con clude that the factors relev ant to this analysis point strongly in favor of [Bond's] being in custody when he was questioned by [the officer] in the bedroom of his trailer home. The interrogation . . . took place late at night in [B ond's] bed room, w ith [Bond] in bed and partially clothed. To be sure, the questioning did not occur in the potentially coercive atmosphere of a police station, or of a strange and unfamiliar location. It ran to the other extreme, however. Whether [Bond] was awake or asleep when the officers entered his b edroom , the highly private location of the interrogation, the late hour, [Bond's] state of undress, the number of officers present, and the accusatory nature of the questioning we re such that an ordinary person in the circumstances would be intimidated, and would not think he could end the encou nter merely by telling the officers to leave. The interrogation . . . was the polar opposite of the questioning that accompanies a traffic stop, which is expected , takes place in a public or s emipublic place, and is mutually understood to be brief. The ordinary person does not expect his f riends or ne ighbors, let alo ne police o fficers, to ap pear in his bedroom late at night. Th ere is a world of difference between a person being questioned during normal daytime hours, at his dining room table, in a relaxed atmosphere (such as in Beckw ith [ v. United States, supra ] ), and a person being questioned late at night, in bed, undressed, by three officers blocking the bedroom door (as in this case). Moreover, unlike the routine traffic stop, which is a "known quantity" to most people, the unusual nature of the interrogation in this case was such that [Bond] would have had no way of gauging how long th e quest ioning was g oing to continu e. The atm osphere in which the interrogation in this case was conducted was one of pressure, accusation, and uncertainty that would lead a reasonable person to believe that silence was not an option. 142 Md. App. at 233-34. Buck argues that, because Detective Piazza accompanied him to his bedroom when he got dressed, his case is analogous to Bond . We disagree. Th e detectives went to B uck's house after already m eeting and talking to him on the street the day before. It was mid-day and Buck let them in the house. Detective Piazza did not ask any questions of Buck as Buck 25

was putting on clothes. He told Buck he was n ot under arr est and did n ot have to go to the station house with the officers for questioning. Other than the fact that a police officer was present in the defendant's bedroom, with the defendant present, the circumstances in Bond have little in com mon w ith the cir cumsta nces in the case at bar. In arguing tha t, under the o bjective totality of the circumstances test, Buck was not in custody, the State relies upon this Court's opinions in Mineha n v. State , 147 Md. App. 432, cert. denied, 372 Md. 431 (2002), and Ashe v. Sta te , 125 M d. App . 537, cert. denied, 354 Md. 571 (19 99). In both case s, we held that a defe ndant was no t "in c usto dy" when he was interrogated by police, even though the interrogation took place at a police station. In Minehan , in the course of investigating a string of robberies, the police developed Minehan as a suspect. Minehan also was the alleged victim of a supposed "robbery" of the florist store at which he worked. The police decided to question him about the supposed "robbery" as a means to pursue further questioning about the other robberies. After

ascertaining Minehan's work schedule, three officers in plainclothes appeared at the store at 8:30 a.m. one d ay and asked to speak w ith him at the p olice station about the florist store robb ery. He agreed. Th e officers then "followed him around the shop as he com pleted his work and walked out with him." 14 7 Md. A pp. at 439. A lthough M inehan ha d driven to work, he acc epted th e offic ers' off er to driv e him to the polic e station . One officer patted him do wn be fore he got into the polic e vehic le, whic h was unma rked.

26

At the police station, the officers took Minehan to a room used for interviewing victims and witnesses. Another room, designated for suspects, was not used. Minehan sat at the head of a long ta ble, with three of ficers f acing h im. The interview, which was taped, lasted one hour and 45 minutes, with a 20-minute cigarette break. Minehan started making incriminating remarks about a quarter of the way into the interview. He was not given Miranda warnings at any time. After he confessed, the officers obtained his consent to go to his house right then to collect evidence. When that effort was not fruitful, the of ficers drove Minehan back to the florist store, to his car, and let him go. They arrested him one week later. This Court held that Minehan was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda during the ride to the police station because he agreed to accompany the officers, was not restrained (except for the use of a seatbelt), "and the c onversatio n in the car was unremarkable." Id. at 441. With respect to the interview at the police station, we observed that merely because a person is interviewed by officers in a police station setting does not mean that the perso n is in custody per se . See Mathiason, supra , 429 U.S. at 495 (holding that suspect who was questioned in isolation fo r 30 minu tes in police s tation w as not " in custo dy," as he had agreed to go to the police station for que stioning). In addition, it is an e stablished ru le "that police do not violate Miranda by telling the accused he or she is only a witness, when, in fact, the person is a suspect." Minehan, supra , 147 Md. App. at 442 (citing Mathiason , supra, 429 U.S. at 495-96 and Beckwith, supra , 425 U.S. at 347). We went on to comment as follows

27

about the fact that Minehan was released at the end of the interview instead of being placed under arre st: [T]here is rarely custody when the person questioned leaves the interrogation unencumbered, only to be arreste d at a later time . See Bertra m v. State , 33 Md. App. 115, 148-49, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976) [ aff'd , 280 Md. 616 (1977)]; Lummings [ v. State ], 27 Md. App. [361,] 378-79, 341 A.2d 294 [,cert. denied, 276 Md. 74 0 (1975)]; see also United States v. Scu lly, 415 F.2d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir.1969) (holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station f reely); United States v. Manglona , 414 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave, and did in fact freely leave the interview); State v. Patterson, 146 N.C. App. 113, 552 S.E.2d 246, 252-54 (2001) (holding that accused was not in custody when asked to "give his side of the story" and then left the station une ncumbered). Minehan, supra , 147 Md. App. at 442. After reasoning that all of the above fac tors weighed against "custody," we noted as well that Minehan had said, at the outset of his interview, that he had come to the police station of his own free will; that the of ficers had to ld him at that p oint that he w as free to leave and did not have to answer any questions; and that, before he confessed, he again was told that he was not und er arrest and could leave w ithout saying anything. After the confession, Minehan was told he was not under arrest and that the police prob ably would contact him in the future to "maybe discuss things here." Id. at 443. These factors likewise weigh ed aga inst a de termina tion of c ustody. Fina lly, we commented as follows about the intentions of the police in bringing Minehan in for questioning:

28

We recognize that bringing Minehan to the police station to discuss the [florist store] robbery wa s clearly a subterfuge for extracting a confession from him. Furthermore, once the officers shifted the interview from the [florist store] robbery to M ineh an's alleg ed cr imin ality, the pressure in the room increased, a change that was palpable from reading the transcripts and which was captured by Minehan's anxious question, "What is happening to me?" With a slightly differen t set of facts, this police action would have jeopardized the admission of the entire confession: it was a risky enterprise. G iven Minehan 's unencumbered departure a nd his statem ents on the r ecord, how ever, we u phold admission of the con fession, afte r all. Id. In Ashe v. Sta te , supra , 125 Md. App. 537, a victim was beaten to death by an angry mob of people. Two days later, investigating officers went to Ashe's house and aske d him to go with them to the police station for an interview. Ashe was told he was not a suspect in the mu rder (alth ough, in fact, he was). He rode to the station house in the police cru iser; the trip was three to four minutes long. He was told he was not under arrest and would be free to leave at any tim e. Under q uestioning, w ithout Miranda warnings, he made

incrimin ating sta temen ts. The in terroga tion laste d one a nd one -half ho urs. After Ashe was charged, he moved to suppress the statements, on the ground that they were obtained b y custodial interro gation, with out Miranda warnings. Specifically, he argued that, when the police told h im he wa s not unde r arrest and w as free to leave, he thought that meant that he could leave after giving a statement. The suppression court found that he was told no such thing and that a reasonable person in his situation would not have thought that his freedom was restricted and that he could not end the interrogation an d leave. This Cou rt affirmed on that poin t. 29

Another case that bears some similarity to the case at bar is Allen v. State , 158 Md. App. 194 (2004), aff'd , 387 Md. 3 89 (20 05). Lik e this cas e, Allen involved interrogations by members of the Charles County Sheriff's Department, at the station house, with an arrest following closely thereafter. At mid-morning one day, the Sheriff's Department received a telephone call from Allen, reporting that he had been assaulted the night before and had stabbed the man w ho assaulte d him un til the ma n stopp ed mo ving. He then h ad driven h is car (which in fact belonged to the other man) and had crashed it into a ditch. Uniformed officers responded to Allen's location and found him partially clad and covered in blood. Without prompting, he reported that he did not know where he was or who the person he had stabbed was, and only knew that the incide nt had take n place in a s hack on a hill. He volunteered to show the officers the shack. The officers handcuffed Allen and put him in a marked cruiser. He then directed them to the shack. An officer went inside and found the stabbing victim, w ho wa s dead. Allen was not told that the victim was dead, however. He was unc uffed at th at point. One of the officers asked Allen if he would be willing to discuss the incident at the station house. Th e officer ex plained tha t Allen was not under arrest and was free to leave without discussing the incident. Allen agreed to accompany the officers. He sat in the front seat of the p olice ca r, restrain ed only b y a seat be lt. Upon arrival at the station house, he was taken to an inte rview r oom. A t 10:55 a.m., one of the officers entered and repeated to Allen that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and did not have to discuss the incident. Allen

30

agreed to talk. He answered questions for two hours, in the course o f which h e confess ed to stabbing the victim. During that time, he was given drinks and snacks, when he asked for them. The conversation between the officer and Allen was carried on in normal tones. The police took Allen's bloo dy clothing and gave him a prison jumpsuit to w ear. After Allen confessed, he was a sked to give a written statement, to which he agreed. The process that was followed was the same as what trans pired in the c ase at bar: the officer typed out the written questions and the answers as given. In the written statement, Allen agreed that he had been told before he came to the station house that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, and reaffirmed that he still had that understanding. The process of taking the written statement began at 12:56 p.m. and ended at 3:56 p.m. During that time, the police were obtaining an arrest warrant. After the written statement was complete, the officers offered to drive Allen home. He asked to be taken to his parents' house instead . The officers complied, and dropped Allen o ff, at 4:30 p.m. They took his sh oes, which we re bloo dy. Plainclo thes po lice kep t Allen' s paren ts' hous e unde r surveil lance. Fifteen minutes later, the police obtained the arrest warrant. They arrested Allen at 5:10 p.m. This Court reviewed the factors that are important in deciding whether a person is in custody, and concluded, "[p]ursuant to the `reasonable person' analysis . . . , that the trial court was entitled to find from the eviden ce that [A llen] was n ot in custody du ring the [interv iew]." 158 M d. App . at 236. "Allen was advised that he was not under arrest, was

31

free to leave, and did not have to `discuss the incident' with the detectives." Id . With respect to the events following the interview, we observed: [T]he Whitfield [ v. State, supra,] Court suggested that events after a police interview, such as a formal arrest, may be relevant to the question of whether the suspect w as actually in custody during a prior interview. In this regard, we are mindful that when the police transported [Allen] to his home, they already knew that they were going to arrest him as soon as possible. But, our focus concerns [Allen's] state of mind during the interview. [The interrogating detective] testified that, when he first encountered Allen, he knew little about the circumstances of [the victim's] death. In other words, [the detective] had not fixed on [Allen] as the culprit when the interview began. Rather, [Allen's] statements during the interview led [the detective] to believe [Allen] murdered [the victim]. That the sheriffs decided to monitor [ Allen] afte r they drove him to his parents' house, because of what was learned during the interview, does not establish that a reasonab le person w ould have perceived he was in custody while at the sheriff's office during the interview. 158 Md. App. at 235. To be sure, there are aspects of the two main cases relied upon by the State, and Allen, that militate in favor of a legal findin g that, consid ering the total c ircumstanc es, a reasona ble person in Buck's position would not have thought he was "in custody" when he was interrogated by the detectives as he was being driven to the police station, while at the police station, and on the drive hom e from the police station . Buck ag reed to acc ompany th e officers when they appeared at his house. He was told then, and later con firmed in h is written statement th at he had b een told, he w as not und er arrest and was free to leave. He was not physically restrained by handcuffs or otherwise. The officers came to Buck's house in mid-day, in plainclothes, and transported him to the station house in an unmarked car.

32

After confessing, Buck was not arrested at the station house. During his later, warned, inter view , he said h e knew h e had been at the statio n house v olun tarily. There are other factors within the total circumstances to be considered here that militate in favor of a legal finding that a reasonable person in Buck's situation would have thought he was in custody from the time he was driven to the station house to the time he was returne d to his h ouse, h owev er. Buck knew, before he was questioned at the station house on March 2, 2005, that the police had targete d him as the murderer in the Baroody case. When the officers encountered Buck on the street, on March 1, 2005, the murder w as discussed. In Buck 's presence, Detective Minor telephoned Detective Piazza and said, "I think we got him" -- a clear reference to Buck's being the person the officers tho ught had com mitted the murder. During the interrogation at the station hous e the next d ay, Buck rem inded D etective M inor of that, and said he had taken those words to mean that the o ffic ers th ought he had kille d Ba rood y. Soon thereafter, Detective Minor asked Buck "how it felt to kill that man," and Buck proceeded to con fess to the murder. Just as a defendant's subjective belief as to whether he is in custody does not control whether, under the objective standard, he is in custody, neither does a police off icer's subjective belief as to whether the defendant indeed committed the crime control the custody question. Howeve r, when an of ficer articulates to the defendant his belief that the defendant committed the crime, the custody inquiry is transformed, and becomes whether a reasonab le

33

person in the defendant's situation - i.e., having been told by the police that they think he committed the crime -- would th ink he w as free to bre ak off th e interview and leave. In Stansbury v. California , supra , 468 U.S . 420, the Su preme C ourt held tha t "an officer's subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody." 511 U.S. at 319 (emphas is added). L ikewise, in Berkem er v. McC arty , supra , the Court h eld that, whether a motorist qu estioned in a roadside encounter with a police officer during a traffic stop was in custody did not depend up on the officer's intention -- not communicated -- to immed iately take the motoris t into cus tody and charge him w ith an of fense. The Court in Stansbury explained its reasoning in Berkemer as follows: [T]he officer "never communicated his intention to" the motorist during the relevant questio ning. The lack of communication was crucial, for under Miranda, "[a] policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect w as `in custod y' at a partic ular time"; rather, " the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have under stood h is situatio n." 511 U.S. at 323-24 (quoting Berkemer, supra , 468 U .S. at 442) (emphasis added). The Stansbury Court went on to state: An officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being q uestion ed. Those be liefs are relevant on ly to the exten t they wou ld affect how a reaso nable per son in the position of the individual b eing ques tioned wo uld gaug e the bread th of his or her "freedom of action." Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. The weight and pertinence of any communications regarding the officer's degree of suspicion will depend upon the facts and 34

circumstances of the particular case. In sum, an officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessme nt whethe r that individu al was in custody, but only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would h ave affec ted how a reasonab le person in that position would perceiv e his or h er freed om to le ave. . . . 511 U .S. at 325 (emph asis add ed) (cita tion om itted). Thus, in the case at bar, one factor in assessing the existence of cu stod y vel non is that, when the officers were interrogating Buck on the drive to the station house, at the station house, and afterward, Buck knew, from what he had heard the officers say the day before, that they h ad targe ted him as the m urdere r in the B aroody c ase. Moreover, while at the station house, Buck gained additional knowledge, again from the police, that he was the focus of their investigation. During the interrogation, Detective Piazza told Buck that the police w ere in the process of executing a search w arrant for Buck's house to look for evidence, in particular, Baroody's DNA. Unlike in Allen, in which the investigating officers had not identified the defendant as the cu lprit before interrogating him, and only focused their investiga tion on the d efendan t after he ma de stateme nts that led them in that direction, here, the police were focused upon B uck as the k iller before the y took him in for questioning; he knew that because he heard them say it; and that knowledge was further confirmed for him when he was told that his house was in the process of being searched for ph ysical evid ence c onnec ting him to the m urder. See also U nited States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 108 (3rd Cir. 2005) (holding that, when defenda nt was sum moned to

35

the FBI office without explanation, was questioned in a confrontational manner about narcotics traff ickin g, an d wa s told by the inve stiga ting agen t that he th ought sh e wa s gui lty, she was "in c ustody," und er the rule of Miranda ); United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C. 2000) (holding that, once the defendant was told by the police that they had a warrant compellin g him to submit to process to give hair samples and bodily fluids, he would have perceived that his circum stances had changed drastically and he was no longer f ree to leave). In addition, Buck did not go to the station house to speak with the detectives complete ly on his own; nor did he contact them initially (as was the case in Allen). The detectives went to Buck's house, unannounced, at a time when (based upon their discussion with Mrs. Buck the day before), they knew h e would be alone in the house , with his pare nts at work . They asked him to go to the station house to talk, in a circumstance in which he would not be in a p osition to hav e a parent o r anyone else d rive him to the station house and in which he did not have any other means of transportation. The drive from Buck's house to the station house in La Plata (and back) was 30 minutes. For six hours, Buck was never let out of a detective's sight, from the time the detectives entered his hou se at 12 :45 p.m ., until he was re turned to his house at ap proximate ly 6:50 p.m. He was escorted clo sely at all times. Buck did not free ly leave the station house on his own. Interrogation continued during the drive home, with Buck's being asked to point out the location at which he stabbed Baroody. The detectives entered Buck's house when they picked him up and when they

36

dropped him off, never leaving him alone. Indeed, the questioning continued in front of Buck's parents after he was taken home. Without question, it would have been most logical for the police to have ended the interrogation at the station house by placing Buck under arrest. He wa s driven ho me, only to be le ft with his parents and then arrested less than 20 minutes later (while under surv eillance), simp ly so Detective Piazza co uld say he kep t his end of the bargain with Buck by not arresting him on the spot. (According to Detective Piazza, he told Buck he would not be arrested that day -- in fact, he was arrested that day, but at his house instead of at the police s tation.) The interrogation at the station house lasted for about five hours, during which time Buck was not allowed to move about unescorted and was at all times being watched. He was escorted to and from his cigarette breaks by one sheriff's deputy on one occasion and by two sheriff's deputies on the other occasion. They monitored him during his two cigarette breaks and questioned him about his knowledge of the murder during the second such break. In the course of the five-hour interrogation, Buck was asked accusatory que stions, was to ld his house was bein g searched for evidence in the Baroody murder, was asked to give a DNA sample , and ga ve such a samp le. He was shown a photograph of his kitchen, taken

Download Buck v. State.pdf

Maryland Law