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Ellen L. Hollander
626 Courthouse East 111 North Calvert Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (410) 333-6241

November 23, 1998

Hon. Alan M. Wilner, Chief Judge Hon. Charles E. Moylan, Jr. Hon. William W. Wenner Hon. Robert F. Fischer Hon. Dale R. Cathell

Hon. Arrie W. Davis Hon. Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. Hon. Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. Hon. James P. Salmon Hon. James R. Eyler

Re:

Calhoun v. Eagan

John C. Calhoun v. James K. Eagan, Guardian of the Property and Next Friend of Laura M. Calhoun and Kevin J. Calhoun, Minors, No. 1723, September Term, 1995. HEADNOTE: PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY CONSTITUTES A DEFENSE TO A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION BROUGHT BY A CHILD AGAINST A PARENT FOR THE DEATH OF THE OTHER PARENT - AN EXCEPTION TO PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY EXISTS FOR CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT OR WANTON AND MALICIOUS WRONGS COMMITTED BY THE PARENT/DEFENDANT UPON THE CHILD - IT IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY AS TO WHETHER THE SURVIVING PARENT'S CONDUCT WAS CRUEL AND INHUMAN OR WANTON AND MALICIOUS.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1723 SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995 ___________________________________

JOHN C. CALHOUN

v.

JAMES K. EAGAN, GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY AND NEXT FRIEND OF LAURA M. CALHOUN AND KEVIN J. CALHOUN, MINORS

___________________________________

Harrell, Hollander, Eyler, JJ. ___________________________________

Opinion by Hollander, J. ___________________________________

Filed: August 30, 1996

This case requires us to examine the doctrine of parent-child immunity, which has been part of the law of Maryland since 1930. See Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 622-28 (1994); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 21-23 (1930). Generally, it proscribes

parents and their unemancipated children from asserting civil claims against one another. The Court of Appeals has, however,

recognized an exception to this doctrine, which allows a child to sue a parent for "cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs." Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68 (1951). That

exception is central to this case. In 1994, James K. Eagan, appellee, the court-appointed

guardian of the property of two minor children, Laura M. Calhoun and Kevin J. Calhoun, filed a wrongful death action against John C. Calhoun, appellant, in the Circuit Court for Howard County. He

alleged that appellant, the father of Laura and Kevin, deliberately or recklessly killed Gladys E. Calhoun, appellant's wife and the children's mother. Appellant contended that the action was barred The circuit court disagreed, ruling that Thereafter, a

by parent-child immunity.

Calhoun's conduct fell within the Mahnke exception.

jury found in favor of the children and awarded them $2,360,000 in damages. The jury, however, was unable to reach a verdict on the

issue of whether appellant's actions "were atrocious, show[ed] a complete abandonment of the parental relation, were intentional, were willful and were malicious." Nevertheless, the circuit court

determined that this inability was of no consequence and entered judgment in favor of appellees.

Calhoun

now

appeals

and

presents

two

questions

for

our

consideration: I. Did the Court err by not enforcing the parent-child immunity law of the State of Maryland in favor of Appellant and in denying Appellant's Trial Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions for Directed Verdict? II. Did the failure of the jury to reach a verdict on question 2 of the verdict sheet substantiate that Appellant's conduct was within the framework of parentchild immunity? We conclude that it was a question for the jury as to whether appellant's conduct was cruel and inhuman or wanton and malicious, so as to fit within the Mahnke exception. Therefore, the circuit Moreover,

court erred in ruling upon the issue as a matter of law.

the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that critical issue. Therefore, we shall reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

FACTUAL SUMMARY1 John and Gladys Calhoun were married on June 15, 1974. The

couple had two children: Laura, born on October 4, 1980 and Kevin, born on July 23, 1982. The Calhouns both worked for the National They experienced difficulties in the

Security Agency ("NSA").

marriage; appellant conceded that he had an extramarital affair with a co-worker at the NSA, which family members knew about and Ms. Calhoun suspected.

In large measure, we shall summarize the facts in the light most favorable to appellee, the prevailing party. 3

1

The events at the center of this case occurred on May 13, 1992. That afternoon, the Calhouns decided to clean the gutters of Appellant leaned a ladder against the side of the

their home.

house, and Ms. Calhoun climbed the ladder as her husband held it. While his wife was on the ladder, Calhoun kicked it, causing her to fall to the ground. attempt to summon help. Appellant did not call 911 or otherwise In addition, although he had been trained Instead, he washed,

in CPR, he did not attempt to help his wife.

changed his clothes, and then drove to a hardware store to purchase joint compound. He then went to pick up Laura at her school, where An hour later, he picked up Kevin at his After arriving at

he met with a teacher. school.

Thereafter, he drove his children home.

the house, he maneuvered his children away from the side of the house where their mother's body was lying. That evening, he took

both his children to a softball game in which Laura participated. At approximately 9 p.m. that evening, Laura called her aunt and uncle, Javier and Milagros Santiago. Calhoun's brother. Mr. Santiago was Gladys

Laura was trying to find her mother and asked Ms. Santiago

the Santiagos whether they knew where she was. responded that she did not know.

At 10 p.m., Ms. Santiago called Calhoun

appellant and asked whether Ms. Calhoun was in the house. responded that she was not.

He also stated that her car was not at Worried,

the house, but that her pocketbook was in the kitchen.

the Santiagos decided to drive to the Calhoun residence, along with their sons, Yiloiz and Nell.

4

At 10:25 p.m., Calhoun called 911 and reported his wife missing. At approximately 10:30 p.m., he called Jennifer Calhoun

Rydings, a daughter from a prior marriage, and told her he could not find his wife. He asked Rydings to come to the house, which

Rydings agreed to do. When the Santiagos arrived at the house at approximately 10:40 p.m., Mr. Santiago began asking questions about his sister's After seeing her keys, wallet, and driver's license

whereabouts.

in the kitchen, Mr. Santiago asked how her car could be gone. Calhoun responded that the car was "in the shop." asked for a flashlight in order to begin a search. Mr. Santiago

He told Yiloiz,

his sixteen-year-old son, to look in the living room and on the porch. When Yiloiz went to the porch, he saw his aunt's body on

the ground. Yiloiz immediately ran to the kitchen and alerted his mother, and then raced to the garage where his father and appellant were standing. lying. cold. Everyone went to the place where Ms. Calhoun's body was

Mr. Santiago touched Ms. Calhoun's legs and found them After he checked for a pulse and found none, he directed his

wife to call 911. Rydings arrived at the house and encountered Yiloiz as he was running down the driveway to meet the ambulance. that something was "wrong" with Gladys. Yiloiz told her

Still unsure of what was

happening, Rydings drove to the house and ran through the front door. Ms. Santiago then led her to Ms. Calhoun's body. Rydings

5

felt Ms. Calhoun's neck for a pulse and could not find any. also found her body to be "very, very stiff." her father begin to cry and fall to the ground.

She

Later, Rydings saw Rydings testified

at trial that, at that point, "I got very angry because immediately I just knew he had something to do with this. I mean, I don't know

how, I just knew and I was very angry, very angry." Rydings telephoned her sister, Jacqueline Calhoun, another daughter from appellant's prior marriage, and told her what had happened. Jacqueline drove to her father's house and remained

there until approximately 4 a.m. Medical personnel arrived at the scene and pronounced Ms. Calhoun dead. 10:54 p.m. Howard County police were dispatched to the house at Officer T.R. Read examined Ms. Calhoun's body and

observed a significant skull fracture and a large amount of dried blood on Ms. Calhoun's head and arms. He also saw two large dried

blood stains on a blue plastic tarpaulin that was covering a stack of scaffolding behind Ms. Calhoun's body. In addition, he noted a

small area of blood spatter on the tarpaulin, consistent with an impact area where Ms. Calhoun's head would have hit the tarpaulin. Homicide detective Frank Dayhoff arrived at 11:39 p.m. and took charge of the investigation. At 12:30 a.m., Detective Dayhoff

conducted the first of a series of interviews with appellant. Calhoun initially indicated that he did not know how his wife had died. He said that he had left his house between 1:30 and 2:00

p.m. to purchase joint compound, then went to pick up his children

6

at school, returned home at approximately 4:30 p.m., and then took his children to dinner and a softball game. He acknowledged that

Gladys had suspected him of having an affair with a co-worker, but added that this was not true and Gladys's suspicions were

"nonsense."

He also stated that he and his wife had had a good

relationship and had been rebuilding their marriage since March 1992. On May 21, 1992, eight days after his wife's death, Calhoun provided an

Detective Dayhoff again interviewed appellant.

account that was consistent with the one that he had first given. On the night of June 6, 1992, Detective Dayhoff interviewed appellant for a third time. Bowerman. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Sam

The detective confronted Calhoun with a note that one of The co-worker stated that,

his wife's co-workers had written.

about two weeks before her death, Ms. Calhoun had said, "If I die suddenly, it won't be an accident. capable of doing." shaken and pale. fell. You don't know what he is

After reading the note, Calhoun became visibly He then stated: "I kicked the ladder and she

It was all over a simple thing."

Appellant also provided Detective Dayhoff with the following information. He stated that he and Gladys were talking as she According to the

climbed the ladder; the conversation grew heated.

detective's testimony at trial, appellant related that his wife made a caustic remark "about something that had happened between them, something he had tried to do in Lancaster, PA a few weeks before." As this remark "challenged his manhood," appellant became

7

angry at her because "she was right." ladder.

Calhoun then kicked the

An autopsy was performed on Ms. Calhoun by Dr. Dennis Chute, an assistant medical examiner. Dr. Chute concluded that Ms.

Calhoun had died from head injuries sustained in a fall from a ladder. He classified the death as a homicide.

In July 1992, appellant was arrested and charged with second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and reckless endangerment. On March 11, 1993, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, pursuant to an agreed Statement of Facts. On June 24, 1993, he was sentenced to five years When the civil trial began on March 13, 1995,

imprisonment.

appellant was incarcerated at the State correctional facility in Roxbury. At the civil trial, Rydings testified that her father had informed her of his intention to get a divorce. She also knew her

father had contacted a lawyer in order to attempt to arrange an amicable divorce settlement. The reason for this, according to

Rydings, was that Calhoun believed that his previous divorce had cost him much financially, for which he was "extremely angry." Rydings testified: He didn't want to loose [sic] his money. It really bothered him that he was going to have to [lose] his money because he knew that in a divorce she would get the kids, the house, the whole thing and he didn't want to go through that again after he had gone through it with my mother. Rydings also stated that, according to her father, the lawyer said: 8

"[Y]ou don't need a lawyer, you need a hit man." Jacqueline Calhoun also testified that her father had spoken to her about a divorce. She stated that the financial

circumstances of his previous marriage were "always a sore subject" between her mother and father. Mom got everything." She added: "Dad would always say

Additionally, she testified that her father

had "a very, very high temper," a characteristic that she and her sister regarded as "almost comical." Additionally, she said that

after leaving her father's house in the early morning hours of May 14, 1992, she proceeded directly to the police station, because she felt the death was not accidental.2 Detective Dayhoff testified that Ms. Calhoun's injuries were inconsistent with a fall from a ladder. He particularly relied on

2

The following colloquy occurred at trial:

[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Now why did you go to the police station? MS. CALHOUN: Because I knew that something was wrong. I knew that -- I had a gut feeling that everything was not right and that it wasn't an accident. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: What did you base that feeling on at that particular time? MS. CALHOUN: There's nothing in particular. I guess its [sic] just a lifetime of knowing your father. I knew that he didn't have a particular loving relationship with her. I knew that he had spoken about a divorce. He had talked about a divorce with me. And I also knew that he was not going to get a divorce because she, as a result of him having an affair, she would have been entitled to most everything and he would not have allowed that to happen.

9

the fact that Ms. Calhoun had two head wounds.

He stated: "It is

inconceivable that a person could fall and even if they fell directly on the top of their head, could receive two large gaping wounds that fractured the skull in these places from the fall." Autopsy photographs substantiated that Ms. Calhoun had two head wounds. In addition, Detective Dayhoff testified that Ms. Calhoun's body lacked "ancillary injuries" that would be consistent with a fall from a ladder. These injuries would include compression

fractures and contusions or fractures in her shoulders, elbows, hips, or knees. He reasoned that, when a body falls, it strikes In Detective Dayhoff's

the ground in a number of different places.

view, Ms. Calhoun "slid" down the ladder, sustaining contusions on her lip and nose when they hit the rungs, and landed in a sitting position. Then, Ms. Calhoun was struck in the head with great The force caused her head to strike the

force by a blunt object.

tarpaulin, resulting in the blood stains. Dr. Chute testified, however, that Ms. Calhoun's injuries were consistent with a fall from a ladder, although he conceded that it was "possible" that the two head wounds could have been caused by blows from an object, such as a two-by-four. He further stated

that it was possible that her injuries were caused by an event other than a fall from a ladder or a blow to the head, "because the wounds are not specific of a particular object which the skull or the scalp came in contact with."

10

Both Laura and Kevin testified briefly at trial.

They each

stated that they had loved their mother and that they missed her. In addition, both children have received counseling while residing with Susan appellant. at trial. and Robert Hereth, who are apparently friends of

Their counselor, Dr. David C. Williams, also testified He stated that Laura was fearful of her father, did not

trust him, and did not wish to live with him after he was released from prison. Dr. Williams also testified that Kevin was still

unable to discuss at length what the loss truly meant to him. Kevin was, however, aware that his father had pleaded guilty to the charges related to his mother's death. In his testimony, Calhoun insisted that the incident was an accident, and that he did not intend to kill his wife. Calhoun

gave virtually the same account of the occurrence that he had given to the police in his third interview, but with one variation. He

stated that he kicked the ladder because he was angry at himself, not Gladys. He explained that the subject of Lancaster,

Pennsylvania referred to a shopping trip with his wife to make amends for his extramarital affair. When his wife mentioned

Lancaster, appellant became angry and disappointed in himself for what he had done "behind my wife's back." kicked the ladder. It was then that he

The next thing he knew, his wife was lying face Calhoun testified that he realized Once inside to "get her

down on the ground next to him.

that she was not breathing and then ran to call 911. the house, however, he decided that he needed

11

breathing" again.

He walked outside, tried unsuccessfully to turn Appellant further

his wife over, and then "panicked" and left.

stated that he wanted to preserve his marriage with Gladys; he ended his affair with the co-worker, adding that it was inexcusable but it was not "a long term relationship." Calhoun also admitted

that he had lied to the police during his initial interviews. Further, Calhoun testified that, after their mother's death, Laura and Kevin lived with him. Appellant said that, as

appellant's sentencing approached, he made arrangements for the children's care. On March 30, 1993, he signed an agreement giving

temporary legal custody of his children to Robert and Susan Hereth, in the event that appellant were sent to prison. The arrangement

is to terminate upon appellant's request for the return of his children upon his release from prison. The Hereths subsequently

filed in the circuit court a "Complaint for Temporary Custody and Other Relief," in which Calhoun joined, seeking an order awarding them temporary legal custody of Laura and Kevin "from June 24, 1993 to so long as the said minors should reside with them." 6, 1993, the court signed such an order. On April

In addition, Calhoun

joined the Hereths in opposing a later petition filed by the Santiagos, seeking appointment as guardians of the children. On

September 24, 1993, the court signed another order naming the Hereths as guardians of the person for Laura and Kevin and naming appellee as guardian of their property. With respect to the

custody issue, appellant offered in evidence various pleadings and

12

other documents, some of which referred to the fact that appellant had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his wife. The parties stipulated at trial that appellant wants to be reunited with his children upon his release from custody.

Appellant conceded, however, that he has not paid any formal child support to appellee, although he has continued to pay the taxes, mortgage payments, and insurance on the home that he had owned with his wife. At the close of appellee's evidence, Calhoun made a motion for judgment on the basis of parent-child immunity. The trial court

denied the motion, stating that "the Court is of the opinion that the parent/child immunity does not apply in this case." At the

close of all the evidence, appellant made another motion for judgment on the same ground. In response, appellee contended that

the case fits within the exception announced in Mahnke v. Moore. The court agreed with appellee and again denied the motion.3 The case was then submitted to the jury. contained three questions. The verdict sheet

First, the jury was asked: "With

Nevertheless, the court declined to submit appellee's punitive damages claim to the jury. Relying on our decision in Cohen v. Rubin, 55 Md. App. 83, 99-101 (1983), the court reaffirmed a pre-trial determination that punitive damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action. In Cohen, we stated: "We are of the opinion . . . that punitive damages are not recoverable in cases arising under the wrongful death statute unless and until the legislature so provides." Id., 55 Md. App. at 101. See also Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. State ex rel. Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 280 (1866). This ruling has not been challenged on appeal. 13

3

respect

to

Plaintiffs'

claims

that

the

Defendant,

John

C.

Calhoun[,] committed a wrongful act or acts which caused the death of Gladys E. Calhoun, how do you find?" Second, the jury was

asked: "With respect to Plaintiffs' claims that the wrongful act or acts of the Defendant, John C. Calhoun[,] were atrocious, show a complete abandonment of the parental relation, were intentional, were willful and were malicious, how do you find?" Third, the jury

was asked, if it found for the plaintiffs on Question 1 or both Questions 1 or 2, what damages it found that the plaintiffs had suffered "as a result of the wrongful act or acts of the

Defendant." Appellant's counsel objected to the second question, claiming it was "only necessary for punitive damages." The court overruled

the objection, stating, "My interpretation is, it should be in there according to the statute in [Mahnke]." Thereafter, the jury As

found in favor of appellee with respect to the first question.

to the second question, the jury foreman stated that the jury "could not come to a verdict." total of $2,360,000 in damages.4 Appellee's counsel requested resubmission of the second It then awarded the children a

question, in the form of five separate questions.

He argued that

This sum consisted of $70,000 to Laura and $90,000 to Kevin for "pecuniary/economic damages" until their eighteenth birthdays; $1,000,000 to each child for "mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, parental care, attention, advice, counsel, training or guidance"; and $100,000 to each child for costs of education that they could reasonably expect would have been paid by their mother. 14

4

the jury "obviously can't agree on all of them" and "[p]erhaps they can agree one way or the other on each one of those five items." Calhoun's counsel objected, saying: Your Honor, I object to that recommendation. As I understand the wrongful death act, ah . . . as far as proof. When you look at the statute, and I'll have to pull that a little bit . . . the statute says the criteria for proof is, number one, determine if there is a wrongful act. And the statute defines a wrongful act. The statute defines a wrongful act not in terms of what the definition of . . . item two does. That's why I objected to it to begin with. * * * [O]nce you find the wrongful act, . . . as I understand the cases, you go into the damages. The jury has . . . found the wrongful act, and that's all they [are] required to do. In my opinion, and I think I have some law to back that up, I have to dig it up, because I was going over last night. . . . [O]nce they've found a wrongful act, that ends that part of the burden of proof ah . . . of their . . . of their obligation as a jury, ... to do anymore. And then they go into the damages. I . . . I think the jury has done its job. I . . . they don't have to do anymore. The trial judge agreed with appellant and declined to resubmit the second question. The following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: That's my understanding too, Mr. Peklo [appellee's counsel], that once they decide number one, they don't necessarily have to go into number two to come up with number three. Because the way the statute reads, wrongful act, and they have determined it was a wrongful act. So, okay. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: I understand your position, Your Honor. We respectfully disagree. THE COURT: You respectfully disagree. why do they have to go to number two. But, I don't ...

[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Well, that's just our position, Your Honor, I mean. THE COURT: No, I say what's your reasoning behind going to number two. Once they make a decision that there was 15

a wrongful act, you're saying they can't go into damages until they decide one or the other. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Oh no. They can, they can. It was suggested that, that be put into help for any ah . . . well, I'll withdraw that. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Bailiff you can let them go. They're free to go. Thereafter, the court entered final judgment in favor of appellee.

DISCUSSION I. We begin with a review of the doctrine of parent-child

immunity.

In English common law, there was no rule preventing See W. Page Keeton et The 1891

suits between parents and their children. al., PROSSER doctrine of
AND

KEETON

ON THE

LAW

OF

TORTS 904 (5th ed. 1984). first appeared in an

parent-child

immunity

decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891), overruled in part in Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 906 (Miss. 1992).5 There, the court refused to permit a suit

by a minor against her mother (and then her mother's executor) in which she alleged that her mother had wrongfully committed her to an insane asylum. The court said, at 9 So. at 887:

[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as

Interestingly, in almost all of the authorities, the appellant's name in the Mississippi case is spelled "Hewlett." In the Southern Reporter, however, her name is spelled "Hewellette." Hereinafter, for ease of reference, we shall use "Hewlett." 16

5

this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand. Although the court cited no authority to support its broad pronouncement, jurisdictions. its holding rapidly spread to many other

See, e.g., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn.

1903) (child could not recover for severe injuries inflicted by cruel and inhuman treatment on the part of her father and

stepmother), overruled in Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994) (parent-child immunity limited to conduct involving the exercise of parental supervision or the provision of parental care and custody); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905) (fifteen-year-old raped by her father could not maintain action), overruled in part in Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952); Miller v. Pelzer, 199 N.W. 97 (Minn. 1924) (action for deceit not permitted); Smith v. Smith, 142 N.E. 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1924) (action during majority for assault committed during minority not permitted), disapproved in Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992); Matarese v. Matarese, 131 A. 198 (R.I. 1925) (no recovery for child's injuries resulting from parent's negligent operation of automobile), overruled in Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 145 A. 753 (Conn. 1929). 17

In 1930, the Court of Appeals joined these jurisdictions in its decision in Schneider v. Schneider, supra, 160 Md. at 19. There, the Court reversed a judgment in favor of a mother against her unemancipated son for injuries that resulted from the son's negligent operation of the family automobile. Relying on Hewlett

and other cases, the Court stated: "It appears that a majority of courts in which the question has arisen have decided that a minor child cannot maintain such an action against its parent."

Schneider, 160 Md. at 22.

The Court noted the potential conflict

of interest that would arise if the parent were placed in the position of being the guardian of the child and simultaneously the child's adversary. Id., 160 Md. at 22-23. But the Court also

emphasized the public policy concerns articulated in Hewlett: suit is inconsistent with the parent's and the dependence of the minor upon the dependence of the law upon her for necessary legal and social functions. * * * We need not dwell upon the importance of maintaining the family relation free for other reasons from the antagonisms which such suits imply. "Both natural and politic law, morality, and the precepts of revealed religion alike demand the preservation of this relation in its full strength and purity." Schouler, Domestic Relations, sec. 223. Id., 160 Md. at 22, 23-24. In Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128 (1937), the Court reaffirmed Schneider, and refused to permit a suit in equity by a minor child against his father for support or an increase in the amount of maintenance. It held: "[F]or acts of passive negligence incident Maintenance of the status or office, her, and also with the fulfilment of

18

to the parental relation, there is no liability." 134.

Id., 172 Md. at

It also reiterated the public policy rationale that supported

the doctrine, saying: "The doctrine is founded upon public policy, and is designed to preserve the peace and harmony of the home, as well as to recognize the authority of the parent, under normal conditions, responsible for the maintenance of the home." Id.

As the decades have passed the doctrine of parent-child immunity has become increasingly unpopular. Beginning in the early See, e.g., Rousey

1960's, courts steadily began to repudiate it.

v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (declining, over a strong dissent, to adopt the doctrine in the District of Columbia); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (seminal case abrogating the doctrine except in cases when the parent's tort involves "an exercise of parental authority" or "ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care"). Commentators and treatise writers have also See Richard J. Gilbert & Paul T.

generally denounced the doctrine.

Gilbert, MARYLAND TORT LAW HANDBOOK

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