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Anthony Campitelli v. Vivian Johnston, No. 2148, September Term, 1999

______________________________________________________________ FAMILY LAW -- ALIMONY -- An agreement to pay alimony until the death of the payee is not void as against public policy

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2148 September Term, 1999

ANTHONY CAMPITELLI

v.

VIVIAN JOHNSTON

Salmon, Eyler, Smith, Marvin H. (Ret., specially assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, J.

Filed: November 3, 2000

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County denying the petition of Anthony Campitelli, appellant, to terminate or reduce spousal support payable to Vivian Johnston, appellee. Finding no error, we shall affirm.

Factual Background On June 15, 1953, appellant and appellee were married. On August 22, 1972, the parties entered into a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"), in which they resolved all monetary issues relating to the end of their marriage. As part of the Agreement, appellant agreed to pay

appellee spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month, non-tax deductible to appellant, subject to an annual cost of living increase. The support was to continue until the death

of appellee, regardless of any remarriage by appellee or appellant and/or the death of appellant. In addition to the

support provision, the parties mutually released each other from all obligations; appellee conveyed her right, title, and interest with respect to several properties to appellant, and appellant agreed to hold appellee harmless with respect to those properties. At the time, appellee had approximately

$20,000 in cash, a condominium worth $50,000, and miscellaneous assets. On September 15, 1972, the parties were divorced. The

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Agreement was not incorporated or merged into the judgment of absolute divorce. On October 4, 1990, the parties entered In that amendment, the

into an amendment to the Agreement.

support was increased to $40,000 annually and made tax deductible to appellant, but as before, the support continued until the death of appellee. There was no provision in the

Agreement, or the amendment, that specifically dealt with modification, i.e., it was neither prohibited nor permitted. Appellee remarried in 1991. Subsequent to remarriage,

appellee paid none of her living expenses, purchased two vacation homes, and generally lived quite comfortably. time of trial, appellee's net worth was approximately $615,000, and appellant's net worth was nine to ten million dollars. Appellant stopped paying support at the end of 1998. Appellee filed a petition to enforce the support provision in the amendment to the Agreement, and appellant filed a petition to terminate or reduce spousal support. The latter petition At the

asserted as grounds appellee's remarriage and the absence of any need for money by appellee. On July 6, 1999, the matters were heard by a master, who on July 29, 1999, issued a report and recommendation. The

master recommended denial of appellant's motion, reduced the

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support in arrears to a judgment, and awarded attorney's fees to appellee. Appellant filed exceptions, which were overruled

by the circuit court. Questions Presented 1. Whether the Trial Court's determination that Title 11 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code Annotated was inapplicable to this proceeding was clearly erroneous. Whether an alimony provision within a Property Settlement Agreement requiring the payment of alimony to a former spouse who has remarried is void as against public policy. Whether the finding that the obligation of a payor spouse to continue to pay alimony to a remarried former spouse, where that spouse is worth over $615,000 and has little or no necessary expenses, is not harsh or inequitable constituted an abuse of discretion. Whether the Court was clearly erroneous in awarding attorney's fees to the Appellee. Discussion 1. Appellant contends that the circuit court was "clearly erroneous" in finding that Title 11 of the Family Law Article, entitled "Alimony," was inapposite. Appellant relies on

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Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Rep. Vol.),

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