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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 59 September Term, 2002 ______________________________________________ RO BER T DA VIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND _______________________________________________ No. 36 September Term, 2002 _______________________________________________ DAMONT ADAMS v. STATE OF MARYLAND _____________________________________________ Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathe ll Harrell Battaglia, JJ.

Opinion by Bell, C.J.

Filed:

October 21, 2004

*Eldridge, J. now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

The Petitioners, R obert Da vis and D amont A dams, were arrested, charged with, and convicted of, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and a handgun violation. The arrests, charges and convictions followed the search of 4011 Boarman Avenue, in Baltim ore C ity, by o fficers of the B altimore C ity Police Dep artment, pursuant to a search a nd seizure w arrant. The w arrant incorp orated by reference the affidavit of the police officer a ffiants, O'Ree and Brickus. In that affidavit, they

indicated that a "rushed or no knock forced entry" of the premises would be required. The issue tha t this case presen ts is wh ether, w here the re is no s tatute so provid ing, a judge is authorized to issue a "no-knock" warrant, on the basis of which the police may make a "no-knoc k" en try to execute a search and seizure w arrant. 1 The Court of Special Appea ls affirmed the judgments of conviction, holding both that a "no-knock" entry was justified by the exigent circumstances detailed in the search and seizure warrant, thus affirmative ly validating the propriety of the issuance of a "no-kn ock" w arrant, and th at, in any event, the "good admissibility of the evidence.2
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faith" exception to the exclus iona ry rule "saved" the We shall reverse.

As w e shall se e, infra, neither party directly presented the issue we have identified. Rather, they argued in their briefs about the sufficiency of the factual predicate for the issuance of the "no-knock" warrant, thus assuming the authority of the judge to issue it. The State, therefore, alternatively, asked us to decide whether the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule applies to render the evidence seized pursuant to a "no-knock" warrant for which the factual basis was inadequate, admissible, neverth eless. 2 Although the pe titioners were tried together in the Circu it Court for Baltimore City, their a ppeals were h eard by tw o diffe rent pan els of th e Cou rt of Sp ecial A ppeals . In Davis v. S tate, 144 Md. App. 144, 797 A. 2d 84 (2002), the court decided the case on both grounds. In the case of Adams, however, although implicitly recognizing a judge's authority to issue a "no-knock" warrant, the court, in an unreported opinion, declined to decide whether the affidavit made a sufficient showing to justify the issuance of such a warrant in that case, preferring to rest its decision instead on the

After conducting an investigation, police officers O'Ree and Brickus applied for, and obtained, a search and seizure warrant for the Boarman Avenue premises, the petitioners,3 and a blac k Nissan S entra, whic h they alleged was driven b y the petitioners and associated with their operation. The application for the search warrant, which

included the officers' affidavit, enumerated the applicants' considerable experience, 4 and detailed their investigation,5 includ ing t he co nclu sion s the y reached as

"good faith" e xceptio n to the e xclusio nary rule. In the police officers' affidavit, the petitioner Robert Davis is referred to as "Meatball," whom they describe as a black male, "6' 1," 175 pounds, in his twenties." The p etitioner Dam ont Ad ams w as also re ferred t o in the a ffidav it, as "Big gie." In the case of Officer O'Ree, that experience consisted of five (5) years as a police officer, three with the Baltimore City Police Department, one hundred eighty four (184) hours of specialized training in narcotic enforcement, more than three hundred (300) narcotic/drug arrests, resulting in numerous convictions and writing or being the affiant on more than seventy (70) search and seizure warrants "for illegal controlled dangerous substan ces, mo ney, gun s and re lated m aterial." Officer Brickus's experience consisted of approximately ten (10) years as a police officer, com pletion of th e Police A cademy an d Roll Ca ll and In-Se rvice Train ing as to various co ntrolled dan gerous su bstances, m ore than on e thousan d (1000) n arcotics arrests and participation in the investigation, preparation and execution of more than two hundred fifty (250) search and seizure warrants, resulting in the recovery of narcotics and related p araphe rnalia.
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Specifically, they averred: "During the month of February 2000, Your Affiants Chris O'Ree and Jonathan Brickus of the North Western District Enforcement Unit met with a confidential source. We believe this confidential source to be extremely reliable and has provided information that has been corroborated. The source provided Your Affiant [sic] with information outlining a drug organization that sells marijuana p rimarily in the 5100 Block of Park Heights Ave. This confidential source is a user of marijuana and is familiar with pricing , packagin g, and the a ppearanc e and eff ects of it. "The confiden tial source advised Yo ur Affiant [sic] that the leaders 2

of the group are two guys known as `Meatball' and `Biggie'. The confide ntial sour ce ad vised tha t the m ale k now n, as `Me atba ll' is a 6'1 175lb male in his twenties. The confidential source advised Your Affiant [sic] that `Biggie' [sic] name is Damont. The confidential source advised Your Affiant [sic] that `Biggie' and `Meatball' have a room at 4011 Boarman Ave., on the second floor. The confidential source advised that they store their m ain supply of m arijuana in tha t room and bring sma ll amounts to the 5100 block of P ark Heig hts Ave. f or street sales in their black late model two door Nissan Sentra. "The confidential sources then pointed out to Your Affiants the dwelling known as 4011 Boarman Ave. as the dwelling where the marijuana was stored. We then went to the 5100 block of Park Heights Ave. where the source s then pointed out `M eatball' and `Biggie'. "The 5100 block of Park Heights Ave. is well known to the police and citizens for a high level of marijuana sales. Your Affiant [sic] then interviewe d `Biggie' a nd identified him to be D amont A dams. Th e male known as `Meatball' was also interviewed. They both were located in the 5100 block of Park Heights Ave. Damont Adams and `Meatball' both stated that they drive a b lack Nissa n Sentra. D uring the inte rview, the tw o could not provide a valid reason for being in the area. After the interview was complete your Affiants observed the two drive away in the late model black two door Nissan Sentra Maryland registration #FXF894. "The confidential source advised that he/she was inside of 4011 Boarman Ave. in the extremely recent past and observed large amounts of marijuana inside the dwelling. The source stated that on the first floor of the dwelling th ere is a large sc reen televisio n. Your A ffiants we re able to observe a large screen television on the first floor through an open front door. "During the First week of February 2000 your Affiants have observed `Meatball' and Damont Adams on several occasions in the 5100 block o f Park Heigh ts Ave . "Your Affiants then contacted a reliable confidential registered informant NWD #398. NWD#398 advised that two black males fitting the description of `Meatball' and Damont Adams, that drives [sic] a black Nissan Sentra, are living in the 4011 Boarman Ave. NWD#398 advised that at 4011 Boarman Ave., several people live there and share the house for communal use. "Confidential Inform ant NWD #398 has prov ided Your A ffiant [sic] information that directly resulted in over fifteen se arch and seizure warrants, which resulted in the seizure of thousands of dollars worth of 3

a result of tha t investigation . Then, the a pplicants su bmitted: "The prior experience of your Affiant [sic] indicates that narcotic/drug dealers/user s have, carry, an d use Firea rms to prote ct their operations. This protection is both from the Police and other drug dealers/users who may try to seize the drugs or moneys gained from the operation. These Firearms include handguns, rifles and shotguns. These weapons allow the drug dealer/user to operate openly and freely; also enabling them to retalia te against an yone they feel threatened by. The possession of these w eapons is a n extension of the narc otic operation and/or conspiracy being conducted. Due to the nature of the evidence you [sic] Affiant [ sic] is seeking to seize in this in vestigation, sp ecifically Article 27 Section 275-302 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Your Affiant [sic] must g ain entry quick ly and safely into the dwelling. If entry is stalled or delayed the controlled dang erous substance can easily and quickly be destroyed. Therefore, Your Affiant [sic] will attempt to gain entry by the rush or N o-Knoc k forced e ntry. This will en able the Entry `crack' c ocai ne, n ume rous handguns, sh ot gu ns an d US curr ency. NWD#398 has proven to be extremely reliable, and the information that he/she has provided has prove n to be acc urate and c orrect. NW D#398 is familiar with the packaging, pricing and sales techniques of marijuana, crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin and illegal firearms. NWD#398 has provided your Affiant [sic] informa tion on drug operation s in the North W estern District that has been corroborated. "A check of the Baltimore City Police Department Juvenile arrest records revealed that Damont Adams has been arrested three times in the past two years for C.D.S. violations. "On 4 February 2000 at approximately 9:00 am Your Affiant [sic] observed the Nissan Sentra with the tag #FXF894 parked in front of 4011 Boarman Ave. "Based o n informa tion provide d from an extremely reliab le confidential source of the detailed information on `Meatball' and Damont Adams's marijuana sales and storage in 4011 Boarman Ave. [sic] The corroborated information of the source. [sic] Your Affiant [sic] believes that `Meatba ll' and Dam ont Ada ms are storin g large am ounts of m arijuana in 4011 Boarman Ave. Your affiant [sic] prays of the issuance of a search and seizure warrant for the address of 4011 Boarman Ave., the vehicle known as a two door Nissan Sentra tag #FXF894, a black male known as `Mea tball' an d Dam ont Ad ams fo r violatio ns of th e Mar yland C.D .S. laws ."

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Team to recover the evidence in tact and provide me mbers of the entry team w ith a ma rgin of safety fro m we apons , which may be o n the sc ene." A judge issued the search and seizure warrant. Although the warrant did not do so explicitly, no express provision to that effec t being inclu ded in the w arrant, becau se it "incorporated by reference " the affida vit of Off icers O'R ee and B rickus, wh ich stated their intention "to gain entry by the rush or No-Knock forced entry," the warrant implicitly authorized a "no-knock entry." In executing the warrant, the police neither

knocked, nor announced their presence or purpose; rather, they gained entry, as they stated that they intended to do, through the use of fo rce. The p etitioners we re found in

a second floor bedroom, in w hich various wea pons and drug paraphernalia also w ere found. In a refrigera tor in that sam e room, th e officers recovered a large ziplock

baggie containing 60 smaller baggies of suspected marijuana. The petitioners moved, pre-trial, to suppre ss 6 the evidence seized during the search. Their argu ment wa s directed to, an d challenged , the sufficiency of the showing the affiants made to justify the issuance of the warrant, which the petitioners characte rized as a "no -knock " warr ant. M ore par ticularly, the petition ers argu ed, inter alia, that the facts a lleged in the a ffidavit submitted in support of the search a nd seizure warrant were in suffici ent to jus tify a "no- knock entry." 7 The Circuit Court denied the
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Counsel for petitioner Davis made the motion, which petitioner Adams joined.

The petitioners also argued that the application did not establish probable cause for the search. The pe titioners have not appealed th e Circuit Court =s denial of th eir motion on that basis. Th e issue, theref ore, is not bef ore this Co urt.

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motion to suppress. It held that, in light of their wealth of experience in the area of narcotics drug enf orcemen t, as detailed in th eir affidavit , the police officers'

determination that a no-knock entry was required was not "irrational." It reasoned: "Somewhat more vexing is the consideration whether the warrant itself provides say a sufficient basis for a no-knock forced entry. The cases, which have been discussed by the defense, and reviewed by the Cou rt, largely involve situations in which law en forcement office rs were confronted with situations which post entry were determined either to rise to the level of exi gen cy permitting no-knock entry or failed to meet that standard, and thus require suppression "No cases we re found in which the issue pre sented w as, in this context, in which there was pre-raid approval for a no-knock entry on a set of facts wh ich essentially recite the office rs' general an d specific experience in law enforcement, from which they extrapolate the need, a s they perceive it, for a no-knock en try. It is, of course , well-settled in search and seizure law that the issuing judge is permitted to rely upon the experience of law enforcement officers and the conclusions which reasonab ly flow fro m that experience in making the probable cause determ ination. "I see no reason to dep art from that pattern wh en the exa mination is not the presence or absence of probable cause, but is instead the existence of exigencies meriting a no-knock entry. It is, in any event, a close[] question fo r the Cour t. "Howev er, crediting the affiant's experience which involves hundreds of narcotics arrests, ex tensive trainin g, and con siderable experience in narcotics law enforcement, I cannot conclude that their conclusion with respe ct to the likelines s of firearm s on the pro perty is an irrationa l one." Both of the petitioners timely appealed. In separate opinions, by different pa nels of the court, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals affirmed the judg ments o f the C ircuit Co urt. With regard to petitioner Adams, the court, in an unrep orted opinio n, declined to

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consider whether the affidavit submitted in support of the application for the search and seizure warrant sufficiently alleged facts to authorize a "n o-knock " warran t. Instead, it held that "even if the application for the search warrant did not set forth legally sufficient exigent circumstances justifying a `no-knock' warrant, the evidence seized should not be suppressed under the good faith exception to the exclus ionary rule." explained: "Although the good f aith exception to the exclusionary rule has not been considered by the appellate courts of this State in the context of a `no knock' warrant, facially valid but later determined to have been issued on an insufficient showing of exigent circumstan ces, other co urts have applied it in that co ntext. U.S. v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182, 18 4-87 (7 th Cir. 1993) ; U.S. v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8 th Cir. 1992) ; State v. Hughes, 589 N.W.2d 912, 915-16 (N. D. 1999). We find those decisions persuasive and accord ingly aff irm Ad ams's c onvictio ns and senten ces." Petitioner Davis's conviction was also affirmed, as previously indicated. In that The court

case, which the intermediate appellate cou rt reporte d, see Davis v. S tate, 144 Md. App. 144, 797 A.2d 84 (2002), ho wever, the court determ ined that the a ffidavit con tained sufficient facts to establish a reasonable suspicion of the then existence of exigent

circumstances and, thus, to permit a judge to make a pre-entry finding that a "no-knock" entry onto th e prem ises wa s justified . Id. at 152-58, 797 A. 2d at 89-93. Pointing to

the experience of the affiant officers, as set forth in their a ffidavit, the c ourt credited their conclusion that those involved in the drug trade often are dangerous and carry weapons and that drugs are easily and quickly destroyed when entry onto the premises is delayed or stalled. The court further observed that the affidavit indicated that large amounts of

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drugs had been seized as a result of information supplied by one of their sources, the reliable confiden tial registered so urce, that sev eral people resided in th e dwelling, and that the petitioner's co-defendant Adams had several previous arrests for drug violatio ns," 8 id. at 158, 7 97 A. 2 d at 93, a ll of which , it conclude d, supporte d its holding. Alternatively, the intermediate appellate court held that, even if the no-knock

entry were illega l in that case, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to render the evid ence se ized in th e case a dmissib le. Id. at 159, 797 A. 2d at 93. court reasoned: "Other courts have applied the good faith exception to cases involving the issuing of a no -knock search warra nt. See United S tates v. Tisdale, 195 F.3d 70 (2 nd Cir. 1999) ; United States v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182 (7 th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moland, 996 F. 2d 259 (10th Cir. 1993) ; United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843 (8 th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F. Supp. 2 d 119,(D . Mass. 20 01); United States v. Rivera , 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 799 7 (D. M aine 2000 ); United States v. Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d 518 (S.D.N.Y . 1999); United States v. Tavarez, 995 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y . 1998); State v. Van Beek, 591 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1999); State v. Eason, 629 N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 2001). We agree w ith those decisions. * * * * The

"[E]ven if we had concluded that Judge Sweeney should not have authorized a no-knock entry in this case, we would not reverse appellant's conviction. Suppressing evidence under these circumstances would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish police for the errors of judges and magistrates. When the police officers follow the proper course of conduct by seeking a no-knock search warrant, the good faith exception applies." Id. at 160, 797 A.2d at 94.

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The arrests attributed to the petitioner Adams were, as we have seen, juvenile arrests. 8

This Court g ranted th e petition s for ce rtiorari in both ca ses, Adams v. State, 369 Md. 570, 801 A.2d 10 31 (2002 ); Davis v. S tate, 370 Md. 268, 805 A.2 d 265 (20 02), to address whether the intermediate appellate court correctly resolved the issues they presented. II. In this Court, petitioner Davis challenges, once again, the sufficiency of the factual support offered to justify the issuance of a "no-knock" warrant. He argues that, taken as a w hole , the f actu al av erments simp ly are insufficient, under Richards v.

Wiscon sin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997), to justify use of a "no-knock" entry to execute the subject warrant. In that case, the petitioner notes, the

Supreme Court held that police officers may not rely on general allegations that narcotics investig ations, per se, present circumstances that w arrant no-knock entries, 520 U. S. at 388, 117 S. Ct. at 1417, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 620, and that, in each case, the police and/or the court, as the case may be, must consider whether the facts of that particular case constitute an exigenc y sufficient to warrant a no-kn ock entry. 395, 117 S. Ct. at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 625. Davis characterizes the invocation, by the applicants for the "no-kn ock" w arrant, of their experience to establish that the petitioners, the suspected marijuana dealers, "ha[d], carr[ied] and use[d] Firearms to protect their operations" as "a con clusory statement that drugs and weapons go hand-in-hand" and submits that that use of Id. at

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experience, to create a rea sonable su spicion that " [i]f entry is stalled or delayed the controlled dangerous substance can easily and quickly be destroyed" results in a

"considera ble overgeneralization," of the kind against which the Richards Court cautioned. See 52 0 U. S. a t 393, 11 7 S. Ct. a t 1421, 1 37 L. E d. 2d at 6 23. Nor does

petitioner Davis agree that the additional factors identified by the Davis court provide the requisite showing: "Even with this add itional inform ation, the aff idavit fails to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances existed to justify not knocking and announcing. Rather, the `large amount of drugs' supports the petitioner's position that the danger of destruction of evidence was insignificant, the fact that `several people resided in the dwelling' was not alleged to create any extra danger, and unlike the defendant in Wynn [v. S tate, 117 Md. App. 133, 699 A.2d 512 (1 996)], the fact that Adams h ad `several arrests for dru g violations' d oes not in any way su ggest th at Ada ms had a prope nsity for v iolence ." Both of the petitioners deny that the "good faith" exception to the warrant requirement is applicable to save the admissibility of the eviden ce in this case . This is

so, they submit, because the police could not have acted ob jectively and rea sonably because the offer of conclusory statements based on unsupported assumptions, rather than case sp ecific and particularized fact s, has bee n rejecte d, by Richards, as a sufficient basis for establishing a reasonable suspicion of the existence of exigency warranting a "no-knock" entry. As petitioner Adams puts it, "to apply the `good faith' exception to a no-knock authorization based on an affidavit's categorical statements about drug dealers is to create just another prohibited per se rule."

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The State, of course, does not agree . On the co ntrary, it proffers th ree argum ents as to why this Court, as did the Court of Special Appeals, should affirm the judgment of the Circuit Co urt. With resp ect to the suf ficiency of the factual alleg ations in support of a "no-knock" en try, it argues, pointing to the factors the intermediate appe llate court identified in Davis, that they were of "details specific to the case and supported the inference that knocking and announcing could pose a danger to police officer or risk the destruction of eviden ce." Also s ignificant to th e State, is the fa ct that authorization for the "no-knock" entry was sought from a judicial officer, in the request for the search and seizure warrant, as to which a different, more deferential, standard of review from that applicable to an on the scene determination by the officers applies. Application of that standard to the case sub judice, the State submits, properly resulted in the trial judge upholding th e no knock en try. Referencing the test of objective good faith set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n. 23, 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 3420 n. 23, 82 L. Ed. 2 d 677, 6 98 (1984), "whethe r a reasona bly well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistra te's authoriza tion," the State argues that th e applicants "relied in good faith on the warrant's a uthorization to conduc t a no-kno ck entry, and thus, the evidence seized is admissible pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclus ionary rule."

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Fina lly, the State submi ts that, assuming a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the evidence would be admissible pursuant to the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines.9 In State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 821 A.2d 922 (2003), this Court rejected the same argument in the context of a search and seizure warrant executed in violation of the knock and announce requirement. In that case, the State argued both that cocaine the police recovered in executin g a search w arrant witho ut first knock ing and an nouncing their presence w as, neverthe less, admissib le because it would h ave been discovered inevitably when the officers entered the home pursuant to the valid warrant and that the warrant was an indepe ndent sou rce for the c ocaine. A lthough rec ognizing th e close interre lationship between inevitable discovery and independent source, we noted their analytical distinction: "The ine vitable disco very doctrine a pplies wh ere eviden ce is not actu ally discovered by lawful means, but inevitably would have been. Its focus is on what would have happened if the illegal search had not aborted the lawful method of discovery. The independent source doctrine, however, applies when the evidence actually has been discovered by lawful means. Its focus is on what actually happened - was the discovery tainted by the illegal search?" 374 Md. at 292, 821 A.2d at 932 (quoting United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1318 n.1 (7 th Cir. 1993)). We rejected the State's argument. As to inevitable discovery, we said: "To app ly the inevitable d iscovery rule . . . w henever th ere is a valid warrant, to render admissible, any evidence seized in execution of that warrant in violation of the knock and announce rule is, in effect, to create a blanke t excep tion to th at rule fo r all case s involv ing valid search warra nts, . . .precisely wha t Richards prohibits. This is exactly what the High Court has said w e may no t do." State v. Lee, 374 Md. at 303, 821 A.2d at 938. As to independent source, we concluded: "`[W]e re ject the Go vernmen t's position beca use it wou ld comple tely emasculate the knock-and-announce rule. As stated supra , the requirement that officers reasonably wait is a crucial element of the knock-and-announce rule. To remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift move gut the constitution's regulation of how officers execute such warrants."' Id. at 303, 821 A.2d at 938 (quoting U.S. v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 98 6 (6 th Cir. 200 0). Lee controls the case sub judice, insofar as the inevitable discovery and independent 12

III. The Fourth Amendm ent of the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the p eople to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, bu t upon pro bable cau se, supporte d by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the p lace to be searched, and the pers ons or th ings to b e seized ." Its clear and unequivocal purpose is to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, because it recognizes "`the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedd ed in our trad itions since the origins of th e Repub lic,'" Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New Y ork, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1 387, 6 3 L. Ed. 2d 639, 660 (1980)). See also, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1697, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 827 (1999) ("`the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose,'" quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng . Rep. 194 , 195 (K.B . 1603)); United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 21 25, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 764 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amen dment is dire cted"), it thus p rotects the righ ts of citizens to "retreat into his [or her] own home and be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 100 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. Unite d States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683, 5 L. Ed. 2d source arguments are concerned. 13

734, 739 (196 1). In terpreted as ge nera lly in pari mater ia with the F ourth Am endmen t, Dua v. Comc ast Cable , 370 Md. 604, 622, 805 A.2d 1061, 1072 (2002); Scott v. State , 366 Md. 121, 139, 782 A.2d 862, 873 (2001); Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319-21, 430 A.2d 4 9, 53-5 4 (198 1), Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights has a like, though perhaps n ot identical, purpose and effect, to prohibit unlawful searches and seizures, Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 21, 688 A.2d 22, 32 (1995); Givner v . State, 210 Md. 484, 492-93, 124 A.2d 764, 768-69 (1956), and is subject to a like, but not identical, interpretation. It provides: "all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, an d ough t not to b e grante d." A. Unlike many States, whose legislatures have enacte d such laws, e.g . State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 898, 900-901 (Neb. 1991) (citing Neb. Rev. Stat.

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