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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND FRANK R. MARQUARDT, et al. v. SUPERVISOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION OF CALVERT COUNTY : : : : : : :

Civil Action WMN-01-2074

MEMORANDUM Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 7), and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 11). briefed and are ripe for decision. The motions have been fully Upon review of the pleadings

and applicable case law, the Court determines that no hearing is necessary (Local Rule 105.6) and that Defendant's motion will be granted and Plaintiff's motion will be denied. I. BACKGROUND1 Plaintiffs Frank and Mary Marquardt own several acres of woodlands in Calvert County, Maryland. In 1988, the Marquardts

entered into a Forest Conservation and Management Agreement ("FCMA") with the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"). The

FCMA provided that Plaintiffs would maintain their land in an undeveloped status, in exchange for which the State agreed to "freeze" the corresponding real property assessment at its 1988 value for a 15 year period. In addition, a 1987 boundary survey

of the property indicated that it was one parcel of five acres or
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The facts and procedural history set forth herein are undisputed by the parties.

more, thereby apparently qualifying the property for an "agricultural use assessment" that yielded a substantially lower assessment value than the fair market value. From 1988 until

1995, Plaintiff's woodland property was taxed based on the 1988 agricultural use assessment. In 1995, the then-Supervisor of the Department of Assessments and Taxation informed Plaintiffs that the agricultural use assessment had been improperly applied, because Plaintiff's woodlands actually consisted of several contiguous lots, none of which was 5 acres or larger. Plaintiffs were told

that beginning in 1995, the land would be reassessed at the 1988 full cash value for the remainder of the FCMA. The Marquardts appealed the 1995 reassessment to the Circuit Court for Calvert County, whereupon the reassessment was upheld.2 Marquardt v. Supervisor, Civil Action No. 96-598 (March 18, 1998). That decision was in turn affirmed by the Maryland Court

of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion, and on August 26, 1999, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. Shortly

thereafter, Plaintiffs challenged the 1997 assessment of the property, which was the same 1988 full cash value as the 1995

In that decision, the Circuit Court (Sothoron Jr., J.) held that: (1) the Supervisor could not be equitably estopped from reassessing the property, since that doctrine cannot be applied against the state in performance of its governmental capacity; and (2) the reassessment was based on substantial evidence. See, Civil No. 4-C-99-1287, at 4-5 (summarizing Judge Sothoron's opinion). 2

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assessment.

On December 16, 1999, the Maryland Tax Court (Martz,

J.) issued an order affirming the 1997 assessment. On June 29, 2001, the Circuit Court for Calvert County reviewed and affirmed the order of the Tax Court. Action No. 4-C-99-1287.3 See, Civil

The court found that the Tax Court had

correctly determined that Plaintiff's challenge to the 1997 assessment was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, because the case presented the same issues as were fully litigated in the challenge to the 1995 assessment. Id. at 9.

The court also held that the Tax Court's factual findings, namely, that the agricultural assessment does not apply to property comprised of contiguous multiple lots such as Plaintiffs', was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 12.

Finally, the Circuit Court considered and rejected the Marquardts' claim that the State's reassessment of the property before the end of the 15-year FCMA period had violated the Contract Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution.4 Id. at 14-15. Specifically, the circuit court found that the

According to Defendant, this decision is pending review by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Plaintiffs made no mention of the appeal in their pleadings. The Circuit Court noted that it was unclear whether Plaintiffs had raised the Contract Clause issue before the Tax Court, but because Plaintiffs raised it "in numerous other documents" filed with the court, the Circuit Court addressed the Contract Clause issue separately from the findings and application of law by the Tax Court. Civil Action No. 4-C-991287, at n. 10. 3
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1995 reassessment (and thus the 1997 assessment at the same level) did not constitute a "change in law" that impaired the contractual relationship at issue. Id. at 14 (citing General

Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)). On July 16, 2001, Plaintiffs filed this action, claiming again that the 1995 reassessment violates the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.5 Defendant has moved to dismiss the

Complaint on the ground that, inter alia, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. II. DISCUSSION The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that "a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings." District of Columbia Court The doctrine

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983).

"precludes not only review of adjudications of the state's highest court, but also the decisions of its lower courts." Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). The purpose of the doctrine is to safeguard our dual

system of government, in which "the independence of state courts would surely be compromised if every adverse decision in state court merely rang the opening bell for federal litigation of the

Plaintiffs also assert an "interrelated" claim that the Supervisor's interpretation of the Maryland agricultural use assessment's exclusion of land less than 5 acres violates Article 43 of the Maryland State Constitution. Complaint at

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