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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : GLENWOOD ADAMS : v. CALVERT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination case is Defendant Calvert County Public Schools' motion for summary judgment. The issues are fully briefed and the : Civil Action No. DKC 2001-1012 :

court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion

for summary judgment will be granted. I. Background The following facts are uncontroverted or in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Glenwood Adams ("Adams"), an African-American, was hired by Calvert County Public Schools ("CCPS") as a Custodian at Northern High School in 1980. He worked there until he was promoted to Head His duties

Night Custodian at Windy Hill Middle School in 1998.

included cleaning and buffing the floors and the gym, mowing and manicuring grass, working with machinery and equipment, and snow removal. In 1990, Adams filed discrimination charges against CCPS

on the basis that he was not hired as Head-Night Custodian at Windy Hill. The charges were settled in 1998 and as part of the

settlement Custodian.

Adams

was

promoted

to

the

position

of

Head-Night

Adams sought promotion to the position of Head Day Custodian three times in the Spring and Summer of 2000. Other candidates

were deemed more qualified by CCPS and received these promotions. Adams asserts that the selection process for custodial positions has many deficiencies, including implementation problems regarding Article X of the "Agreement Between the Calvert Association of Educational Support Staff and the Board of Education of Calvert County" ("Article X"). The first promotion Adams applied for, and did not receive, was a vacancy for Head-Day Custodian at Mill Creek Elementary School ("Mill Creek"). Plaintiff submitted a letter in application for this position on May 16, 2000 and interviewed for the position. CCPS replied to Adams on June 15, 2000 that another applicant, Robert Hall, had been chosen. older than Adams. Hall is an African-American male

Adams alleges that he was not selected in

retaliation for the employment discrimination action that he filed in 1990. In June 2000, Adams applied for two other Head-Day

Custodian positions that became vacant at approximately the same time. and These positions were at Patuxent High School ("Patuxent") Leonard Elementary School ("St. Leonard"). He was The

St.

interviewed for both positions, but was awarded neither.

successful applicant at Patuxent was Steve Brooks ("Brooks"), an

2

African-American male, and the successful applicant at St. Leonard was Wallace Thacker ("Thacker"), a white male, both younger than Adams. Adams was interviewed for all three positions, but received ratings that were lower than Hall, Brooks, and Thacker. Four

people were involved in selecting the three successful applicants. Three of the four decision-makers were over age 50 at the time they rejected the application of the then-46 year old Adams. Brooks and Thacker were 35 and 34, respectively, when they received the promotions at issue. Adams asserts that the selections of Brooks

and Thacker were acts of age discrimination and retaliation.1 II. Standard of Review A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other

words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam Inv.

Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987);

Plaintiff asserted a race discrimination claim in his complaint, but does not pursue it in his opposition to summary judgment. 3

1

Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pulliam,

810 F.2d at 1286 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tinsley v. A party

First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1998).

who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, on those

issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. 477 U.S. at 256. In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated: In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the 4 Anderson,

nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. However, "`a mere scintilla of evidence Barwick v. Celotex Corp.,

is not enough to create a fact issue.'"

736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967)). There must be "sufficient evidence

favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. significantly If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not probative, summary judgment may be granted."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). III. Analysis Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has abandoned his Title VII claim with respect to race discrimination and it was not raised in his EEOC charge; (2) CCPS cannot be sued under the ADEA or

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