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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND HARLEYSVILLE INS. CO. v. MAC'S SEPTIC SERVICE, et al. : : : : :

Civil Action WMN-01-226

MEMORANDUM Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 14). for decision. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe Upon a review of the pleadings and applicable case

law, this Court determines that no hearing is necessary (Local Rule 105.6) and that Plaintiff's motion will be granted. I. BACKGROUND Defendant, Mac's Septic Service, T/A Robert Townsend, Jr., was insured under a Commercial Auto Policy and a Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy with Plaintiff, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company. The Commercial Auto Policy had a liability

limit of $500,000 per each accident, and the Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy had an aggregate limit of $1,000,000. On

September 1, 2000, Plaintiff issued a Named Driver Exclusion for Defendant Robert Townsend III as a result of the suspension of Townsend's driver license due to a citation for attempting to drive under the influence. This Named Driver Exclusion applied

to the Auto policy and stated that "this policy shall not apply to any claims arising from accidents which occur while any `auto' is being operated by [Robert Townsend, III]." Robert Townsend,

Jr. read and signed the exclusion. On December 18, 2000, while driving a 1994 GMC LowPro Topkick truck which was owned by Robert Townsend, Jr. and Mac's Septic Service, Robert Townsend III was involved in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Robert Townsend

III was covered under a policy issued by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF). Plaintiff filed this action seeking a

declaratory judgment order relieving Plaintiff of any duty to defend or indemnify Defendant for any claims arising out of the December 18, 2000 accident and has now filed a motion for summary judgment. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is proper if the evidence before the court, consisting of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of record, establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after reasonable time for discovery and upon motion, "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322.

If the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of 2

material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party must, in order to withstand the motion for summary judgment, produce sufficient evidence in the form of depositions, affidavits or other documentation which demonstrates that a triable issue of fact exists for trial. Id. at 324. The non-moving party is entitled

to have "all reasonable inferences . . . drawn in its respective favor." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1129 (4th Furthermore, the mere existence of some factual

Cir. 1987).

dispute is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be a genuine issue of material fact. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Anderson v. Thus, only

disputes over those facts that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law are considered to be "material." Id. Finally, because the matter is before the Court in diversity, the Court is bound by the applicable Maryland substantive law. 28 U.S.C.

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