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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SOUTHERN DIVISION

KELLIE L. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. AW-99-870 PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY MARYLAND, et. al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently before the Court are Defendants Prince George's County, et. al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff Kellie Campbell's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have filed an opposition and a reply, therefore the motions are ripe for resolution. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to counts I and III, and grant, in part, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to counts II, IV, V, VI and XI, and deny, in part, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for the remaining counts.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Kellie Lynn Campbell, a female-African-American, was hired by Defendant Prince George's County, Maryland on December 26, 1995 to work in the Prince George's County Police Department's Drug Analysis Laboratory as a Forensic Chemist I/II. On December 26, 1997, Plaintiff was 1

promoted to Forensic Chemist II, while also receiving an "outstanding" job performance evaluation from her immediate supervisor. Plaintiff alleges, however, that during her first year of employment at the drug laboratory, she observed health, safety and other violations in the laboratory that Plaintiff believed would endanger the health and safety of herself and other employees. Plaintiff began reporting her concerns to the Prince George's County Police Department ("PGCPD") and other laboratory employees. After receiving no response, Plaintiff prepared a memorandum dated August 21, 1996, in which she enumerated the alleged health and safety violations. For the most part, Plaintiff's complaints went unanswered. However, after several employees repeatedly complained about the poor air quality in the laboratory, Prince George's County closed the laboratory in April 1997 for one week while the air quality problem was addressed. Despite the remedial measures, Plaintiff still observed safety and other violations on a regular basis. Plaintiff additionally became agitated when she learned that Alison Grieshaber, a white-female hired in March 1997, was given a starting salary three thousand dollars ($3,000) more than the Plaintiff. In October 1997, Plaintiff met with Defendant Esther Strongman, who was the Prince George's County Police Department's EEO Officer, about the alleged pay inequities, which Plaintiff believed were based on race. Defendant Strongman denied Plaintiff's claims. On November 10, 1997, Plaintiff submitted another memorandum to the PGCPD, identifying problems with the packaging of evidence and hazardous situations which existed due to improper packaging. The memorandum, again, went unanswered by PGCPD. On March 3, 1998, Defendant John Porter began his employment with the drug laboratory. Plaintiff alleges that from March until July, Defendant Porter continuously and inappropriately calibrated various pieces of forensic equipment, thus making the drug analysis, in Plaintiff's opinion, unreliable in many

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instances. Plaintiff brought to Defendant Porter's attention the problem with the equipment. In response, Defendant Porter, allegedly ordered Plaintiff to refrain from retesting any drug samples for accuracy. In addition, Plaintiff had submitted a request for paid administrative leave to attend the Mid-Atlantic Association of Forensic Scientists ("MAAFS"). In May 1998, Defendant Porter, allegedly denied Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff then submitted a request to use annual leave to attend the conference, but that request, as well, was rejected by Defendant Porter. Plaintiff viewed these rejections as retaliation for her complaints about Defendant Porter. Plaintiff, upset with Defendant Porter's conduct, submitted a memorandum to Defendant Lt. Michael Ricucci, Commander, Forensic Services Section, on May 22, 1998. In the memorandum, Plaintiff alleged that she was being subjected to racial discrimination and disparate treatment. Plaintiff also mention that she was covered under the American's with Disability Act (ADA) because of her liver transplant in 1993. Due to the liver transplant, Plaintiff was under medication that caused a reduction in her immune system. In response, Defendant Porter prepared his own memorandum dated June 8, 1998 stating that Plaintiff did not want to perform drug analysis on potentially biohazardous material because of her suppressed immune system. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Porter requested that Plaintiff submit to a Fitness-for-duty (FFD) exam to determine whether she could continue to work in the drug laboratory. As a result of the June 8 memorandum, Lt. Ricucci ordered Plaintiff to submit to an FFD exam on August 3, 1998. Plaintiff believed that the June 8, memorandum, as well as the order to submit to an FFD exam, were in retaliation for her complaints about the drug laboratory, Defendant Porter and based upon Plaintiff's race. Plaintiff was put on administrative leave pending her FFD exam. The Defendants denied Plaintiff paid administrative leave while awaiting her test. On August 17, before Plaintiff's FFD exam,

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Plaintiff was allegedly ordered back to work by Defendant Porter. On September 11, 1998, the Prince George's County Medical Advisory Board found that Plaintiff was fit to return to duty. The medical board determined that the Plaintiff was at no greater risk than anyone else in the drug laboratory, to contract some sort of disease from the tested materials. Plaintiff once again met with Defendant Strongman to complain about what she felt like was discriminatory treatment. Plaintiff also sent another memorandum to Defendants Porter, Ricucci and John Farrell, Chief of Police, Prince George's County Police Department protesting the FFD exam. Plaintiff continued to notice safety and procedural violations within the drug laboratory. Plaintiff also alleges that cases were taken out of her locker and proper chain of custody reports were not signed. On November 4, 1998, Plaintiff received a phone call from Assistant State's Attorney ("ASA") Toni Drake asking for testimony in a criminal drug trial that was in progress. While reviewing her case in preparation for testifying, Plaintiff discovered that there was a problem with the drug standard used to compare with the evidence sample obtained from the crime scene. Plaintiff informed the ASA of the problem with the drug standard. Furthermore, Plaintiff stated that she could not testify with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the substance she analyzed was cocaine, based on the anomalies in the drug standard. Plaintiff explained to ASA Drake and her supervisors that she previously overlooked an error in the drug analysis. However, Plaintiff also took the time to explain to ASA Drake and her supervisors all of the problems in the drug laboratory, including Plaintiff's problems with Defendant Porter. As a result of Plaintiff's inability to verify the accuracy of the cocaine tested, the charges in the criminal trial were dropped. On November 5, 1998, Plaintiff was informed by the State's Attorneys office that there was going

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to be an investigation into the testing standards used at the drug laboratory. Plaintiff was taken down to the internal affairs office and was asked to make a statement by three officers. At first, Plaintiff hesitated to give a statement until she had an attorney. Her statement was rescheduled for another time when she had an attorney present. The investigation proceeded with interviews of drug laboratory employees, including Defendant Porter. On November 6, 1998, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave by Lt. Arthur Collins, the investigator assigned to the case, pending the outcome of the internal investigation. Plaintiff was interviewed by the internal affairs office on November 10, 1998. As a result of the investigation, on February 26, 1999, Plaintiff was proposed for termination. Plaintiff was terminated from her employment effective March 12, 1999. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). While the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences. See Deans v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1998); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). To defeat such a motion, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence of specific facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'"

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Celotex , 477 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted). Accordingly, in determining whether genuine and material factual disputes exist, the Court has reviewed the memorandums and the exhibits attached thereto, construing all facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).

DISCUSSION Plaintiff, in her Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concede that Counts II, (Title VII race discrimination), IV (Section 1981 race discrimination), V (Section 1981 retaliation, and VI (Section 1983 First Amendment claim against Defendant Prince George's County) should be dismissed. Therefore, the Court will grant, in part, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to those counts and will not discuss their merits in the following memorandum opinion.

I.

Plaintiff's Claim of Discrimination based upon Disability. (Count I)1 Plaintiff argues that she has been treated differently by the Prince George's County Government

("PGCG") because of her disability. More specifically, Plaintiff points to Defendant Porter's June 8, 1998 Memorandum which relieved Plaintiff of some of her job duties, and that the PGCPD made her submit to an FFD exam. Plaintiff believes that because Defendants used general assumptions to subject Plaintiff to an FFD, Defendants have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and therefore, Plaintiff should be granted summary judgment on the issue of disability discrimination.

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All counts refer to Plaintiff's Verified First Amended Complaint. 6

A. Was the Plaintiff Disabled Pursuant to the ADA? Absent direct proof of discrimination, Plaintiff must follow the three step process set out by McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The first prong of the McDonnell-Douglas test is that the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the Plaintiff must show: (1) that she has a disability; (2) that she is otherwise qualified for the employment; and (3) that she was excluded from the employment or benefit due to discrimination solely on the basis of the disability. Doe v. University of Maryland Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, disability is defined as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity of such individual; (B) having a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. (emphasis added) 42 U.S.C.

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