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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

KERRY L. SPENCER v. HENDERSEN-WEBB, INC., ROBERT L. KILBERG, ZIMLIN & KILBERG, RUPP & ASSOCIATES, INC., AND FRANCES FLORES

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CIVIL NO. Y-98-3649

J. Steven Lovejoy, Esquire, Towson, Maryland, and David R. Breschi, Esquire, Towson, Maryland, counsel for Plaintiff. Jerrold A. Thrope, Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, Lawrence S. Greenwald, Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, and Kristine A. Crosswhite, Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for Defendant Hendersen-Webb, Inc. Mary Malloy Dimaio, Esquire, Towson, Maryland, for Defendants Rupp and Associates, Inc., Frances Flores, Robert Kilberg, and Zimlin & Kilberg. YOUNG, Joseph H., Senior United States District Judge Date: December ___, 1999 Memorandum Opinion I. This case is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The Plaintiff, Kerry L. Spencer ["Spencer"], filed a

complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on September 25, 1998, alleging that Hendersen-Webb, Inc. ["Hendersen"] defamed her credit and violated the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ["MCDCA"], and Robert L. Kilberg ["Kilberg"], 1

Zimlin & Kilberg, Rupp and Associates ["Rupp"], and Frances Flores ["Flores"] defamed her credit and violated various provisions of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ["FDCPA"] and the MCDCA in their efforts to collect a debt arising from a residential lease. Court in October 1998. The case was removed to this

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss were After discovery,

denied by marginal order on December 7, 1998.

Spencer filed a motion on August 23, 1999, seeking summary judgment on her statutory claims. The Defendants filed Hendersen

oppositions and cross-motions for summary judgment.

moved for summary judgment on Spencer's MCDCA and defamation claims and the other Defendants moved for summary judgment on Spencer's defamation claims. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A

"genuine" dispute about a material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

325 (1986).

In response, the non-moving party "may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248; Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). Failure to demonstrate a genuine issue for Strag v. Board of The mere existence

trial will result in summary judgment.

Trustees, 55 F.3d 943, 951 (4th Cir. 1995).

of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's case is insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. 252. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

The non-movant's evidence, however, is to be believed and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Id. at 255.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 28, 1993, Spencer and William T. Taylor ["Taylor"] signed a contract to rent 10212H Sunnylake Place for one year, beginning July 1, 1993, at $504 per month. The lease was signed

by Taylor, Spencer, and a representative of Hendersen-Webb, Inc., as Agent for the owner, Lakecrest Apartments Limited Partnership. The events surrounding the lease are disputed. Apparently,

Kerry Spencer's mother -- Vycky Spencer -- signed a lease for 10212H Sunnylake Place on February 24, 1993, approximately three months prior to the Spencer-Taylor lease. 3 See Pl.'s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment ex. 2.

The Vycky Spencer lease

indicates that she paid a $250 security deposit to Hendersen and that the lease would run from June 1, 1993, through May 31, 1994. Id. According to Spencer, her mother was building a house which By securing new tenants for

was ready for occupancy in May 1993.

the apartment -- Kerry Spencer and Taylor -- Vycky Spencer was able to break her lease. Id. at 3. Spencer claims that her

mother relinquished the security deposit by signing it over to her. See id. at 3, ex. 7. Hendersen, however, points out that

the Spencer-Taylor lease does not indicate that they paid a security deposit. In addition, Hendersen contends that Vycky

Spencer received a refund of the security deposit and deposited it in her bank account. Judgment at 6, ex. 2. According to Spencer, Taylor made the rent payments from June to December 1993 and, when he moved out in December, agreed to pay the rent for the remainder of the lease. Partial Summary Judgment at 5. Pl.'s Motion for See Hendersen's Cross-Motion for Summary

Spencer made no further rent Id.

payments and moved out of the apartment in February 1994.

On May 9, 1998, Spencer and her new fianc

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