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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND YOLANDA HOLMES : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 99-2011 : E.SPIRE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al. : : :

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff, Yolanda Holmes, filed suit against Defendants, e.spire Communications, Inc. ("e.spire") and American

Communications Services, Inc. ("ASCI"), in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County alleging sex and pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").1 Defendants removed the case to this court. Currently pending and ready for resolution are

Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment (Paper No. 32), Defendants' motion to withdraw admissions (Paper No.34),

Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Paper No. 40), and Plaintiff's second motion for summary judgment (Paper No. 41). No hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's first motion for summary

Plaintiff's complaint also alleges wrongful discharge under Maryland common law. Defendants' motion to dismiss that claim was granted (Paper No. 30), leaving only Plaintiff's Title VII and FMLA claims.

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judgment is denied; Defendants' motion to withdraw admissions is denied as moot; Plaintiff's second motion for summary judgment is denied; and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is

granted. I. Background. In July 1996, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants as a fulltime accounts payable clerk. 2 temporary employee for Prior to this, she worked as a In the fall of 1997,

Defendants.

Plaintiff learned she was pregnant and would give birth in March 1998. She communicated this information to Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that she was advised that she would receive six weeks of maternity leave that would begin after the birth of her child. Plaintiff also alleges that she was informed that

her six week leave would not be reduced in any fashion. On December 23, 1997, as Plaintiff was beginning a scheduled vacation from work, she was informed by her doctor that she would require bed rest for the remainder of her pregnancy. She

notified Defendants of her medical situation and took medical leave, which was approved by Defendants. Plaintiff claims she

was told that her position would remain open pending her return

ASCI and e.spire are the same entity. The company was operating as ASCI when Plaintiff was hired and changed its name to e.spire at or around the time of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's complaint. 2

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from leave, but that Defendants replaced her with a full-time accounts payable clerk shortly after her leave began. Plaintiff

claims that she communicated frequently with Defendants' human resources department during her leave. Plaintiff gave birth on March 5, 1998. Eight days later,

on March 13, 1998, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Defendants instructing her to return to work by March 17, 1998 or risk termination. This information, according to Plaintiff,

was contrary to her understanding that she would have six weeks of maternity leave following the delivery of her child and that her post-delivery maternity leave would not be reduced by her pre-delivery medical leave. Plaintiff claims that she requested

to use her accumulated vacation time, approximately 62 hours, to extend her leave beyond March 17, but her request was denied. Plaintiff alleges Defendants were advised by her doctor that she was under a continuing disability as the result of recently giving birth and would require accommodations, such as working at home a few hours a day, if she was to return to work so soon after the delivery. Plaintiff claims that despite her efforts

to work out a reasonable accommodation, she was terminated from her position on March 17, 1998, because of her pregnancy, child birth, and pregnancy-related medical condition.

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On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims for sex and pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII and the FMLA. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on her

second count--violation of the FMLA--on the basis of facts that were deemed admitted due to Defendants' failure to respond to requests for admission. Defendants, in turn, moved to withdraw

those admissions and moved for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff's counts. Plaintiff subsequently filed a cross motion

for summary judgment on both counts. II. Summary Judgment Standard. Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Miller v.

Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990).

A genuine dispute

exists if a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the case under governing law will preclude summary judgment. Id. at 252;

Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising, 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995).

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The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4 th Cir. 1979). The moving party may meet this burden by demonstrating

the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-

moving party then must, through affidavits or other kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), demonstrate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 324. Id. at

The non-moving party cannot rely on "the mere pleadings

themselves," or simply set forth speculation, allegations, or denials to demonstrate genuine issues of fact. The court must not weigh the evidence. must determine whether enough evidence Id.

Rather, the court to enable a

exists

reasonable factfinder to find in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. inferences most favorably The court must view all facts and to the non-moving party, who is

entitled to have the credibility of his evidence assumed, his version of events in dispute accepted, and internal conflicts resolved in his favor. Charbonnages de France, 597 F.2d at 414.

The non-moving party, however, is only entitled to inferences

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that

"fall

within

the

range

of

reasonable

probability."

Thompson Everett, 57 F.3d at 1323. III. Discussion. A. Cross motions for summary judgment. Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiff contends that the evidence establishes intentional discrimination on the part of Defendants in violation of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"). She argues

that Defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reason for her termination--the alleged expiration of her FMLA leave--is merely a pretext for discrimination. Defendants violated the FMLA Plaintiff also alleges that when they terminated her.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII pregnancy discrimination, and that even if a prima facie case has been shown, Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that a Defendants' pretext for proffered reason for her

termination

was

discrimination.

Finally,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of an FMLA violation. 1. Title VII Pregnancy Discrimination.

As explained in the following discussion, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII pregnancy discrimination because she has 6 not offered evidence that

Defendants treated similarly situated nonpregnant employees more favorably than pregnant employees.3 established a prima facie case, she Even assuming Plaintiff cannot show that the

proffered nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination-- her alleged exhaustion of FMLA leave--was actually a pretext for intentional discrimination. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, states, in relevant part, that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 2000e(k). must be 42 U.S.C.

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