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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2032 SEPTEMBER TERM, 1994 ___________________________________

PAMELA W. DOSER v. JOHN C. DOSER ___________________________________ Wenner, Fischer, Hollander, JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Hollander, J. ___________________________________ Filed: September 8, 1995

Pamela

Doser,

appellant,

filed

a

complaint

for

absolute

divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on September 17, 1991, on grounds of desertion. Following a lengthy hearing before

a Domestic Relations Master in November, 1992, Ms. Doser filed exceptions to the master's findings and recommendations, which the circuit court heard on June 3, 1993. At the close of the hearing,

the court orally overruled all exceptions but one--the finding as to the value of certain marital property--and, as to the one exception, indicated that it would remand to the master to take further testimony. The court directed the parties to draft an order to

that effect, but the parties could not agree on the content of the order. More than a year later, on August 3, 1994, the court heard de novo testimony, limited to the grounds of divorce. That day, the

court issued a written order granting divorce nunc pro tunc to the date on which the master filed his Findings and Recommendations. The court also overruled all of Ms. Doser's exceptions, including the one concerning the value of marital property. judgment, Ms. Doser now appeals. Appellant presents six issues for our consideration, which we have re-ordered for clarity: 1. 2. Did the trial court commit error in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law? Did the trial court commit error in failing to use its independent judgment on the issue of marital property valuation and alimony? From that

3.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to permit evidence of the marital property's value as of the date of the divorce? Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to remand to the master after stating on the record that it would be remanded for further presentation of evidence concerning the value of marital property? Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to award an adequate amount of indefinite alimony? Did the trial court commit error in failing to award [Ms. Doser] her full attorney's fees?

4.

5. 6.

In light of Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 (1991) and its progeny, Kirchner v. Caughey, 326 Md. 567 (1992), Bagley v. Bagley, 98 Md. App. 10 (1993), and Lemley v. Lemley, 102 Md. App. 266 (1994), we answer Questions 1 and 2 in the affirmative. According-

ly, we shall vacate the Chancellor's order and remand for such further proceedings as the court deems necessary in order to make more specific findings with respect to each exception. We also

agree, with respect to Question 3, that the court erred in failing to value the marital property as of the date of the divorce. We

shall address the remaining issues for the guidance of the trial court.1 Md. Rule 8-131(a).

The factors underlying awards of alimony, monetary award, and counsel fees are so interrelated that, when a trial court considers a claim for any one of them, it must weigh the award of any other. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law Art.

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