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Eastside Vend Distributors, Inc. v. The Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. No. 33, September Term, 2006 Headnote: Preliminary injunctions are designed as a preventative and protective remedy for actions which may occur in the future. The purpose of interlocutory injunctions is to maintain the status quo between parties engaged in litigation pending the resolution of such litigation. If the granting of a preliminary injunction would fail to prevent a future act or maintain the status quo between the parties, then it should not be granted. If the granting of an interlocutory injunction satisfies the above criteria, then the court will examine four factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, (2) the balance of convenience, (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted, and (4) the public interest. See Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05, 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984). The party seeking the injunction has the burden of proving the facts necessary to support each factor and must prove all four factors in order to receive preliminary relief. Should the plaintiff fail to prove even one of the factors, an interlocutory injunction will not be granted. Furthermore, as a precursor to analyzing the four factors, courts must balance the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff against the likelihood of irreparable harm to the defendant. Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 783-84, 511 A.2d 501, 507 (1986). If this "balance of hardships" weighs in favor of the plaintiff, then the likelihood of success on the merits factor is replaced with a more lenient standard: whether "the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation." Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
In the present case, the petitioner failed to estab lish its entitlement to a preliminary injunction.

Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore City Case #24-C-04-003998

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 33 September Term, 2006

Eastside Vend Distributors, Inc. v. The Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc.

Bell, C. J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Greene Eldridg e, John C. (Re tired, Specially assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Cathell, J.

Filed: December 19, 2006

This case arises f rom the de nial of a m otion for pr eliminary injunction. On May 7, 2004, Eastside Vend Distributors, Inc. ("Eastside"), petitioner, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc. ("CCE"), The Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. ("PBG"), and Mars Super Markets, Inc. ("Mars"). As relevant to this particular action before the Court, the complaint alleged violation of the Maryland Antitrust Act 1 ("the Act") via price discrimination on the part of the two bottling companies, CCE and PBG. It also alleged that M ars, as a supe rmarket, w as comp licit by knowin gly receiving and inducing the alleged discrimina tory prices in viola tion of the A ct.2 On March 30, 2005, Eastside filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit PBG , responde nt, from denying Eastside rebates on the Pepsi products that Eastside purchases from PBG.3 The Circuit Court held a hearing on May 19 and 20, 2005. The Circuit Court denied the motion and issued an order to that effect on May 23, 2005 . On M ay 26, 2005, E astside timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. On March 20, 2006, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's denial of Eastside's motion for preliminary injunction. On May 3, 2006, Eastside filed a petition for writ of certio rari with this Court. We granted certiorari on June 14, 2006. Eastside Vend Distrib., Inc. v. The Pepsi

The Maryland Antitrust Act is codified in Maryland Code (1975, 2005 Repl. Vol.),

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