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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2514 September Term, 2001

EARNEST FORD v. BALTIMORE CITY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Adkins, Greene, Moylan, Charles E. (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ. Opinion by Greene, J.

Filed: December 27, 2002

On March 3, 1999, appellant, Earnest Ford, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming the Baltimore City Sheriff's Office and Baltimore City Deputy Sheriff's Arthur

Phillips, Mary Krall, and Arthur Seabrook as defendants in a suit alleging trespass, infliction counts of assault, battery, false negligence, arrest, negligent intentional training and

intentional of

trespass,

emotional

distress,

negligent

supervision, and violations of the Maryland State Declaration of Rights. Thereafter, appellant amended his complaint to remove the Appellant instead in the amended

Baltimore City Sheriff's Office as a defendant. added the State of Maryland as a defendant

complaint. the court

On November 30, 2001, at the conclusion of a hearing, granted a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

appellees.

Appellant subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate, or in

the Alternative, for Reconsideration and a Request for Hearing. The court denied that motion on January 8, 2002. Appellant noted an appeal from the court's January 8, 2002, decision to present the following questions for review1: I. II. Did the court err in ruling that Deputy Phillips did not act with malicious intent? Did the court err in concluding that the State was not negligent?

III. Did the court err in concluding that appellees did not violate appellant's State constitutional rights?

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On appeal, the State of Maryland and the three deputies are the appellees. 1

Regarding appellant's first question presented, we hold that the facts viewed in a light most favorable to appellant do not support a finding of malice or negligence. We conclude, however,

that the court erred in dismissing the State constitutional claims against the State. FACTS In 1995, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Queen, who was charged with non-support. The warrant identification letter noted that Queen was an AfricanAmerican male, 5'9" tall, and weighed approximately 155 lbs. The

warrant notification letter was dated July 28, 1995, and indicated that the warrant was "due" on October 28, 1995. Queen was

sentenced to eighteen months in the Anne Arundel County Detention Center on January 22, 1998. The warrant was consequently dismissed on the day of Queen's sentencing. On March 10, 1998, not realizing the arrest warrant had been dismissed, Baltimore City Deputy Sheriffs Phillips, Krall, and Seabrook attempted to execute the warrant at 2705 Norland Road, Baltimore, Maryland, where Ford allegedly had resided since 1993. The sheriffs were dressed in plain clothes with their badges around their necks. Following procedure, Deputies Phillips and Krall

approached the front door while Deputy Seabrook guarded the back door to ensure that the suspect did not escape. Upon knocking on the front door, the deputies were greeted by

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appellant, an African-American male, standing 5'9", but weighing approximately 210 lbs. Appellant was a Maryland State Trooper, The parties dispute

although this fact was unknown to appellees.

whether Deputy Phillips identified himself or stated the purpose of the visit.2 Deputy Phillips asked permission to enter the

residence to speak with appellant.

Appellant stated that the

deputies could not come in and attempted to close the front door. Deputy Phillips stuck his foot in the door to keep it from closing and he and Deputy Krall forced their way into appellant's home. Upon entering the residence, Deputy Phillips advised appellant that he had a warrant permitting him to enter appellant's home.3 Appellant, faced with the forcible entry, moved toward his telephone to attempt to call for assistance. Appellant contends

that Deputy Phillips, seeing the furtive movement, jumped on his back and pinned him on the couch. Although these facts are in

dispute, it is clear that appellant, at some point, was able to call 911 for assistance and informed the operator that unknown individuals were in his house. second call to his Maryland Appellant was also able to make a State Police barracks. It is

undisputed that appellant refused to inform the deputies of his identity.
2

Appellees contend that Deputy Phillips identified himself and stated that the deputies had a warrant. Alternatively, appellant alleges that the deputies never identified themselves as law enforcement officers.
3

Appellant contends that the deputies refused to show him the warrant. 3

At this time, Deputy Seabrook entered the home to assist the other deputies and search for other people. Deputy Seabrook, while searching the residence, noticed a photograph of appellant wearing a State Trooper of his uniform. Deputy Seabrook informed the other asked

deputies

discovery.

Thereafter,

Deputy

Phillips

appellant if he was a Maryland State Trooper, but appellant would not reveal his identity.4 Shortly thereafter, Baltimore City police officers arrived in response to appellant's 911 call. Deputy Phillips explained to the responding officers that he possessed an arrest warrant for an individual attempting living to at the address if and that was the the deputies subject of were the

determine

appellant

warrant. Officer Derek Phyall, one of the Baltimore City officers, recognized appellant and indicated that appellant was a Maryland State Trooper. A debate arose between Deputy Phillips and Officer

Phyall when the officer refused to reveal appellant's identity and defended appellant's right to refuse to answer the deputies' questions. Appellant eventually went upstairs and retrieved his The license revealed that appellant was not the Consequently, Deputy Phillips

driver's license.

subject of the arrest warrant.

recorded the information, apologized to appellant, and left the residence.

Appellant contends that the deputies had not identified themselves or their purpose for being in his home. Appellant explained he refused to disclose his identity because he had not violated any laws, was in his own home, and consequently was under no obligation to respond. 4

4

Appellant

further

contends

that

Deputy

Phillips

used He

obscenities and abusive language during the entire incident.

further alleges that he sustained injuries to his back when Deputy Phillips jumped on him to subdue him. On March 3, 1999, appellant filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging assault, battery, negligence, negligent trespass, intentional trespass, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and

supervision, and violations of the Maryland State Declaration of Rights. The complaint named the three Baltimore City deputy

sheriffs and the Baltimore City Sheriff's Department as defendants. On March 31, 1999, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, appellant filed an amended complaint in which he eliminated the Baltimore City Sheriff's Department as a defendant and instead included the State of Maryland. Defendants filed

another Motion to Dismiss that was subsequently denied on May 4, 1999. Consequently, appellant filed a second amended complaint State of Maryland and the Baltimore City deputy

against the

sheriffs as defendants.

Specifically the second amended complaint

alleged assault, battery, negligence, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the State of Maryland, Deputies Phillips, Krall and Seabrook. The second amended

complaint also included counts of negligent trespass, intentional trespass, violations of the State Declaration of Rights against all

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four defendants, and counts of negligent training and supervision against the State of Maryland. On or about April 7, 2000, at the conclusion of discovery, appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the second amended complaint in its entirety. court granted appellees' motion. On May 2, 2000, the

On May 19, 2000, appellant filed

a Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On this same date, appellant also filed a motion to vacate or, alternatively, for reconsideration of the court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment. The court, on

June 14, 2000, denied both appellant's motion to extend time and motion to vacate or reconsider the grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment. On July 13, 2000, appellant noted an appeal to this Court, challenging the grant of appellees' summary judgment motion and the denial of appellant's subsequent motions. In an unreported

opinion, filed on March 27, 2001, we reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further

proceedings so that the circuit court could consider appellant's opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. was held on November 30, 2001. A hearing

At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court again granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of all defendants. On December 10, 2001, appellant once again filed

a Motion to Vacate or, In the Alternative, for Reconsideration and

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Request for Hearing.

That motion was denied on January 8, 2002.

Appellant thereafter noted this appeal. DISCUSSION Standard of Review Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, in relevant part: The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts, including all inferences, in the light most

favorable to the opposing party. See Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676 (2001); Williams v. Mayor & Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 114 (2000). The trial court on summary judgment must not

try the case or decide factual disputes, but decide the case when no dispute of material facts exists. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst. Inc., 366 Md. 29, 73 (2001); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 205-06 (1996); Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247 (1981). The standard of appellate review is

whether the trial court was legally correct. Pence v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 363 Md. 267, 279 (2001); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 144 (1994); Saponari v. CSX Transp., Inc., 126 Md. App. 25, 37 (1998).

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I. Malice Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment because the facts viewed in the light most favorable to appellant give rise to a genuine dispute regarding malice. We do not agree.

We begin by generally examining the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA). We note that generally under common law, the State enjoys immunity and is thus protected from suit for both

sovereign

ordinary torts and State constitutional torts.

Baltimore Police

Department v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 306 (2001) (citing Condon v. State of Md.-University of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 492 (1993)). The State, however, has partially waived this immunity by statute. The MTCA provides in pertinent part: (1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection. (2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence. Md. Code (1975, 1999 Repl. Vol.),

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