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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

No. 2967

September Term, 2007

E. SCOTT FRISON, JR.

v.

JERRY J. MATHIS

Hollander, Graeff, Moylan, Charles E., Jr. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Graeff, J.

Filed: October 1, 2009

This appeal involves a request for attorney's fees by appellant, E. Scott Frison, Jr., related to his efforts to collect an unpaid legal bill owed by his former client, Jerry J. Mathis, appellee. Mr. Frison filed suit, pro se, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, to collect his legal fees. After a jury returned a verdict in Mr. Frison's favor for $35,818.13, Mr. Frison filed a motion for attorney's fees, alleging "willful and intentional violations of Maryland Rule 1-341." The circuit court denied Mr. Frison's request, concluding that Mr. Frison was not eligible to recover attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 1-341 because he represented himself pro se. Mr. Frison appealed, raising an issue of first impression: Whether a pro se attorney litigant may recover attorney's fees pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mr. Mathis retained Mr. Frison, an attorney licensed in the District of Columbia, to represent him in a lawsuit filed against him by Aaron Hargrove.1 The jury awarded judgment to Mr. Hargrove in the amount of $142,000. Mr. Mathis refused to pay Mr. Frison for the legal fees incurred during the lawsuit, claiming that Mr. Frison had committed errors in the trial that resulted in an unfavorable disposition.

Although Mr. Frison is not a member of the Maryland Bar, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County admitted him pro hac vice to represent Mr. Mathis in the prior civil lawsuit. Mr. Mathis states in his brief, and the record reflects, that on April 2, 2004, the circuit court ordered "that due to the frequency in which" Mr. Frison had "been admitted pro hac vice in the State of Maryland," he was "not to be admitted pro hac vice any time within the next twenty-four (24) months . . . ." The circuit court did not base its ruling on the fact that Mr. Frison is not licensed to practice law in the State of Maryland, and neither do we.

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On October 13, 2005, Mr. Frison filed suit, pro se, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Mr. Mathis, to recover the unpaid legal bill.2 A two-day jury trial commenced on January 3, 2007. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury entered a verdict against Mr. Mathis in the amount of $35,818.13. The jury awarded Mr. Frison $30,950.61 for the legal representation that Mr. Frison provided Mr. Mathis at trial and $4,867.52 for Mr. Frison's work on appeal. On January 12, 2007, Mr. Mathis noted an appeal. On January 29, 2007, Mr. Frison filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341. Mr. Frison requested attorney's fees for 253 hours of work, asserting that "[t]he time spent responding to bad faith filings by Mathis interfered with cases Frison could have taken and earned fees." At the conclusion of the motion, Mr. Frison signed the following certification, requesting $57,900 in attorney's fees: I HEREBY CERTIFY AND AFFIRM UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY that the entire hours expended in the case, Frison v. Mathis amount to 253 hours as of this filing. I claim that 193 of those hours were expended as a result of the bad faith filings of Mathis [in] Frison v. Mathis. Frison claims entitlement to $57,900 in reasonable attorney's fees per Maryland Rule 1-341. The circuit court reserved ruling on Mr. Frison's motion until after resolution of the underlying case on direct appeal. On October 26, 2007, this Court affirmed the jury's verdict in an unreported opinion. See Mathis v. Frison, No. 2583, Sept. Term, 2006 (filed October 26, 2007). On November 19, 2007, Mr. Frison filed in this Court a motion for

Mr. Frison also sued Mrs. Mathis and two related corporate entities, but these claims were subsequently dismissed. -2-

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attorney's fees under Rule 1-341, alleging that Mr. Mathis acted in bad faith in pursuing the appeal. On December 17, 2007, this Court denied the motion. On February 1, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing to resolve Mr. Frison's outstanding motion for costs and attorney's fees under Rule 1-341. The circuit court did not address whether Mr. Mathis acted in bad faith; rather, it denied Mr. Frison's motion for attorney's fees based on the Court of Appeals' decision in Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123 (1958). The court stated that, pursuant to Weiner, "if you're acting pro se, if you are a member of the Bar . . . you cannot get attorney's fees." The court clarified that Mr. Mathis' status as an attorney licensed in the District of Columbia, but not licensed to practice law in Maryland, was irrelevant to its order. The court stated: "Were you a Maryland attorney down here . . . I [would] rule in the same way." This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION Mr. Frison argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney's fees. He acknowledges caselaw holding that, with respect to a contractual provision authorizing the recovery of attorney's fees, the attorney representing himself was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Mr. Frison contends, however, that under the circumstances of his case, i.e., an action taken to enforce a judgment for attorney's fees against the attorney's former client, he should be allowed to collect attorney's fees.3

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Mr. Frison also argues in his brief that Mr. Mathis was his employer, and therefore, (continued...) -3-

Mr. Mathis counters that Mr. Frison is barred from recovering attorney's fees. He relies on Weiner v. Swales, supra, and Greenbriar Condo., Phase I, Council of Unit Owners, Inc. v. Brooks, 159 Md. App. 275, 283, 316 (2004), rev'd in part on other grounds, 387 Md. 683 (2005), for the proposition that an attorney representing himself, pro se, is not entitled to attorney's fees. Mr. Mathis further contends that the specific language of Rule 1-341 authorizes attorney's fees only for fees actually "incurred," and that Mr. Frison, representing himself, did not incur any attorney's fees. The circuit court agreed with Mr. Mathis' argument and concluded that, pursuant to Weiner, Mr. Frison was not eligible to receive attorney's fees because he was representing himself pro se. The court's conclusion, that Mr. Frison was barred from recovering attorney's fees based on his pro se status, is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Henriquez v. Henriquez, 185 Md. App. 465, 476 (2009) (argument that "court has no authority under the statute to award attorney's fees unless that party actually incurred expenses for legal fees" is a question of law reviewed de novo), cert. granted, ___ Md. ___ (2009).

(...continued) he is entitled to recover attorney's fees as part of his effort to collect his unpaid "wages" pursuant to Md. Code (2008 Repl. Vol.),

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