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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 203 SEPTEMBER TERM, 2001

G.E. CAPITAL MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. v. SAMUEL W. EDWARDS, JR.

Kenney, Krauser, Moylan, Charles E. Jr., (Ret'd, specially assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Kenney, J.

Filed: May 30, 2002

Appellant/mortgagee, G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. ("GECAM"), appeals a decision by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County denying its motion for judgment of possession, which had been filed after GECAM successfully bid for the property of appellee/mortgagor, Samuel J. Edwards, Jr., at a foreclosure sale. GECAM poses two questions on appeal, which we have reordered and rephrased as follows: I. Notwithstanding the subsequent ratification of the foreclosure sale, does the appeal present an issue of significant public importance which is likely to arise often? II. Is a secured party entitled to enforce its right of possession pursuant to Rule 14-102 prior to ratification of the foreclosure where the secured party is the purchaser and the deed of trust provides for the right to possession? We answer both questions in the affirmative and reverse. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 27, 1992, Edwards refinanced his property at 3007 Brodkin Avenue in Fort Washington with GECAM. debt with a deed of trust. Edwards secured the

When he defaulted on the loan, GECAM

appointed substitute trustees and initiated foreclosure proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The foreclosure sale took place on October 6, 2000. GECAM was the highest bidder at the sale, and the trustees accepted its bid. On October 18, 2000, prior to ratification of the sale, GECAM filed a Motion for Judgment of Possession Requesting Order Prior to Ratification of Sale (the "motion"). GECAM asserted that it was

-2the purchaser at the foreclosure and that "[o]nce the mortgagee was in default, movant was entitled to possession." The motion

specifically provides that "[i]f the sale reported herein has not been ratified by the time the motion is decided, movant requests that the Order of Possession provide that no writ of possession issue until ratification of the sale[.]" The court entered a show

cause order on December 19, 2000, and held a hearing on March 2, 2001. At the hearing, the court summarily, and without

explanation, denied GECAM's motion as "premature at this time." The sale was ratified on March 14, 2001. GECAM timely appealed the Edwards has not

court's denial of its motion on April 2, 2001. participated in the appeal. DISCUSSION I. "A case is moot when Mootness there is no

longer

an

existing

controversy between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy." Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951 (1996). Moot cases are Coburn, 342

generally dismissed without a decision on the merits. Md. at 250.

In rare instances, however, we address a moot case if

it "presents 'unresolved issues in matters of important public concern that, if decided, will establish a rule for future

conduct,' or the issue presented is 'capable of repetition, yet

-3evading review.'" Stevenson v. Lanham, 127 Md. App. 597, 612, 736

A.2d 363 (1999) (citations omitted). At present, there is apparently no longer an existing

controversy, because the sale was final and all ownership rights in the property have passed. See Janoske v. Friend, 261 Md. 358, 365,

275 A.2d 474 (1971) (quoting Lannay v. Wilson, 30 Md. 536, 550 (1869)); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927); In re Denny, 242 B.R. 593 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999) (citing In re DeSouza, 135 B.R. 793 (1991)). Therefore, we must determine

whether, as GECAM contends, the issue presented is "capable of repetition yet evading review." GECAM states in its brief that motions for judgment of

possession filed prior to ratification are treated differently in different circuit courts. GECAM alleges, for example, that the

Circuit Courts in Prince George's County and Calvert County will not consider a motion for possession until after ratification, whereas "[s]everal other counties and Baltimore City use a Show Cause Order but not with a hearing, except as may arise under the circumstances of a particular case." According to GECAM, in most

cases, a sale is ratified shortly after a show cause hearing and before this Court would have an opportunity to review the denial of a motion.1

Motions for judgment of possession are appealable interlocutory orders pursuant to Md. Code Ann. (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.),

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