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In Re: Adoption of Sean M.
State: Maryland
Court: Court of Appeals
Docket No: 1836/11
Case Date: 04/27/2012
Preview:In re Adoption of Sean M., No. 1836, September Term, 2011 HEADNOTE FAMILY LAW- PARENTAL DUTIES AND RIGHTS - TERMINATION OF RIGHTS A parent's failure to file a timely objection to a proposed independent adoption, as directed by a show cause order, constitutes an irrevocable deemed consent. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in striking a father's late notice of objection and ordering that an adoption proceed in the normal course, as uncontested. Further, a court need not definitively establish a father's paternity before the father's consent can be deemed as the result of his failure to timely object after being personally served with a show cause order. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - BILL OF RIGHTS - FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - SCOPE OF PROTECTION The deemed consent scheme in the context of independent adoptions does not deprive natural parents of any due process right. It is well established that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. Balancing the father's private interest in the care of his child, the government interest in timely providing permanent and safe homes for children consistent with their best interests, and the risk of error presented by the procedure, the process provided to natural parents is fundamentally fair and is consistent with the process due under Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Here, a father presented no extreme circumstances to justify his untimely filing, and the father's due process rights were not offended by the deemed consent scheme.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1836 September Term, 2011

IN RE: ADOPTION OF SEAN M.

Eyler, Deborah S., Zarnoch, Berger,

JJ.

Opinion by Berger, J.

Filed: April 27, 2012

This case concerns the stepparent adoption of a minor child, Sean M. ("Sean"). Appellant William H., Sean's purported father ( "Father") filed an objection to the stepparent adoption, but did so beyond the time provided by the juvenile court's show cause order. Appellant Jeffrey K. ( "Stepfather") moved to strike the late objection, and the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County granted the motion. Following the order to strike, Father filed motions to alter and amend judgment and to stay adoption proceedings, both of which the circuit court denied. This timely appeal followed. Father presents two issues for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether a natural parent's failure to file a timely objection to a proposed independent adoption, as directed in a show cause order, constitutes an irrevocable consent to the adoption. Whether the statutory scheme resulting in an irrevocable deemed consent to an independent adoption offends the due process rights of the parent.

II.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Sean, the minor child who is the subject of this case, was born on June 16, 2009, to Moira K., his mother ("Mother"). Mother and Father, an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Maryland, were in a romantic relationship during April through November of 2008. Shortly after Sean's birth, on July 14, 2009, Mother filed a custody action against Father in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging that "William [H.] is the natural father

of the minor child." Mother sought sole legal and physical custody of Sean. In his answer to the complaint, Father denied that he was Sean's natural father, and the custody case was ultimately dismissed by the agreement of the parties. Since his birth, Sean has resided exclusively with Mother. Since Mother and Stepfather's marriage on October 16, 2010, Sean has resided with both Mother and Stepfather. Additionally, Stepfather has been involved with Sean's life on a daily basis since Sean was born. Mother asserts that, as of the time the instant action was filed, Father had not been involved with Sean since his birth, had not attempted to establish paternity, and had not attempted to assert any parental rights.1 Having been involved with Sean since his birth and intending to remain in a parental role, Stepfather filed a Petition for Stepparent Adoption of a Minor on March 30, 2011. Mother consented to Stepfather's adoption of Sean, and filed a Consent to Adoption without Termination of Parental Rights. The Petition for Stepparent Adoption stated in paragraph 7: That the natural father of the minor child has not been identified; no persons alleging to be the natural father of the minor child have come forward; and no natural father is listed on the minor child's birth certificate. However, in July, 2009 the natural mother of the minor child, Moira . . . filed a Complaint for Custody against William . . . ; case number C-09-142875 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The Complaint and case was [sic] dismissed by the parties on or about January 21, 2010 . . . .

1

Father does not appear to rebut these assertions.
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The Petition for Stepparent Adoption also noted that, "the natural father of the child is not joining in the present petition." In paragraph 10, the Petition stated: That if William . . . is the natural father of the minor child, he has abandoned his parental rights to the minor child, Sean, for the following reasons: I. He denied that he is the natural father of the minor child in his Answer to Complaints which was filed under oath with this Honorable Court . . . . He has not exercised any parental rights since the minor child's birth; He has not attempted to make any contact with the minor child, has not contacted the minor child by telephone, letters, cards, gifts, or in any way made an effort to see the minor child since birth; He has not attempted to contribute financially or otherwise to the support and maintenance of the minor child.

II.

III.

IV.

The Petition further states, in paragraph 12, that "[i]t is in the best interests of the minor child, Sean, that the parental rights of William . . . , or any other person who may allege to be the natural father of the minor child, be terminated." Along with the Petition, Stepfather, through counsel, filed a Line requesting that the court file "a Show Cause Order and Notice of Objection to William . . . , who is the person suspected of being the natural father to the minor child to be adopted in the above captioned matter." On April 15, 2011, the court issued a show cause order and notice of objection to Father, and Father was properly served by personal service on April 29, 2011.
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The show cause order stated, in pertinent part (emphasis in original): RELATIONSHIP TO POTENTIAL ADOPTEE: [Purported] FATHER You are hereby notified that: 1. A Petition has been filed for the adoption of Sean . . . , who was born on June 19, 2009 in Queen Anne's County, Maryland. 2. If you wish to object to the adoption(s), you must file a notice of objection with the Clerk of the Court at Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County . . . within thirty (30) days after this Order is served on you. For your convenience, a form notice of objection is attached to this Order. WHETHER THE PETITION REQUESTS ADOPTION OR GUARDIANSHIP, IF YOU DO NOT MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS. The Form Notice of Objection, which was provided to Father along with the show cause order, stated, in pertinent part: Instructions to the person served with the show cause order: IF YOU WISH TO OBJECT, YOU MUST MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED IN THE SHOW CAUSE ORDER. You may use this form to do so. You need only sign this form, print or type your name, address, and telephone number underneath your signature, and mail or deliver it to the court at the address shown in paragraph 2 of the show cause order. IF THE COURT HAS NOT RECEIVED YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS.
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Any objection to the show cause order was required to be received by the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County by Tuesday, May 31, 2011.2 Father's objection, however, was not received by the court until Wednesday, June 1, 2011, one day after the thirty-day deadline.3 Stepfather, through counsel, filed a Motion to Strike Late Notice of Objection on June 13, 2011, arguing that the objection should be stricken as untimely. The parties filed various responses to the Motion to Strike, and the court held a hearing regarding the motion on August 8, 2011. The Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County granted Stepfather's Motion to Strike Late Notice of Objection and further ordered that the adoption proceed in the normal course, as uncontested. In his order, the circuit judge stated: Title 9 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure applies. Specifically, 9-107(b), applies and it sets forth that any notice of objection to an adoption or guardianship shall be filed within 30 days after the show cause order is served. In this case, the show cause order, which complies with the rules and the forms, was served by personal service. It was served on April 29th of 2011. Notice of objection was filed in this court on June 1st 2011. By my calculations and I think its also been stated here today, that is two days late.4

The thirtieth calendar day after Father was served with the show cause order fell on Sunday, May 29, 2011. The thirty-first calendar day after Father was served with the show cause order fell on Monday, May 30, 2011, which was Memorial Day. Therefore, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-203, any objection was due to be received by Tuesday, May 31, 2011, the following business day. Because service was made upon Father by personal service and not by mail, Maryland Rule 1-203(c) does not apply and an extra three days are not added to the prescribed period.
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2

The circuit judge stated that the notice of objection was two days late, however the (continued...)
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Quite simply, the Court is to determine whether 9-107 is mandatory. I have heard no reason that would create good cause to exceed the rule. There has been no indication of any disability or of any other reason, its just a late filing and because of that, I find that the motion to strike is appropriate and I'll strike the notice of objection.5 Thereafter, Father filed a motion to Alter and Amend Judgment on August 18, 2011, and filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Adoption Proceeding on August 24, 2011. The court denied both motions on September 12, 2011. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW In child custody and termination of parental rights cases, this court utilizes three interrelated standards of review. In re Adoption of Victor A., 386 Md. 288, 297, 872 A.2d 662, 667 (2005) (citing In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586, 819 A.2d 1030, 1051 (2003)). The Court of Appeals described the three interrelated standards as follows: We point out three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes. When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131 (c)] applies. [Second,] if it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual (...continued) notice was actually one day late. Due to the 30th day falling on a Sunday and the 31st day falling on Memorial Day, Father's objection was due to be received by the court on the 32nd day, May 31. The transcript of the August 8, 2011 hearing was originally omitted from the record for this appeal. Father filed a motion to supplement the record with the hearing transcript on March 30, 2012. We grant Father's motion to supplement the record.
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findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court's] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Yve S., supra, 373 Md. at 586, 819 A.2d at 1051. We review the trial court's conclusions as to matters of law de novo. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Audrey B., Adriana H., and Eric H., 186 Md. App. 454, 463, 974 A.2d 965, 970 (2009) (quoting Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535, 901 A.2d 175 (2006) ("[W]here an order [of the trial court] involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, [the appellate court] must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are `legally correct' under a de novo standard of review.")). There is no factual finding at issue involved in this appeal; the issue at stake is an order of the trial court involving the interpretation of Maryland statutory law. Accordingly, we review the trial court's conclusion regarding the effect of Father's untimely objection de novo. DISCUSSION Summarizing the contentions of the parties, Father first argues that his failure to file a timely objection to the proposed independent adoption within the required time period does not constitute an irrevocable consent to the adoption. Stepfather responds that Father

concedes that he did not timely file a notice of objection, and that under the reasoning of various cases construing the same thirty-day objection period within the context of CINA cases, Father's deemed consent is irrevocable.

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Second, Father argues that even if his failure to file a timely objection is considered a deemed consent under Maryland law, the deemed consent scheme is unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional right to enjoy the society of his child. Stepfather responds that, under existing law, the Maryland statutory scheme is constitutional and violates no constitutional right of Father. We address each of Father's contentions in turn. I. Father's first argument is that his failure to file a timely objection to the proposed independent adoption within the required time period is not an irrevocable consent to the adoption. Father argues that the case law construing the thirty-day objection period is within the context of Child in Need of Assistance ("CINA") and guardianship proceedings, and is therefore irrelevant to an independent adoption where the child is not CINA.6 Additionally, Father argues that the trial court should have established his paternity before proceeding with the adoption. We find neither argument persuasive, as discussed below.

All references to "guardianship" refer exclusively to guardianship proceedings arising under Sections 5-313 through 5-328 of the Family Law Article. Such guardianships result in termination of parental rights, and one method by which a parent consents to such a guardianship is by failing to file a timely notice of objection after being served with a show cause order.
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A. Statutory construction and applicability of guardianship-related case law Father is correct that we have not previously addressed the issue of deemed consent in the context of independent adoptions. We, however, disagree with Father's argument that the existing case law is entirely inapplicable. We believe that prior cases construing the same thirty-day objection period in the context of guardianship proceedings are relevant to independent adoptions as well, inasmuch as the language is nearly identical. We begin our analysis of the thirty-day objection period by examining the language of the statute and implementing rules. When presented with an issue of statutory

construction, we keep in mind the following principles: Our predominant mission is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible, from the language of the statute (or Rule) itself. If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legislative intent ends and we apply the language as written in a commonsense manner. We do not add words or ignore those that are there. If there is any ambiguity, we may then seek to fathom the legislative intent by looking at legislative history and applying the most relevant of the various canons that courts have created. Audrey B., supra, 186 Md. App. at 462-63, 974 A.2d at 970 (quoting Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571-72, 880 A.2d 343 (2005)). The procedures governing independent adoptions are found in
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