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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 00279 SEPTEMBER TERM, 2001 ____________________________ __

IN RE ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP No. T00032005

____________________________ __

Hollander, Eyler, James R. Wenner, William W. (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ. ____________________________ __

Opinion by Hollander, J. ____________________________ __

Filed: December 4, 2001

In

this

termination

of

parental

rights

case,

we

must

consider whether a child has the right to withdraw his statutory consent to a petition seeking termination of parental rights. John B., Jr. ("John"), appellant, the minor child of Sheri H. and John B., Sr., complains, inter alia, that the Circuit Court

for Baltimore City erred or abused its discretion when it did not permit him to withdraw his "deemed consent" to a Petition for Guardianship, with the Right to Consent to Adoption or Long Term Care Short of Adoption ("the Petition"). The Petition was

filed on February 23, 2000, by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services ("the Department" or "DSS"), appellee, when John was ten years of age. the Petition.1 From the time that John came into the Department's care in 1995, he was placed with his paternal grandparents, Christine and Melvin G. Because John was happy with that placement, he The circuit court subsequently granted

did not object to the Petition and was deemed to have consented to it. However, both before and at the termination of parental

rights ("TPR") hearing on March 28, 2001, John's counsel advised Neither parent is a party to this appeal. Ms. H., who objected to the Petition, appeared through counsel at the hearing, but she has not appealed the circuit court's ruling. John B., Sr. neither objected to the Petition nor attended the hearing. We observe that the mother's name is spelled variously as Sherri, Sherry, and Sheri. We shall use the spelling as it appears in appellant's brief.
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the court that John no longer agreed to the Petition.

Claiming

that John is deeply "attached" to his mother and has "strong ties" to his two siblings, his attorney sought to revoke John's statutory consent, and voiced John's opposition to the Petition.

On appeal, John presents three questions for our review, which we have reordered and rephrased slightly: I. Did the trial court err in failing to consider whether the child's changed circumstances warranted relief from the 30-day response deadline to the show cause order? Did the trial court err in failing to consider evidence regarding John's family ties? Was the evidence sufficient to support the termination of parental rights?

II.

III.

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm. FACTUAL SUMMARY John was born on July 10, 1989. He has a younger half

sister, Shunta F., born on January 3, 1993, and an older half brother, James H., born on March 12, 1984. The Department filed

a termination petition as to John and Shunta, but not as to James.2 DSS acknowledges that John is "close" to his siblings.

The court heard the Petition as to Shunta at the same time that it heard the Petition as to John. Shunta has not challenged the court's ruling granting the Petition. 2

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Shortly after Shunta's birth, the hospital reported that both she and Ms. H. tested positive for drugs. Nevertheless,

the three children did not come into care until August 1995, when they were removed because Ms. H.'s drug problem interfered with her ability to care for the children. children ranged in age from eleven to two. removed, he was immediately placed with At the time, the When John was his paternal In his

grandparents, with whom he has resided ever since.

brief, appellant recognizes that "[t]here is no question but that John's current placement with his grandparents affords him a stable environment." On September 14, 1995, by agreement of the parties, the children were found to be children in need of assistance

("CINA") and committed to the Department.

Thereafter, beginning

in 1995, Ms. H. entered several service agreements. In John's brief, he concedes that his mother "failed to adhere" to those agreements. On August 4, 1995, Ms. H. entered her first service

agreement, in which she agreed to obtain drug treatment and attend parenting classes. On August 15, 1995, she also agreed

to a safety plan, in which she acknowledged her drug problem and her failure to provide proper care for her children. Further,

she agreed to enter a drug detoxification and treatment program.

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Ms. H. executed a second service agreement on November 22, 1995, in which she again agreed to complete drug treatment, obtain a stable home, and attend parenting classes. On the same

day, she entered a residential drug treatment program, but left just three days later. of the service She did not comply with the provisions or the safety plan. Ms. H. On

agreement

subsequently had "sporadic contact" with her caseworker.

November 23, 1999, Ms. H. entered yet another service agreement, which again provided for drug treatment, parenting classes, and stable housing. Ms. H. did not comply with its terms.

Throughout this time, John consistently desired both sibling and parental visitation. Although the Department recommended

regular sibling visits, John frequently complained about the inadequacy of visitation. In its transfer summary dated August

12, 1996, the Department acknowledged that "John needs to visit with his siblings. He is very close to his brother."

When John was nine years old, he expressed a desire "to grow up with his paternal grandparents." John's parents had maintained though they At that time, neither of contact John with the

regular saw

Department,

even

occasionally.

Accordingly, on or about March 22, 1999, the parties agreed to a permanency plan for John of relative placement for the purpose

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of adoption or custody and guardianship.3 On July 28, 1999, the Department wrote a letter to John Sr., informing him that DSS was initiating termination of parental rights because John had been in care for "too long." In a

stipulation of September 29, 1999, the Department noted that the permanency plans for all three children were subject to change and were pending reevaluation by the Show Cause Committee. The

Department subsequently changed the permanency plan for John and Shunta to adoption, while the permanency plan for James H. continued to be long-term foster care. As we noted, DSS filed the Petition on February 23, 2000, when John was ten years old. A Show Cause Order was served on John's

Ms. H. on April 17, 2000, and she timely objected.

father was served with the Petition on June 4, 2000, and did not object. By motion on May 2, 2000, John's counsel complained As a

about service of the Show Cause Order on appellant.

result, on May 5, 2000, when John was about two months shy of his eleventh birthday, the Department re-served the Show Cause Order on John's attorney. Accordingly, at a hearing on June 6,

2000, John's counsel withdrew her motion challenging service of Appellant points out that a permanency plan of relative placement for the purpose of adoption or custody and guardianship differs from a permanency plan for adoption. It does not necessarily require or contemplate a termination of parental rights. See Md. Code, Fam. Law

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