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In re Anthony R. No. 4, September Term, 2000 Headnote: In the case at bar, appellant was charged as a juvenile under two petitions. The juvenile court denied appellant's motion to dismiss one petition on the grounds that the State's Attorney violated section 3-812(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The juvenile court also denied appellant's motion to dismiss the second petition on the grounds that it violated the statute of limitations. We hold that the first petition should have been dismissed because the State's Attorney failed to file the delinquency petition within thirty days of receiving a referral from an intake officer in violation of section 3-812(b). We also hold that the one-year statute of limitations for most misdemeanor offenses in adult proceedings also applies to juvenile proceedings.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case Petition Nos. 399021021 and 399085025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 4 September Term, 2000

IN RE ANTHONY R.

Bell, C. J. Eldridge *Rodowsky Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell, JJ.

Opinion by Cathell, J.

Filed: December 6, 2000 Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

Appellant, Anthony R., was charged as a juvenile under petition number 399021021 and petition number 399085025. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion for the juvenile court to dismiss petition 399021021 because the petition was not filed in accordance with Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 3-812(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.1 After a hearing, the motion was denied. A motion to dismiss petition 399085025 was also filed prior to trial and was also denied. After adjudication hearings, the juvenile court found facts to sustain both petitions. A disposition hearing was held on August 31, 1999, at which time a delinquency finding was made and appellant was placed on indefinite probation. Appellant filed an appeal on September 21, 1999 to the Court of Special Appeals, appealing the juvenile court's denial of the two motions to dismiss. We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. Appellant presents two questions: 1. Did the juvenile judge err in holding that the Court of Appeals decision in In re James S.[, 286 Md. 702, 410 A.2d 586 (1980)], was no longer good law and in therefore refusing to dismiss the Petition filed against the Appellant in violation of the time requirements of Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, [section] 3-812(b)? 2. Did the juvenile judge err in ruling that the statute of limitations did not apply to juvenile offenses? We answer yes to questions I and II. We reverse the findings of the trial court in petition 399021021 and in petition 399085025 and shall direct that court to dismiss those petitions. Facts The allegations of petition 3990850252 were first made by Corey B., based on an alleged incident

1

All references to section 3-812 are to this subsection unless otherwise cited.

Appellant, in his brief submitted to the Court, incorrectly identified the charges for petition 399085025 as being for petition 399021021 and vice versa. Appellant also misnumbered case 399085025 as 399085205 in part of his brief. After a review of the record and the transcript, we have (continued...)

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on December 3, 1997. Corey B. stated that he was on a bus, going to school, when a group of approximately nine boys boarded the bus. One of these boys, Generio, approached Corey B. and questioned him as to why he had hit Generio's cousin. Corey B. replied that he did not know anything about the incident at which time Generio struck Corey B. The other boys in the group, including appellant, then started to attack Corey B. Corey B. testified that appellant was one of the boys who hit him. Appellant testified that he did not hit Corey B. and he did not witness any other boys hitting him. The allegations of petition 399021021 occurred on September 14, 1998. Corey B. testified that he was in the cafeteria at Patterson High School when he was approached by appellant and two other boys. The three boys asked Corey B. if he wanted to fight. The boys left when he responded that he did not want to fight. Later in the day, Corey B. was confronted by the same three boys. Corey B. testified that appellant hit him in the face and when Corey B. fought back, all three boys attacked him. Appellant testified that he did not hit Corey B. that day. A hearing was held before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a juvenile court, on April 28, 1999, at which time appellant argued that petition 399021021 should be dismissed because the State failed to comply with the time requirements of section 3-812. Under section 3-812(b), the State's Attorney shall prepare and file a delinquency petition within thirty days of receipt of a referral from the intake officer. The State's Attorney received the referral from the intake officer on December 15, 1998, but did not file the delinquency petition until January 21, 1999, seven days after the thirty-day deadline. After the hearing,

(...continued) been able to determine the correct numbers and charges for each petition. Appellee had accepted appellant's facts without identifying the mistakes.
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the juvenile court kept the matter sub curia, granting appellant time to file a written brief in support of his motion. Appellant filed a brief on April 30, 1999, in which appellant stated that in accordance with In Re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 410 A.2d 586 (1980), petition 399021021 should be dismissed with prejudice for the State's failure to comply with section 3-812(b). The juvenile court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order on May 11, 1999, denying appellant's motion to dismiss. In its opinion, the court stated that: Maryland courts have made it abundantly clear that dismissal is not appropriate when the mandatory time provisions are not complied with regarding the intake phase, adjudication, disposition, and restitution hearings in juvenile cases. After considering statutory changes to Section 3-812(b), In re James S., post-James case law, Maryland Rule 1-201, and the overall purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act, this Court concludes that a bright line test or blanket rule that dismissal is mandated is not appropriate. Instead, the better approach is to examine the totality of the circumstances and the facts of each case to determine the sanction for noncompliance with the statute. Under some circumstances, dismissal with prejudice will be the proper sanction for failure to comply with Section 3812(b). However, after considering the nature of the charges and the fact that the respondents have not been detained as a result of the delay, this Court does not believe that dismissal is required . . . . Appellant thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss both petitions on July 6, 1999. In the motion, appellant claimed that under petition 399085025 he had been denied his right to due process and his right to a speedy trial based on the period of delay until the hearing and that the State's failure to file with the court and serve on appellant an order to extend the State's time for petitioning in the delinquency matter of petition 399085025 made the extension ineffective.3 The court heard oral arguments on the motion on July 7, 1999, before the adjudication hearing. At the hearing, appellant renewed his claims from his motion

In light of the questions presented, we need not address the affect of a failure to serve the extension request and order on appellant or the failure to include them in the file.
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to dismiss and also claimed that the State violated Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 5-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,4 by not prosecuting a misdemeanor within one year after the offense was committed. The court dismissed the due process and speedy trial claims based on its analysis of Supreme Court and Maryland case law. The court also dismissed appellant's last issue about the applicability of section 5-106, stating that: The Court believes that based on the purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act, as detailed in this Court's memorandum, opinion, and order dated May 11, of accountability, responsibility, the Court does not believe that that section applies to the Juvenile Causes Act, and accordingly, will deny the [appellant's] motion to dismiss on that ground as well. The adjudication hearing was then held and the court found that under petition 399085025, there was evidence to sustain the facts as to the second degree assault. The court found petitioner "not involved" in the reckless endangerment charge. Under petition 399021021, the court found petitioner "involved" as to both second degree assault and molesting a student on school property under Maryland Code (1978, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 26-101 of the Education Article. Appellant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, we granted certiorari on our own motion. Discussion We will first examine the legislative history of section 3-812 and address appellant's first question. We will then address whether the statute of limitations in section 5-106 applies to juvenile actions. A. Section 3-812 We commence our analysis of section 3-812 by attempting to ascertain the intent of the legislature.

4

All references to section 5-106 are to this article, unless otherwise cited.
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As we said in State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311(1998): We have said that "[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriot Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent. Marriot Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). .... This Court recently stated that "statutory language is not read in isolation, but `in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.'" Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, [w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed. . . . We may and often must consider other "external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. . . . [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51 (1987), . . . [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning -- what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as "the legislative scheme." [Id.
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at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59. We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27,

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