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In Re Franklin P. No. 4, September Term, 2001 Headnote: The Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction to the criminal court in respect to the allegations facing petitioner. The Juvenile Court attempted to rescind the waiver of jurisdiction while the State had already proceeded with criminal charges against petitioner in the criminal court. We hold that petitioner's issue is not yet reviewable on appeal, because the Circuit Court's denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Waiver orders are interlocutory and are challengable after the final disposition of the matter in criminal court. We also hold that when a juvenile court waives jurisdiction to the criminal court, its jurisdiction is lost and has vested with the proper adult criminal court. Juvenile courts in Maryland do not have the authority to rescind an order of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction after jurisdiction has been transferred to the criminal court.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case Nos. 100290029, 100290030, 100290031

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 4 September Term, 2001

IN RE: FRANKLIN P.

Bell, C. J. Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ.

Opinion by Cathell, J.

Filed:

October 18, 2001

In three juvenile petitions filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City sitting as the Juvenile Court,1 the State of Maryland charged petitioner, Franklin P., with various delinquent offenses. The State then sought to have the Juvenile Court waive jurisdiction2 for each of these petitions. Petitioner was fifteen years of age at the time of the offenses charged in the first

The first petition, No. 900066001, was filed on March 6, 2000. The second petition, No. 900066002, was also filed on March 6, 2000. The third petition, No. 600108007, was filed on April 17, 2000. Section 3-801(i) of the Court's Article, in effect at the time this matter was heard below, as relevant to this case, provided: "`Court', means [a] circuit court for a county sitting as a juvenile court . . . ." Similar provisions currently exist. Thereafter, the statute describes the "jurisdiction" of the "Juvenile Court." Section 3-804, et seq. Section 3-817, concerning waiver issues, speaks to the waiver of "exclusive jurisdiction," stating the circumstances in which a juvenile court can "waive jurisdiction." In light of the statute, and also in light of the language of some of the cases, it has become the practice to speak in terms of the juvenile court's "jurisdiction." The Constitution of Maryland, however, does not provide for a separate juvenile court. The Constitution provides that the courts of general jurisdiction are the circuit courts. Accordingly, a juvenile court, despite the statutory language, is part of the circuit court, and exercises the jurisdiction of that court. In reality, the Legislature's statutory scheme for juvenile causes, whatever the language used, is a process of granting and limiting powers, not, strictly speaking, granting and limiting jurisdiction. The statutes, in relation to criminal offenses, create a segmentation of the circuit court into two branches or divisions, both still part of the circuit court. The "juvenile court" deals, generally, in respect to criminal matters, with most offenses created by juveniles; the other branch, the criminal court, deals, generally, with offenses committed by adults. But, technically, neither is a separate court with independent jurisdiction. The Legislature has also addressed certain concerns in respect to waivers from one of the general jurisdiction branches that deal with criminal matters to the other. In a technical sense, albeit the statutory language used is "jurisdiction," what is being waived and transferred is the authority of one branch or division or the other to try the case. While we recognize the technical distinction, we will, in this opinion, continue to use the terms jurisdiction and authority interchangeably, unless the context indicates otherwise.
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juvenile petition and sixteen years of age at the time of those offenses charged in the other petitions. He was sixteen years, or older, at the time of the waiver proceedings. On three

separate days, July 13, 2000, August 11, 2000, and September 18, 2000, the Juvenile Court held hearings in respect to the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. On September 18, 2000, the

Juvenile Court entered an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction for each of the three petitions.3 On September 22, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order waiving jurisdiction. On October 19, 2000, the Juvenile Court issued an order vacating the previous waiver of juvenile jurisdiction concerning these petitions and ordered petitioner returned to juvenile court jurisdiction. At this point, he was almost seventeen years of age. The Juvenile Court

then scheduled an adjudicatory hearing for November 16, 2000; meanwhile, the State had obtained criminal indictments4 charging petitioner. Due to the existing criminal indictments,

the State, apparently believing the authority to try the case was in the criminal court, declined to put on a case at the adjudicatory hearing before the Juvenile Court. The State's failure to

put on a case led the Juvenile Court to dismiss the juvenile petitions against petitioner without In addition to the instant events, petitioner had had contacts with the juvenile courts in reference to fifteen prior allegations of conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult. In eleven instances, the allegations were dismissed. He had been twice committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice and had been placed on probation on another occasion. He is 6 feet tall and weighs 155 pounds. He is now almost eighteen years of age.
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The State, by three indictments filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, on October 16, 2000, criminally charged petitioner with armed carjacking and eleven related offenses, felony theft, concealment of a deadly weapon, unauthorized use of livestock, and possession of a shank in the detention center. -2-

prejudice. On February 16, 2001, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as a criminal court, heard petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the criminal charges on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Circuit Court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss finding that the Juvenile

Court had lost its jurisdiction upon its order waiving jurisdiction to the criminal court. Specifically, the Circuit Court found that at the time of the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction any further prosecution of the charges vested with the criminal court and that the Juvenile Court had no further authority over petitioner's charges. Petitioner then filed, on February 23, 2001, an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On our own motion, we granted petitioner's Petition for Certiorari Before Judgment and Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, prior to a determination by the Court of Special Appeals and enjoined further proceedings in the criminal cases pending the outcome of proceedings in this Court. We also ordered that petitioner be released to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ"). On June 6, 2001, this Court directed that this case be treated as an appeal from a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction. This was done under the

provisions of Maryland Rule 8-121, for the sole purpose of complying with the confidentiality provisions of the juvenile law. Petitioner presents two questions5 to this Court:

The wording of these two questions above is found in petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment and Request for Expedited Review submitted to our Court. This wording, while substantively the same, was changed in petitioner's brief subsequently submitted to this Court. The questions in petitioner's brief read: (continued...) -3-

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1. Whether a juvenile court has the authority to rescind an order of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and, if so, whether the criminal court lacks jurisdiction in this case? 2. Whether an immediate appeal in this case lies under the collateral order doctrine? We answer the second question in the negative. The Circuit Court's order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable order. Moreover, as we discuss further infra, the granting of waivers to the criminal court was not intended, by the legislature, to be immediately appealable, even by the indirect method of motions to dismiss in the criminal court following an attempt by the juvenile court to reclaim authority over the case. Here, the collateral order doctrine is not applicable. Because of our answer on the second question, we need not resolve the first question. However, for guidance purposes, and because of the importance of the questions and the probability that, since the question has now arisen, it might arise with some frequency in the future, we will discuss the first issue presented. Because the issue is better addressed in context, we shall also examine the

legislative history relating to juvenile waiver appealability, at some length, infra. I. Facts

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(...continued) 1. Whether a circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, has the fundamental jurisdiction and authority to rescind an order of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, and whether, in light of that rescission in Franklin's juvenile cases, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction in the criminal cases? 2. Whether the lower court's order denying Franklin's motion to dismiss the criminal indictment for lack of jurisdiction is an immediately appealable order? -4-

Petitioner is diagnosed as seriously emotionally disturbed. He has a history of multiple suicide attempts, a lengthy psychiatric background, and multiple psychiatric hospitalizations. The record before us discloses that petitioner was first hospitalized at eight years of age and has been hospitalized over six times, prior to the present alleged crimes. During petitioner's

stays at various treatment programs, he would not follow rules set by the programs, threatened staff or other students, missed appointments, or walked out altogether. In one particular

hospitalization, petitioner destroyed property and was unmanageable, causing him to be restrained and medicated. On another occasion, petitioner threatened his teacher with a metal

table leg, requiring police to be called. Also, in past educational programs, be it private school, a particular special school or the like, petitioner himself frustrated his progress. Petitioner

was easily distracted, provoked his peers, and has had many instances of impulsive, disruptive, and assaultive behavior. Last year, petitioner remained for only one day in the Baltimore City School system. and DJJ. The Juvenile Court, at the August 11, 2000 waiver hearing in respect to the present charges, requested petitioner be placed in custody of DJJ. The Court requested that a Petitioner has been involved with both Department of Social Services ("DSS")

representative of DJJ6 find a secure and therapeutic setting for petitioner to fulfill his juvenile commitment order. Petitioner was jointly committed to DSS and DJJ.

The Juvenile Court requested specifically that Ms. Gertrude Brown, a representative of DJJ testifying at the hearing on behalf of DJJ, attempt to find a program for petitioner that included a secure setting, an educational program, and individual psychiatric treatment. -5-

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At the final waiver hearing, on September 18, 2000, the Juvenile Court waived juvenile jurisdiction as to petitioner's juvenile petitions. This ruling came after testimony from the DJJ

representative, Ms. Brown, that even though petitioner was amenable to treatment and should be retained in the juvenile system, DJJ was at that precise time unable to place petitioner in an appropriate facility for an extended duration.7 stated
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When making its ruling, the Juvenile Court statutory criteria 8 for treating

and

referenced

the

applicable

Ms. Brown testified that petitioner had, in fact, been accepted into two residential treatment programs, and at least one of them was secure, but only available for a brief time. Securing proper treatment for petitioner beyond his eighteenth birthday was a concern for the Juvenile Court at this hearing, in part due to petitioner's age, complex and difficult history, and prior failures in rehabilitative type settings. Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), section 3-817(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article details how the court may waive juvenile jurisdiction and bring about the juvenile's treatment as an adult. Section 3-817 reads: "

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