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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND Nos. 604, 605 & 634 September Term, 2008

IN RE: LAVAR D., BRITNY C. & RONALD B.

Hollander, Eyler, James R., Matricciani, JJ. Opinion by Eyler, James R., J.

Filed: December 30, 2009

Ronald B., Britny C., and Lavar D., appellants,1 were charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in separately filed delinquency petitions, with assault and related offenses, arising out of an altercation between appellants and the victims, Sarah Kreager and Troy Ennis, on a Mass Transit Administration ("MTA") bus on the afternoon of December 4, 2007. After proceedings, the circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, found each appellant involved as to charges of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, disorderly conduct, and reckless endangerment. Appellants were acquitted of several other charges. Subsequently, the court placed each appellant under the control of the Department of Juvenile Services for community-based placement and other rehabilitative services, and also required each appellant to complete fifty hours of community service. On May 19, 2008, Lavar D. and Britny C. noted appeals. On May 23, 2008, Ronald B. noted an appeal. On September 11, 2008, we consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal. In this Court, appellants raise several questions for our consideration. They are, as phrased by appellants, as follows: 1. Where appellants were charged with assault and related offenses and the judge, sitting as fact-finder, recognized that self-defense "has been raised in this case," did the judge impermissibly shift the burden of proof when he stated that

Two other juveniles, Nakita M . and W esley B. were adjudicated jointly with appellants below. Nakita M . and Wesley B. are not parties to this appeal, however. A sixth child, Shamira B., also participated in the preliminary hearings in the juvenile court, but pled involved prior to the adjudicatory hearings. -1-

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"the burden of proving self defense rest[s] upon the person accused of the assault"? 2. Where defense counsel proffered that the alleged victim had testified in the disposition hearing of a co-respondent, held before the same judge sitting as fact-finder in the present case, that her children were not in custody solely because of this incident, did the court err in prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the victim as to whether she had a pending charge for distribution of narcotics, where the alleged sale of drugs occurred in the presence of her three children? 3. Is the evidence sufficient to establish that each appellant is a delinquent child? 4. Where the interrogating officer urged Mr. B. to "[h]help [sic] yourself" before "four [other respondents] tell me exactly what happened and exactly what you did" and emphasized that "[a]fter now is too late" did the lower court err in finding that the resulting custodial statement was not the product of police inducement? 5. [Appellants' argument #5 was withdrawn]. 6. Did the lower court err in precluding cross-examination of Mr. Ennis concerning past domestic violence of M s. Kreager? 7. Did the lower court err in allowing the State to introduce statements by co-respondents with blank and omitted passages containing redacted statements implicating the other respondents? 8. Did the lower court err in prohibiting the accused from refreshing one victim's recollection of whether he had made prior false statements to the police when it ruled that "you can't use a document he didn't prepare to refresh his recollection"? We shall affirm.

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Factual Background On January 31, 2008, the first day of pretrial motions hearings, appellants moved for suppression of their statements to MTA police, arguing that the statements were coerced. When the State attempted to play the taped statements for the court, counsel for Nakita M. argued that "if the State is going to play the one part," as to the voluntariness of the statement, "I would ask that the State play both parts or the whole thing." Subsequently, the following colloquy ensued, in pertinent part. THE STATE: Your Honor, the State's intent is to, there are certain portions that the State does not believe are admissible and the State, it's planning to stop at those points. Counsel does have a copy of a transcript that indicates those stoppage points. I don't know if that's what counsel's referring to. THE COURT: I don't know either. * * *

THE COURT: Could you help me out, [counsel for Nakita M.]? COUNSEL FOR NAKITA M.: Yes, I can, Your Honor. If the State intends to play one part, the State should play every part of the tape. But at this point, Your Honor

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