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REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF

MARYLAND

No. 0275

September Term, 2000

IN RE: TAMARA R.

Hollander, Thieme,* Adkins, JJ.

Opinion by Adkins, J.

*Thieme, J., participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; he participated in the adoption of this opinion as a retired, specially assigned member of this Court.

Filed: December 29, 2000

In this appeal we are asked to decide the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to grant sibling visitation in a CINA

proceeding, and to balance the sibling's need for visitation against the constitutional rights of a parent who opposes it. Tamara R. ("Tamara"), appellant, a child found to be in need of assistance ("CINA"), petitioned the juvenile court for

visitation with her brother and her half-sister, who remained in the care and custody of their father and have never been found to be in need of assistance.1 On appeal, appellant contends that

the Circuit Court for Saint Mary's County, sitting as a juvenile court, erred in ruling that (1) it did not have jurisdiction to entertain her petition for visitation; and (2) a grant to Tamara of the right to visit with her siblings would unduly interfere with the constitutional right of her father to raise his other children as he saw fit.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On August 11, 1999, the Saint Mary's County Department of Social Services ("DSS"), filed a petition alleging that Tamara, Tamara's half-sister, Mary, is the child of her father, Mr. R. Mary resides with Mr. R. and her mother, wife of Mr. R., who was not a party to the proceeding. Mr. R. had sole custody of Tamara's brother, Jonathan. There is little or no mention in the record regarding the mother of Tamara and Jonathan, who is not a party. Although we hold that Mrs. R., as the custodial parent of Mary, is a necessary party under Rule 2-211(a), see infra, we make no ruling regarding whether the non-custodial mother of Tamara and Jonathan is a necessary party.
1

age

14,

was

a

CINA.

The

petition

was

based

on

Tamara's

allegations of sexual abuse by her father. 22, 1999 adjudication her hearing, of Tamara

Before the September recanted, At and then

reasserted before a

allegations the

sexual of

abuse. sexual

the

hearing not

master,

allegations

abuse

were

resolved because the parties agreed that appellant was a CINA due to "the special needs of the child and parent/child

conflict." A disposition hearing was held on November 17, 1999. hearing, the master recommended that DSS be given At the and

care

custody of Tamara and that DSS should facilitate an appropriate schedule for Tamara to visit with her siblings. On December 8,

1999, the master recommended that Tamara "have visitation with her siblings twice a month . . . ." noted exceptions to this recommendation. Tamara's father timely The father contended,

inter alia, that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over appellant's siblings because they were never adjudicated CINA, and that a grant of visitation would interfere with his

constitutional rights to raise his own children as he saw fit. On February 11, 2000, a hearing was held on the father's exceptions. evidence appellant During the hearing, exhibits were introduced into indicated have that it with would her be beneficial for

that to

visitation

siblings.

Tamara's

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therapist reported: Given [the] allegations of sexual abuse and the resulting circumstances, it is my impression that Tamara is experiencing a great deal of anger, sadness, betrayal and confusion. She has lost daily contact with her nuclear family, and she especially misses interacting with her siblings. Since Tamara has not been able to see her brothers and sister regularly, she misses them very much, which has further contributed to her feelings of depression and isolation. I believe it would be to Tamara's therapeutic benefit to have regular visitation with her siblings; the regular contact with them would provide her with some of the family interaction she has lost, and would help her by supporting the continuation of the sibling relationship. The court, however, did not address the merits of Tamara's petition for visitation because it ruled that (1) it did not have jurisdiction over appellant's siblings; and (2) an order for visitation would interfere with the constitutional rights of Mr. R. [T]here is no authority to exercise and extend the jurisdiction [of the juvenile court] over siblings who are not already before the Juvenile Court under any proceedings . . . the siblings being the ones who [appellant] wishes to visit with. The [c]ourt further finds that the extension of jurisdiction to allow the [c]ourt to order visitation . . . would undermine clearly . . . the relationship between the [appellant], and her father and the entire family unit by . . . forcing a parent who is otherwise raising his children as he sees fit, [and to order visitation] would indicate that this is not in the best interest of the whole family unit, and that -3-

is what this is all about. And the [c]ourt, therefore, cannot, under any existing law or authority in this case, I think there are serious constitutional questions as to [the father's] right under these proceedings and in this particular environment . . . . Yes, there is a provision in the law that allows a petition by any sibling to have visitation with another, but that has to be generated by the siblings [not adjudicated CINA]. . . . In this case it is not. And it flies in the face of this family unit and trying to get this family back together. . . . In this [c]ourt's opinion there is no justification legally to court order and force the visitation of minor children who are in the custody of a parent who is presumed to be raising them in the manner in which he sees fit . . . . Additional discussion. facts will be added as necessary to our

DISCUSSION Tamara contends that the juvenile court erred in ruling that it did not would have not jurisdiction, interfere and that granting visitation

rights

with

her

father's

constitutional

rights as a parent.

We agree that the juvenile court did have

jurisdiction, and conclude that Mr. R.'s constitutional rights as a parent would not necessarily have been interfered with by a grant of visitation. A. Jurisdiction Of Juvenile Court Tamara relies on Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), Section -4-

5-525.2 of the Family Law Article ("FL"), which provides: (a) Petition for visitation rights. - Any siblings who are separated due to a foster care or adoptive placement may petition a court, including a juvenile court with jurisdiction over one or more of the siblings, for reasonable sibling visitation rights. (b) Role of court. - If a petitioner under this section petitions a court to issue a visitation decree or to amend an order, the court: (1) may hold a hearing to determine whether visitation is in the best interest of the children; (2) shall weigh the relative interest of each child and base its decision on the best interest of the children promoting the greatest welfare and least harm to the children; and (3) may issue an appropriate order or decree. Tamara contends that section 5-525.2 confers jurisdiction upon the juvenile court in this instance. contends would that "a much it is sounder designed Mr. R., on the other hand, of a the statute for

interpretation to 'provide

deem

that

mechanism

interested non-[party] siblings who have a sibling under the jurisdiction of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt . . . to file in that child's CINA case and ask the court to give them visitation.'"

The cardinal rule in statutory construction is to ascertain -5-

and carry out the true intention of the legislature. v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 348 Md. 143, we 148 to

See Hyle In

(1997). the

determining

legislative

intention,

look

general

purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 491 (1993).

See Condon v. Univ.

Ordinarily, we look to See Gordon "On the

the words of the statute to determine its intent.

Family P'ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 137 (1997).

other hand, while the language of the statute is the primary source meaning statute purpose, for determining of be or the legislative is not intention, absolute; with the plain the the v.

rule must aim,

construction construed policy of

rather, to

reasonably the

reference body."

enacting

Tracey

Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387 (1992).

Indeed, a statute's purpose

"`is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.'" Kaczorowski v.

Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514 (1987) (quoting United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143, 25 S. Ct. 406, 408 (1905)). We

will not interpret a statute in isolation; but rather, we will look to the intention "is statutory to be scheme as by a whole because [a legislative statute] in

discerned

considering

light of the statutory scheme." 124, 132 (1993).

GEICO v. Ins. Comm'r, 332 Md.

In this instance, we find that the plain

-6-

language and the statutory purpose are consistent, and that both support Tamara's position that the juvenile court has

jurisdiction to consider her petition for visitation with her siblings. Section 5-525.2 gives a juvenile court jurisdiction to

decide visitation rights with siblings who are separated if it has jurisdiction "over one or more of the siblings." juvenile court had jurisdiction over Tamara. the statute appellee -- causes that us to reject must the have Here, the

A plain reading of requested over by the

limitation

the

court

jurisdiction

sibling being visited, rather than the sibling petitioning for visitation. Had the legislature intended to so limit

jurisdiction, it would have placed the words "with the sibling or siblings adjudicated CINA" at the end of subpart (a) of

section 5-525.2, rights."

following

"for

reasonable

sibling

visitation

In the absence of such language, the plain meaning of

the words is that siblings who are separated by foster care or adoptive placement may petition for visitation with each other, regardless of whether they have all been adjudicated CINA. Appellee argues that the legislative history reported in the Session Review, a summary of the legislative session prepared by the Department of Legislative Reference, supports its view that in order for the juvenile court to order that a child be visited -7-

without the child requesting it, the court must have adjudicated the child a CINA. He relies on the italicized language in the following excerpt from the Session Review: Under current law, an equity court has broad authority to grant visitation rights to any person in an appropriate case. There is apparently some confusion as to whether this authority extends to [the] juvenile court. This bill is intended to clarify that when a juvenile court has jurisdiction over children, the court may grant reasonable sibling visitation rights if it is in the best interest of the children. Department of Legislative Reference, Legislative Session Review, 1994, p. 211 (emphasis added). We do not read the Session The Session Review

Review in the same manner as appellant.

simply makes a general statement referring to "children" under the court's jurisdiction, and makes no particular comment on whether all of the children must be adjudicated CINA before the court can entertain a visitation order. We do not see the

language in the Session Review as inconsistent with the clear language of section 5-525.2, allowing such visitation when there is jurisdiction over "one or more of the siblings." Mr. R. further argues that interpreting section 5-525.2 to confer statute jurisdiction conferring in this case is inconsistent for with the

general

jurisdiction

juvenile

courts.

Relying on Md. Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), section 3-804 of

-8-

the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"), he contends that under section 3-804, the only way a juvenile court can obtain jurisdiction is by a petition asking the court to

adjudicate the child as delinquent, in need of supervision, or in need of assistance.2 Because there has been no such petition

with respect to Mary and Jonathan, he contends, the juvenile court does not have the jurisdiction to visitation order. Mr. R.'s approach takes an unduly narrow view of a juvenile court's role with respect to the family once it has acquired jurisdiction over a CINA child, and ignores the traditional role subject them to a

2

This section provides in pertinent part: (a) Child alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision or assistance or with citation for violation; termination of parental rights and related adoption proceedings. - The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over: (1) A child alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision, in need of assistance or who has received a citation for a violation; and (2) With respect to any child who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and previously has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance, all termination of parental rights proceedings and related adoption proceedings.

CJ

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